



**FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**  
**1961-1963**  
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**Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington

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## **Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

### **26. Memorandum for Discussion**

Washington, October 17, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. The memorandum indicates it was prepared for discussion on October 17. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 161-162.

#### **SUBJECT**

The Cuban Situation

1. The establishment of medium range strike capability in Cuba by the Soviets was predicted by me in at least a dozen reports since the Soviet buildup was noted in early August.
2. Purposes are to:
  - (a) Provide Cuba with an offensive or retaliatory power for use if attacked.
  - (b) Enhance Soviet strike capability against the United States.
  - (c) Establish a "hall mark" of accomplishment by other Latin American countries, most particularly Mexico, and other Central American countries within strike range of the United States.
3. The MRBM capability we have witnessed will expand and the defensive establishments to protect this capability likewise will be expanded. There appears to me to be no other explanation for the extensive and elaborate air defense establishment.
4. In my opinion the missiles are Soviet, they will remain under Soviet operational control as do ours, they will be equipped with nuclear warheads under Soviet control (because conventional warheads would be absolutely ineffective), Cubans will supply most of the manpower needs with the Soviets permanently exercising operational command and control. Nevertheless, there will be a substantial number of Soviets on site at all times.
5. Soviet political objectives appears to me to be:
  - (a) The establishment of a "trading position" to force removal of U.S. overseas bases and Berlin.
  - (b) To satisfy their ambitions in Latin America by this show of determination and courage against the American

Imperialist.

6. Consequences of action by the United States will be the inevitable "spilling of blood" of Soviet military personnel. This will increase tension everywhere and undoubtedly bring retaliation against U.S. foreign military installations, where substantial U.S. casualties would result, i.e., Tule, Spanish bases, Moroccan bases, and possibly SAC bases in Britain or Okinawa. Jupiter installations in Southern Italy, Turkey, and our facilities [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] do not provide enough "American blood."

7. The situation cannot be tolerated. However, the United States should not act without warning and thus be forced to live with a "Pearl Harbor indictment" for the indefinite future. I would therefore:

(a) Notify Gromyko and Castro that we know all about this.

(b) Give them 24 hours to commence dismantling and removal of MRBMs, coastal defense missiles, surface to air missiles, IL 28s and all other aircraft which have a dual defensive-offensive capability, including MIG 21s.

(c) Notify the American public and the world of the situation created by the Soviets.

(d) If Khrushchev and Castro fail to act at once, we should make a massive surprise strike at air fields, MRBM sites and SAM sites concurrently.

John A. McCone/1/

Director

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## **27. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone**

Washington, October 17, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 163-165.

Several alternatives indicated below were posed for consideration at the close of meeting covered by memorandum dated October 17th./1/

/1/See Document 23.

All dealt with the specific actions U.S. Government should take against Cuba at this time. The discussions centered around:

(a) Whether military action should be taken prior to a warning to, or discussions with, Khrushchev and Castro.

(b) Notification to or consultation with our allies, including NATO, OAS, and others.

(c) Referral to the United Nations.

(d) Effect on the "balance of nuclear power equation" of the MRBM installations in Cuba.

Three principal courses of action are open to us, and of course there are variations of each.

(1) Do nothing and live with the situation. It was pointed out clearly that Western Europe, Greece, Turkey, and other countries had lived under the Soviet MRBMs for years; therefore, why should the United States be so concerned.

(2) Resort to an all-out blockade which would probably require a declaration of war and to be effective would mean the interruption of all incoming shipping. This was discussed as a slow strangulation process, but it was stated that "intelligence reports" indicated that a blockade would bring Castro down in four months. (Note: I have seen no such estimate.)

(3) Military action which was considered at several levels. The following alternatives are:

(a) Strafing identified MRBM installations.

(b) Strafing MRBM installations and air fields with MIGs.

(c) (a) and (b) plus all SAM sites and coastal missile sites.

(d) (a), (b), and (c) above plus all other significant military installations, none of which were identified.

Discussions of all of the above were inconclusive and it was asked that the group reassemble, and develop their views on the advantages and disadvantages and the effects of the following:

(1) Warning to Khrushchev and Castro.

(a) If the response is unsatisfactory, pursuing a course of military action.

(b) If the response is unsatisfactory, referring to the OAS and the United Nations prior to taking military action.

(2) Warning to Khrushchev and Castro and if the response is unsatisfactory, convening Congress, seeking a declaration of war, and proceeding with an all-out blockade.

(3) Strike militarily with no warning, the level of the military effort being dependent upon evolving circumstances. In all probability this type of action would escalate into invasion and occupation, although the meeting was not agreed on this point.

(4) Blockade with no warning and no advance notice such as a declaration of war, with the President depending upon existing Congressional resolutions for authority.

John A. McCone/2/

Director

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## **28. Memorandum for the File**

Washington, October 19, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone. The source text bears the handwritten notation "1100 AM-10-18-62 w/the President et al." Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 183-186. A tape recording of this meeting is available in the Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Presidential Recordings, No. 30.2 and

30a.1. The recording makes it clear that McCone's account is a summarized version that excludes his own comments and observations.

Early in the morning of October 18th, Secretary McNamara called Mr. McCone at his residence expressing great concern over the reports from NPIC as a result of their examination of the two flights run on October 15th./1/ Lundahl was at the house with the enlargements which indicated that, in addition to the three mobile MRBM sites detected on flight October 14th, there appeared to be now two IRBM sites with fixed launchers zeroed in on the Eastern United States. McNamara felt that this development demanded more prompt and decisive action.

/1/Apparent reference to the "Wheeler Report," October 17, reproduced in *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, pp. 175-180.

The group which had been meeting on Tuesday met in the Cabinet Room at 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday/2/ with the President. State tabled revisions in their papers on covering a limited one-time strike and blockade, most of which are dated 10/18--11:00 a.m./3/

/2/At this point in the source text "Wed.?" and "Thursday?" are written for "Tuesday" and "Wednesday" and a marginal note indicates that the DCI did not attend the October 16 meeting or the one on Wednesday, October 17, in Under Secretary Ball's Conference Room.

/3/Presumably McCone is referring to papers entitled "Plan I, Limited One-Time Strike (50 Sorties) Against MRBM Sites," and "II, Blockade," undated. (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Cuba, Subjects, Standing Committee, 9/62-10/62) See the Supplement.

At the opening of the meeting, McCone gave a brief resume of current intelligence and Lundahl presented the most recent photography. President questioned Lundahl further if the uninitiated could be persuaded that the photographs presented offensive MRBM missiles. Lundahl stated probably not and that we must have low-level photography for public consumption.

Secretary Rusk then stated that developments in the last 24 hours had substantially changed his thinking. He first questioned whether, if it is necessary to move against Cuba, and then concluded that it was because Cuba can become a formidable military threat. He also referred to the President's recent public statements and indicated a feeling that if no action was taken, we would free the Soviets to act any place they wished and at their own will. Also, Rusk stated the failure on our part to act would make our situation unmanageable elsewhere in the world. He furthermore indicated that this would be an indication of weakness which would have serious effect on our Allies. Secretary pointed out to the President that action would involve risks. We could expect counter action and the cost may be heavy. The President must expect action in Berlin, Korea and possibly against the United States itself. Rusk felt a quick strike would minimize the risk of counter action. He raised the question of solidarity of the Alliance and seemed to dismiss this question, feeling that the Alliance would hold together. Rusk stated that if we enter upon positive action, we can not say for sure what the final Soviet response will be and therefore what the final outcome will be. However he felt that the American people will accept danger and suffering if they are convinced doing so is necessary and that they have a clear conscience. The Secretary reviewed the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of World War I, World War II, and the Korean war. These factors militated in favor of consulting with Khrushchev and depending on the Rio pact. This, he indicated, might have the possibility of prevention of action and settlement by political means. The other course open was the declaration of war. Rusk expressed himself in favor of leaning upon the Rio pact, but does not dismiss the alternative of a unilateral declaration of war as the ultimate action we must take. The alternate is a quick strike.

Ambassador Bohlen was not present but his views were expressed in a message which was read in which he strongly advocated diplomatic effort and stated that military action prior to this would be wrong./4/ He urged against action first and then decisive value of discussion. He also stated that limited quick military action was an illusion and that any military action would rapidly escalate into an invasion. McNamara at this point presented the

alternatives referred to the previous day, stating that alternatives one and two were not conclusive and that we would have to resort to alternative 3 and in fact this would lead us ultimately into an invasion./5/

/4/Bohlen was on his way to Paris to assume the position of Ambassador. The message has not been found.

/5/Presumably a reference to Document 27.

General Taylor generally reviewed the situation stating that the Chiefs looked upon Cuba as a forward base of serious proportions, that it cannot be taken out totally by air; that the military operation would be sizeable, nevertheless necessary.

Ambassador Thompson urged that any action be preceded by a declaration of war;/6/ he strongly advocated that we institute a blockade and not resort to military action unless and until it is determined that Castro and Khrushchev refuse to reverse their activities and actually remove the missiles which are now in place./7/

/6/In an October 17 memorandum to Martin, Hilsman noted that the Bureau of Intelligence and Research had considered Ambassador Thompson's suggestion that the United States "make a declaration of war against Cuba which would be followed by no immediate offensive action other than the isolation of the island by naval blockade." Hilsman concluded that the idea had "very considerable merit." (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2062)

/7/McCone briefed the group on his meeting at noon on October 17, at which Eisenhower also urged decisive rather than limited action. (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Presidential Recordings, No. 30.2) A memorandum for the file by McCone is in Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record, 24 Sept.-31 Dec., 1962. It is also reproduced in *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, pp. 167-168.

Secretary Dillon questioned what would be accomplished by talking to Khrushchev. He pointed out that we would probably become engaged in discussions from which we could not extract ourselves and therefore our freedom of action would be frustrated. Dillon was very positive that whatever action we take should be done without consultation with Khrushchev. Rusk seemed to disagree indicating there was a possibility that Khrushchev might be persuaded to reduce his efforts but he admitted also that he might step them up as a result of discussions.

President Kennedy was non-committal, however he seemed to continually raise questions of reactions of our allies, NATO, South America, public opinion and others. Raised the question whether we should not move the missiles out of Turkey. All readily agreed they were not much use but a political question was involved. Bundy thought this a good idea either under conditions of a strike or during a preliminary talk.

McNamara discussed in some detail the effects of a strike indicating that we could expect several hundred Soviet citizens to be killed; he pointed out that all of the SAM sites were manned exclusively by Soviets and a great many Soviet technicians were working on the MRBMs and at the air fields. He agreed that we could move out of Turkey and Italy; pointed out the political complications. At this point McNamara seemed to be reconsidering his prior position of advocating military action and laid special emphasis on the fact that the price of Soviet retaliation, whether in Berlin or elsewhere, would be very high and we would not be able to control it.

Secretary Ball throughout the conversation maintained the position that strike without warning was not acceptable and that we should not proceed without discussion with Khrushchev. President Kennedy then said that he thought at some point Khrushchev would say that if we made a move against Cuba, he would take Berlin. McNamara surmised perhaps that was the price we must pay and perhaps we'd lose Berlin anyway. There followed an exchange of view on the possibility of the Soviets taking Berlin and our prospect of retaining it.

President Kennedy rather summed up the dilemma stating that action of a type contemplated would be opposed by the alliance--on the other hand, lack of action will create disunity, lack of confidence and disintegration of our several alliances and friendly relations with countries who have confidence in us.

As a result of discussions of the "price" of a strike, there followed a long discussion of the possibilities of a blockade, the advantages of it, and manner in which it would be carried out, etc. There seemed to be differences of opinion as to whether the blockade should be total, or should only involve military equipment which would mean blockading Soviet ships. Also there were continued references to blockading ships carrying offensive weapons and there seemed to be a differentiation in the minds of some in the policy of blockading offensive weapons as contrasted to blockading all weapons.

There followed discussion as to policies the President should follow with respect to calling Congress into session, asking for a declaration of war, advising the country and authorizing action. Thompson continued to insist that we must communicate with Khrushchev. There was a discussion concerning the President's meeting with Gromyko/8/ and the position he should take should the Cuban question come up. The President was advised to draw Gromyko out and it was indicated he probably would receive a flat denial that there were any offensive weapons in Cuba.

/8/See Document 29.

Meeting adjourned with the President requesting that we organize into two groups. One to study the advantages of what might be called a slow course of action which would involve a blockade to be followed by such further actions as appeared necessary as the situation evolved. Second would be referred to as a fast dynamic action which would involve the strike of substantial proportions with or without notice.

John A. McCone/9/

Director

/9/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## **29. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, October 18, 1962, 5 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Gromyko Talks. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky on October 21 and approved by the White House on October 23. The meeting was held at the White House. The President and the Foreign Minister also discussed Berlin, a test ban agreement, and U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations; memoranda of these conversations are printed in vols. XV, pp. 370-376; VII, pp. 589-592; and V, respectively. An October 17 briefing memorandum for the conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/10-1762.

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President

The Secretary

Ambassador Thompson

Mr. Hillenbrand

Mr. Akalovsky

USSR

Foreign Minister Gromyko

Mr. Semenov

Ambassador Dobrynin

Mr. Sukhodrev

After a discussion on Germany and Berlin, Mr. Gromyko stated he wished to set forth the Soviet position on Cuba and to voice the views of the Soviet Government with regard to US actions relating to Cuba.<sup>/1/</sup> Continuing to read from his prepared text, he asserted that the Soviet Government stood for peaceful coexistence and was against interference by one state in the internal affairs of another state, and this also applied to relations between big and small states. This, he said, was the basic core, the credo of Soviet foreign policy, and it was not just a statement.

<sup>/1/</sup>Prior to his meeting with Gromyko, the President had discussed the Cuban situation with Dean Acheson at 3:45 p.m. For a record of their conversation, see Acheson, *Homage to Plain Dumb Luck*, p. 202. The President then conferred with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara from 4:30 to 5 p.m. No record of this meeting, other than a notation in the President's Appointment Book, has been found. (Kennedy Library)

The President was surely fully familiar with the attitude of the Soviet Government, and of Mr. Khrushchev personally, toward recent developments and toward actions by the United States Government in relation to Cuba. For quite some time there had been an unabated anti-Cuban campaign in the United States, a campaign which was apparently backed by the United States Government. Now the United States Government wished to institute a blockade against trade with Cuba, and there had also been some talk of organized piracy under the aegis of the United States. All this could only lead to great misfortunes for mankind. The United States Government seemed to believe that the Cubans must settle their internal affairs not at their own discretion, but at the discretion of the United States. Yet Cuba belonged to Cubans and not to the United States. If this was so, why then were statements being made in the United States advocating invasion of Cuba? What did the United States want to do with Cuba? What could Cuba do to the United States? If one were to compare the human and material resources of Cuba and the United States, one would see immediately that the United States was a giant and Cuba only a baby. Cuba could not constitute a threat to any country in Latin America. It was strange to believe that small Cuba could encroach upon any Latin American country. Cuban leaders, including Castro personally, had stated for all the world to know and in the most solemn fashion that Cuba did not intend to impose its system and was in favor of peaceful coexistence. However, those who called for aggression against Cuba said that Cuban statements were insufficient, in spite of the fact that those statements were substantiated by deeds. If one were to approach problems this way, then it would be easy to justify any aggression. All international problems must be resolved by negotiation between the states concerned. After all, the US and USSR were now negotiating and making statements which should be given credence. Was it not sufficient for Cuba to state that it wished negotiations and a solution of existing problems on a mutually acceptable basis? The President was surely familiar with President Dorticos' speech at the General Assembly.<sup>/2/</sup> What the Cubans wanted was to make their home and country secure. They appealed to reason and conscience and called upon the

United States not to resort to encroachments. Thus the question arose of why it was necessary to fan this campaign, to organize hostile actions, and to take actions directed against those countries which were extending their hand of friendship to Cuba? This was a violation of international law, and how could the Soviet Government just sit by and observe this situation idly?

/2/For text of this address, October 8, see U.N. doc. A/PV.1145, pp. 369-375.

Mr. Gromyko said he knew that the President appreciated frankness. Mr. Khrushchev's conversation with the President at Vienna<sup>3/</sup> had been frank and therefore, with the President's permission, he himself wished to be frank, too. The situation today could not be compared to that obtaining in the middle of the 19th century. Modern times were not the same as those when colonies had been divided among colonial powers. Modern times could not be compared to those when it took weeks or months for the voice of the attacked to be heard. Statements had been made that the US was a powerful and great nation; this was true, but what kind of a nation was the USSR? Mr. Khrushchev had been favorably impressed with the President's statement at Vienna regarding the equality of forces of our two nations. Since this was so, i.e., since the USSR was also a great and strong nation, it could not stand by as a mere observer when aggression was planned and when a threat of war was looming. The US Government was surely aware of the Soviet Government's attitude toward the recent call-up of 150,000 Reservists in the United States. The Soviet Government believed that if both sides were for relaxation of international tensions and for solving the outstanding international problems, such demonstrations could be designed only for the purpose of increasing tensions and should therefore be avoided. If worse should come to worse and if war should occur, then surely 150,000 soldiers would be of no significance. As the President was surely aware, today was not 1812, when Napoleon had relied on the number of soldiers, sabres and rifles. Neither could today's situation be compared to 1941, when Hitler had relied on the number of tanks and guns. Today, life itself and military technology had created an entirely different situation, where it was better not to rely on arms. As to Soviet assistance to Cuba, Mr. Gromyko stated that he was instructed to make it clear, as the Soviet Government had already done, that such assistance, pursued solely for the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba and to the development of Cuba, toward the development of its agriculture and land amelioration, and training by Soviet specialists of Cuba nationals in handling defensive armaments were by no means offensive. If it were otherwise, the Soviet Government would have never become involved in rendering such assistance. This applied to any other country as well. Laos was a good and convincing illustration of this point. If the Soviet Government had pursued a different policy, the situation in that country today would be quite different. It was quite evident that the Soviet Union and its friends had broader opportunities of influencing the situation in that country than had the United States. However, the USSR had sought an understanding on that question, since it could not go back on the basic principle of its foreign policy, which was designed to alleviate tensions, to eliminate outstanding problems and to resolve them on a peaceful basis.

/3/Memoranda of Kennedy's conversations with Khrushchev, June 3-4, 1961, are printed in volume V.

Such was the position of the Soviet Government with regard to Cuba. The Soviet Government and Mr. Khrushchev personally appealed to the President and the United States Government not to allow such steps as would be incompatible with peace, with relaxation of tensions, and with United Nations Charter under which both the US and the USSR had solemnly affixed their signatures. The Soviet Government addressed its appeal to the United States on this question because both our countries were major powers and should direct their efforts only to ensuring peace.

The President said he was glad that Mr. Gromyko had referred to Laos because he believed that the Soviet policy on that problem was as Mr. Gromyko had described it. So far the Soviet Union had apparently met its obligations just as the United States had met them. However, a most serious mistake had been made last summer with respect to Cuba. The US had not pressed the Cuban problem and had attempted to push it aside although of course a number of people in this country opposed the regime now prevailing in Cuba and there were many refugees coming to this country. However, there was no intention to invade Cuba. But then last July the USSR, without any communication from Mr. Khrushchev to the President, had embarked upon the policy of supplying



arms to Cuba. The President said he did not know the reasons for that shift in Soviet policy, because there was no threat of invasion and he would have been glad to give appropriate assurances to that effect had Mr. Khrushchev communicated with him. Soviet arms supply had had a profound impact in the United States; Ambassador Dobrynin was surely aware of how the American people and the Congress felt on this matter. The administration had tried to calm this reaction and he, the President, had made a statement that in view of the nature of Soviet assistance to Cuba at this time coolness was required. Yet, the President said, he wished to stress that Soviet actions were extremely serious and he could find no satisfactory explanation for them. The Soviet Union was surely aware of US feelings with regard to Cuba, which was only 90 miles away from the United States. The President continued that the US planned no blockade of Cuba; it was only a question of ships taking arms to Cuba not being able to stop in the United States with their return cargo. Thus a very unfortunate situation had developed. The President said he did not know where it was taking us but it was the most dangerous situation since the end of the war. The US had taken the Soviet statement concerning the nature of armaments supplied to Cuba at its face value. He, the President, had attacked last Sunday in Indianapolis a Senator who was advocating invasion, and he had stated that the Cuban problem must be kept in perspective.<sup>/4/</sup> The President reiterated that this was a dangerous situation, and said he did not know where the USSR planned to have it end.

<sup>/4/</sup>For text of Kennedy's remarks, October 13, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 771-773.

Mr. Gromyko said that there had already been an invasion, and it was well known how it ended. It was well known now, both from facts and statements, including the President's own, under what circumstances and by whom that invasion had been organized. Everyone knew that if the United States had merely lifted its little finger, Cuban emigres and smaller Caribbean countries which had helped them would not have dared undertake any invasion.

The President interjected that he had discussed with Mr. Khrushchev the April 1, 1961, invasion and had said that it was a mistake. He also pointed out he would have given assurances that there would be no further invasion, either by refugees or by US forces. But last July the Soviet Union took certain actions and the situation changed.

Mr. Gromyko continued that Cubans and the Cuban Government had before them the vital question of whether they should remain unprepared to resist attack or to take steps to defend their country. He said he wished to reiterate that the Soviet Union had responded to appeals for assistance only because that assistance pursued the sole objective of giving bread to Cuba and preventing hunger in that country; also, as far as armaments were concerned, Soviet specialists were training Cubans in handling certain types of armaments which were only defensive--and he wished to stress the word defensive--in character, and thus such training could not constitute a threat to the United States. He reiterated that if it were otherwise the Soviet Union would never have agreed to render such assistance.

The President said that in order to be clear on this Cuban problem he wanted to state the following: The US had no intention of invading Cuba. Introduction last July of intensive armaments had complicated the situation and created grave danger. His own actions had been to prevent, unless US security was endangered, anything from being done that might provoke the danger of war. The President then read a portion of his September 4 statement on Cuba<sup>/5/</sup> and stated that this had been US position and policy on this question. He noted that the Attorney General had discussed the Cuban situation with Ambassador Dobrynin so that the latter must be aware of what it was. The President again recalled his Indianapolis speech of last Sunday and said that we were basing our present attitude on facts as they had been described by Mr. Gromyko; our presumption was that the armaments supplied by USSR were defensive.

<sup>/5/</sup>See vol. X, Document 411.

Mr. Gromyko stated the Soviet Union proceeded from the assumption that on the basis of Soviet Government's statements and his own today the US Government and the President had a clear idea of the Soviet policy on this matter and of the Soviet evaluation of US action in relation to Cuba. He said he had nothing to add to what he had already said./6/

/6/The conversation concluded shortly after 7 p.m. and the discussion among the President's advisors resumed in Ball's conference room until 9:15 p.m. when they were recalled to the White House for a meeting with the President that lasted past midnight. No record of the discussion at the Department of State has been found, but the Attorney General recalled that at the White House they explained their "recommendations to the President," who was "not at all satisfied" and sent them back to work (*Thirteen Days*, pp. 43-44), and the President's Special Counsel remembered that the "President had already moved from the air-strike to the blockade camp." (Sorensen, *Kennedy*, p. 691)

### **30. Editorial Note**

On October 18, 1962, the Central Intelligence Agency released a "Joint Evaluation of the Soviet Mission Threat in Cuba," based on intelligence obtained as of 9 p.m. that day. The evaluation, prepared by the Guided Missile and Astronautics Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center, was codenamed Iron Bark because it drew upon intelligence material provided by the Central Intelligence Agency's important Soviet source, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. It was based on "relatively complete photo interpretation of U-2 photography" made on missions of October 14, and two on October 15 and "very preliminary and incomplete readout" of coverage of six U-2 missions on October 17.

The evaluation concluded that there was "at least one Soviet regiment consisting of eight launchers and sixteen 1020-nm (SS-4) medium-range ballistic missiles now deployed in western Cuba at two launch sites." These mobile missiles had to be considered operational and could be launched within 18 hours after the decision to launch was made. The evaluation concluded that "Fixed, soft sites, which could achieve initial operational capacity during December 1962, are now being deployed near Havana." These sites were probably intended for 2200-nm (SS-5) intermediate-range ballistic missiles and could be operational by December 1962. All missiles were manned by Soviet personnel and were under Soviet control. Although there was no positive evidence of nuclear warheads in Cuba, the evaluation suggested that "one must assume that nuclear warheads could now be available in Cuba to support the offensive missile capacity as it becomes operational." The expected warheads for these missiles would weigh 3,000 pounds and have yield in the low megaton range.

The significance of these developments, according to the evaluation, was that the Soviet Union "intends to develop Cuba into a prime strategic base, rather than as a token show of force. The mixed force of 1020-and 2200-nm missiles posed a common threat to the United States and a large portion of Latin America. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Cuba, 5 Sept-19 Oct 1962) See the Supplement. An extract of this evaluation is reproduced in *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, pages 187-191.

### **31. Record of Meeting**

Washington, October 19, 1962, 11 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuba "Week" Drafts. Secret. Drafted by Meeker. The meeting was held in Ball's conference room. McCone's handwritten notes on this meeting are in the Supplement. Gilpatric's handwritten notes on the meeting, comprising less than 1 page and dealing primarily with the Katzenbach-Meeker discussion of the legal framework, are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, RLG's Notes re Cuba.

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Rusk

Under Secretary Ball

Ambassador Thompson

Deputy Under Secretary Johnson

Assistant Secretary Martin

Leonard C. Meeker

Secretary Dillon

Secretary McNamara

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric

Assistant Secretary Nitze

General Taylor

Attorney General Kennedy

Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach

John A. McCone

Ray S. Cline

McGeorge Bundy

Theodore Sorensen

Dean Acheson

Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by asking Mr. Johnson if he was ready to lay a program before the group. Mr. Johnson said that he was not.

Then ensued a military photographic intelligence briefing on installations in Cuba, presented by a CIA representative (Arthur Lundahl). Following this, Mr. McCone called on Mr. Cline to give the most recent intelligence estimate conclusions of the United States Intelligence Board. Mr. Cline did so on the basis of three papers which were distributed to the group.<sup>/1/</sup> (As he started, Mr. Cline spoke of China by inadvertence instead of Cuba; a few moments later this was called to his attention and corrected.)

<sup>/1/</sup>Early the morning of October 19 McCone had sent a memorandum to the members of the USIB reviewing the discussion among the principals on October 18 and asking for guidance before the 11 a.m. meeting that day. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962) Presumably these papers are the response to that request. The papers have not been identified further, but McCone's memorandum is included in the Supplement. Also reproduced in *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, pp. 193-194.

Secretary Rusk then said he thought there should be an exposition of the legal framework surrounding possible military measures by the United States, turned to me, and seemed about to call on me, when the Attorney General signalled and said "Mr. Katzenbach." Secretary Rusk then called on the latter. Mr. Katzenbach said he believed the President had ample constitutional and statutory authority to take any needed military measures. He considered a declaration of war unnecessary. From the standpoint of international law, Mr. Katzenbach thought United States action could be justified on the principle of self-defense.

I said that my analysis ran along much the same lines. I did not think a declaration of war would improve our position, but indeed would impair it. I said that a defensive quarantine of Cuba would involve a use of force, and this had to be considered in relation to the United Nations Charter. The Charter contained a general prohibition against the use of force except in certain limited kinds of situation. One of these was "armed attack," but the situation in Cuba did not constitute armed attack on any country. Another exception was collective action voted by the competent United Nations organ to deal with a situation under Chapter VII of the Charter. Obviously, no resolution could be obtained from the Security Council. And it seemed quite problematical whether we could obtain a recommendation from the General Assembly.

The Charter also contained Chapter VIII on regional arrangements. Article 52 provided that regional arrangements could deal with "such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action". Thus a case could be made under the Charter for the use of force if it were sanctioned by the American Republics acting under the Rio Treaty. The Organ of Consultation, pursuant to Articles 6 and 8 of that Treaty, could recommend measures, including the use of armed force, to meet a situation endangering the peace of America. As to the prospects for securing the necessary two-thirds vote in the Organ of Consultation, Mr. Martin would have something to say about that.

If the contention were advanced that a defensive quarantine voted under the Rio Treaty constituted "enforcement action" under Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, and therefore required the authorization of the Security Council, we would be able to make a reasonably good argument to the contrary. While our ability to persuade seven members of the Security Council to vote with us on this issue might be uncertain, we would in any event be able to prevent a vote going against our position.

Mr. Martin then gave as his estimate that the United States could secure immediately a vote of 14 in the OAS. He thought the majority could be increased within 24 hours to 17 or perhaps even 18 or 19. He was hopeful in regard to Ecuador and Chile, and believed there was a good chance of getting Mexico. The Attorney General said the President would be placed in an impossible position if we went to the OAS and then failed to get the necessary votes, or if there were a delay. He asked if we could be perfectly sure of the outcome before seeking OAS concurrence. Mr. Martin said he hated to guarantee anything, but he had a lot of confidence about this. You couldn't go to the American Republics in advance without loss of security, but he felt that a last-minute approach to heads of state, laying the situation on the line, would produce the votes. The Attorney General again expressed his great concern at the possibility of a slip.

There followed a discussion covering the meeting held the night before with the President.<sup>/2/</sup> One participant looked back on the meeting as having arrived at a tentative conclusion to institute a blockade, and thought the President had been satisfied at the consensus by then arrived at among his advisers. General Taylor quickly indicated that he had not concurred and that the Joint Chiefs had reserved their position.

<sup>/2/</sup>See footnote 6, Document 29.

Mr. Bundy then said that he had reflected a good deal upon the situation in the course of a sleepless night, and he doubted whether the strategy group was serving the President as well as it might, if it merely recommended a blockade. He had spoken with the President this morning, and he felt there was further work to be done. A blockade would not remove the missiles. Its effects were uncertain and in any event would be slow to be felt. Something more would be needed to get the missiles out of Cuba. This would be made more difficult by the prior

publicity of a blockade and the consequent pressures from the United Nations for a negotiated settlement. An air strike would be quick and would take out the bases in a clean surgical operation. He favored decisive action with its advantages of surprises and confronting the world with a fait accompli.

Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Acheson for his views. Mr. Acheson said that Khrushchev had presented the United States with a direct challenge, we were involved in a test of wills, and the sooner we got to a showdown the better. He favored cleaning the missile bases out decisively with an air strike. There was something else to remember. This wasn't just another instance of Soviet missiles aimed at the United States. Here they were in the hands of a madman whose actions would be perfectly irresponsible; the usual restraints operating on the Soviets would not apply. We had better act, and act quickly. So far as questions of international law might be involved, Mr. Acheson agreed with Mr. Katzenbach's position that self-defense was an entirely sufficient justification. But if there were to be imported a qualification or requirement of approval by the OAS, as apparently suggested by Mr. Meeker, he could not go along with that.

Secretary Dillon said he agreed there should be a quick air strike. Mr. McCone was of the same opinion.

General Taylor said that a decision now to impose a blockade was a decision to abandon the possibility of an air strike. A strike would be feasible for only a few more days; after that the missiles would be operational. Thus it was now or never for an air strike. He favored a strike. If it were to take place Sunday morning, a decision would have to be made at once so that the necessary preparations could be ordered. For a Monday morning strike, a decision would have to be reached tomorrow. Forty-eight hours' notice was required.

Secretary McNamara said that he would give orders for the necessary military dispositions, so that if the decision were for a strike the Air Force would be ready. He did not, however, advocate an air strike, and favored the alternative of blockade.

Under Secretary Ball said that he was a waverer between the two courses of action.

The Attorney General said with a grin that he too had had a talk with the President, indeed very recently this morning. There seemed to be three main possibilities as the Attorney General analyzed the situation: one was to do nothing, and that would be unthinkable; another was an air strike; the third was a blockade. He thought it would be very, very difficult indeed for the President if the decision were to be for an air strike, with all the memory of Pearl Harbor and with all the implications this would have for us in whatever world there would be afterward. For 175 years we had not been that kind of country. A sneak attack was not in our traditions. Thousands of Cubans would be killed without warning, and a lot of Russians too. He favored action, to make known unmistakably the seriousness of United States determination to get the missiles out of Cuba, but he thought the action should allow the Soviets some room for maneuver to pull back from their over-extended position in Cuba.

Mr. Bundy, addressing himself to the Attorney General, said this was very well but a blockade would not eliminate the bases; an air strike would.

I asked at this point: who would be expected to be the government of Cuba after an air strike? Would it be anyone other than Castro? If not, would anything be solved, and would we not be in a worse situation than before? After a pause, Mr. Martin replied that, of course, a good deal might be different after a strike, and Castro might be toppled in the aftermath. Others expressed the view that we might have to proceed with invasion following a strike. Still another suggestion was that US armed forces seize the base areas alone in order to eliminate the missiles. Secretary McNamara thought this a very unattractive kind of undertaking from the military point of view.

Toward one o'clock Secretary Rusk said he thought this group could not make the decision as to what was to be done; that was for the President in consultation with his constitutional advisers. The Secretary thought the

group's duty was to present to the President, for his consideration, fully staffed-out alternatives. Accordingly, two working groups should be formed, one to work up the blockade alternative and the other to work up air strike. Mr. Johnson was designated to head the former, and Mr. Bundy the latter. Mr. Johnson was to have with him Ambassador Thompson, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Mr. Martin, Mr. Nitze, and Mr. Meeker. Mr. Bundy was to have Secretary Dillon, Mr. Acheson, and General Taylor. Mr. McCone, when asked to serve with the air strike group, begged off on the ground that his position and duties on the US Intelligence Board made it undesirable for him to participate in the working group. Mr. Katzenbach was detailed to the Johnson group, later visiting the Bundy group to observe and possibly serve as a devil's advocate.

Mr. Sorensen commented that he thought he had absorbed enough to start on the draft of a speech for the President.<sup>/3/</sup> There was some inconclusive discussion on the timing of such a speech, on the danger of leaks before then, and on the proper time for meeting with the President once more, in view of his current Western campaign trip.

<sup>/3/</sup>Sorensen drafts of letters to Khrushchev, de Gaulle, Adenauer, and Macmillan are in the Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2062, and the Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Cuba, respectively. No draft of the speech, dated this early has been found, but an 11-paragraph synopsis of a speech for October 23 is attached to the paper described in footnote 5 below.

Before the whole group dispersed, Ambassador Thompson said the Soviets attached importance to questions of legality and we should be able to present a strong legal case. The Attorney General, as he was about to leave the room, said he thought there was ample legal basis for a blockade. I said: yes, that is so provided the Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty adopted an appropriate resolution. The Attorney General said: "That's all political; it's not legal." On leaving the room, he said to Mr. Katzenbach, half humorously: "Remember now, you're working for me."

The two groups met separately until four o'clock. They then reconvened and were joined once more by the cabinet officers who had been away in the earlier afternoon.

The Johnson group scenario, which was more nearly complete and was ready earlier, was discussed first.<sup>/4/</sup> Numerous criticisms were advanced. Some were answered; others led to changes. There was again a discussion of timing, now in relation to a Presidential radio address. Mr. Martin thought Sunday might be too early, as it would be virtually impossible to get to all the Latin American heads of state on Sunday. Ambassador Thompson made the point that 24 hours must be allowed to elapse between announcement of the blockade and enforcement, so as to give the Soviet Government time to get instructions to their ship captains.

<sup>/4/</sup>A copy of this 6-page paper with the handwritten notation "First Blockade Paper, Johnson" is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 7 A 2896, Historical, Cuba. After sketching the advantages and disadvantages of a blockade, it presented a 5-day scenario and predicted the reaction of U.S. allies, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. Another paper "Second Draft, 10/19/62" on the blockade consisted of a detailed list of the elements in a course of action. (Ibid., Cuba Drafts)

Approximately two hours were spent on the Johnson scenario. About 6 o'clock the Bundy approach<sup>/5/</sup> was taken up, its author saying, "It's been much more fun for us up to this point, since we've had a chance to poke holes in the blockade plan; now the roles will be reversed." Not much more than half an hour was spent on the Bundy scenario.

<sup>/5/</sup>A preliminary 7-page draft of this paper "Air Scenario, October 19, 1962" had sections on the military program, the schedule of public statements, notice to Khrushchev and Castro, and notice to friends. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-1862) Pre-sumably this is the draft discussed. A second draft included the same sections but suggested two different alternatives for notifying Khrushchev and Castro and included three additional parts: II) a 3-page possible White House statement for the evening of October 22, III) a 1-page paper

dealing with an announcement for the morning of October 23, and IV) a 2-page, 11-paragraph synopsis of the President's speech on October 23. (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subjects Files, Cuba)

More than once during the afternoon Secretary McNamara voiced the opinion that the US would have to pay a price to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba. He thought we would at least have to give up our missile bases in Italy and Turkey and would probably have to pay more besides. At different times the possibility of nuclear conflict breaking out was referred to. The point was made that, once the Cuban missile installations were complete and operational, a new strategic situation would exist, with the United States more directly and immediately under the gun than ever before. A striking Soviet military push into the Western Hemisphere would have succeeded and become effective. The clock could not be turned back, and things would never be the same again. During this discussion, the Attorney General said that in looking forward into the future it would be better for our children and grandchildren if we decided to face the Soviet threat, stand up to it, and eliminate it, now. The circumstances for doing so at some future time were bound to be more unfavorable, the risks would be greater, the chances of success less good.

Secretary Rusk, toward the end of the afternoon, stated his approach to the problem as follows: the US needed to move in a way such that a planned action would be followed by a pause in which the great powers could step back from the brink and have time to consider and work out a solution rather than be drawn inexorably from one action to another and escalate into general nuclear war. The implication of his statement was that he favored blockade rather than strike.

In the course of the afternoon discussion, the military representatives, especially Secretary McNamara, came to expressing the view that an air strike could be made some time after the blockade was instituted in the event the blockade did not produce results as to the missile bases in Cuba. The Attorney General took particular note of this shift, and toward the end of the day made clear that he firmly favored blockade as the first step; other steps subsequently were not precluded and could be considered; he thought it was now pretty clear what the decision should be.

At about six-thirty Governor Stevenson came into the room. After a few minutes, Secretary Rusk asked him if he had some views on the question of what to do. He replied: "Yes, most emphatic views." When queried as to them, he said that in view of the course the discussion was taking he didn't think it was necessary to express them then. When asked: "But you are in favor of blockade, aren't you?", he answered affirmatively. He went on to say he thought we must look beyond the particular immediate action of blockade; we need to develop a plan for solution of the problem--elements for negotiation designed to settle the current crisis in a stable and satisfactory way and enable us to move forward on wider problems; he was working on some ideas for a settlement. One possibility would be the demilitarization of Cuba under effective international supervision, perhaps accompanied by neutralization of the island under international guaranties and with UN observers to monitor compliance.

Once again there was discussion of when another meeting with the President should be held. It was generally agreed that the President should continue on his trip until Sunday morning. He would be reachable by telephone prior to that time.

The meeting broke up about seven o'clock.

### **32. Special National Intelligence Estimate**

SNIE 11-18-62

Washington, October 19, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA-Cuba. Top Secret; Controlled Dissemination; Psalm. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 197-202.

## SUBJECT

SNIE 11-18-62: Soviet Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba

### The Problem

To estimate probable Soviet reactions to certain US courses of action with respect to Cuba.

### The Estimate

1. A major Soviet objective in their military buildup in Cuba is to demonstrate that the world balance of forces has shifted so far in their favor that the US can no longer prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power even into its own hemisphere. In this connection they assume, of course, that these deployments sooner or later will become publicly known.
2. It is possible that the USSR is installing these missiles primarily in order to use them in bargaining for US concessions elsewhere. We think this unlikely, however. The public withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba would create serious problems in the USSR's relations with Castro; it would cast doubt on the firmness of the Soviet intention to protect the Castro regime and perhaps on their commitments elsewhere.
3. If the US accepts the strategic missile buildup in Cuba, the Soviets would continue the buildup of strategic weapons in Cuba. We have no basis for estimating the force level which they would wish to reach, but it seems clear already that they intend to go beyond a token capability. They would probably expect their missile forces in Cuba to make some contribution to their total strategic capability vis-a-vis the US. We consider in Annex B/1/ the possible effects of a missile buildup in Cuba upon the overall relationship of strategic military power.

/1/Attached, but not printed.

4. US acceptance of the strategic missile buildup would provide strong encouragement to Communists, pro-Communists, and the more anti-American sectors of opinion in Latin America and elsewhere. Conversely, anti-Communists and those who relate their own interests to those of the US would be strongly discouraged. It seems clear that, especially over the long run, there would be a loss of confidence in US power and determination and a serious decline of US influence generally.

### Effect of Warning

5. If the US confronts Khrushchev with its knowledge of the MRBM deployment and presses for a withdrawal, we do not believe the Soviets would halt the deployment. Instead, they would propose negotiations on the general question of foreign bases, claiming equal right to establish Soviet bases and assuring the US of tight control over the missiles. They would probably link Cuba with the Berlin situation and emphasize their patience and preference for negotiations, implying that Berlin was held hostage to US actions in Cuba.
6. There is some slight chance that a warning to Castro might make a difference, since the Soviets could regard this as a chance to stand aside, but it also would give time for offers to negotiate, continued buildup, and counterpressures, and we think the result in the end would be the same.
7. Any warning would of course degrade the element of surprise in a subsequent US attack.

### Effect of Blockade

8. While the effectiveness of Castro's military machine might be impaired by a total US blockade, Castro would



be certain to tighten internal security and would take ruthless action against any attempts at revolt. There is no reason to believe that a blockade of itself would bring down the Castro regime. The Soviets would almost certainly exert strong direct pressures elsewhere to end the blockade. The attitudes of other states toward a blockade action are not considered in this paper. It is obvious that the Soviets would heavily exploit all adverse reactions.

#### Soviet Reaction to Use of Military Force/2/

/2/For a further comment on differences between reaction to a blockade and to US measures of force against Cuba, see Annex A. [Footnote in the source text. Annex A is attached, but not printed.]

9. If the US takes direct military action against Cuba, the Soviets would be placed automatically under great pressure to respond in ways which, if they could not save Cuba, would inflict an offsetting injury to US interests. This would be true whether the action was limited to an effort to neutralize the strategic missiles, or these missiles plus airfields, surface-to-air missile sites, or cruise missile sites, or in fact an outright invasion designed to destroy the Castro regime.

10. In reaction to any of the various forms of US action, the Soviets would be alarmed and agitated, since they have to date estimated that the US would not take military action in the face of Soviet warnings of the danger of nuclear war. They would recognize that US military action posed a major challenge to the prestige of the USSR. We must of course recognize the possibility that the Soviets, under pressure to respond, would again miscalculate and respond in a way which, through a series of actions and reactions, could escalate to general war.

11. On the other hand, the Soviets have no public treaty with Cuba and have not acknowledged that Soviet bases are on the island. This situation provides them with a pretext for treating US military action against Cuba as an affair which does not directly involve them, and thereby avoiding the risks of a strong response. We do not believe that the USSR would attack the US, either from Soviet bases or with its missiles in Cuba, even if the latter were operational and not put out of action before they could be readied for firing.

12. Since the USSR would not dare to resort to general war and could not hope to prevail locally, the Soviets would almost certainly consider retaliatory actions outside Cuba. The timing and selection of such moves would depend heavily upon the immediate context of events and the USSR's appreciation of US attitudes. The most likely location for broad retaliation outside Cuba appears to be Berlin. They might react here with major harassments, interruptions of access to the city or even a blockade, with or without the signing of a separate peace treaty.

13. We believe that whatever course of retaliation the USSR elected, the Soviet leaders would not deliberately initiate general war or take military measures, which in their calculation, would run the gravest risks of general war./3/

/3/On October 20 this estimate was updated to include a 3-page inventory of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. The resulting estimate, SNIE 11-19-62, which also included slight revisions and renumbering in the estimate section, is in Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2662. Also reproduced in *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, pp. 211-220.

### 33. Editorial Note

On October 19, 1962, the Central Intelligence Agency released another "Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba" (see Document 30) for the initial evaluation. The new evaluation was based on intelligence as of 8 p.m. on October 19. It included Iron Bark material and was based on "relatively complete photo interpretation" of four of the six U-2 missions of October 17 and part of the final two missions.

This evaluation discovered an additional regiment of Soviet 1020-nm (SS-4) missiles at two sites east of Havana in the Sagua La Grande area that appeared to be more permanent than the two sites already identified at San Cristobal in western Cuba. This evaluation predicted that the two 2200-nm (SS-5) sites in the Guanajay area near Havana could be operational within 6 weeks and by December 15-30, respectively. Although there was still no evidence of currently operational nuclear storage facilities in Cuba, there was evidence that a site was under construction near Guanajay. The evaluation suggested that the assumption that nuclear weapons were already in Cuba still held true. The evaluation also suggested that the 1020-nm missiles would probably be equipped with 2 to 3 megaton warheads and the 2200-nm IRBM's with 3 to 5 megaton warheads. The significance of the new intelligence in this evaluation was that it indicated that the Soviet military buildup in Cuba was being carried out on an "urgent basis" on a pattern of deployment "calculated to achieve quick operational status and then to complete site construction." An extract is reproduced in *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, pages 203-208.

In addition to the two evaluations, nine supplements were prepared. Supplement 1 was as of 10 p.m. October 20; supplement 2 was as of 10 p.m. October 21; supplement 3 as of 10 p.m. October 22; supplement 4 as of 1 a.m. October 24; supplement 5 as of 10 p.m. October 24; supplement 6 as of 2 a.m. October 26; supplement 7 as of 2 a.m. October 27; supplement 8 as of 2 a.m. October 28; and supplement 9 as of 10:20 p.m. October 28. The two evaluations and the annexes covered the immediate crisis. Extracts of the supplements are all *ibid.*, pages 227-234, 261-262, 281-282, 293-294, 299-301, 313-314, 323-325, 337-340, 349-350, respectively.

### **34. Minutes of the 505th Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 20, 1962, 2:30-5:10 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the Oval Room. For the Attorney General's account of this meeting, see *Thirteen Days*, pp. 48-50.

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

The President

Attorney General

Robert F. Kennedy

CIA

John A. McCone, Director

Mr. Ray Cline

Mr. Arthur Lundahl

Mr. Chamberlain

Defense

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary

Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary

Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary (ISA)

JCS

General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, Chairman

OEP

Edward A. McDermott, Director

State

Dean Rusk, Secretary

George Ball, Under Secretary

U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador to the UN

Edwin Martin, Assistant Secretary, Inter-American Affairs

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large

Treasury

Douglas Dillon, Secretary

White House

McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Theodore Sorensen, Special Counsel

Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President

Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Intelligence Briefing

The first twenty minutes were spent in the presentation and discussion of photographic intelligence establishing the presence in Cuba of Soviet intermediate-range and medium-range missiles, mobile missile launchers and missile sites.

Mr. Ray Cline of the Central Intelligence Agency summarized the report of the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center, dated October 19, 1962 (SC 09538-62).<sup>1/</sup> Mr. Arthur Lundahl of CIA described the various missile sites and launching pads, displaying enlarged pictures identical to those in the Committee report.

<sup>1/</sup>Apparent reference to the report of 8 p.m., October 19; see Document 33.

In response to the President's question, Mr. Cline stated that there were no U-2 photographic reconnaissance

missions over Cuba from August 29th to October 14th. The gap in photographic coverage was in part due to bad weather and in part to a desire to avoid activating the SAM Air Defense installations which the Russians were hurriedly installing in Cuba during this period. Since October 14th, nine high altitude missions have been flown. Information from these missions is not fully processed, but will be available for presentation by Monday.

In summary, the Council was informed that sixteen SS-4 missiles, with a range of 1020 nautical miles were now operational in Cuba and could be fired approximately eighteen hours after a decision to fire was taken. The bearing of these launchers was 315 degrees, i.e. toward the central area of the United States.

The President summarized the discussion of the intelligence material as follows. There is something to destroy in Cuba now and, if it is destroyed, a strategic missile capability would be difficult to restore. (Specific details of the briefing are contained in the attached Committee report.)/2/

/2/Not found attached.

### Blockage Track

Secretary McNamara explained to the President that there were differences among his advisers which had resulted in the drafting of alternative courses of action. He added that the military planners are at work on measures to carry out all recommended courses of action in order that, following a Presidential decision, fast action could be taken.

Secretary McNamara described his view as the "blockade route." This route is aimed at preventing any addition to the strategic missiles already deployed to Cuba and eventually to eliminate these missiles. He said to do this we should institute a blockade of Cuba and be prepared to take armed action in specified instances.

(The President was handed a copy of Ted Sorensen's "blockade route" draft of a Presidential message, which he read.)/3/

/3/Not found; however, drafts of three unattributed papers for blockade scenarios, all dated October 20, are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Meetings. One presented a 5-day scenario with anticipated Soviet, allied, and Cuban reaction; the second outlined nine courses of action in the 24 hours before a blockade was instituted; and the third, with "Third Draft" typed on it, offered 23 steps that had to be taken before the A hour. None of these papers, however, contained a draft Presidential message.

Secretary McNamara concluded by explaining that following the blockade, the United States would negotiate for the removal of the strategic missiles from Cuba. He said we would have to be prepared to accept the withdrawal of United States strategic missiles from Turkey and Italy and possibly agreement to limit our use of Guantanamo to a specified limited time. He added that we could obtain the removal of the missiles from Cuba only if we were prepared to offer something in return during negotiations. He opposed as too risky the suggestion that we should issue an ultimatum to the effect that we would order an air attack on Cuba if the missiles were not removed. He said he was prepared to tell Khrushchev we consider the missiles in Cuba as Soviet missiles and that if they were used against us, we would retaliate by launching missiles against the USSR.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that SNIE 11-19-62, dated October 20, 1962,/4/ estimates that the Russians will not use force to push their ships through our blockade. He cited Ambassador Bohlen's view that the USSR would not take military action, but would limit its reaction to political measures in the United Nations.

/4/See footnote 3, Document 32.

Secretary McNamara listed the disadvantages of the blockade route as follows:

1. It would take a long time to achieve the objective of eliminating strategic missiles from Cuba.
2. It would result in serious political trouble in the United States.
3. The world position of the United States might appear to be weakening.

The advantages which Secretary McNamara cited are:

1. It would cause us the least trouble with our allies.
2. It avoids any surprise air attack on Cuba, which is contrary to our tradition.
3. It is the only military course of action compatible with our position as a leader of the free world.
4. It avoids a sudden military move which might provoke a response from the USSR which could result in escalating actions leading to general war.

The President pointed out that during a blockade, more missiles would become operational, and upon the completion of sites and launching pads, the threat would increase. He asked General Taylor how many missiles we could destroy by air action on Monday.

General Taylor reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor an air strike on Tuesday when United States forces could be in a state of readiness. He said he did not share Secretary McNamara's fear that if we used nuclear weapons in Cuba, nuclear weapons would be used against us.

Secretary Rusk asked General Taylor whether we dared to attack operational strategic missile sites in Cuba.

General Taylor responded that the risk of these missiles being used against us was less than if we permitted the missiles to remain there.

The President pointed out that on the basis of the intelligence estimate there would be some fifty strategic missiles operational in mid-December, if we went the blockade route and took no action to destroy the sites being developed.

General Taylor said that the principal argument he wished to make was that now was the time to act because this would be the last chance we would have to destroy these missiles. If we did not act now, the missiles would be camouflaged in such a way as to make it impossible for us to find them. Therefore, if they were not destroyed, we would have to live with them with all the consequent problems for the defense of the United States.

The President agreed that the missile threat became worse each day, adding that we might wish, looking back, that we had done earlier what we are now preparing to do.

Secretary Rusk said that a blockade would seriously affect the Cuban missile capability in that the Soviets would be unable to deploy to Cuba any missiles in addition to those now there.

Under Secretary Ball said that if an effective blockade was established, it was possible that our photographic intelligence would reveal that there were no nuclear warheads in Cuba; hence, none of the missiles now there could be made operational.

General Taylor indicated his doubt that it would be possible to prevent the Russians from deploying warheads to Cuba by means of a blockade because of the great difficulty of setting up an effective air blockade.

Secretary McNamara stated that if we knew that a plane was flying nuclear warheads to Cuba, we should immediately shoot it down. Parenthetically, he pointed out there are now 6000 to 8000 Soviet personnel in Cuba.

The President asked whether the institution of a blockade would appear to the free world as a strong response to the Soviet action. He is particularly concerned about whether the Latin American countries would think that the blockade was an appropriate response to the Soviet challenge.

The Attorney General returned to the point made by General Taylor, i.e. that now is the last chance we will have to destroy Castro and the Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba.

Mr. Sorensen said he did not agree with the Attorney General or with General Taylor that this was our last chance. He said a missile buildup would end if, as everyone seemed to agree, the Russians would not use force to penetrate the United States blockade.

#### Air Strike Route

Mr. Bundy handed to the President the "air strike alternative,"<sup>5/</sup> which the President read. It was also referred to as the Bundy plan.

<sup>5/</sup>A copy of this 3-page scenario, which had paragraphs on the military program, schedule of public statements, notice to Khrushchev and Castro--Alternative 1, notice to Khrushchev and Castro--Alternative 2, and notice to Friends, is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files: Black Book Cuba, and in the Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Cuba.<sup>5/</sup>

The Attorney General told the President that this plan was supported by Mr. Bundy, General Taylor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with minor variations, by Secretary Dillon and Director McCone.

General Taylor emphasized the opportunity available now to take out not only all the missiles, but all the Soviet medium bombers (IL-28) which were neatly lined up in the open on airbases in Cuba.

Mr. McNamara cautioned that an air strike would not destroy all the missiles and launchers in Cuba, and, at best, we could knock out two-thirds of these missiles. Those missiles not destroyed could be fired from mobile launchers not destroyed. General Taylor said he was unable to explain why the IL-28 medium bombers had been left completely exposed on two airfields. The only way to explain this, he concluded, was on the ground that the Cubans and the Russians did not anticipate United States air strike.

Secretary Rusk said he hesitated to ask the question but he wondered whether these planes were decoys. He also wondered whether the Russians were trying to entice us into a trap. Secretary McNamara stated his strong doubt that these planes were decoys. Director McCone added that the Russians would not have sent one hundred shiploads of equipment to Cuba solely to play a "trick". General Taylor returned to the point he had made earlier, namely, that if we do not destroy the missiles and the bombers, we will have to change our entire military way of dealing with external threats.

The President raised the question of advance warning prior to military action--whether we should give a minimum of two hours notice of an air strike to permit Soviet personnel to leave the area to be attacked.

General Taylor said that the military would be prepared to live with a twenty-four hour advance notice or grace period if such advance notice was worthwhile politically. The President expressed his doubt that any notice beyond seven hours had any political value.

There was a brief discussion of the usefulness of sending a draft message to Castro, and a copy of such message was circulated.<sup>6/</sup>

/6/Not found.

The President stated flatly that the Soviet planes in Cuba did not concern him particularly. He said we must be prepared to live with the Soviet threat as represented by Soviet bombers. However, the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba had an entirely different impact throughout Latin America. In his view the existence of fifty planes in Cuba did not affect the balance of power, but the missiles already in Cuba were an entirely different matter.

The Attorney General said that in his opinion a combination of the blockade route and the air strike route was very attractive to him. He felt we should first institute the blockade. In the event that the Soviets continued to build up the missile capability in Cuba, then we should inform the Russians that we would destroy the missiles, the launchers, and the missile sites. He said he favored a short wait during which time the Russians could react to the blockade. If the Russians did not halt the development of the missile capability, then we would proceed to make an air strike. The advantage of proceeding in this way, he added, was that we would get away from the Pearl Harbor surprise attack aspect of the air strike route.

Mr. Bundy pointed out that there was a risk that we would act in such a way as to get Khrushchev to commit himself fully to the support of Castro.

Secretary Rusk doubted that a delay of twenty-four hours in initiating an air strike was of any value. He said he now favored proceeding on the blockade track.

Secretary Dillon mentioned seventy-two hours as the time between instituting the blockade and initiating an air strike in the event we receive no response to our initial action.

Director McCone stated his opposition to an air strike, but admitted that in his view a blockade was not enough. He argued that we should institute the blockade and tell the Russians that if the missiles were not dismantled within seventy-two hours, the United States would destroy the missiles by air attack. He called attention to the risk involved in a long drawn-out period during which the Cubans could, at will, launch the missiles against the United States. Secretary Dillon said that the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba was, in his opinion, not negotiable. He believed that any effort to negotiate the removal of the missiles would involve a price so high that the United States could not accept it. If the missiles are not removed or eliminated, he continued, the United States will lose all of its friends in Latin America, who will become convinced that our fear is such that we cannot act. He admitted that the limited use of force involved in a blockade would make the military task much harder and would involve the great danger of the launching of these missiles by the Cubans.

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric saw the choice as involving the use of limited force or of unlimited force. He was prepared to face the prospect of an air strike against Cuba later, but he opposed the initial use of all-out military force such as a surprise air attack. He defined a blockade as being the application of the limited use of force and doubted that such limited use could be combined with an air strike.

General Taylor argued that a blockade would not solve our problem or end the Cuban missile threat. He said that eventually we would have to use military force and, if we waited, the use of military force would be much more costly.

Secretary McNamara noted that the air strike planned by the Joint Chiefs involved 800 sorties. Such a strike would result in several thousand Russians being killed, chaos in Cuba, and efforts to overthrow the Castro government. In his view the probability was high that an air strike would lead inevitably to an invasion. He doubted that the Soviets would take an air strike on Cuba without resorting to a very major response. In such an event, the United States would lose control of the situation which could escalate to general war.

The President agreed that a United States air strike would lead to a major Soviet response, such as blockading Berlin. He agreed that at an appropriate time we would have to acknowledge that we were willing to take strategic missiles out of Turkey and Italy if this issue was raised by the Russians. He felt that implementation of a blockade would also result in Soviet reprisals, possibly the blockade of Berlin. If we instituted a blockade on Sunday, then by Monday or Tuesday we would know whether the missile development had ceased or whether it was continuing. Thus, we would be in a better position to know what move to make next.

Secretary Dillon called attention to the fact that even if the Russians agreed to dismantle the missiles now in Cuba, continuing inspection would be required to ensure that the missiles were not again made ready.

The President said that if it was decided to go the Bundy route, he would favor an air strike which would destroy only missiles. He repeated this view that we would have to live with the threat arising out of the stationing in Cuba of Soviet bombers.

Secretary Rusk referred to an air strike as chapter two. He did not think we should initiate such a strike because of the risk of escalating actions leading to general war. He doubted that we should act without consultation of our allies. He said a sudden air strike had no support in the law or morality, and, therefore, must be ruled out. Reading from notes, he urged that we start the blockade and only go on to an air attack when we knew the reaction of the Russians and of our allies.

At this point Director McCone acknowledged that we did not know positively that nuclear warheads for the missiles deployed had actually arrived in Cuba. Although we had evidence of the construction of storage places for nuclear weapons, such weapons may not yet have been sent to Cuba.

The President asked what we would say to those whose reaction to our instituting a blockade now would be to ask why we had not blockaded last July.

Both Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Ball made the point that we did not institute a blockade in July because we did not then know of the existence of the strategic missiles in Cuba.

Secretary Rusk suggested that our objective was an immediate freeze of the strategic missile capability in Cuba to be inspected by United Nations observation teams stationed at the missile sites. He referred to our bases in Turkey, Spain and Greece as being involved in any negotiation covering foreign bases. He said a United Nations group might be sent to Cuba to reassure those who might fear that the United States was planning an invasion.

Ambassador Stevenson stated his flat opposition to a surprise air strike, which he felt would ultimately lead to a United States invasion of Cuba. He supported the institution of the blockade and predicted that such action would reduce the chance of Soviet retaliation of a nature which would inevitably escalate. In his view our aim is to end the existing missile threat in Cuba without casualties and without escalation. He urged that we offer the Russians a settlement involving the withdrawal of our missiles from Turkey and our evacuation of Guantanamo base.

The President sharply rejected the thought of surrendering our base at Guantanamo in the present situation. He felt that such action would convey to the world that we had been frightened into abandoning our position. He was not opposed to discussing withdrawal of our missiles from Turkey and Greece, but he was firm in saying we should only make such a proposal in the future.

The Attorney General thought we should convey our firm intentions to the Russians clearly and suggested that we might tell the Russians that we were turning over nuclear weapons and missiles to the West Germans.

Ambassador Thompson stated his view that our first action should be the institution of a blockade. Following this, he thought we should launch an air strike to destroy the missiles and sites, after giving sufficient warning so



that Russian nationals could leave the area to be attacked.

The President said he was ready to go ahead with the blockade and to take actions necessary to put us in a position to undertake an air strike on the missiles and missile sites by Monday or Tuesday.

General Taylor summarized the military actions already under way, including the quiet reinforcement of Guantanamo by infiltrating marines and the positioning of ships to take out United States depend-ents from Guantanamo on extremely short notice.

The Attorney General said we could implement a blockade very quickly and prepare for an air strike to be launched later if we so decided.

The President said he was prepared to authorize the military to take those preparatory actions which they would have to take in anticipation of the military invasion of Cuba. He suggested that we inform the Turks and the Italians that they should not fire the strategic missiles they have even if attacked. The warheads for missiles in Turkey and Italy could be dismantled. He agreed that we should move to institute a blockade as quickly as we possibly can.

In response to a question about further photographic surveillance of Cuba, Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President agreed, that no low level photographic reconnaissance should be undertaken now because we have decided to institute a blockade.

Secretary Rusk recommended that a blockade not be instituted before Monday in order to provide time required to consult our allies.

Mr. Bundy said the pressure from the press was becoming intense and suggested that one way of dealing with it was to announce shortly that we had obtained photographic evidence of the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba. This announcement would hold the press until the President made his television speech.

The President acknowledged that the domestic political heat following his television appearance would be terrific. He said he had opposed an invasion of Cuba but that now we were confronted with the possibility that by December there would be fifty strategic missiles deployed there. In explanation as to why we have not acted sooner to deal with the threat from Cuba, he pointed out that only now do we have the kind of evidence which we can make available to our allies in order to convince them of the necessity of acting. Only now do we have a way of avoiding a split with our allies.

It is possible that we may have to make an early strike with or without warning next week. He stressed again the difference between the conventional military buildup in Cuba and the psychological impact throughout the world of the Russian deployment of strategic missiles to Cuba. General Taylor repeated his recommendation that any air strike in Cuba included attacks on the MIGs and medium bombers.

The President repeated his view that our world position would be much better if we attack only the missiles. He directed that air strike plans include only missiles and missile sites, preparations to be ready three days from now.

Under Secretary Ball expressed his view that a blockade should include all shipments of POL to Cuba. Secretary Rusk thought that POL should not now be included because such a decision would break down the distinction which we want to make between elimination of strategic missiles and the downfall of the Castro government. Secretary Rusk repeated his view that our objective is to destroy the offensive capability of the missiles in Cuba, not, at this time, seeking to overthrow Castro!

The President acknowledged that the issue was whether POL should be included from the beginning or added at a later time. He preferred to delay possibly as long as a week.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the problem involved in referring to our action as a blockade. He preferred the use of the word "quarantine".

Parenthetically, the President asked Secretary Rusk to reconsider present policy of refusing to give nuclear weapons assistance to France. He expressed the view that in light of present circumstances a refusal to help the French was not worthwhile. He thought that in the days ahead we might be able to gain the needed support of France if we stopped refusing to help them with their nuclear weapons project.

There followed a discussion of several sentences in the "blockade route" draft of the President's speech. It was agreed that the President should define our objective in terms of halting "offensive missile preparations in Cuba". Reference to economic pressures on Cuba would not be made in this context.

The President made clear that in the United Nations we should emphasize the subterranean nature of the missile buildup in Cuba. Only if we were asked would we respond that we were prepared to talk about the withdrawal of missiles from Italy and Turkey. In such an eventuality, the President pointed out that we would have to make clear to the Italians and the Turks that withdrawing strategic missiles was not a retreat and that we would be prepared to replace these missiles by providing a more effective deterrent, such as the assignment of Polaris submarines. The President asked Mr. Nitze to study the problems arising out of the withdrawal of missiles from Italy and Turkey, with particular reference to complications which would arise in NATO. The President made clear that our emphasis should be on the missile threat from Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson reiterated his belief that we must be more forthcoming about giving up our missile bases in Turkey and Italy. He stated again his belief that the present situation required that we offer to give up such bases in order to induce the Russians to remove the strategic missiles from Cuba.

Mr. Nitze flatly opposed making any such offer, but said he would not object to discussing this question in the event that negotiations developed from our institution of a blockade.

The President concluded the meeting by stating that we should be ready to meet criticism of our deployment of missiles abroad but we should not initiate negotiations with a base withdrawal proposal./7/

/7/The NSC Record of Action No. 2457 for this meeting reads:

"Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba

"a. Noted a briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence, supported by photographic intelligence, establishing the presence in Cuba of Soviet strategic missiles, including mobile launchers and missile sites under construction.

"b. Discussed alternative courses of action aimed at removing the strategic missiles from Cuba." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings)

### **35. Memorandum for the Files**

Washington, October 20, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution. Drafted by McCone.

Following the White House meeting with the President on the afternoon of October 20th, I spoke privately to the Attorney General. The Attorney General was to meet alone with the President, presumably to discuss policy matters.

I told the AG I was very worried about some of the wording in the second draft of the speech of the President as prepared by Sorensen/1/ and I was most particularly worried about the approach of Governor Stevenson. I reasoned, as I had repeatedly in meetings over the last 3 or 4 days, that we must not lose sight of the very important objectives of removing the Castro Communist government from Cuba and establishing a climate which would permit the Cuban people to establish a government of their own choice. In my talk with the AG I pointed out that Stevenson's proposal would not only cause the removal of the Guantanamo Base, which was most undesirable, but it would also place a crown of jewels on the head of Castro and we nor anyone else could do much about it after such a position had been established publicly.

/1/Not further identified.

About 9:00 o'clock in the evening (time uncertain) the AG called me at my home and said he had discussed my views with the President who concurred and he felt I could rest assured that the situation that worried me would not develop further. I then mentioned to the AG that numbered paragraph 2 of the speech did not give the President latitude for military action which may be necessary without suffering the indictment of committing a "surprise attack" and that I had suggested some different wording to Sorensen.

The AG then asked I call the President to arrange for a briefing of General Eisenhower.

I immediately talked with the President by telephone and arranged to see Eisenhower on Sunday morning and possibly take him to the White House for a direct meeting with the President. Details to be worked out upon Eisenhower's arrival.

I then expressed my concern at the wording of paragraph 2 of the speech. The President concurred; said he had made up his mind to pursue the course which I had recommended and he agreed with the views I expressed in the afternoon meeting./2/ He said that he would be careful to preserve the widest possible latitude for subsequent military action at any time after the commencement of the blockade.

/2/See Document 34.

I then mentioned the Castro problem to the President. He seemed alert to the situation.

John A. McCone/3/

Director

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **36. Notes on Meeting With President Kennedy**

Washington, October 21, 1962.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Misc. Papers Regarding Cuba. Top Secret. For McCone's record of this meeting, mistakenly noted as occurring at 10 a.m., see the Supplement. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President)Also reproduced in *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, pp. 241-242.

1. The meeting was held in the Oval Room at the White House and lasted from 11:30 a.m. to approximately 12:30 p.m. In attendance were the Attorney General, General Taylor, General Sweeney and the Secretary of Defense.

2. The Secretary of Defense stated that following the start of an air attack, the initial units of the landing force could invade Cuba within 7 days. The movement of troops in preparation for such an invasion will start at the time of the President's speech. No mobilization of Reserve forces is required for such an invasion until the start of the air strike. General LeMay had stated that the transport aircraft, from Reserve and Guard units, which would be required for participation in such an invasion can be fully operational within 24 to 48 hours after the call to active duty.

3. The Secretary of Defense reported that, based on information which became available during the night, it now appears that there is equipment in Cuba for approximately 40 MRBM or IRBM launchers. (Mr. McCone, who joined the group 15 or 20 minutes after the start of the discussion, confirmed this report.) The location of the sites for 36 of these launchers is known. 32 of the 36 known sites appear to have sufficient equipment on them to be included in any air strike directed against Cuba's missile capability.

4. We believe that 40 launchers would normally be equipped with 80 missiles. John McCone reported yesterday that a Soviet ship believed to be the vessel in which the Soviets have been sending missiles to Cuba has made a sufficient number of trips to that island within recent weeks to offload approximately 48 missiles. Therefore, we assume there are approximately that number on the Island today, although we have only located approximately 30 of these.

5. General Sweeney outlined the following plan of air attack, the object of which would be the destruction of the known Cuban missile capability.

a. The 5 surface-to-air missile installations in the vicinity of the known missile sites would each be attacked by approximately 8 aircraft; the 3 MIG airfields defending the missile sites would be covered by 12 U.S. aircraft per field. In total, the defense suppression operations, including the necessary replacement aircraft, would require approximately 100 sorties.

b. Each of the launchers at the 8 or 9 known sites (a total of approximately 32 to 36 launchers) would be attacked by 6 aircraft. For the purpose, a total of approximately 250 sorties would be flown.

c. The U.S. aircraft covering the 3 MIG airfields would attack the MIG's if they became airborne. General Sweeney strongly recommended attacks on each of the airfields to destroy the MIG aircraft.

6. General Sweeney stated that he was certain the air strike would be "successful"; however, even under optimum conditions, it was not likely that all of the known missiles would be destroyed. (As noted in 4 above, the known missiles are probably no more than 60% of the total missiles on the Island.) General Taylor stated, "The best we can offer you is to destroy 90% of the known missiles." General Taylor, General Sweeney and the Secretary of Defense all strongly emphasized that in their opinion the initial air strike must be followed by strikes on subsequent days and that these in turn would lead inevitably to an invasion.

7. CIA representatives, who joined the discussion at this point, stated that it is probable the missiles which are operational (it is estimated there are now between 8 and 12 operational missiles on the Island) can hold indefinitely a capability for firing with from 2-1/2 to 4 hours' notice. Included in the notice period is a countdown requiring 20 to 40 minutes. In relation to the countdown period, the first wave of our attacking aircraft would give 10 minutes of warning; the second wave, 40 minutes of warning; and the third wave a proportionately greater warning.

8. As noted above, General Sweeney strongly recommended that any air strike include attacks on the MIG aircraft and, in addition, the IL28s. To accomplish the destruction of these aircraft, the total number of sorties of such an air strike should be increased to 500. The President agreed that if an air strike is ordered, it should probably include in its objective the destruction of the MIG aircraft and the IL28s.

9. The President directed that we be prepared to carry out the air strike Monday/1/ morning or any time thereafter during the remainder of the week. The President recognized that the Secretary of Defense was opposed to the air strike Monday morning, and that General Sweeney favored it. He asked the Attorney General and Mr. McCone for their opinions:

/1/October 22.

a. The Attorney General stated he was opposed to such a strike because:

(1) "It would be a Pearl Harbor type of attack."

(2) It would lead to unpredictable military responses by the Soviet Union which could be so serious as to lead to general nuclear war.

He stated we should start with the initiation of the blockade and thereafter "play for the breaks."

b. Mr. McCone agreed with the Attorney General, but emphasized he believed we should be prepared for an air strike and thereafter an invasion.

RSMc/2/

/2/McNamara's initials appear in an unidentified hand indicating he signed the original.

### **37. Editorial Note**

At 12:30 p.m. on October 21, 1962, President Kennedy met privately with British Ambassador Ormsby Gore at the White House. According to the Ambassador's report to London, Kennedy summarized the evidence from the U-2 flights, stated that the United States appeared faced with either an all-out air strike on October 22 to eliminate the missiles or to blockade the island, and asked Ormsby Gore which of these two courses of action he could support. Ormsby Gore chose the second alternative. The President then admitted that he and his principal advisors had come to the same conclusion. For Ormsby Gore's account of the meeting, see Harold Macmillan, *At the End of the Day, 1961-1963*, pages 190-194. No record of this meeting has been found at the Kennedy Library or in Department of State Files.

### **38. Minutes of the 506th Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 21, 1962, 2:30-4:50 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the Oval Room.

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

The President

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy

CIA

John A. McCone, Director

Mr. Ray Cline

Mr. Whelan

Mr. Arthur Lundahl

Defense

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary

Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary

Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary (ISA)

JCS

General Maxwell D. Taylor

Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN, Chief of Naval Operations

OEP

Edward A. McDermott, Director

State

Dean Rusk, Secretary

George Ball, Under Secretary

U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the UN

Edwin Martin, Assistant Secretary, Inter-American Affairs

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large

Treasury

Douglas Dillon, Secretary

USIA

Donald Wilson, Acting Director

White House

McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Theodore Sorensen, Special Counsel

Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Others:

Mr. Robert Lovett

(There is attached a tentative agenda for today's meeting, which was followed in large part.)/1/

/1/Not printed.

Introduction

Intelligence officers summarized new information which had become available since yesterday's meeting./2/  
Attached is a page highlighting the new facts presented to the Council./3/

/2/See Document 34.

/3/Apparent reference to a revised and retyped version of a Deputy Director of Intelligence briefing, which is reproduced in *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, pp. 221-265.

Substantial Issues in a Draft Presidential Speech

The Council members read the third draft of the President's speech. (Copy attached.)<sup>4</sup> There was some discussion of the date when positive information as to the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba became available. The draft was revised to state that such information became available Tuesday morning, October 16th.

Attached but not printed.<sup>4</sup>

The draft speech summarized the number of missiles and the number of sites known to exist in Cuba. Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President agreed, that specific numbers of missiles and sites be deleted.

The question was raised as to whether the speech should emphasize Soviet responsibility for the missile deployment or Castro's irresponsibility in accepting them. Secretary Rusk argued that we must hold the USSR responsible because it is important to emphasize the extra-hemispheric aspect of the missile deployment in order to increase support for our contemplated actions.

The President referred to the sentence mentioning the deployment of missiles by the Soviet Union and called attention to our deployment of missiles to Italy. Secretary Rusk pointed out that our missiles were deployed to NATO countries only after those countries were threatened by deployed Soviet missiles. Hence, our deployment was part of the confrontation of Soviet power, and, therefore, unrelated to the Cuban deployment by the USSR.

The President pointed out that Soviet missiles were in place, aimed at European countries, before we deployed United States missiles to Europe.

Secretary Dillon recalled that we sent United States missiles to Europe because we had so many of them we did not know where to put them.

The President referred to the sentence in the draft speech which states that the USSR secretly transferred weapons to Cuba. He said we should emphasize the clandestine manner in which the USSR had acted in Cuba.

The Attorney General wanted to be certain that the text as drafted did not preclude us from giving nuclear weapons to Western Germany, West Berlin, and France in the event we decided to do so.

It was agreed that no message would be sent to President Dorticos of Cuba at the present time and the draft speech was so revised.

The question of whether our actions should be described as a blockade or a quarantine was debated. Although the legal meaning of the two words is identical, Secretary Rusk said he preferred "quarantine" for political reasons in that it avoids comparison with the Berlin blockade. The President agreed to use "quarantine" and pointed out that if we so desired we could later institute a total blockade.

Both Secretary Dillon and Director McCone urged that the speech state that we were seeking to prevent all military equipment from reaching Cuba. They argued that later we might act to prevent all equipment from reaching Cuba even though at present our objective was to block offensive missile equipment.

The President preferred the phrase "offensive missile equipment" on the grounds that within forty-eight hours we will know the Soviet reaction. At such time we will know whether, as is expected, the Soviets turn back their ships rather than submit to inspection. Secretary McNamara agreed we should proceed in two stages. Initially our objective is to block offensive weapons and later we can extend our blockade to all weapons, if we so decide.

The President parenthetically pointed out that we were not taking action under the Monroe Doctrine.

General Taylor returned to a sentence in the earlier part of the draft (bottom of page 4) and asked whether we were firm on the phrase "whatever steps are necessary." The President agreed that these words should remain so that he would not be hindered from taking additional measures if we so decide at a later date.

(The President asked Under Secretary Ball to obtain assurances that Dakar would not be used by the Soviets for air shipments to Cuba.)

Secretary Rusk commented that our objective was to "put out the fire" in Cuba and get United Nations teams to inspect all missile activity in Cuba. The President felt that a better tactic was for us initially to frighten the United Nations representatives with the prospect of all kinds of actions and then, when a resolution calling for the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, Turkey and Italy was proposed, we could consider supporting such a resolution.

Ambassador Stevenson said we should take the initiative by calling a U.N. Security Council meeting to demand an immediate missile standstill in Cuba. Secretary Rusk pointed out that following the President's speech we would either be in the posture of a complainant or of a defendant.

Mr. Sorensen said our posture should be to accuse the Soviets of being the aggressors and seek to persuade others to agree with us. He foresaw that some nations in the United Nations would immediately try to label us as the aggressors because of the actions which we had taken.

Secretary Rusk raised the question of whether we should move first in the United Nations or first in the OAS. He said our United Nations action should be aimed at removing the missile threat while our objective on the OAS would be to persuade other Latin American countries to act with us under the Rio Treaty.

In response to the President's question, Assistant Secretary Martin said that if there were a United Nations action before the OAS acted, the usefulness of the OAS would be seriously affected. Secretary Rusk felt we should act first in the OAS, then in the United Nations where our action program could be more flexible.

The President agreed that a reference in the draft speech to a Caribbean security force should be dropped.

The President said we should pin the responsibility for the developments in Cuba directly on Khrushchev. In response to the President's question, Ambassador Thompson agreed--naming Khrushchev would make it harder



for him to reverse his actions in Cuba, but such reference to him would be more effective in producing favorable actions.

The President asked that the phrases describing the horrors of war should be deleted.

Ambassador Thompson urged, and the President agreed, that we should use the part of the TASS statement on Cuba which flatly states that the Russians have all the weapons they need and require no more for their defense. Therefore, the only reason for Soviet deployment of weapons to Cuba is the aim of dominating the Western hemisphere.

The President agreed that the invitation to a summit meeting should be deleted.

Ambassador Stevenson repeated that he favored an early conference with the Russians on terms acceptable to us, to be held in an atmosphere free of threat. The President responded that he did not want to appear to be seeking a summit meeting as a result of Khrushchev's actions. Ambassador Thompson agreed. The President added that we should not look toward holding a meeting until it is clear to us what Khrushchev really thinks he will obtain worldwide as a result of his actions in Cuba.

Secretary Rusk said our first objective was to get a fully inspected missile standstill in Cuba before we sit down to talk with the Russians. Mr. McCone was concerned that if we let it be known that we are prepared to talk to the Russians now, it would appear to outsiders that our only response to Khrushchev's challenge was to negotiate.

The Attorney General said that in his view we should anticipate a Soviet reaction involving a movement in Berlin. Secretary Dillon felt that the Soviet reaction in Berlin would be governed by the actions we would take in response to the Russian missile deployment in Cuba.

Following a discussion of ways in which we could reach the Cuban people through television despite Cuban jamming efforts, the President told Mr. Wilson that we should go ahead with the television project involving the relay of signals via instruments aboard a ship at sea for use anywhere.

The Attorney General felt that the paragraphs in the President's draft speech addressed to the Cuban people were not personal enough. The President asked that these paragraphs be rewritten.

Following discussion of the pressure by the press for information, the President decided that no information on the missile deployment would be given out today.

In response to a Presidential question, General Taylor said an invasion of Cuba could be carried out seven days after the decision to invade had been taken. Secretary McNamara said the President had asked a question which was difficult to answer precisely. Present plans called for invasion to follow seven days after an initial air strike. The timing could be reduced, depending upon whether certain decisions were taken now. Some actions which were irreversible would have to be taken now in order to reduce the time when forces could be landed. He promised the President a breakdown of the decisions which he would have to take immediately in order to reduce the seven-day period.

The President said that in three or four days we might have to decide to act in order that we would not have to wait so long prior to the landing of our forces. As he understood the situation, a decision taken today would mean that an air strike could not be undertaken before seven days, and then seven days later the first forces could be ashore.

General Taylor explained that air action would be necessary to bring the situation under control prior to the dropping of paratroopers. He added that 90,000 men could be landed within an eleven-day period.

Secretary McNamara said that planning was being done under two assumptions. The first called for an air strike, and seven days later, landings would begin. Twenty-five thousand men would be put ashore the first day, and on the eighteenth day, 90,000 would be ashore. The second plan provided for the landing of 90,000 men in a twenty-three day period. The President told General Taylor that he wanted to do those things which would reduce the length of time between a decision to invade and the landing of the first troops.

The President said he believed that as soon as he had finished his speech, the Russians would: (a) hasten the construction and the development of their missile capability in Cuba, (b) announce that if we attack Cuba, Soviet rockets will fly, and (c) possibly make a move to squeeze us out of Berlin.

Secretary Dillon said that in his view a blockade would either inevitably lead to an invasion of Cuba or would result in negotiations, which he believes the Soviets would want very much. To agree to negotiations now would be a disaster for us. We would break up our alliances and convey to the world that we were impotent in the face of a Soviet challenge. Unless the Russians stop their missile buildup at once, we will have to invade Cuba in the next week, no matter what they say, if we are to save our world position. We cannot convey firm intentions to the Russians otherwise and we must not look to the world as if we were backing down.

Secretary McNamara expressed his doubt that an air strike would be necessary within the next week.

Admiral Anderson described, in response to the President's question, the way the blockade would be instituted. He added that the Navy did not need to call up reserves now to meet the immediate situation. He said that forty Navy ships were already in position. The Navy knew the positions of twenty-seven to thirty ships en route to Cuba. Eighteen ships were in Cuban ports, and fifteen were on their way home.

Admiral Anderson described the method to be used in the first interception of a Soviet ship. It was hoped that a cruiser rather than a destroyer would make this interception. It would follow accepted international rules. He favored a twenty-four hour grace period, beginning with the President's speech, during which the Russians could communicate with their ships, giving them instructions as to what to do in the event they were stopped by United States ships.

Secretary McNamara said he would recommend to the President later today which kinds of reserve forces should be called up. He felt that air reserves would be necessary if it were decided to make an air strike, but probably would not be needed if our action was limited to a blockade.

Admiral Anderson said we had a capability to protect United States ships in the Caribbean. If the Komar ships took any hostile action, they could be destroyed, thereby creating a new situation. If a MIG plane takes hostile action, he would like to be in a position to shoot it down, thereby creating again a new situation. He estimated that the Soviets could not get naval surface ships to the area in less than ten days and Soviet submarines could not get to the area in less than ten to fourteen days.

In response to a question, Admiral Anderson said that if the Navy received information that a Soviet submarine was en route to Havana, he would ask higher authority for permission to attack it.

Secretary McNamara said he favored rules of engagement which would permit responses to hostile actions, including attacks to destroy the source of the hostile action.

The President answered a question as to whether we were to stop all ships, including allied ships by saying that he favored stopping all ships in the expectation that allied ships would soon become discouraged and drop out of the Cuban trade.

Diplomatic Measures

Under Secretary Ball summarized a scenario (copy attached)/5/ providing for consultation with our allies. He said Dean Acheson would brief de Gaulle and the NATO Council, Ambassador Dowling would brief Adenauer, and Ambassador Bruce would brief Macmillan. Present at such briefings would be technical experts from CIA who could answer questions concerning the photographic intelligence which reveals the missile sites.

/5/Attached, but not printed.

The President said we must assume that Khrushchev knows that we know of his missile deployments, and, therefore, he will be ready with a planned response. He asked that the draft speech emphasize his belief that the greatest danger to the United States in the present situation is doing nothing but acknowledging that in days to come we would be seriously threatened.

Ambassador Stevenson read from a list of problems which he foresaw in the United Nations. Secretary Rusk said we must decide on tactics for the Security Council meeting. He repeated his view that the aim of all our actions is to get a standstill of the missile development in Cuba to be inspected by United Nations observers and then be prepared to negotiate other issues.

The President asked Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze to study the problem of withdrawing United States missiles from Turkey and Italy. Mr. Nitze said such a withdrawal was complicated because we must avoid giving the Europeans the impression that we are prepared to take nuclear weapons of all kinds out of Europe.

Secretary McNamara stated his firm view that the United States could not lift its blockade as long as the Soviet weapons remained in Cuba.

The President asked why we could not start with a demand for the removal or the withdrawal of the missiles and if at a later time we wanted to negotiate for a less favorable settlement, we could then decide to do so. The Attorney General said we should take the offensive in our presentation to the United Nations. Our attitude should not be defensive, especially in view of the fact that Soviet leaders had lied to us about the deployment of strategic missiles to Cuba.

The President interjected a directive that we reverse our policy on nuclear assistance to France in the light of the present situation.

Ambassador Stevenson repeated his view that the United States would be forced into a summit meeting and preferred to propose such a meeting.

The President disagreed, saying that we could not accept a neutral Cuba and the withdrawal from Guantanamo without indicating to Khrushchev that we were in a state of panic. An offer to accept Castro and give up Guantanamo must not be made because it would appear to be completely defensive. He said we should be clear that we would accept nothing less than the ending of the missile capability now in Cuba, no reinforcement of that capability, and no further construction of missile sites.

Secretary McNamara stated his view that in order to achieve such a result we would have to invade Cuba.

The President said what he was talking about was the dismantlement of missiles now in Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson thought that we should institute a blockade, and when the Russians rejected our demand for a missile standstill in Cuba, we should defer any air strike until after we had talked to Khrushchev.

There followed a discussion as to whether we wanted to rely primarily on the United Nations or primarily on the OAS. Assistant Secretary of State Martin indicated that if we did not use the OAS in preference to the United

Nations, we would jeopardize the entire hemispheric alliance. Under Secretary Ball agreed that we should put primary emphasis on the OAS and he preferred that any inspectors going to Cuba should be OAS inspectors rather than United Nations inspectors.

The President indicated a need for further discussion of this matter and suggested that Secretary Rusk speak to him later about it.

As the meeting concluded, the President asked that the word "miscalculate" be taken out of the draft letter prepared for him to send to Khrushchev./6/ He recalled that in Vienna Khrushchev had revealed a misunderstanding of this word when translated into Russian. He also requested that reference to a meeting with Khrushchev be deleted from the draft letter./7/

/6/A copy of this 3-page draft, dated October 20, is in Department of State, Central Files, 373.56361/10-2062. The letter as sent is printed in vol. VI, pages 165-166.

/7/NSC Record of Action No. 2458 for this meeting reads:

"Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba

"a. Noted briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the latest information about the Soviet strategic missile build-up in Cuba.

"b. Discussed and revised a draft Presidential speech to be made on October 22, 1962.

"c. Reviewed military plans to be implemented following the President's speech.

"d. Reviewed diplomatic measures already under way, including consultation with allies and tactics in the UN and the OAS." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings)

### **39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**

Washington, October 22, 1962, 12:17 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10-2262. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by U.A. Johnson and cleared by Tyler.

2269. Elite eyes only for the Ambassador. Following is text of letter to Prime Minister Macmillan to be delivered at 10:00 a.m. Monday London time:

"My dear friend:

We are now in possession of incontrovertible military evidence obtained through photographic reconnaissances, that the Soviets have already installed offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, and that some of these may already be operational. This constitutes a threat to the peace which imperils the security not only of this hemisphere but of the entire free world. You will recall that last month I stated publicly that the Government of the United States would consider the presence of ground-to-ground missiles in Cuba as an offensive threat. In response to my remarks, the Soviets stated that such armaments and military equipment as had been shipped by them to Cuba were exclusively of a defensive nature, and this was repeated to me only last Thursday by Gromyko under instructions./1/

/1/See Document 29.

The foregoing has created a highly critical situation which must be met promptly and fearlessly. This evening at 1900 hours Washington time I shall be making a public statement of which Ambassador Bruce will be giving you a draft together with this message. This text is not necessarily final in every detail, but the essentials of the problem, and the means by which I intend to meet it, have already been decided as set forth in the present text. Ambassador Bruce will also be prepared fully to explain to you the evidence on which we have based our conclusions.

I am also writing to Chairman Khrushchev to bring home to him how perilous is his present course of action, but expressing the hope that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiation.

I am quite clear in my mind that these missiles have got to be withdrawn, and you will see that I intend to state this publicly in my speech as well as telling Chairman Khrushchev this in my letter to him.

The object of the quarantine, which will be put into effect immediately, is to prevent the Soviet Union from introducing additional missiles into Cuba and to lead to the elimination of the missiles that are already in place.

I shall also be sending a personal message to Prime Minister Diefenbaker, General deGaulle, Chairman Adenauer, and Prime Minister Fanfani<sup>2/</sup> and have sent Dean Acheson to Paris [to] assist Ambassador Finletter in briefing the North Atlantic Council shortly before I make my public statement. However, I wanted you to be the first to be informed of this grave development, in order that we should have the opportunity, should you wish it, to discuss the situation between ourselves by means of our private channel of communication.

<sup>2/</sup>Copies of these letters and one to Nehru, all transmitted by telegram before 2 a.m. on October 22, and which repeated the substance of the letter sent to Macmillan, are in Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10-2262.

This is a solemn moment for our two countries, indeed for the fate of the entire world. It is essential that the already great dangers before us should not be increased through miscalculation or underestimation by the Soviets of what we intend to do, and are prepared to endure, in the face of the course on which they have so recklessly embarked.

I need not point out to you the possible relation of this secret and dangerous move on the part of Khrushchev to Berlin. We must together be prepared for a time of testing. It is a source of great personal satisfaction to me that you and I can keep in close touch with each other by rapid and secure means at a time like this, and I intend to keep you fully informed of my thinking as the situation evolves.

In the meanwhile I am also requesting an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council. I have asked Ambassador Stevenson to present on behalf of the United States a resolution calling for the withdrawal of missile bases and other offensive weapons in Cuba under the supervision of United Nations observers.<sup>3/</sup> This would make it possible for the United States to lift its quarantine. I hope that you will instruct your representative in New York to work actively with us and speak forthrightly in support of the above program in the United Nations."

Rusk

<sup>3/</sup>For text of this draft resolution, which Stevenson presented to Valerian Zorin, President of the U.N. Security Council at 7:30 p.m., see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, p. 404 or U.N. doc. S/5181.

#### **40. Editorial Note**

President Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk, Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy, and Under Secretary George Ball met on October 22, 1962, at 11 a.m. to discuss Cuba. A tape recording of the conversation is available, but is of poor quality and is punctuated by long periods when

apparently material was being read and/or drafted. The discussion was on the President's upcoming speech on the Cuban Missile Crisis; consideration of a proposal for removal of nuclear weapons from all non-nuclear nations--Turkey, Italy, and Cuba; and the handling of the press and other briefings before the speech. The tape, which lasts for 40 minutes and 40 seconds, ends before the meeting does. (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Presidential Records, No. 32.1)

At 11:45 p.m. the group met again and discussed instructions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in anticipation of possible actions and confrontation. The President stressed the need to inform personnel at missile sites in Turkey not to fire if and when they came under Soviet attack. The group also discussed making clear to Allies that commitments in Berlin would not be compromised, and that the United States needed to protect U.S. credibility and to maintain the strategic balance. The group finished with a discussion of the timing of the President's public announcement of the discovery of the missiles. The tape lasts for 11 minutes and 18 seconds and covers the entire meeting. (Ibid., No. 32.2)

#### **41. Minutes of the 507th Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 22, 1962, 3 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

The President opened the meeting by asking Secretary Rusk to read the attached message from Prime Minister Macmillan which had just been received./1/ Secretary Rusk observed that for a first reaction to information of our proposed blockade it was not bad. He added that it was comforting to learn that the British Prime Minister had not thought of anything we hadn't thought of.

/1/A copy of this message, which expressed sympathy and support for the U.S. position but worried about how the Soviet Union might respond, is in the Supplement. (Telegram 222308Z from the White House; Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2262)

The President commented that the Prime Minister's message contained the best argument for taking no action. What we now need are strong arguments to explain why we have to act as we are acting.

Secretary Rusk stated that the best legal basis for our blockade action was the Rio Treaty. The use of force would be justified on the ground of support for the principals of the United Nations Charter, not on the basis of Article 51, which might give the Russians a basis for attacking Turkey.

The Attorney General said that in his opinion our blockade action would be illegal if it were not supported by the OAS. In his view the greatest importance is attached to our obtaining the necessary fourteen favorable votes in the OAS. Secretary Rusk commented that if we do not win the support of the OAS, we are not necessarily acting illegally. He referred to the new situation created by modern weapons and he thought that rules of international law should not be taken as applying literally to a completely new situation. He said we need not abandon hope so early.

Mr. Salinger reported that Gromyko had departed from New York without making other than a usual departure statement containing nothing about Cuba.

Secretary Rusk said the Department had decided to hold off calling a Security Council meeting despite the possibility that the Russians might ask one first. The basis of this decision was that we would have to name Cuba in the documents requesting the Security Council meeting and this we did not wish to do.

Director McCone summarized the latest intelligence information and read from the attached document./2/ He

added that we have a report of a fleet of Soviet submarines which are in a position to reach Cuba in about a week. He also mentioned that the London Evening Standard had printed a great deal of information about the existence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba.

/2/ Apparent reference to notes by McCone for this meeting, October 22. Reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 271-273.

In response to a suggestion by Mr. Bundy, the President outlined the manner in which he expected Council Members to deal with the domestic aspects of the current situation. He said everyone should sing one song in order to make clear that there was now no difference among his advisers as to the proper course to follow. He pointed out the importance of fully supporting the course of action chosen which, in his view, represented a reasonable consensus. Any course is extremely troublesome and, as in the case of the Berlin wall, we are once again confronted with a difficult choice. If we undertake a tricky and unsatisfactory course, we do not even have the satisfaction of knowing what would have happened if we had acted differently. He mentioned that former Presidents, Eisenhower, Truman and Hoover had supported his decision during telephone conversations with each of them earlier in the day.

The President then summarized the arguments as to why we must act. We must reply to those whose reaction to the blockade would be to ask what had changed in view of the fact that we had been living in the past years under a threat of a missile nuclear attack by the USSR.

- a. In September we had said we would react if certain actions were taken in Cuba. We have to carry out commitments which we had made publicly at that time.
- b. The secret deployment by the Russians of strategic missiles to Cuba was such a complete change in their previous policy of not deploying such missiles outside the USSR that if we took no action in this case, we would convey to the Russians an impression that we would never act, no matter what they did anywhere.
- c. Gromyko had left the impression that the Soviets were going to act in Berlin in the next few months. Therefore, if they acted now in response to our blockade action, we would only have brought on their Berlin squeeze earlier than expected.
- d. The effect in Latin America would be very harmful to our interests if, by our failure to act, we gave the Latinos the impression that the Soviets were increasing their world position while ours was decreasing.

Two questions were raised which the President hoped would be discussed and settled the following day:

- a. What is our response if one of our U-2 planes is shot down by a SAM missile?
- b. If the missile development in Cuba continues, what is our next course of action?

The President concluded by acknowledging the difficulties which he was asking the military to accept because of the necessity of our taking action which warned Cuba of the possibility of an invasion.

Secretary Rusk commented that if anyone thought our response was weak, they were wrong because he believed that a "flaming crisis" was immediately ahead of us.

The President read from a list of questions and suggested answers which might be made public. The first question was why we had not acted earlier. The response is that we needed more evidence of the exist-ence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba. This additional evidence was required in order to gain the necessary fourteen votes in the OAS. In addition, if we had acted earlier, we might have jeopardized our position in Berlin because our European Allies would have concluded that our preoccupation with Cuba was such as to reveal our lack of

interest in Berlin, thus tempting the Russians to act in Berlin. Earlier action would undoubtedly have forced us to declare war on Cuba and this action, without the evidence we now have, would have thrown Latin American support to Castro.

There followed a discussion of why evidence of Soviet missiles was lacking. Information about the strategic missile sites was reported by the refugees but these reports could not be substantiated from aerial photography. Aerial photographs taken on August 29th revealed no missile sites. It was not until October 14th that photographic evidence of the sites and missiles was available. The cloud cover prevented photography for a period of time and the possibility of an attack on an overflying American plane led to a restriction on the number of U-2 flights. Mr. McCone felt that the information given to Senator Keating about the missile sites had come from refugee sources, which he had accepted without further substantiation. The Attorney General pointed out that even if there had been U-2 flights, construction at the missile sites was not far enough along to have been detected by photography much earlier than October 14. It was pointed out that all Soviet experts agreed that Khrushchev would not send strategic missiles to Cuba. Therefore, there was a tendency to downgrade the refugee reports.

Commenting on what should be said publicly about our actions in Cuba, Secretary Rusk cautioned that we should say nothing now which might tie our hands later in the event we wanted to take additional actions.

The President referred again to the question of distinguishing between Soviet missiles in Cuba and United States missiles in Turkey and Italy. Secretary Rusk read extracts from the NATO communique of 1959. The President thought that it was most important that everyone be fully briefed as to why these situations with respect to the deployment of missiles do not match. He again called attention to the secret deployment of the weapons and the TASS statement saying that the Russians had no need to position strategic missiles in foreign countries. Soviet missiles in Cuba have a quite different psychological effect than Soviet missiles positioned in the USSR in that the Soviet action in Cuba may in fact be a probing action to find out what we would be prepared to do in Berlin.

Secretary Rusk added that the threat to the United States from Soviet missiles in Cuba was of worldwide importance because this threat was to a country which in effect provided the sole defense of some forty Free World States.

The President suggested that we should make clear the difference between our Cuban blockade and the Berlin blockade by emphasizing that we were not preventing shipments of food and medicine to Cuba, but only preventing the delivery of offensive military equipment.

General Taylor asked how we should reply to the question: Are we preparing to invade? The President responded by saying that we should ask the press not to push this line of questioning and to accept our statement that we are taking all precautionary moves in anticipation of any contingency. Secretary McNamara agreed that we should say that the Defense Department had been ordered to be prepared for any contingency and that we were not now ready to say anything more than was in the President's speech.

In response to a Presidential question, Secretary McNamara said that an information group was working on the problem of voluntary press censorship based on experience during the Korean War.

*[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]*

Secretary McNamara reported that the Defense Department was working on how we would prevent the introduction into Cuba of nuclear weapons by airplanes. He said some planes could fly non-stop from the Soviet Union if refueled en route. Present arrangements provided that we would be informed of any plane flying to Cuba and we would then decide what action to take against it.

It was agreed that no reserves would be called today, but that a review would be made tonight as to the necessity



of such action.

Acting Secretary Fowler raised several questions involving domestic controls, including gold transfers, foreign exchange controls, and control of the stock market. He said, in response to the President's question, that another look would be taken the following day before any recommendation would be made as to closing the stock market.

Secretary Rusk said that if we were asked whether our blockade was an act of war, we should say that it was not. The President asked whether friendly ships would be halted and Admiral Anderson replied in the affirmative, saying that we would challenge all ships. The President agreed that we should stop all Soviet Bloc and non-Bloc ships when the order to institute the blockade was given.

Portion of the NSC Meeting Minutes, Monday, October 22, 1962/3/

/3/The remainder of the source text is classified Top Secret; Sensitive and has the handwritten notation "Absolutely No Distribution."

The President discussed the reasons why he had decided against an air strike now. First, there was no certainty that an air strike would destroy all missiles now in Cuba. We would be able to get a large percentage of these missiles, but could not get them all.

In addition we would not know if any of these missiles were operationally ready with their nuclear warheads and we were not certain that our intelligence had discovered all the missiles in Cuba. Therefore, in attacking the ones we had located, we could not be certain that others unknown to us would not be launched against the United States. The President said an air strike would involve an action comparable to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Finally, an air strike would increase the danger of a worldwide nuclear war.

The President said he had given up the thought of making an air strike only yesterday morning. In summary, he said an air strike had all the disadvantages of Pearl Harbor. It would not insure the destruction of every strategic missile in Cuba, and would end up eventually in our having to invade.

Mr. Bundy added that we should not discuss the fact that we were not able to destroy all the missiles by means of an air strike because at some later time we might wish to make such an attack./4/

/4/NSC Record of Action No. 2459 for this meeting reads as follows:

"Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba

"a. Noted an intelligence summary presented by the Director of Central Intelligence.

"b. Discussed the domestic aspects of actions to be announced later in the day.

"c. Considered future military and political actions to follow implementation of the quarantine." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings)

## **42. National Security Action Memorandum 196**

Washington, October 22, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAMs. No classification marking. In addition to the recipients mentioned in the source text, copies were also sent to Ball, Gilpatric, Thompson, Sorensen, Bundy, O'Donnell, Salinger, Wilson, Rostow, and Nitze.

TO

The Vice President

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Attorney General

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Establishment of an Executive Committee of the National Security Council

I hereby establish, for the purpose of effective conduct of the operations of the Executive Branch in the current crisis, an Executive Committee of the National Security Council. This committee will meet, until further notice, daily at 10:00 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. I shall act as Chairman of this committee, and its additional regular members will be as follows: the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Ambassador-at-Large, the Special Counsel, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The first meeting of this committee will be held at the regular hour on Tuesday, October 23rd, at which point further arrangements with respect to its management and operation will be decided.

John Kennedy

**43. Memorandum for the File**

Washington, October 24, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on October 24. A briefer account of this meeting by Clifton is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Clifton Series, Conferences with the President. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 275-279.

SUBJECT

Leadership meeting on October 22nd at 5:00 p.m.

ATTENDED BY

The Leadership, except for Senator Hayden,

The President, Rusk, McNamara, McCone and Ambassador Thompson

McCone read a summary of the situation, copy of which is attached./1/ This statement had been discussed with the President, Attorney General and Bundy and had been modified to conform to their views.

/1/Not found attached and not printed.

There were a few questions of a substantive nature, Hickenlooper asked when missiles would be in operational status. McCone replied with the existing figures as reported in the morning report. Hickenlooper then asked if the Cuban situation is tied in to the China/India confrontation. McCone replied that we have no information one way or the other. Thompson then indicated it was more probable that Cuba may force a showdown on Berlin.

Secretary Rusk then reviewed his current appraisal of the Soviet Union indicating there had been some radical moves within the USSR which were indicating a tougher line. It appeared the hard-liners are coming in to ascendancy and the soft co-existent line seems to be disappearing. Peiping seems somewhat more satisfied with Moscow now. Rusk stated that he did not wish to underestimate the gravity of the situation; the Soviets were taking a very serious risk, but this in his opinion represents the philosophy of the "hard-liners". Russell questioned the Secretary as to whether things will get better in the future, whether we will have a more propitious time to act than now, the thrust of his questioning being, "Why wait." Rusk answered that he saw no opportunity for improvement.

The President then reviewed the chronology of the situation, starting on Tuesday, October 16th, when the first information was received from the photographic flight of October 14th. He stated that he immediately ordered extensive overflights; that McCone briefed President Eisenhower; that we must recognize that these missiles might be operational and therefore military action on our part might cause the firing of many of them with serious consequences to the United States; furthermore the actions taken, and further actions which might be required, might cause the Soviets to react in various areas, most particularly Berlin, which they could easily grab and if they do, our European Allies would lay the blame in our lap. The President concluded whatever we do involves a risk; however we must make careful calculations and take a chance. To do nothing would be a great mistake. The blockade of Cuba on the importation of offensive weapons was to be undertaken, all ships would be stopped and those containing offensive weapons would not be permitted to proceed. We have no idea how the Bloc will react but the indications are, from unconfirmed sources, they will attempt to run the blockade. Initially the blockade would not extend to petroleum. This might be a further step. We are taking all military preparations for either an air strike or an invasion. It was the President's considered judgment that if we have to resort to active military actions, then this would involve an invasion. Rusk then stated that our proposed action gave the other side a chance to pause. They may pull back or they may rapidly intensify the entire situation existing between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Senator Russell then demanded stronger steps, stated he did not think we needed time to pause. The President had warned them in September and no further warning was necessary. We must not take a gamble and must not temporize; Khrushchev has once again rattled his missiles; he can become firmer and firmer, and we must react. If we delay, if we give notification, if we telegraph our punches, the result will be more a difficult military action and more American lives will be sacrificed. The thrust of Senator Russell's remarks were to demand military action. He did not specifically say by surprise attack; however he did not advocate warning.

McNamara then described the blockade, indicating that this might lead to some form of military action; that there would be many alternative courses open to us. The President then reviewed in some detail time required to assemble an invasion force which would involve 90,000 men in the actual landings and a total of about 250,000 men. He stated this could not be done in 24 or 36 hours but would take a number of days and that many preliminary steps had been taken.

Halleck recalled a recent briefing by Secretary McNamara in which he stated it would take three months to prepare adequately to invade Cuba. McNamara then reaffirmed the 250,000-man figure, with 90,000 of them

actually involved in the landing force. He stated that he could be ready in 7 days and that the landing would be preceded by substantial air strike. Russell again questioned the delay. He also seriously criticized any policy which involved extensive airborne alerts of SAC in the interests of our state of readiness, pointing out that the consequences would be the serious attrition of our SAC forces, most particularly the B-47s, which are now quite old. McNamara stated that we could carry on an airborne alert indefinitely because preliminary plans had been made, repair parts, etc., secured and were in position.

Vinson then asked if the Joint Chiefs of Staff actually approved the plans for the invasion. McNamara answered, "Yes." The plans had been developed over a 10-month period and had been submitted to the President by the JCS on a number of occasions.

Note: This question did not refer to whether the JCS did or did not approve the proposed actions of blockade against Cuba.

The President then reviewed matters again, read an intelligence note from a United Nations source which indicated Soviet intention to grab Berlin. Russell promptly replied that Berlin will always be a hostage. He then criticized the decision, stated we should go now and not wait.

Halleck questioned whether we were absolutely sure these weapons were offensive. The President answered affirmatively. McNamara then made a most unusual statement. He said, "One might question whether the missiles are or are not offensive. However there is no question about the IL 28s." Note: This was the first time anyone has raised doubt as to whether the MRBMs and the IRBMs are offensive missiles.

Questions were then raised concerning the attitude of our Allies. The President advised steps taken to inform our major Allies. He then read the message received from the Prime Minister which in effect agreed to support us in the United Nations and then raised many warnings including the dangers to Berlin, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, etc., etc./2/

/2/See footnote 1, Document 41.

Senator Saltonstall brought up the question of the legality of the blockade. A great many Senators expressed concern over the proposed action with the OAS, indicating that they felt the OAS would delay rather than act. Saltonstall then asked whether a blockade would be legal if the OAS did not support it. The President answered that it probably would not; however we would proceed anyway.

Fulbright then stated that in his opinion the blockade was the worst of the alternatives open to us and it was a definite affront to Russia and that the moment that we had to damage or sink a Soviet ship because of their failure to recognize or respect the blockade we would be at war with Russia and the war would be caused because of our own initiative. The President disagreed with this thinking. Fulbright then repeated his position and stated in his opinion it would be far better to launch an attack and to take out the bases from Cuba. McNamara stated that this would involve the spilling of Russian blood since there were so many thousand Russians manning these bases. Fulbright responded that this made no difference because they were there in Cuba to help on Cuban bases. These were not Soviet bases. There was no mutual defense pact between the USSR and Cuba. Cuba was not a member of the Warsaw Pact. Therefore he felt the Soviets would not react if some Russians got killed in Cuba. The Russians in the final analysis placed little value on human life. The time has come for an invasion under the President's statement of February 13th./3/Fulbright repeated that an act [attack] on Russian ships is an act of war against Russia and on the other hand, an attack or an invasion of Cuba was an act against Cuba, not Russia. Fulbright also expressed reservations concerning the possible OAS action.

/3/Presumably Fulbright is referring to the statement made by the President on September 13; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 674-675.

The President took issue with Fulbright, stating that he felt that an attack on these bases, which we knew were manned by Soviet personnel, would involve large numbers of Soviet casualties and this would be more provocative than a confrontation with a Soviet ship.

Vinson urged that if we strike, we strike with maximum force and wind the matter up quickly as this would involve the minimum of American losses and insure the maximum support by the Cuban people at large who, he reasoned, would very quickly go over to the side of the winner.

The meeting was concluded at 6:35 to permit the President to prepare for his 7:00 o'clock talk to the nation./4/

/4/For text of the President's report to the American people, see *ibid.*, pp. 806-809.

It was decided to hold a meeting on Wednesday, October 24th. During this meeting Senator Hickenlooper expressed himself as opposed to the action and in favor of direct military action. He stated that in his opinion ships which were accosted on the high sea and turned back would be a more humiliating blow to the Soviets and a more serious involvement to their pride than the losing of as many as 5,000 Soviet military personnel illegally and secretly stationed in Cuba.

John A. McCone/5/

Director

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

#### **44. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev**

Washington, October 22, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. At 7:41 p.m. on October 21 the Department of State had sent Ambassador Kohler the first draft of this message. (Telegram 961 to Moscow; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163) Subsequent changes and additions resulted in only the second and final paragraphs remaining as originally drafted. The message was delivered to the Foreign Ministry at about 6 p.m. Washington time. Also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 19, 1973, pp. 635-636.

Dear Mr. Chairman: A copy of the statement I am making tonight concerning developments in Cuba and the reaction of my Government thereto has been handed to your Ambassador in Washington./1/ In view of the gravity of the developments to which I refer, I want you to know immediately and accurately the position of my Government in this matter.

/1/See footnote 4, Document 43; a 3-paragraph memorandum of Rusk's conversation with Dobrynin at 6 p.m., during which the Secretary of State gave the Soviet Ambassador copies of the statement and this message, is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-2262.

In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the one thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility that your Government would not correctly understand the will and determination of the United States in any given situation, since I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor.

At our meeting in Vienna and subsequently, I expressed our readiness and desire to find, through peaceful negotiation, a solution to any and all problems that divide us. At the same time, I made clear that in view of the

objectives of the ideology to which you adhere, the United States could not tolerate any action on your part which in a major way disturbed the existing over-all balance of power in the world. I stated that an attempt to force abandonment of our responsibilities and commitments in Berlin would constitute such an action and that the United States would resist with all the power at its command.

It was in order to avoid any incorrect assessment on the part of your Government with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took place, the United States would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

Moreover, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing its support of this declared policy.<sup>/2/</sup> Despite this, the rapid development of long-range missile bases and other offensive weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. I must tell you that the United States is determined that this threat to the security of this hemisphere be removed. At the same time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any misjudgment on your part.

<sup>/2/</sup>For text of this resolution, October 3, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1962, pp. 389-390.

I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiation.

Sincerely,

JFK/3/

<sup>/3/</sup>Kennedy's initials appear in an unidentified hand presumably indicating he signed the original.

#### **45. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan**

October 22, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The source text bears no drafting information. No time appears on the source text. Kennedy refers to it as happening "one hour" after Rusk gave Dobrynin the message to Khrushchev, but that would be during the address to the nation. Macmillan states that the conversation took place at 11:30 p.m. London time. (Harold Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, 1961-1963, p. 194)

The clandestine way that the Soviets have made their build-up in Cuba would have unhinged us in all of Latin America. To allow it to continue would have thrown into question all our statements about Berlin.

PM spoke.

We have the potential to occupy Cuba but we didn't start that way.

There would be a gap of some days before invasion could be mounted. Preparations for invasion would have public notice. This way provides action without immediate escalation to war.

Action is limited now. Greater force would give him the same excuse in Berlin.

It may be necessary to expand blockade to include fuel, lubricants and so forth.

PM spoke. (about possible Russian actions)

He may require us to seize their ships by force.

There is no telling what he will do--probably it will be something in Berlin.

PM spoke.

We have had no plan to invade Cuba. We must get their missiles out. What exchange possible is not known. But getting the missiles out is the object of our policy.

We are aware that this action is not complete application of force--does not immediately solve the problem.

The alternatives were air strike or invasion. These may be necessary but going completely into Cuba now invites him into Berlin.

PM spoke.

If we had the force on hand to take Cuba tonight that would be okay, but it would take a week to build up.

Prime Minister spoke.

We are attempting to begin the escalation in a way to prevent WW III. Maybe this will result anyway, but we cannot accept his actions.

PM spoke. (about talking to K on phone)

No, but I sent a letter to him one hour ago./1/

/1/Document 44.

Khrushchev is playing a double game. He said he wasn't going to do anything until after the election. He said weapons in Cuba were not offensive.

It is obvious that he was attempting to face us in November with a bad situation.

PM answered.

Mr. Bundy suggested the following point which the President made.

The build-up in Cuba, if completed, would double the number of missiles the Soviets could bring to bear on the U.S. They would also overcome our warning system which does not face south. Furthermore, the short distance involving short times of flight would tempt them to make a first strike.

PM spoke.

Some action was necessary. It could result in WW III; we could lose Berlin.

PM spoke.

Invasion may yet be required. It requires seven days for mobilization of the necessary forces. In any event we won't invade until I speak again with you.

PM spoke.

It faces Khrushchev with action taken which has unpleasant options for him also.

#### **46. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State**

Paris, October 22, 1962, 9 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2262. Secret; Niact; Elite. Received in the Department of State at 7:29 p.m.

1901. Eyes only for the Secretary. Deptel 2300./1/ I accompanied Mr. Acheson this afternoon when he called on President de Gaulle at five pm local time./2/ Mr. Acheson began conversation by presenting President de Gaulle with copy of President's letter contained Deptel 2304./3/ He also handed President de Gaulle part one of President's speech/4/ since other sections not yet received by Embassy. However, they will be delivered to President de Gaulle's Chef de Cabinet as soon as received.

/1/Telegram 2300, October 21, reported that a special air flight carrying Acheson and a special briefing officer would arrive in Paris at 2 a.m. October 22 and should be met by Finletter and Lyon. (Ibid., 611.3722/10-2162)

/2/For an account of this meeting and other briefings by U.S. officials in Paris, see Sherman Kent's November 14 memorandum for the record in the Supplement under date of October 21. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, HS/HC 850A, Job 84-00499R)

/3/Not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 39.

/4/For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962*, pp. 806-809.

President de Gaulle read both communications carefully and then remarked that he would welcome further elucidation by Mr. Acheson.

Mr. Acheson outlined background of present situation in Cuba, reason for President's proposed action, going into considerable detail, emphasizing that maximum buildup had occurred within past week, and saying that he had Mr. Sherman Kent with him who was prepared to brief President de Gaulle in more detail.

President de Gaulle listened with obvious interest and then remarked that US for first time felt itself threatened since missiles in Cuba were aimed at US and they had no other reason to be in Cuba save threaten US. He continued that President Kennedy wishes to react, and to react now, and certainly France can have no objection to that since it is legal for a country to defend itself when it finds itself in danger.

He then referred to blockade and said that of course there would be no objection on part of France to US initiating such blockade, but he himself had doubts as to its effectiveness. He wondered whether it would be sufficiently effective to cause Cubans [Soviets] to remove missiles and their bases. He admitted it would at least stop additional missiles going to Cuba.

President de Gaulle then referred to our proposal to consult with other American nations, asked whether that would be effective, and remarked he himself did not know.

With respect to proposed action in Security Council, President de Gaulle remarked that he realized that this was in line with our policy. Personally he did not think it would be practical. There might be much talk, but he doubted whether Security Council would be effective.



In conclusion, President de Gaulle said that he felt blockade was one positive step, and he repeated that France made no objection thereto. President de Gaulle said he believed that if blockade were initiated USSR would react perhaps in neighborhood of Cuba, but more likely in area where they could act more effectively. President de Gaulle felt they would choose Berlin since they would want to make West suffer, and this was where they could do so most effectively. If they choose Berlin, President de Gaulle said, three powers would have to take necessary steps; number of countersteps have been prepared and they would have to be taken.

President de Gaulle continued that perhaps Soviets wished, and perhaps US also wished to some extent, to intensify international situation somewhat to bring about talks. Perhaps that is Mr. Khrushchev's view. President de Gaulle said he did not think we would have war but if Soviets forced US in such places as Berlin, France would be with US, "France will act in accord with you."

President de Gaulle expressed appreciation for having been informed by President. He said that he realized this had been done after decision had been made, but nevertheless appreciated being informed. He said he would reply to President's letter as soon as possible, but meanwhile if Mr. Acheson saw President please explain de Gaulle's appreciation and tell him he would be replying to his message./5/

/5/A copy of de Gaulle's reply, November 2, is in the Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.

President de Gaulle said that in this serious time it was important that governments keep in close contact. This would be done in Washington through Ambassador Alphand and through Ambassador Bohlen when he arrives here shortly. President de Gaulle ruminated that while one never knew what real intentions of Soviets were, he did not think present situation would lead to war. He thought it might be great maneuver to engage US in talks on Berlin and on Cuba. Berlin was the sensitive point and it was there that Soviets no doubt would press. Perhaps also Khrushchev had in mind impressing other Latin American states by showing them that USSR could establish themselves anywhere in Western hemisphere and could not be moved out. He repeated he hoped blockade would be effective, but did not think it would be.

At this point Mr. Kent was called into room to brief President de Gaulle. President de Gaulle was obviously very interested in briefing and showed keen interest, asking pertinent questions, which revealed his military background. In addition to specific technical questions, he inquired as to Cuba's self-sufficiency with respect to food, petroleum, etc.

His obvious concern with this Cuban development was expressed in his statement: "US has been defending Europe in order that Europe may not become base against US. Now there is base in America directed against US. This is not a good thing."

President de Gaulle inquired what countries were being informed in similar manner. Mr. Acheson replied UK, France, Germany./6/

/6/Records of briefings of various foreign leaders are in the Supplement.

President de Gaulle was friendly, relaxed and deeply interested. He appreciated significance of situation rapidly, and obviously found here subject which interested him considerably. His Chef de Cabinet was extremely cooperative in maintaining secrecy of interview, and we drove to Elysee in Elysee motorcars and were taken in back door to avoid any leakage to press of Mr. Acheson's visit.

Lyon

#### **47. Minutes of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 23, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Executive Committee Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive. For McCone's 3-page record of this meeting, also printed in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 283-284, see the Supplement. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President) Gilpatric's handwritten 2-page record of this meeting is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, RLG's Notes on Cuba.

## 1. Intelligence

The meeting began with a briefing by Mr. McCone in which, in addition to written material, he emphasized the strength of evidence substantiating the non-participation of Cubans in Soviet missile installations in Cuba.

## 2. Unity on the Home Front

There was general discussion of the problem of adequate briefing of Members of the Congress and of the press on the way in which the crisis had developed and on the reasons for the decisions which had been taken. A number of assignments were given to individual members of the Committee for further work on this problem.

## 3. Blockade Effects Estimates

The President asked the Director of Central Intelligence for an analysis of effects of the blockade on Cuba, not to include food and medicine, and for a comparable analysis of the effects of a comparable blockade on Berlin./1/

/1/See footnote 1, Document 54.

## 4. Items Presented by the Department of Defense

a. The President approved plans for the issue of the Proclamation of Interdiction of ship delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba./2/ The Proclamation was to be issued at 6:00 pm and the Interdiction to become effective at dawn October 24.

/2/For text of the Proclamation of Interdiction, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 809-811. It was officially signed at 7:06 p.m.

b. The President approved and later signed an Executive Order authorizing the extension of tours of duty of certain members of the Armed Forces./3/

/3/For text of Executive Order 11058, see 27 F.R. 10403.

c. The President approved the following contingency plan for action in the event of an incident affecting U-2 overflights. The President will be informed through SAC/DOD channels, and it is expected that if there is clear indication that the incident is the result of hostile action, the recommendation will be for immediate retaliation upon the most likely surface-to-air site involved in this action. The President delegated authority for decision on this point to the Secretary of Defense under the following conditions:

(1) that the President himself should be unavailable

(2) that evidence of hostile Cuban action should be very clear.

d. It was expected, but not definitely decided, that if hostile actions should continue after such a single incident

and single retaliation, it would become necessary to take action to eliminate the effectiveness of surface-to-air missiles in Cuba.

e. The Secretary reported that he was not ready to make a recommendation on air intercept of Soviet flights to Cuba, that he was maintaining aircraft on alert for prompt reaction against known missile sites, that preparations for invasion were proceeding at full speed, that the quarantine would initially exclude POL, though this decision should be reexamined continuously.

f. The Attorney General was delegated to check the problem of the legal possibility of permitting foreign flag ships to participate in U.S. coastwise trade, in order to prevent shipping requirements for an invasion from disrupting U.S. commerce.

g. The Secretary of Defense recommended, and the President approved, about six low-level reconnaissance flights for the purpose of obtaining still more persuasive photography of Soviet missile sites.

h. The President, on hearing these reports, asked whether U.S. air forces in Southeastern United States were properly deployed against possible hostile reaction, and after discussion he directed that photographs be taken of U.S. airfields to show their current condition.

#### 5. State Department Business

a. Secretary Ball reported the urgent need for persuasive evidence in New York as described by Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy, and the President directed Secretary Ball and Mr. McCone to work together to meet this requirement as well as possible.

b. There was a brief discussion of possible reactions in Berlin, and the President indicated that he would wish to consider whether additional Soviet inspection of convoys would be acceptable. After the meeting, the President designated Assistant Secretary Nitze to be Chairman of a Subcommittee of the Executive Committee, for Berlin Contingencies./4/

/4/Documentation on the Nitze subcommittee is printed in volume XV. At this time the President also established two other subcommittees. The first, chaired by Rostow, was to consider advance planning during the crisis; the second, chaired by Wiesner, dealt with communications.

c. The President decided that it would be advisable not to make his forthcoming trip to Brazil, and the assignment of diplomatic disengagement was given to the Department of State.

6. There was discussion of the problem of effective communications and it was agreed that for the present, Dr. Wiesner will be asked informally to lead an inter-departmental review of this matter and to report on the problem on Wednesday, October 24.

McGeorge Bundy/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

#### **48. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, October 23, 1962, 5 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Niact; Elite; Eyes Only. The source text is a translation done at the Embassy in Moscow and received in the Department of State at 11:56 a.m. Kohler had been handed the letter at a meeting with Kuznetsov at 3 p.m. Moscow time. A copy of the

Russian-language text is *ibid.*

1042. Policy. Embtel 1041./1/ Embassy translation follows of Khrushchev's letter of October 23 to President. Kuznetsov informed me letter would not be published "for time being."

/1/Dated October 23. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2362)

*Begin Text.* Mr. President.

I have just received your letter, and have also acquainted myself with text of your speech of October 22 regarding Cuba./2/

/2/Document 44, and see footnote 4, Document 46.

I should say frankly that measures outlined in your statement represent serious threat to peace and security of peoples. United States has openly taken path of gross violation of Charter of United Nations, path of violation of international norms of freedom of navigation on high seas, path of aggressive actions both against Cuba and against Soviet Union.

Statement of Government of United States America cannot be evaluated in any other way than as naked interference in domestic affairs of Cuban Republic, Soviet Union, and other states. Charter of United Nations and international norms do not give right to any state whatsoever to establish in international waters control of vessels bound for shores of Cuban Republic.

It is self-understood that we also cannot recognize right of United States to establish control over armaments essential to Republic of Cuba for strengthening of its defensive capacity.

We confirm that armaments now on Cuba, regardless of classification to which they belong, are destined exclusively for defensive purposes, in order to secure Cuban Republic from attack of aggressor.

I hope that Government of United States will show prudence and renounce actions pursued by you, which would lead to catastrophic consequences for peace throughout world.

Viewpoint of Soviet Government with regard to your statement of October 22 is set forth in statement of Soviet Government, which is being conveyed to you through your Ambassador in Moscow./3/

/s/ N. Khrushchev. *End text.*

Original of letter being airpouched today.

Kohler

/3/For text of the Soviet statement, see *The New York Times*, October 24, 1962.

#### **49. Editorial Note**

At 9 a.m. on October 23, 1962, Secretary of State Rusk addressed a Special Meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States. After reviewing the steps that had brought the situation to a head, Rusk asked the Council to take all measures necessary to remove the threat to hemispheric security. For text of his address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 12, 1962, pages 720-722. The Council continued its deliberations until 5 p.m., when it passed, with one abstention, a resolution along the lines called for by Rusk. For its text, see *American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1962*, pages 408-410.

At 4 p.m. Ambassador Stevenson delivered his opening statement to the specially convened meeting of the United Nations Security Council calling the installation of the missiles in Cuba a profound challenge to the peace. For text of his statement and the following ones by the Cuban and Soviet representatives, see U.N. doc. S/PV. 1022.

## **50. Record of Action of the Second Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 23, 1962, 6 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1-5. Top Secret; Sensitive. For McCone's record of this meeting, see Document 51.

### 1. Intelligence

There was a preliminary report of low level reconnaissance.

### 2. Proclamation of Interdiction

The Proclamation of Interdiction was reviewed, slightly revised, and approved in the version later signed by the President./1/

/1/See footnote 2, Document 47.

### 3. Message to Khrushchev

A further message to Khrushchev was agreed in the form later dispatched by the Department of State./2/

/2/See Document 52.

4. The President requested the Secretary of Defense to give a further review to the process of naval action and engagement under the quarantine.

5. The Secretary of Defense was requested to consider and recommend appropriate arrangements for the continuation of General Norstad as Supreme NATO Commander during the crisis.

6. Assistant Secretary Pittman reported briefly on civil defense capability and was requested to produce recommendations for a special plan covering the southeastern area of the United States during the period of a possible invasion of Cuba. The President expected to review these plans at a separate meeting on October 24th.

7. Assistant Secretary Nitze was confirmed as Chairman of a subcommittee on Berlin preparations of the Executive Committee. The President invited Mr. Nitze to sit regularly with the Executive Committee in this capacity.

8. Counselor W.W. Rostow was confirmed as Chairman of a second subcommittee on advance planning.

MG. B.

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**FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**  
**1961-1963**  
**Volume XI**  
**Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington

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## Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

### 51. Memorandum for the Files

Washington, October 23, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. Also reproduced in *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, pp. 291-292.

#### SUBJECT

Executive Committee Meeting on 23 October 1962 6:00 p.m. All members present plus Counsel for Defense Department

1. Committee reviewed the blockade proclamation and approved it. It was signed by the President at 6:00 p.m.
2. The President instructed McNamara to review all details of instructions to the Fleet Commanders regarding procedures to be followed in the blockade. There was an extended discussion of actions to be taken under various assumed Soviet resistance activities such as (a) failing to stop, (b) refusing right to board, (c) ships turning around, heading in another direction, etc.
3. Discussion of the effect on U.S. industry by chartering and preempting the use of 20 or 30 American ships. Gilpatric reported that this would have little or no effect on the American economy. McCone questioned these findings; however Gilpatric said that this had been thoroughly studied and McCone's concerns as expressed at the morning meeting were unfounded. The Attorney General stated that it was within the law to use foreign bottoms, however decision was made to preempt U.S. bottoms and not worry about the consequences because they would not be serious.
4. The President urged that Norstad be retained at SHAPE during the period of crisis, perhaps until 1 February 63. He indicated Lemnitzer might be used as CINCEUR with Norstad remaining as SACEUR. Bundy stated that this is complicated as the two posts are so co-mingled that they really must be held by one man. Taylor raised question that if this was done it would hurt Lemnitzer's prestige. The President said that he felt that Norstad was so experienced and so capable and his judgment so sound, as evidenced by today's cable, /1/ copy of which I have not seen, that he would take the risk of NATO country criticisms, he did not think that Lemnitzer would be hurt, and he wished Norstad to remain. Defense to take under advisement and report within 24 hours.

/1/Not further identified.

5. In the prolonged discussion of report on Civil Defense problems, the President seemed particularly concerned

over the situation if we should launch attacks which might result in four or five missiles being delivered on the United States. DOD spokesmen stated that the area covered by the 1100-mile missiles involved 92 million people. They felt that fall-out space was available though not equipped for about 40 million. The President asked what emergency steps could be taken. Replied that many arrangements could be made without too much publicity, such as repositioning food, actually obtaining space, putting up shelter signs, etc. I got the conclusion that not very much could or would be done; that whatever was done would involve a great deal of publicity and public alarm.

Prior to the departure of Secretary McNamara at approximately 7:00 o'clock, McCone (who had not been called upon for an intelligence appraisal) stated to the President that he felt certain intelligence should be reported to the meeting prior to the departure of Secretary McNamara as some items observed by the Intelligence Community might prove of great significance.

[1 paragraph (17-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

John A. McCone/2/

Director

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## **52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union**

Washington, October 23, 1962, 6:51 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Confidential; Niact; Eyes Only.

985. You should deliver following letter addressed by the President to Chairman Khrushchev immediately. This replaces message contained Deptel 982./1/

/1/Not printed. (Ibid.: Lot 66 D 204)

"Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October twenty-third./2/ I think you will recognize that the steps which started the current chain of events was the action of your Government in secretly furnishing offensive weapons to Cuba. We will be discussing this matter in the Security Council. In the meantime, I am concerned that we both show prudence and do nothing to allow events to make the situation more difficult to control than it already is.

/2/See Document 48.

I hope that you will issue immediately the necessary instructions to your ships to observe the terms of the quarantine, the basis of which was established by the vote of the Organization of American States this afternoon, and which will go into effect at 1400 hours Greenwich time October twenty-four.

Sincerely, JFK"

Rusk

## **53. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to President Kennedy**

Washington, October 24, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Cuba, Security. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Rusk.

I met with Ambassador Dobrynin last evening on the third floor of the Russian Embassy and as you suggested made the following points:/1/

/1/The meeting took place at 9:30 p.m., October 23.

I told him first that I was there on my own and not on the instructions of the President. I said that I wanted to give him some background on the decision of the United States Government and wanted him to know that the duplicity of the Russians had been a major contributing factor. When I had met with him some six weeks before, I said, he had told me that the Russians had not placed any long-range missiles in Cuba and had no intention to do so in the future. He interrupted at that point and confirmed this statement and said he specifically told me they would not put missiles in Cuba which would be able to reach the continental United States.

I said based on that statement which I had related to the President plus independent intelligence information at that time, the President had gone to the American people and assured them that the weapons being furnished by the Communists to Cuba were defensive and that it was not necessary for the United States to blockade or take any military action. I pointed out that this assurance of Dobrynin to me had been confirmed by the TASS statement and then finally, in substance, by Gromyko when he visited the President on Thursday./2/ I said that based on these assurances the President had taken a different and far less belligerent position than people like Senators Keating and Capehart, and he had assured the American people that there was nothing to be concerned about.

/2/October 18; see Document 29.

I pointed out, in addition, that the President felt he had a very helpful personal relationship with Mr. Khrushchev. Obviously, they did not agree on many issues, but he did feel that there was a mutual trust and confidence between them on which he could rely. As an example of this statement I related the time that Mr. Khrushchev requested the President to withdraw the troops from Thailand and that step was taken within 24 hours.

I said that with the background of this relationship, plus the specific assurances that had been given to us, and then the statement of Dobrynin from Khrushchev to Ted Sorensen and to me that no incident would occur before the American elections were completed, we felt the action by Khrushchev and the Russians at this time was hypocritical, misleading and false. I said this should be clearly understood by them as it was by us.

Dobrynin's only answer was that he had told me no missiles were in Cuba but that Khrushchev had also given similar assurances through TASS and as far as he (Dobrynin) knew, there were still no missiles in Cuba.

Dobrynin in the course of the conversation made several other points. The one he stressed was why the President did not tell Gromyko the facts on Thursday. He said this was something they could not understand and that if we had the information at the time why didn't we tell Gromyko.

I answered this by making two points:

Number one, there wasn't anything the President could tell Gromyko that Gromyko didn't know already and after all, why didn't Gromyko tell the President this instead of, in fact, denying it. I said in addition the President was so shocked at Gromyko's presentation and his failure to recite these facts that he felt that any effort to have an intelligent and honest conversation would not be profitable.

Dobrynin went on to say that from his conversations with Gromyko he doesn't believe Gromyko thought there were any missiles in Cuba. He said he was going to contact his government to find out about this matter.



I expressed surprise that after all that had appeared in the papers, and the President's speech, that he had not had a communication on that question already.

Dobrynin seemed extremely concerned. When I left I asked him if ships were going to go through to Cuba. He replied that was their instructions last month and he assumed they had the same instructions at the present time. He also made the point that although we might have pictures, all we really knew about were the sites and not missiles and that there was a lot of difference between sites and the actual missile itself. I said I did not have to argue the point--there were missiles in Cuba--we knew that they were there and that I hoped he would inform himself also.

I left around 10:15 p.m. and went to the White House and gave a verbal report to the President.

#### **54. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (Smith) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone**

Washington, October 23, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA-Cuba. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

#### **SUBJECT**

Soviet Challenge to the Quarantine/1/

/1/Another memorandum from Smith to McCone, October 23, estimating the effect on Cuba of a blockade covering all goods except food and medicines is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Materials, 10/1/62-11/12/62)

1. Our best guess is that:

a. A challenge at sea to the quarantine is unlikely, at least for a day or two.

b. Thereafter a challenge is likely if the Soviets believe that their political efforts are not succeeding and a heightening of the crisis is required.

c. In staging any challenge, they would probably employ a vessel with nonmilitary cargo, refuse boarding, and exploit the subsequent attack by the US.

d. Retaliatory actions would follow if the incident itself failed to produce quick political results. It would be aimed either at a US ship elsewhere or at access to Berlin; we think the latter somewhat more likely.

2. Today's TASS statement suggests that the Soviets wish to retain full freedom of action while they consider their initial moves. There is some intelligence, dating from before the President's speech, indicating that the Soviets had decided to run any US blockade which might be established. Nevertheless, we think it likely that, at least for a day or two, they will avoid a challenge at sea while they observe the results of their political efforts to get the quarantine lifted.

3. If the USSR feels that these efforts are succeeding, the Soviets will probably continue to avoid challenges, lest an incident interrupt this favorable trend. On the other hand, if Soviet political tactics are bearing little fruit, they may judge that an incident would be useful as a means of heightening the crisis further and bringing extra international pressure on the US.

4. If and when they decide to permit an incident of this sort, the Soviets would not allow the US to board a vessel, since this would mean acceptance in principle of quarantine. Instead, their tactics would probably be to choose a ship carrying a nonmilitary cargo and to allow it to be attacked.

5. It is possible that the Soviets, in deciding to test the quarantine, would accompany their probe ship with a submarine which would counterattack the US vessel after the Soviet ship was struck. Or the counterattack might be made by an aircraft from Cuba. We think this unlikely, however, because the Soviets would almost certainly estimate that the US would respond by tightening the blockade and launching a full-scale effort to seek out and destroy a Soviet submarine in the area of quarantine operations.

6. After an incident, the Soviets would probably allow a pause while they exploited this incident and observed its effects. Unless the US showed signs of quickly yielding, however, we believe that they would then follow with some form of retaliation.

7. We do not believe that this would take the form of major military action. Instead, the Soviets would choose between an attack on a US ship elsewhere or a move on the access routes to Berlin, designed to remind the US of the vulnerability of its position there. In most circumstances, they probably would regard a Berlin move as both more effective and easier to control. Still, they would probably exercise care to avoid giving the impression that they were moving toward a general showdown with the US.

8. The USSR might use a submarine, however, to deliver through the quarantine some particularly critical item and to demonstrate, with a subsequent announcement, its ability to frustrate US efforts.

For the Board of National Estimates:

Abbot Smith

## **55. Record of Action of the Third Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 24, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1-5. Top Secret; Sensitive. For Robert Kennedy's recollections of the meeting, see *Thirteen Days*, pp. 67-71.

### 1. Intelligence

The Director of Central Intelligence summarized the intelligence briefing. The President directed that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of Central Intelligence take immediate action to obtain more "black boxes."

### 2. Defense Operations

a. The Secretary of Defense presented photographs of dispersal of existing U.S. planes in the southeast U.S., and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that modifications of readiness were being considered to permit improvement of the situation.

b. The Secretary of Defense reported the plans for naval interception, noted the presence of a submarine near the more interesting ships, and warned that radio silence might be imposed. There was discussion of the problem of dealing with such submarines, and it was understood that in the event of intervention by a submarine in the process of interception the submarine might have to be destroyed.

3. In the middle of the meeting there were reports that certain Soviet ships had appeared to have stopped or turned back, and the President directed that there be no interception of any target for at least another hour while clarifying information was sought.

4. Dr. Wiesner presented an initial briefing on the communications situation and the President directed that most urgent action be taken by State, Defense and CIA to improve communications worldwide, but particularly in the Caribbean area. After the meeting, the President, in discussion with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, directed that special responsibilities should be assigned to designated individuals and a plan for this purpose will be presented for approval by State, Defense and White House officers at the next meeting of the Committee.

5. The President directed that State and USIA should give immediate attention to increasing understanding in Europe of the fact that any Berlin crisis would be fundamentally the result of Soviet ambition and pressure, and that inaction by the United States in the face of the challenge in Cuba would have been more and not less dangerous for Berlin.

6. The President directed that a senior representative of USIA should regularly be present at meetings of the Executive Committee./1/

McGeorge Bundy

/1/Following this meeting, the Nitze (Berlin-NATO) Subcommittee met at 11 a.m. to consider various aspects of the Cuban crisis that might affect Berlin. For a record of this meeting, see vol. XV, pp. 395-397.

## **56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey**

Washington, October 24, 1962, 11:24 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2462. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Ball, cleared with Tyler and NEA, approved by Rusk. Also sent to Paris for USRO.

445. For Ambassadors Hare and Finletter from Secretary. Soviet reaction Cuban quarantine likely involve efforts compare missiles in Cuba with Jupiters in Turkey. While such comparison refutable, possible that negotiated solution for removal Cuban offensive threat may involve dismantling and removal Jupiters. Recognize this would create serious politico-military problems for US-Turkish relations and with regard to Turkey's place in NATO Alliance. Therefore need prepare carefully for such contingency order not harm our relations with this important ally.

Urgently request Ambassador Hare's assessment political consequences such removal under various assumptions, including outright removal, removal accompanied by stationing of Polaris submarine in area, or removal with some other significant military offset, such as seaborne multilateral nuclear force within NATO.

Ambassador Finletter also requested comment standpoint NATO aspect problem. Do not discuss with any foreigners./1/

Rusk

/1/At 2:19 p.m. on October 24 the Department of State sent a similar telegram to Rome. (Telegram 865 to Rome; *ibid.*)

## **57. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the**

## **National Security Council (Rostow) to President Kennedy**

Washington, October 24, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, WWRostow. Top Secret; Sensitive.

Representatives of State and Defense, the Attorney General, and Mr. Lovett, met to consider the course of action to be followed with respect to the Soviet vessels which have altered course (Group A), and those vessels still proceeding towards Cuba (Group B). With respect to Group A, it is recommended:

1. That the Department of Defense intercept, trail, and photograph, but not interfere with, such vessels. The object is to record the fact of their turnaround and, to the extent possible, the character of their cargo.

With respect to Group B, it is recommended that:

1. They be stopped and searched in accordance with the Proclamation;
2. That the order to search be determined by the order of their operational availability to our forces;
3. Should a vessel refuse to comply with orders to stop, we should proceed to execute the terms of the Proclamation with special attention to the minimum use of force, given the likelihood that their cargoes will prove innocent.

It is recommended that a Department of Defense spokesman announce that:

1. Some of the Bloc vessels proceeding towards Cuba appear to have altered course;
2. No intercepts have yet been necessary;
3. Other vessels are proceeding towards Cuba and will be intercepted in accordance with the Proclamation.

On a background basis, it will be explained that those vessels which altered course were those we had reason to believe contained offensive weapons; but that inspection of other vessels is required, now and in the future, until offensive weapons and installations are removed from Cuba, because such vessels could contain essential components for offensive weapons.

W. W. R./1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

## **58. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, October 24, 1962, 3:25 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking appears on the source text.

Bundy--Have you got the word in on what is happening at sea?

Ball--No.

Bundy--The six most interesting ships have turned back. Two others are turning on. We are starting over here a thinking session as to what might be done which will be going on all afternoon. If you want to come, it would be helpful to have you. Walt is here. If there is anyone you want to send, send him. I have told the Secretary and you are the only two I have told. Will you alert anyone else you wish to alert?

Ball--I will. The other ships are going forward?

Bundy--Two tankers are coming on, but six interesting ships have turned back; six may not be a precise figure. Khrushchev told Lord Russell he thought it would be useful to have a top level meeting.

Ball--I'll be over.

## **59. Editorial Note**

On October 24, 1962, Acting Secretary-General U Thant sent identical messages to President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev appealing to them to refrain from "any action which may aggravate the situation and bring with it the risk of war." He requested that each side take some time "to enable the parties concerned to get together with a view to resolving the present crisis peacefully and normalizing the situation in the Caribbean." (*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, page 422) Also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 12, 1962, page 740.

On October 25 President Kennedy responded to the Secretary-General reiterating U.S. statements made in the Security Council and assuring U Thant of his desire to reach a satisfactory solution of the crisis. (*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, page 424) Chairman Khrushchev also wrote to U Thant on October 25 welcoming and agreeing with the Acting Secretary-General's initiative. (*Ibid.*, page 425)

U Thant responded to Chairman Khrushchev the same day requesting that Soviet ships en route to Cuba avoid the interception area imposed by the U.S. quarantine in order to allow time for discussion of an agreement under the U.N. Charter. In a letter to President Kennedy, also on October 25, U Thant appealed to him to issue instructions to U.S. ships in the Caribbean to "do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of any untoward incident" and expressed the hope that a settlement could be reached quickly. (Both *ibid.*, pages 425-426)

## **60. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, October 24, 1962, 8:25 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking. A similar but briefer memorandum of a telephone conversation between Bundy and Ball at 8:05 p.m. is in the Supplement. (Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba)

Bundy--I am getting a little groggy, so many people have different views, but the current situation is this. Bob thinks that it may well be important to intercept a tanker and to turn him back. His own understanding was that that was his orders. I understand that there are complications. He is going to go down to Flag Plot and look hard and find out what he knows and what anyone knows about where these things will be. He agrees that we must not do this at night time. Therefore, the question is really what orders Admiral Innison (?) [Dennison] has for dawn, that they require Presidential action and a meeting of the Committee tonight. You had better argue with your Secretary.

Ball--Yes. Right.

Bundy--I understand that he is an anti-tanker interceptor. I think we have to leave the question of further discussion in suspense until McNamara has reviewed it and come in and said. If he comes in and says let's let it go until the meeting tomorrow morning, which we might as well have at 10 as at 8, because we miss dawn in either case. If he comes in and says that, does the Department wish to say no, no, we want orders for interception at dawn?

Ball--I don't think that we feel that strongly about that. My position is that since we are not singling out any special ships, then we ought to just take anything that comes on a completely nondiscriminatory basis, and not indulge any presumptions about what any particular kind of vessel might--

Bundy--I think that you will find that to do that requires a very distinct adjustment in the basic orders to the Navy. They are not operating on the basis of enforcing a blockade in that sense. They are enforcing a blockade with instructions from McNamara as to which ship to enforce it upon.

Ball--Adm. Ricker [Rickover?] felt that that was the easiest operational kind of--

Bundy--All I'm saying is is that means different orders from what they now have.

Ball--My own view, you may pick out certain ships as we were preparing to do, those ships are not now in the equation; therefore, the thing to do is to take anything that comes and I would feel happier if the first ship that came along was a Belgian or Moroccan ship, so that we could establish the principle of what we are doing.

Bundy--Right.

Ball--If it happens to be a Soviet tanker, . . .

Bundy--Right.

Ball--I will probably hear later tonight from Bob after he has been out there and had a look.

Bundy--I would think that when Bob has had a look at Flag Plot, he will call me and I will call you.

Ball--Very good.

## **61. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy**

Moscow, October 24, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Cuba. A copy of this letter, transmitted in telegram 1070 from Moscow, October 24, arrived in the Department of State at 9:24 p.m. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 304)

Dear Mr. President: I have received your letter of October 23,/1/ have studied it, and am answering you.

/1/See Document 52.

Just imagine, Mr. President, that we had presented you with the conditions of an ultimatum which you have presented us by your action. How would you have reacted to this? I think that you would have been indignant at such a step on our part. And this would have been understandable to us.

In presenting us with these conditions, you, Mr. President, have flung a challenge at us. Who asked you to do this? By what right did you do this? Our ties with the Republic of Cuba, like our relations with other states,

regardless of what kind of states they may be, concern only the two countries between which these relations exist. And if we now speak of the quarantine to which your letter refers, a quarantine may be established, according to accepted international practice, only by agreement of states between themselves, and not by some third party. Quarantines exist, for example, on agricultural goods and products. But in this case the question is in no way one of quarantine, but rather of far more serious things, and you yourself understand this.

You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather are setting forth an ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force. Consider what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What would it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean guiding oneself in one's relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness. You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us.

No, Mr. President, I cannot agree to this, and I think that in your own heart you recognize that I am correct. I am convinced that in my place you would act the same way.

Reference to the decision of the Organization of American States cannot in any way substantiate the demands now advanced by the United States. This Organization has absolutely no authority or basis for adopting decisions such as the one you speak of in your letter. Therefore, we do not recognize these decisions. International law exists and universally recognized norms of conduct exist. We firmly adhere to the principles of international law and observe strictly the norms which regulate navigation on the high seas, in international waters. We observe these norms and enjoy the rights recognized by all states.

You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that every sovereign state enjoys, you are trying to legislate in questions of international law, and you are violating the universally accepted norms of that law. And you are doing all this not only out of hatred for the Cuban people and its government, but also because of considerations of the election campaign in the United States. What morality, what law can justify such an approach by the American Government to international affairs? No such morality or law can be found, because the actions of the United States with regard to Cuba constitute outright banditry or, if you like, the folly of degenerate imperialism. Unfortunately, such folly can bring grave suffering to the peoples of all countries, and to no lesser degree to the American people themselves, since the United States has completely lost its former isolation with the advent of modern types of armament.

Therefore, Mr. President, if you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the United States. When you confront us with such conditions, try to put yourself in our place and consider how the United States would react to these conditions. I do not doubt that if someone attempted to dictate similar conditions to you--the United States--you would reject such an attempt. And we also say--no.

The Soviet Government considers that the violation of the freedom to use international waters and international air space is an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war. Therefore, the Soviet Government cannot instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the orders of American naval forces blockading that Island. Our instructions to Soviet mariners are to observe strictly the universally accepted norms of navigation in international waters and not to retreat one step from them. And if the American side violates these rules, it must realize what responsibility will rest upon it in that case. Naturally we will not simply be bystanders with regard to piratical acts by American ships on the high seas. We will then be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary and adequate in order to protect our rights. We have everything necessary to do so.

Respectfully,

N. Khrushchev/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Khrushchev signed the original.

## **62. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**

New York, October 25, 1962, 8:40 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General. Confidential; Limited Distribution. The source text bears the notation "Bundy saw 11 p.m. 25 Oct."

UNMIS 18. For Harriman--State; Forrestal--White House. From Schlesinger. Fol is text of memo I sent to Stevenson October 24: "Memorandum to Governor Stevenson.

I had a talk this evening with Averell Harriman. He made the following points:

1. Khrushchev, he said, is sending us desperate signals to get us to help take him off the hook. He is sending messages exactly as he did to Eisenhower directly after the U-2 affair. Eisenhower ignored these messages to his cost. We must not repeat Eisenhower's mistake.

2. The signals are (1) the instructions to the Soviet ships to change their course; (2) the message to Bertrand Russell;/1/ (3) his obviously premeditated appearance last night at an American concert in Moscow and his subsequent visit with the American singer.

/1/For text of this letter, October 24, see *American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 421-422.

3. In view of these signals from Khrushchev, the worst mistake we can possibly make is to get tougher and to escalate. Khrushchev is pleading with us to help him find a way out.

4. The best way out is the resolution recommended by Cleveland as Tab C in his memorandum (the defanging resolution)./2/ However, Harriman disagrees with Cleveland's view that we should try to negotiate this resolution. He thinks we should try to get Ireland to introduce the resolution tomorrow. We cannot afford to lose any time. Incidents--stopping of ships, etc.--will begin the process of escalation, engage Soviet prestige and reduce the chances of a peaceful resolution. If we act shrewdly and speedily, we can bail Khrushchev out and discredit the tough guys around him--the ones who sold him the Cuban adventure on the theory that Americans were too liberal to fight.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

October 24, 1962"

/2/Presumably a reference to Cleveland's October 24 memorandum to Rusk and Ball. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438) See the Supplement.

## **63. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)**

Washington, October 24, 1962, 10:30 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking.

Ball--The letter from Khrushchev/1/ is garbled, and I am trying to fill it in. As far as shipping goes, it is pretty repetitious. The significant part is the last paragraph. It says: Ball reads last paragraph. It simply says that the OAS has no authority in these matters; that one has to bide by international law; we are committing an act of



piracy; if you were in his place you would take the same view. The significant part is the part I read to you. I don't think we have any option but to go ahead and test this thing out, in the morning, but at least this is the notice he has given to us.

/1/Document 61.

Pres.--Do you want to call up Bob McNamara because we have got the tanker we talked about stopping.

Ball--I'll talk to Bob about it and I will also get hold of Dean and maybe we had better get back to you./2/

/2/A memorandum of Ball's telephone conversation with McNamara at 10:40 p.m. is in the Supplement. (Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba)

Pres.--I will be around.

Ball--The second thing is this. U Thant has just gotten through speaking, and I am waiting for a call from Stevenson. Stevenson is kicking like a steer about reply tonight, but I think we have to reply tonight.

Pres.--He doesn't want to reply tonight?

Ball--He is concerned primarily about the conditions which we put in that proposed reply because he feels that those are in effect conditions to talking rather than the kind of conditions that might emerge out of talk. My own feeling is that we have got to be quite specific about them, otherwise we will get ourselves in a hopeless harass, and I don't think we can afford to do it at this point.

Pres.--How does he want us to change it?

Ball--I think he would like to suggest some concessions we are prepared to make. I am waiting for a call from him. If it is agreeable to you, I am going to take a very firm line that we have to get this thing back to U Thant tonight even though it isn't published because I think we ought to be very prompt in getting some reply back before the Soviet Union comes in with an acceptance of the U Thant proposal. I may not be able to hold the line with him and he may insist on talking with you. I think we have got to go ahead.

Pres.--They are obviously not going to stop. He is stopping the ones he doesn't want us to have. I suppose we will have to stop these. The press will give the impression that we are easing the situation.

Ball--That is inevitable. I have told them that there was no decision not to stop tankers, but only the fact that the initial version does not include POL. They are confused on this. I think we have worked it out so that story will be all right.

Pres.--I think the impression tonight seems to be that the Russians are giving way, which is not quite accurate. They want to believe that it is giving way. I think that, after you talk to McNamara and the Sec., they ought to have either State and Defense put out the indication that Russian ships are approaching.

Ball--I'll do that. Maybe I can persuade Adlai, if not he may insist on talking to you. In the meantime, I will get hold of Bob and Dean, and we may have to get back to you.

#### **64. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)**

Washington, October 24, 1962, 11:15 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking.

Pres.--To be sure that the Russians./1/ Of course we didn't present them with a way out. I don't know whether U Thant has presented them with a way out, whether they are interested in a way out. I suppose there may be a slim chance they may be, we ought to give out a message in a way that gives them enough of an out to stop their shipments without looking like they completely crawled down.

/1/At 10:45 the President had called Ball and stated that he had just had Khrushchev's letter (Document 61) read to him. A memorandum of this telephone conversation, which also deals with stopping a tanker, is *ibid.* See the Supplement.

Ball--We could try something along that line.

Pres.--In other words just say that we suggest the Russians suspend their shipping, until we have a chance to meet with them. Just say otherwise, they have got, we can't withdraw shipping, we can't stop. It may be that is the way he wants it. There is not much time.

Ball--This is what the letter said, that you said last night,/2/ because what you said last night was that you hoped that he would not challenge, direct his captains not to challenge the blockade, and that we were talking about these letters in the Security Council. It would be the same idea.

/2/Document 52.

Pres.--I don't know if there is any way for a binding concentration. The time is so short. When we talk about a barrier, we talk about 500 miles, we can always take it at 300 miles if you have to. We can take it late in the afternoon, the question would be if there is any message we would send to U Thant to give them a way out.

Ball--What we might do, we might get up a draft of something tonight. Let me just read you what we sent him last night, what you sent him last night. Ball reads the letter. He had this in front of him when he, this looks as if he wrote it himself, saying in effect, talking about it in the Security Council . . . This is a letter coming back and saying that he can't do it.

Pres.--The only thing it seems to me would be to U Thant. I don't think there is anything we can say to him that will cause him to change. We are saying not to send them and he is going to send them. Whether U Thant gives him a way out or not, I don't know.

Ball--I just have been talking to Stevenson and the trouble with the U Thant proposal is that there is no inspection or verification in it at all. Stevenson said that he thinks that if we were to accept the principle of some preliminary conversation, in the course of the conversation we could insist upon some kind of verification about when you have to point into the UN; I would not have too much confidence in him or boarding parties in the UN getting on ships and that would give us protection while we were trying to work something out. That is going to take 2 or 3 days to do.

Pres.--He is going to hold up his ships during that 2 or 3 days.

Ball--What we could say is that if you will hold up your ships during the 2 or 3 days, we would have some preliminary talks in the UN to see to if there is some solution.

Pres.--I think rather than direct a message to him, we should get ourselves back to U Thant and say that he can request the Soviet Union to hold up their shipping for the next, for the immediate area, that we would be glad to get into conversations about how the situation could be adjusted.

Ball--If we were to say to the Sov. Union, it appears that a confrontation is about to take place,

Pres.--And to hold their ships, while we meet with him tomorrow afternoon. Probably that is about all we can do. Otherwise we just have to go with this thing. In that case, we could pick up this tanker tomorrow afternoon, instead of tomorrow morning.

Ball--Yep. I will talk to Bob, Dean and Adlai and get back to you.

**65. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)**

Washington, October 24, 1962, 11:25 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking.

Ball--The President called me again and we've been talking about what we might do about getting some kind of a message to K [Khrushchev]. The Pres. had the idea that maybe we ought to do with U Thant tonight instead of trying to get a message back to K because there isn't much we can say that we didn't say in that message he sent last night. Try to get U Thant to make a direct appeal to Mr. K to hold off his ships on the ground that there is going to be a confrontation in the morning which could escalate until there is a chance for a discussion on the modalities of negotiation. The Pres. is very reluctant to face this thing particularly with a tanker involved tomorrow until we make one last try to see if the UN can get itself in between.

Secretary--I must say that I don't think a tanker is the best case.

Ball--It isn't the best case. I talked to McNamara and what he said they had in mind with regard to the tanker was simply to hail it and ask it what it is carrying, where it was going, and if it answered satisfactory to let it go, not to board it. In fact the Commander has no instructions to do more than that. If it goes on through, then we have lost the principle of the quarantine, having done that. On the other hand, we could let this one go but then there will probably be a whole day without stopping a ship, and I am afraid this would be misinterpreted in Moscow, particularly in the light of this letter. The President's idea, this was a kind of an idea we were developing together was possibly if we could get Thant tonight to make the appeal on the ground that there was going to be a likelihood of a confrontation and ask K to instruct his fellows to talk with ours and see if a negotiation could be gotten under way. In the meantime, to hold his ships away from Cuba that something might be done.

Sec.--I don't think there is a chance in the world that K would get instructions to this tanker by 2 am.

Ball--In the meantime, we could hold off til, actually we could even change the thing for half a day as far as that goes. We could outrun the tanker.

Sec.--I should think that we ought to wait til daylight anyhow.

Ball--Well, we are going to wait til daylight as I understood it.

Sec.--I think you might talk to Adlai about this and see if U Thant on his own responsibility will ask Mr. K not to send his ships pending modalities.

Ball--Let me see what we can do.

Sec.--All right, fine. What about the answer?

Ball--If we did that, I suppose we wouldn't answer.

Sec.--Hold off until in the morning?

Ball--Yes. There really isn't anything much that we can say that hasn't been said. If we can now get Thant to do something rather than doing it ourselves.

Sec.--Right.

Ball--Let me see what I can work out when I talk to Stevenson.

**66. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)**

October 24, 1962, 11:45 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking. Ball was in Washington; Stevenson was in New York.

Ball--We've got another idea that I would like to try out on you. Do you think there is any chance that U Thant would be willing to send Mr. K a [letter?]. Let me bring you up to date. We've had a message from K/1/ in which he says in effect that he can't give instructions to his ships to abide by the blockade and that if we violate these rules, that will be our fault and they will be forced to take measures that they deem necessary and adequate to protect their rights, and they have what's necessary to do that. Implications being knowing that there may be a submarine or two in the waters, that could be an attempt to torpedo one of our ships. Would U Thant under all the circumstances knowing the possibility of a confrontation tomorrow be prepared to send a message to K along the lines that he is very concerned about possibility of a confrontation in connection with this quarantine, and that he asked K to hold his ships away from Cuban waters on the condition that we will not molest them while there is a discussion of the modalities of a possible negotiation.

/1/Document 61.

Stevenson--Yes, I think he might do something like this.

Ball--If we could get something out like that tonight, I think we would hold off, because all we've got is a tanker coming through. We've just given instructions not to touch the thing tonight. We can buy a day or two here and see how it goes.

Stevenson--I think it would be a lot more helpful for me in trying to get U Thant to do this if I could have a copy of the message that we have from K.

Ball--I can give you. It's a garbled message, and it hasn't been cleaned up yet.

Stevenson--Well, if you could put on the wire to me, so that I would have it first thing in the morning a substantial text of it.

Ball--I think it would have to be done tonight if we're going to do it because we've got a time dislocation and things are moving so swiftly. Is there a chance of getting hold of Thant tonight.

Stevenson--He's awful hard to get when he goes home. I am afraid it will be almost impossible to do anything with him tonight.

Ball--If you could even talk to him tonight.

Stevenson--I could talk to him on the phone and tell him what the burden of this thing is and that I'm going to be around in the morning with a suggestion that he send a message to K saying that he. I don't know whether he should say that he has this word.

Ball--I don't think he needs to say that he has any word.

Stevenson--See, what he's already said is please hold off on everything.

Ball--What he can say is that he is disturbed about the possibility of a confrontation at sea under the quarantine before further action could be taken toward trying to get this into political channels and he would therefore like an agreement from K that he will hold his ships off on the condition, away from Cuban waters, we won't molest them while the discussion of modalities goes forward.

Stevenson--He says that all concerned should refrain from any actions which may aggravate the situation and bring with it the risk of war. He will say, well I've already said that.

Ball--Yes, but this is giving specific content to it in terms of what the real danger, an immediate confrontation, may be.

Stevenson--I think if he had some feeling that we were likely to present this thing in general subject or conditions, which he knows about, I think maybe he would send such a message.

Ball--This position, I don't want to misrepresent the President on it, but this position that I have from him is that we could hold off for a while while there is some discussions on the modalities of the thing if they will hold their ships away while we do that.

Stevenson--As I understand it, are there any ships nearby?

Ball--There is a ship which was going to be challenged at 2 o'clock tomorrow morning, which is just about 2-1/2 hours from now. We have got that held off.

Stevenson--That was a tanker?

Ball--Yes, and we can continue to hold that one off until we can see if something like this would work.

Stevenson--Would we stop it anyway?

Ball--Yes, we were going to stop it.

Stevenson--Although it was not carrying--

Ball--That is on the theory that we stop everything and challenge it and find out what's on board.

Stevenson--Let me call him. I think he may have trouble getting this message off tonight.

Ball--You know, there is a little flexibility in this because we are challenging these ships 5 hundred miles out; we could outrun most of them and we could challenge them 200 miles out if necessary.

Stevenson--What's next . . . .

Ball--I'm not very clear just what comes how soon. But we could adjust that. We don't want to let ships go

through because this discredits our firmness of attention. What I think, if we could get an agreement from the Russians to hold their ships off while we talk about this, the modalities.

Stevenson--For a couple of days?

Ball--Yes, I think it would be that long probably before we get something settled. We won't take any action as long as their ships are held off, that way we avoid a confrontation until we can see if we can get the modalities with negotiation.

Stevenson--He has diverted the armed ships?

Ball--Yes.

Stevenson--Let me call him and see what I get.

67. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking.

Washington, October 25, 1962, 12:30 a.m.

Bundy--We have now written, and everybody but you have signed off on it, and I hope you won't object, a message to the Chairman/1/ telling him it's your fault and not ours on the basic ground that they misled us--the thing that we think we ought to get back into his chest--. The word of the Soviet Government is what caused the trouble. David Cline [Klein] is arranging to send it out. Do you want to hear it?

/1/See Document 68.

Ball--I would like to hear it. I'll tell you about my conversation with Stevenson./2/

/2/A memorandum of Ball's conversation with Stevenson at 12:20 a.m. is in Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. See the Supplement.

Bundy--How did it go?

Ball--With Stevenson?

Bundy--Yes, mine is in the typewriter.

Ball--The situation with Stevenson is that he finally got Thant out of bed and Thant has agreed to send a message to K which he probably can't do tonight because of the communications but will do it first thing in the morning.

Bundy--Why don't we offer him some communications?

Ball--I think it is probably a matter of his composing it.

Bundy--Nothing is going to happen tonight.

Ball--He says that first thing in the morning he will send the message to K saying that he, pending some consideration of his proposal, he would hope that K will keep his ships away and prevent a confrontation because he thinks there is a chance the Americans are prepared to discuss the modalities of a negotiation.

Bundy--Does that pin us to anything?

Ball--I raised this with Stevenson and in the first place this is not a public thing, this is a private--

Bundy--It will be public soon enough.

Ball--He doesn't.

Bundy--U Thant is on and we are not on on this?

Ball--That's it.

Bundy--Stevenson may go down the drain.

Ball--He just gives his impression. I think it's worth a play.

Bundy--It's worth a try.

Ball--I asked Stevenson to try to get the thing from him in the morning and shoot it down to us as soon as he can. I think I would have put it up in tougher terms, but that's the way it went.

Bundy--Yes, I think the main thing is that Adlai should know what he has sent in the morning.

Ball--I asked him to get it from Thant first thing and let us know, and he said he would and I hope Thant doesn't give too much of an impression of our willingness, but in any event it's just Thant giving an impression.

Bundy--Bundy reads reply to K.

Ball--There is only one very minor point, but I think it might be a major one. That is we use these offensive weapons; actually, my understanding in the conversation with Gromyko, that Gromyko was explicit that they had no weapons that could reach the US.

Bundy--He didn't say it that way.

Ball--I got this from the Secretary.

Bundy--He didn't say it. At least it did not appear in any transcript we had.

Ball--This may have been given by Dobrynin.

Bundy--It is true that Dobrynin has said things. I think this language is more precise in the case than we can document to the Chairman.

Ball--Well, of course his answer will be that they are not offensive.

Bundy--Well, he never said that actually.

Ball--Well, except that this was the implication of what was said by--

Bundy--Then change it to "such as long range nuclear missiles."

Ball--Yes, I think we can do that. It takes it out of that dialectical argument as to what's offensive and what isn't.

Bundy--"Such weapons as long range nuclear missiles."

Ball--Yes.

Bundy--That doesn't let us off the bombers. "Such weapons as (we don't want quite long range) nuclear missiles?"

Ball--I think that would be all right.

Bundy--"Of considerable range?" I don't know George; I have cleared it with everybody else; I think we had better leave it as it is. The point is clear enough.

Ball--Yes. We will deliver that tonight then.

Bundy--It'll be along. Klein is handling that.

Ball--The only thing that concerns me about the Stevenson thing is that he has probably given the impression to U Thant that we will go further than we will go. That's what worries me.

Bundy--I don't know how to advise you on that other than to say that we probably will not go further than we will go.

Ball--If it indicates a weakness in relation to K that will create another element of miscalculation.

Bundy--If he will hold off his ships, then the Americans are interested in the modalities?

Ball--Yes.

Bundy--Has Stevenson showed him our answer?

Ball--No. That is reserved for tomorrow morning.

Bundy--It would seem to me that you should say to Adlai that nothing in, from the point of view of us in Washington, any message to K should be inconsistent with that message.

Ball--I think I will get hold of Adlai first thing in the morning and let him go over and talk to Thant.

Bundy--If Adlai knows early in the morning that he must not sign the US to anything that would make that letter impossible without checking back with us.

Ball--I think that's the way to leave it.

Bundy--Right.

68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Confidential; Eyes Only. Drafted at the White House. A note on the source text indicates it was relayed to McNamara, Lemnitzer, CIA, and Departments of the Treasury and Justice.



Washington, October 25, 1962, 1:59 a.m.

997. Ref: Embtel 1070./1/ Signed original following message from President to Khrushchev delivered to Soviet Embassy 1:45 a.m. Washington time October 25. Please deliver to highest ranking Soviet official immediately available.

/1/See the source note, Document 61.

October 25, 1962

"Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October 24, and I regret very much that you still do not appear to understand what it is that has moved us in this matter.

The sequence of events is clear. In August there were reports of important shipments of military equipment and technicians from the Soviet Union to Cuba. In early September I indicated very plainly that the United States would regard any shipment of offensive weapons as presenting the gravest issues. After that time, this Government received the most explicit assurance from your Government and its representatives, both publicly and privately, that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba. If you will review the statement issued by TASS in September, you will see how clearly this assurance was given.

In reliance on these solemn assurances I urged restraint upon those in this country who were urging action in this matter at that time. And then I learned beyond doubt what you have not denied--namely, that all these public assurances were false and that your military people had set out recently to establish a set of missile bases in Cuba. I ask you to recognize clearly, Mr. Chairman, that it was not I who issued the first challenge in this case, and that in the light of this record these activities in Cuba required the responses I have announced.

I repeat my regret that these events should cause a deterioration in our relations. I hope that your Government will take the necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.

Sincerely yours, John F. Kennedy"

Please report time delivery.

Rusk

69. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

//Source: Department of State, USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Incoming Telegrams. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Received in New York at 3:01 a.m.

Washington, October 25, 1962, 2 a.m.

1084. Deliver to Ambassador Stevenson personally 8:30 am.

On further checking with White House believe it important that you follow up first thing Thursday morning/1/ on suggestion you made to Secretary General late Wednesday night to make sure his message to Khrushchev reflects following general line:

/1/October 25.

1. Concern that Soviet vessels may be under instructions to challenge quarantine and thus bring on a confrontation at sea between Soviet ships and Western hemisphere ships which could lead to escalation of violence.
2. Concern that such confrontation would destroy possibility of talks such as Secretary General has suggested as prelude to political settlement.
3. Hope that Khrushchev will hold his ships out of interception area for limited time in order to permit discussions of modalities of agreement.
4. Confidence, on basis that Soviet ships are not proceeding to Cuba, that United States will avoid direct confrontation with them during same period in order to minimize chances of untoward incidence.

FYI: While we are quite ready to begin conversations on modalities as suggested by SYG we should not give SYG impression nor encourage him to give Khrushchev impression that we can agree on any interim arrangement for uninspected moratorium or "voluntary suspension" without explicit provision for adequate UN observation to ensure against weapons being imported, work on sites continued, or offensive weapons being operational. In other words White House feels it undesirable to give any impression to SYG that would be inconsistent with draft answer to SYG's proposal that was cleared by President and sent you Wednesday night.

Rusk

## **70. Memorandum for the Files**

Washington, October 25, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone. Also reproduced in part in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 305-307. For Bundy's account of this meeting, see Document 71.

### **SUBJECT**

Executive Committee Meeting 10/25/62--10:00 a.m. All Members present

McCone reported on intelligence, reviewing summary of 25 October, including penciled memorandums as indicated, plus Cline memorandum of 25 October on talks with Sir Kenneth Strong, and the Watch Report of same date./1/

/1/A summary of the briefing paper, SC No. 08179/62, October 25 (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1-5), is included in the Supplement. The other documents have not been identified further.

I called special attention to the Belovodsk and reported on page II-5 and the searching of the Cubana airplane by Canadians as reported on page IV-2. Also the shipping schedule.

McNamara reported that at 7:00 o'clock a destroyer intercepted the tanker Bucharest which responded destination was Havana, cargo was petroleum and the Bucharest was permitted to proceed under surveillance. He stated that no United States Navy ships had orders to board. He recommended orders be issued to immediately board Bloc ships and then the Bucharest be boarded. Decision was reached that Navy be instructed to board the next Soviet ship contacted which would be the Graznyy, a tanker, but which was carrying a deck load which might be missile field tanks. Later in the meeting decision was reached not to board the Bucharest. Contact was to be made with the Graznyy as early as possible and that was estimated to be about 8:00 o'clock in

the evening, Friday, October 26th.

McNamara recommended several recurring low-level surveillance strikes of multiple aircraft in an operation that would resemble an air strike. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] It was the Secretary's opinion that since all of these were indicators of some indecision on the part of the Soviets, that we should pursue low-level surveillance in the interests of gathering intelligence, simulating air attack, demonstrating our intention to watch construction, familiarizing ourselves with camouflage and to determine whether the Soviets are building additional sites. This recommendation was approved and 8 sorties were ordered immediately to cover the nine missile sites, the IL 28 site, the MIG 21 airfield, and the nuclear storage sites and the KOMAR missile ship sites. It was decided this reconnaissance should not be announced but, if questioned, we should refer to the President's statement.

McCone then noted the number of ships in the Eastern Atlantic and in the Baltic and Mediterranean which had turned back. Dillon asked about ships in the Pacific. The President asked whether Soviet ships bound elsewhere than Cuba had changed course. McCone said he would report on this in the afternoon.

There was a further discussion of the policy of stopping or hailing non-Bloc ships. It was decided that all ships must be hailed.

Rusk raised the question of discussions with the United Nations. Draft of U.S. reply to the U Thant letter was approved with modifications. It was agreed at the meeting that we must insist upon the removal of missiles from Cuba in addition to demands that construction be stopped and that UN inspectors be permitted at once.

Bundy reviewed Khrushchev letter to the President of the 24th of October and the Kennedy reply./2/ McNamara raised the question of accelerating or raising the escalation of the actions we have so far taken, expressing concern over the plateau, indicating determination to meet our ultimate objective of taking out the missile sites.

/2/Documents 61 and 68.

Rusk then asked certain actions on the part of CIA as follows: (1) An answer to questions of the effect on Cuba because ships were turned about as indicated in recent reports; (2) What had happened to Soviet ships which were bound elsewhere than Cuba; (3) The general Cuban reaction to our actions to date:

- (a) Do they know about Soviet missiles?
- (b) Have they heard the President's speech?
- (c) What is the morale in Cuba?

McCone promised answers.

John A. McCone/3/

Director

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## **71. Record of Action of the Fourth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 25, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee,

Vol. I, Meetings 1-5. Top Secret; Sensitive. For McCone's account of this meeting, see Document 70.

1. Mr. McCone presented the intelligence briefing.
  2. The President requested Mr. McCone to prepare a careful analysis of the present situation inside Cuba, and he asked for further consideration by USIA of the possibility of dropping propaganda leaflets.
  3. The Secretary of Defense reported the current military situation, and on the President's direction instructions were issued for selective investigation and boarding of non-bloc ships, excluding tankers.
  4. The Secretary reported that all armed forces in Cuba have been instructed to fire only in response to attack. Many installations are so camouflaged as to be in a low state of readiness. The Secretary recommended a program of low-level reconnaissance for the purpose of improving intelligence, camouflaging the possibility of a later low-level attack, and emphasizing our concern with offensive installations already in Cuba. The President approved an immediate daylight mission of 8 low-level reconnaissance aircraft to cover missile sites, airfields holding IL28's and MIG's, KOMAR naval vessels, coastal installations, nuclear storage sites, and selected SAM sites.
  5. The President directed that the tanker Bucharest not be intercepted for the present. Her status as a tanker with no contraband cargo made it desirable to allow her to proceed. He directed further that the Defense Department be prepared to make an intercept of an appropriate bloc ship on Friday in daylight.
  6. The President approved a version of an answer to U Thant, but in later discussion a revised version was worked out between New York and Washington and approved by the President at 1:15 p.m./1/
- /1/For text of this letter and the letter from U Thant, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 422 and 424.
7. There was preliminary discussion of alternative courses of action in the immediate future, and the President asked the other members of the Committee to make appropriate arrangements for preparing alternative courses of action for discussion with him at a later meeting.
  8. The President approved the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense that missile fuel be added to the list of contraband goods under the Proclamation of Interdiction./2/

McGeorge Bundy

/2/Following this meeting of the Executive Committee both the Nitze and Rostow subcommittees met to continue their work. Records of these meetings are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin; and *ibid.*, Cuba, General Planning Subcommittee, respectively. See the Supplement.

## **72. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**

New York, October 25, 1962, 2:30 p.m.

//Source: USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Stevenson and Sisco.

1459. Subject: SC on Cuba.

I saw U Thant this morning and conveyed to him suggestions contained in Deptel 1084 (USUN 4963)./1/ He said he would transmit suggestions to Khrushchev in form of confidential message./2/ He would also send

President Kennedy note reporting his message to Khrushchev and asking that US exercise restraint in circumstances.

/1/Document 69.

/2/For text of U Thant's letter to Khrushchev, October 25, see American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1962, p. 425.

Thant told me Zorin asked him at 7:30 last night what Thant appeal in Council was going to say. Thant replied that it was based on his appeal to Khrushchev and Kennedy. Zorin said he had not received it. After Thant explained to Zorin nature of his appeal, Zorin replied that it was very bad proposal, since blockade was wholly illegal and that Thant should be concerned with legality and should not equate lifting quarantine with stopping ships going to Cuba. Thant replied he was not concerned with legality, but with averting a crisis.

Thant told me that Afro-Asians were putting great pressure on Zorin to accept, but that on basis of Zorin's preliminary reaction Thant expects negative reply. Thant anticipates long legal attack on the quarantine.

If both sides accept his suspension proposal this afternoon, he thinks SC should recess pending discussion on modalities. Parties should then report what agreement they have reached on modalities and thereafter substantive negotiations could take place without another Council meeting.

Stevenson

### **73. Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 25, 1962, 5 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1-5. Top Secret; Sensitive. McCone's 3-paragraph summary of this meeting is in the Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President, and reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, p. 309.

Director McCone gave an intelligence briefing which contained no major new information. He listed fifteen ships en route to Cuba, among them the *Graznyy*, which is one of three oil tankers with deck tanks probably containing ammonia.

Mr. McCone noted that a Bloc ship would be entering the Panama Canal on November 2. It would be searched, as have Bloc ships transiting the Canal during the past seven years.

Mr. McCone said he had no information of any unusual developments in Europe.

Secretary Dillon noted that there had been a run on gold in Germany and to a lesser extent in London. His conclusion was that these gold purchases reflected the fear of the buyers.

Secretary McNamara said that the East German passenger ship *Voelker Freundschaft* was at the Cuban barrier. It is a fairly large ship, 525 feet long, and has been ordered to report its position every four hours. He said we faced a decision as to whether or not to stop it.

Secretary McNamara reported that the Lebanese ship which was to have been boarded had turned back before crossing the barrier. Late information on the *Graznyy* revealed that it was lying dead in the water. The result is that to date no ship has yet been boarded.

Secretary Rusk reported on diplomatic developments. He said the question was whether we can get Soviet strategic missiles out of Cuba or at least under UN control. He added that if there was any prospect of success in following a political track, we would have to keep heavy pressure on the Russians. He reported that Soviet representative Zorin in New York was furious about U Thant's proposals for U.S./USSR talks under UN sponsorship in New York, but that Khrushchev had agreed to such talks./1/ Our position would be that during these next two days of preliminary discussions we must somehow stop the missile buildup in Cuba. We must know what is going on at the IRBM sites in Cuba and we need to know whether warheads have actually been delivered to Cuba. Shortly we must decide if the Soviet signals which they are sending us means they are getting ready to talk or whether they are getting ready to attack us.

/1/See Document 59.

Referring to possible UN action, Secretary Rusk said we would probably be able to get only a seven-to-two vote in the Security Council,/2/ but even so, action in the UN General Assembly was a possibility. He specifically mentioned one possibility, i.e. Latin American States proposing a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. He thought that many Latin American States would support this zone, along with many other UN members, and the Soviets would have a difficult time opposing it.

/2/The U.N. Security Council had resumed discussion of the Cuban crisis at 4 p.m. on October 25. For a verbatim record of the discussion, see U.N. doc. S/PV. 1025.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the relationship between our quarantine and Soviet-Cuban relations. The Cubans, who would not be able to survive in political isolation, must henceforth rely entirely on the Soviets. He suggested that we might ask the Brazilian Ambassador in Havana to tell Castro that there was little for Cuba in being tied permanently to the Soviet Union. An appeal might be made to Castro to step aside so that a new government might break this complete dependence from here on out on the Soviet Union.

Secretary Rusk explained the nature of the preliminary talks which are to be held in New York in the next two or three days between U Thant and Zorin on one side and Stevenson and U Thant on the other. The purpose of these talks is to arrive at a solution of the crisis or, if no solution is possible, to provide a basis for later action, having been unable to negotiate a settlement. He said that these talks could not go on for two weeks, but must be limited to a very few days because the IRBM sites in Cuba are becoming operational and the IL-28 bombers will soon be able to fly.

Secretary McNamara said all of his actions were taken with a view to applying force gradually. The ten air reconnaissance missions flown today went well and he recommended that ten more missions be flown tomorrow. Other military actions being taken would be meaningful to the Russians but would still not force escalation.

Secretary McNamara described night reconnaissance flights which involve dropping flares--[6 lines of source text not declassified] The Soviet missiles now have an eight-hour countdown. Low-level reconnaissance could give us intelligence as to whether the Soviet missiles are being placed in position to reduce the length of the countdown.

Secretary Dillon noted that the urgency of the situation was considerably reduced if the Russians do not try to break the quarantine.

Secretary McNamara expressed his concern that if the New York talks go along very long, a kind of plateau will have been reached which would make the decision to take new actions very difficult.

Secretary Rusk summarized the political track as follows. We might get a unanimous vote in the OAS for our actions. We could expect a veto from the Russians in the Security Council. If the U Thant proposals were rejected, we could go to the General Assembly where as many as eighty States might support a Latin American

denuclearization proposal. He was not ready to knock out the possibility of a political solution.

Secretary McNamara said there were many ways of increasing pressure on the Russians by military measures, i.e. quarantine, inspection at sea, surveillance, the addition of jet fuel to the list of products embargoes, and the holding of all petroleum tankers.

The Attorney General noted that if all Bloc cargo ships turn back rather than cross the quarantine barrier, we might let Soviet tankers through in order to avoid an incident at sea during the discussions in New York. He said we might decide that it was better to knock out the missiles by air attack than to stop a Soviet ship on the high seas.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we might buy the charter and cargo of tramp steamers going to Cuba. We could pay either the captain or the owner of the ship whatever he asks to defect with his ship. Such action would step up pressure on the Cubans without further use of military force.

Director McCone agreed that such action would be effective because it would greatly reduce imports into Cuba and also take away from the Cubans their outgoing cargoes.

Secretary McNamara suggested that we might consider harassing all ships heading for Cuba by requiring that they go into U.S. ports for inspection, which could take up to several weeks. The purpose would be to throttle imports by Cuba.

In a discussion of other military measures, Mr. Rostow said any reconnaissance flights would have a beneficial effect on developments in New York.

Secretary McNamara commented that the dropping of flares on the IRBM sites at night would be highly effective. General Taylor thought that the psychological effect of night reconnaissance would be entirely favorable as well as serving to keep up the pressure and providing more information about the readiness status of the strategic missiles.

Secretary Rusk said that he would seek to define our future political moves later in the evening.

Secretary Dillon stated his support of the idea of a Latin American denuclearized zone.

The Attorney General repeated his question as to whether we really wanted to stop a Soviet ship. He said he believed the Soviets had turned their ships around because they did not want us to see what was on them. The tankers, however, continue to move toward Cuba because they have nothing but petroleum. He said he felt that the measures we take should indicate clearly that we mean business but we should avoid a direct confrontation now.

Secretary McNamara said we should decide tonight to take measures tonight which would put us in a position of being ready to board Bloc ships approaching the barrier. We could let Soviet tankers through the quarantine and announce later we were putting an embargo on aviation gasoline. If we were going to board the East German ship we would have to decide tonight.

Both General Taylor and Secretary Dillon pointed out that we could not permit Soviet technicians to go through the quarantine even though technicians are not on the embargo list.

Secretary McNamara recommended that the East German ship not be stopped because it might be necessary for us to shoot at it or to ram it. There would be great danger to the some 1500 passengers aboard. The current situation is that the ship has been hailed and a U.S. destroyer is following it. If we ask it to stop and it does not, then we would have to use force. If in so doing we injure passengers and then discover there are no strategic

missiles aboard, we would be in a very difficult situation. In addition, our world position would appear weak if we allow Soviet ships through the quarantine but stop an East German ship. The Voelker Freundschaft will make a landfall tomorrow and a decision must be made by 2:00 AM this morning if we want to stop it outside Cuban territorial waters.

At this point the President entered the Cabinet Room.

Secretary McNamara reviewed the situation with respect to the Voelker Freundschaft. He said the East German ship had left Rostov on October 11 and Leningrad on October 14. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The destroyer *Pierce* is following the ship which is still outside the barrier. Secretary McNamara recommended that we not stop this ship.

The President referred to the message from U Thant asking us to avoid incidents pending the talks at New York./3/

/3/See Document 59.

Mr. Bundy said the East German ship was not covered by U Thant's message.

General Taylor and Director McCone asked Mr. McNamara [5 lines of source text not declassified]

The President said the only argument against stopping the ship is U Thant's request for no incidents for the time being. He said that we would have to drop the other shoe soon.

Secretary McNamara repeated his earlier statement with respect to the difficulty of stopping a passenger ship. He preferred to stop the *Graznyy* tomorrow if Khrushchev did not accept U Thant's proposed mediation effort.

The Attorney General said he wished to describe again the other side of the argument. He said we could let the tanker through the barrier. As of now no other ships were approaching the barrier. Surveillance measures could be taken to keep the pressure on the Russians and provide time for the political measures suggested by Secretary Rusk without appearing to be backing off from a confrontation. He repeated his view that we may decide that it is better to avoid confronting the Russians by stopping one of their ships and to react by attacking the missiles already in Cuba.

Secretary Dillon said he preferred that the confrontation take place in Cuba rather than on the high seas.

Secretary Rusk noted that the quarantine had become fully effective.

Secretary McNamara reported that there had been no response yesterday or today to our low-level reconnaissance flights. He recommended that we continue to fly daylight reconnaissance missions and add night reconnaissance not only to gain information, but also to convince the public that we are increasing the pressure on the Russians.

The President decided that we should not stop the East German ship. Tomorrow we will know the Soviet response to U Thant's proposal. We will let the tanker through the barrier and later add jet fuel to the list of products embargoed.

The Attorney General said that fifteen ships have turned back, which is an impressive action taken by the Russians. We must be careful that the Russians do not think that we are backing down.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the importance of the first case of our boarding a ship. If the ship carried deck cargo or dry cargo, the case would be different than a passenger ship which is a bad first case.



Mr. Rostow stated the argument for adding petroleum products to the blockade which he said would have a drastic effect on the Cuban economy.

The President again said we should let the East German passenger ship go through and we should seek to avoid any incident in order not to create a bad effect on U Thant's negotiations. We could decide tomorrow afternoon what more we should do after we know Khrushchev's reply to U Thant. He said we must act soon because work on the missile sites is still going on and we must back up very soon the firmness we have displayed up to now.

Ambassador Thompson pointed out that we must react very soon to Khrushchev's strong letter./4/

/4/Document 61.

Secretary Rusk noted that Bloc shipping worldwide was behaving normally except for the ships in Cuban trade.

As the meeting concluded, Mr. McCone reported that some of the strategic missiles deployed in Cuba are now operational.

The President had before him at the meeting a folder containing drafts of alternative next major moves (copy attached)./5/

/5/Not found attached. Apparent reference to three papers entitled "Political Path," October 25 (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Political Actions), "Scenario for Airstrike Against Offensive Missile Bases and Bombers in Cuba," undated (ibid., Air Strike--Cuba), and a paper on the Progressive Economic Blockage. The first two papers are in the Supplement. An earlier version of "Possible Courses of Action," undated, includes a section on the blockade. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Historical, Cuba, October 1962) See the Supplement.

Bromley Smith/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

#### **74. Record of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan**

October 25, 1962, 6:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Macmillan Telephone Conversations. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. For Macmillan's account of this conversation, see *At the End of the Day*, pp. 205-208.

President: Prime Minister, how did you do with your debate?

PM: We did very well, actually very good, very good. I sent you the text of what I said, and I think it was very well accepted. I made all the points I could, especially the one you gave me about your statement of September 11, and the reception was good--and that was very well received.

President: We've got a second message from U Thant/1/ which you may be familiar with which says that . . . asks Khrushchev to keep the ships out of there and asks us to avoid a confrontation. Now we are inclined to--we are sending back a message that if he keeps his ships out of there of course we will avoid a confrontation. As you know, today we figure now 14 ships turned around. They were probably the ones with the aggressive cargo. One tanker we stopped; we asked where it was going; it said it was coming from the Black Sea to Cuba and the cargo was oil. It was obviously a tanker and we passed that. We have tomorrow 2 or 3 vessels that--including

particularly an East German vessel which has probably 600 or 700 passengers. It stopped in Leningrad on its way and it may have 6,000 tons of cargo on it, so we are going to have to stop that, we think. That's what we are now discussing. Now we've got two tracks running. One is that one of these ships--these selected ships--which Khrushchev continues to have come toward Cuba--on the other hand, we have U Thant--we don't want to sink a ship, and then right in the middle of one, U Thant is supposedly arranging for the Russians to stay out, so we are going to have to let some hours go by, but sooner or later, probably by tomorrow evening, we are going to have to accost one of these and board it. Now we got a message last night from Mr. Khrushchev/2/ which I'll make sure you get, if you haven't gotten it already, which says that this is piratical and their ships are going to go through and not submit to this, and if we do stop them they have the means of action against us. That's last night. So that's about where we are.

PM: Thank you very much. I have just seen your message to U Thant./1/ It seems to me extremely ingenious and very calm, because you are saying that the--as you say, the real point is that they ought to get rid of these weapons.

/1/See Document 59.

/2/Document 61.

And then Ambassador Stevenson will be discussing with U Thant the arrangements. What time do you think the Ambassador will be speaking with U Thant?

President: . . . about a half hour ago which goes somewhat further than the first one went. The second one said that he is asking Khrushchev to keep his ships out of there. His first message didn't do that. We are therefore going to accept that because it comes further in our direction than his first one, and tell him that if he can keep the ships out of there that's fine, then we won't have the incident. On the other hand, we do point out in our response to him that some ships still are coming. Now that is that. Now if these conversations begin we are going to point out--once we get this matter of the ships straightened out, because we still haven't had our first search yet, and that's going to be a very important event because we will then know what the Russians are going to do, but that will come tomorrow. Now then, if we begin the conversation we are going to begin to point out that work is going on and that work must stop or otherwise we have got to extend this blockade, and consider other action to stop it. But I think that's at least 24 hours away. I think the next thing for us to do is to figure out how we will handle this first search in view of the fact that the UN is involved in this now. In other words, I don't want to have an incident--fight--with a Russian ship tomorrow morning and to search it at a time when it appears that U Thant has gotten the Russians to agree not to continue. I hope that by tomorrow afternoon it will be clear either that the Russians are discontinuing their shipping during these preliminary conversations or, if they are not, then the responsibility is on them.

. . . . garble . . .

President: Prime Minister, can you repeat that?

PM: I was saying that the question of dealing with the weapons in Cuba--you will be discussing that with U Thant?

President: Yes. As I say, the first problem we have is the circumstances under which we will search the first Russian ship, on the basis of two things: first, Mr. Khrushchev's reply to me last night that he will not permit it; and secondly, U Thant's appeal for a suspension of Russian shipping while these talks go on so that if we get Russian shipping suspended that will produce one situation; if Russian shipping does not suspend, then we will have to face the search and the possible sinking of the ship sometime tomorrow afternoon, so that's our first problem. Then . . . but if we satisfactorily get through that problem, then when these conversations begin we are going to then begin to emphasize that work on these sites is continuing and that unless it is discontinued we must

tighten the blockade and possibly take other actions. That would probably begin to be emphasized the minute the talks begin, but even if the talks don't begin, we are going to begin to say it on Saturday/3/ anyway.

/3/October 27.

PM: I quite understand, and I think that's what you must do. As I see it, there are two stages: the first question is the ships, and then the question of the actual weapons in Cuba. . . .

President: As I say, the 14 ships that have turned back are obviously the ones that have the sensitive cargo that he doesn't want us to be able to produce. The ships that are continuing probably are ones that don't have anything important in them, but we cannot permit him to establish the principle that he determines which ships will go and which will not, but as I say, I think we will--tomorrow night--we will know a lot better about this matter of the UN's actions and Khrushchev's attitude about continuing the shipping, and also what attitude he will take in regard to our searching them.

. . . garble . . .

PM: I say that this is very interesting about the ships. And we . . . the situation tomorrow night.

President: That is correct. We will know tomorrow night whether Khrushchev will accept U Thant's proposal to cease all shipping going to Cuba during these talks, No. 1. No. 2, if he doesn't do that, we will know what their reaction will be to our searching of a vessel, so I think that I could call you tomorrow night at the same time, unless this is too late for you.

PM: . . . indeed. I am very much obliged to you. We will have a talk tomorrow night. Good night.

President: Good night, Prime Minister. I'll send you Khrushchev's message of last evening. Good night.

PM: Yes, I'd very much like to see that.

President: Good night, Prime Minister.

## **75. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State**

Paris, October 25, 1962, 9 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Jupiter--Cuba. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:41 p.m. October 25.

Polto 506. Eyes only for Secretary. Department may desire repeat Ankara and Rome eyes only Ambassadors. Policy. Reference: Deptels 2345 and 2349./1/

/1/Document 56 and footnote 1 thereto.

1. Turkish PermRep here has consistently made it clear that Turks set great store in Jupiters placed in Turkey. He makes very clear that Turkey regards these Jupiters as symbol of Alliance's determination to use atomic weapons against Russian attack on Turkey whether by large conventional or nuclear forces, although Turks have been most reluctant admit presence IRBM's publicly. Fact that Jupiters are obsolescent and vulnerable does not apparently affect present Turkish thinking. My impression is that symbolic importance represents a fixed GOT view, although of course Hare can comment much better than I on this point.

2. For above reason any arrangement of kind suggested reftel which would not have received prior complete

support by GOT would, it seems to us, be most damaging. I emphasize prior consultation, and I think it should be an arrangement freely arrived at by them. My guess is that any arrangement that would not substitute some other considerable kind of atomic capability in Turkey for Jupiters would be rejected by them. See suggestions paras. 8 and 9 below.

5. In this connection, would appear preferable, since Cuba is by definition outside NATO area, to offer close down some US nuclear-capable base outside NATO area rather than making deal involving Turkey or Italy. Such deal would then be strictly US-USSR trade rather than involving one of our NATO allies in any deal.

6. I think that we must be fully aware there is real possibility that, outside of any arrangement made in over-all disarmament context, whole Alliance might be dismayed by such a deal which would compromise and invalidate firm US action re Cuba which has received substantial approval from Alliance. As all know, these weapons were put in Europe as result of heads of government decision in 1957 in response to boastful Soviet MRBM threat to Europe, and Alliance might very well conclude that US was willing weaken nuclear defenses in Europe in order to remove threat in Western hemisphere. However, cannot discount possibility that some members Alliance might be willing accept Cuba-Turk deal "to avoid nuclear war", i.e., Norwegians, Danes and maybe even British.

7. Re question of removal Jupiters accompanied by stationing of Polaris submarines in area, doubt whether mere deployment Polaris would be attractive to Turks since they really would have no say in use of Polaris in time of crisis and they turned down similar proposal in April 1961. Nevertheless, one might argue Turks really have no say over Jupiter use now because of custodial arrangements, but they feel some assurance in having weapons on their territory and somewhat in their hands. Turkish concern re Polaris substitution might be partially met by consulting them on targeting so as to assure that targets of interest to them are covered by Polaris. Also could point out that three Polaris submarines in area would effectively more than double coverage presently afforded by obsolete Jupiters. Doubt, however, above arrangements would adequately compensate Turks.

8. Re suggestion reftel concerning some other significant military offset such as NATO seaborne multilateral nuclear force, we believe most expeditious way do this would be set up small southern command multilateral seaborne force on a "pilot basis". If such firm suggestion made this should be acceptable arrangement to Turks to compensate for loss of obsolete Jupiters. Such offer would take form of converting a number of merchant-type vessels to MRBM force, utilizing Polaris A-2 missiles along general lines of US studies and presentation to NAC by Smith on 22 October./2/ Ships could be deployed in eastern Mediterranean and could be manned by Turkish, Italian and American mixed crews and also possibly Greeks, with appropriate targets of interest to Mediterranean allies covered. Although implementation of this type of force could be realized in short period of time, it would be necessary, as interim step before force comes into being, to station Polaris, as suggested reftel, in eastern Mediterranean. Polaris deployment would then fill gap caused by removal of Jupiters, while Southern Command Multilateral Force was being put together. At same time, rest of Alliance could be investigating possibility of setting up NATO-wide multilateral seaborne force. Southern Command MLF might well serve as model for larger force and could be expanded as other allies indicated desirability to join arrangements this type. To make this whole alternative palatable to Turks and others would require clear US support to implement multilateral seaborne-type force, and if properly presented to Turks and Italians we could highlight flexibility and greater efficiency this type force over Jupiters. Our impression here is that Italians more prone to dismantle Jupiters if proper substitute can be found.

/2/Descriptions of the North Atlantic Council briefing on October 22 are in Polto 502, October 23 (Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2362), and Sherman Kent's November 14 memorandum for the record. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 84-00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850A) See the Supplement for both.

9. Such pilot arrangement, which would not come into being immediately, could permit us offer Soviets withdrawal obsolete Jupiters as face-saving device for Cuban withdrawal (Polaris deployment would cover in interval). Whether or not this would be acceptable to Soviets, the gesture could be made and might well look good in face of world opinion. Whether or not they accept this type of trade, we believe that in any event strong

consideration should be given to withdrawing Jupiters and creating pilot MLF since this would strengthen NATO nuclear capability in eastern Mediterranean. Although Turks didn't agree to stop Jupiter program in 1961, even when faced with facts Jupiters obsolete, of no military value and good Soviet target, they might be willing now to accept substitute in MLF which more effective from all angles./3/

/3/On October 26 the Embassy in Rome replied that removal of the Jupiter missiles from Italy "would probably be manageable," but the United States should consult with the Italian Government before making the final decision. (Telegram 936 from Rome; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Jupiter--Cuba) See the Supplement. On the same day Ambassador Hare replied from Ankara that removal of the missiles from Turkey would present a major problem not only for U.S.-Turkish relations but also for NATO. He explained in detail the ramifications of removal and how some of them might be met. (Telegram 587 from Ankara; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Jupiter--Cuba) See the Supplement.

Finletter

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**FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**  
**1961-1963**  
**Volume XI**  
**Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington

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## **Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

### **76. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk**

Washington, October 25, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Cuba, 1962. Confidential. The source text bears no drafting information.

#### **INTELLIGENCE NOTE**

##### **Soviets Continue to Seek Abandonment of Quarantine While Missiles Stay**

**Ships Turning.** Yesterday's pattern of Soviet ships turning off their Cuban courses has continued. Apparently only tankers are still on course. One, the Bucharest, has cooperated with us by indicating, on request, that its cargo was POL. It was permitted to proceed.

**Soviet Intentions.** Moscow's immediate purpose still appears to be to leave the initiative for an incident up to the US. In doing so its reasons are probably (1) the desire to identify the US as the aggressor, and (2) recognition that if an incident occurs, the USSR will be helpless at the site of the incident and will face the choice of escalation. We believe Moscow is reluctant to make the latter choice.

**Political Action.** Soviet strategy at the moment still is designed to gain time and flexibility for political action, designed to get the quarantine stopped while the missiles stay in Cuba. By the turn-around of its ships Moscow is, in effect, already complying with the U Thant proposal, although formally it may refuse to do so; it is thus seeking to exert pressure for at least tacit US abandonment of the quarantine. For the moment it seems intent on insisting that there can be no restriction on weapons in Cuba and that these weapons are designed solely to defend Cuba against aggression. It is probably waiting (1) to see how much momentum will develop for a trade involving US strategic bases, and (2) whether the US is prepared to exert further force to achieve removal of missiles already in Cuba. Until it obtains greater certainty on these points, it will probably keep its missiles in place.

### **77. Paper Prepared by the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General. Secret. The source text is attached to a memorandum from Rostow to Bundy, October 25.

Washington, October 25, 1962.

## SOVIET TACTICS IN THE SHORT RUN

Soviet reaction since the outbreak of the Cuban crisis indicates Soviet short run tactics are governed by the following considerations:

1. The USSR's first objective in the present stage of the crisis is to retain the bases in Cuba. The Soviets not only see considerable military value in these installations, but they regard them as a telling demonstration of the long-proclaimed shift in the "world relation of forces." Particularly now that the US has committed itself to their elimination, they believe that, if they can prevail, they will have scored a political victory of such proportions that opportunities for further advances will open up in all the areas of East-West contention.
2. Thus the immediate Soviet aim is to deter the US from more drastic action. At the same time, they wish to keep the risks under control.
3. Their diplomatic moves and conduct at sea to date suggest that they fear further US action may be imminent and wish not to have their prestige further engaged if this should occur. Thus they have turned back a number of ships, refrained from spelling out their commitment to Castro in as strong a fashion as previously, and tried to represent the crisis as primarily between Cuba and the US.
4. The primary Soviet tactic will be to draw the US into negotiations, meanwhile getting a standstill. The Soviets calculate that, if this can be done, they will have laid heavy inhibitions upon further US unilateral action and that, with the passage of time, the existing bases will become part of the status quo. They prefer, of course, that the lifting of the quarantine be made a precondition of negotiations, but they probably will not insist upon this. They will probably propose or accept any of several forms of negotiation in addition to their own proposal for US-Soviet-Cuban talks.
5. At the present juncture the Soviets probably view a summit meeting as an appealing proposal to keep open the line of negotiation, especially if a stalemate in the UN approaches which might free the US to take military action. With a summit in prospect they would estimate the pressures for the US to wait would be great. A summit therefore would buy the Soviets some additional time, offer a forum to make a reasonable case, confuse the issues, and raise the political costs of further US action. At the same time, they would not want to be faced at the summit with an ultimatum or an unyielding US position which if it resulted in further actions would redouble the humiliation to the USSR and Khrushchev personally. On balance they probably feel that as long as the US did not appear determined to take action the summit offers more advantages than drawbacks.
6. Although the Soviets would like to minimize the risks at the present juncture, they find it very difficult to acquiesce in the US quarantine. Their reported reaction to U Thant's appeal suggest that they could accept for some time a tacit agreement whereby they refrained from sending patently military cargoes into the quarantine area and the US allowed other vessels through upon a verbal declaration of cargo. It is unlikely that the Soviets will submit to boarding, since in doing so they would be accepting the quarantine. So long as they wish to avoid incidents, therefore, they will be extremely anxious to determine how the US intends to enforce the quarantine.
7. At some stage a quarantine incident would probably commend itself to the Soviets as one means of raising tensions and thereby multiplying international pressures upon the US. The best circumstance would be to lead the US into attacking a manifestly peaceful vessel. If the Soviets decide that such an incident is desirable, they would be primarily concerned with subsequent political exploitation and might not undertake an immediate equivalent reprisal against the US.
8. The time will probably come when the USSR decides that it would be useful to increase tensions by stepping up the element of threat in their pronouncements. Even in this circumstance, however, they are likely to continue avoiding any further commitment to Cuba so long as they remain uncertain about US intentions.

9. With respect to the missiles already in Cuba it seems highly improbable that the USSR will agree to withdraw in the absence of major US concessions elsewhere. There is one circumstance, however, in which a break in this Soviet position might occur. The USSR would regard a successful US military action against the bases, or against Cuba as a whole, as a very great defeat, which might substantially stiffen Western determination to resist Soviet demands in other confrontations, e.g. Berlin. If, therefore, they believed that US military action was all but imminent and unavoidable, they might make a last-minute offer to dismantle the bases in return for some Western concession which, while not offsetting their loss, offered some prospect of saving face. They might even attempt to dispose clandestinely of their missiles. It is difficult to conceive, however, how the Soviets could frame such moves or time them properly. Thus in this circumstance they might decide to let the US attack proceed and to recoup as much as possible thereafter through political exploitation and, perhaps, an off-setting injury to US interests elsewhere.

#### **78. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, October 26, 1962, 9:25 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking.

Bundy--First two or three items; have you got a minute?

Ball--Oh, sure.

Bundy--We have boarded the Lebanese/1/ and care(?)2/ wants to have it got out by Sylvester right away in order to restore our credibility before flag plot leaps.

/1/Bundy is referring to the boarding of the Marcular at 7:50 a.m. on October 26 by personnel from the destroyers Pierce and Joseph P. Kennedy about 180 miles northeast of Nassau. No prohibited cargo was found and the ship was subsequently allowed to continue to Havana. (Department of Defense news release 1745-62, October 26; Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office, SecDef Cable Files, Cuba)

/2/A blank at this point in the source text was filled in by hand with "care(?)."

Ball--I don't see any harm in that.

Bundy--I think that's dandy. It turns out to be Soviet charter, did you know that?

Ball--Yes, and reconditional.

Bundy--Yes, and it even had an unidentified cargo. Second, we have got this very neat point of how to organize the process of Stevenson's instructions today. My suggestion would be that we not have them at the 10:00.

Ball--Not have the instructions?

Bundy--No, not have the two of them--Stevenson and McCloy.

Ball--Well, the only advantage of having them is to get the flavor. Not go into the instructions necessarily.

Bundy--No, no. Well then let's do it that way. Let's have them at the meeting in order that they were at the meeting and then we better work out--Bob McNamara and the Attorney General are all steamed up about getting a think tank going like the ones we had last week. And I think they are right about that and they are going to



want to borrow space in your Department to do it.

Ball--OK.

Bundy--Which I am all for. It seems to me that those two things--we will have to generate an instructions working party and maybe it's all one thing--maybe the instructions will lead to what the rest of the problems are.

Ball--I had McCloy in for breakfast this morning, with Cleveland, going over the instructions.

Bundy--How was he?

Ball--He is all heated up. He is a very good fellow.

Bundy--Is he clear and strong?

Ball--Yes, very clear and very strong. What I want the President to suggest when he talks to him is now--to say to Stevenson--"When you and McCloy talk to Thant" and "When you and McCloy do this . . ." And if necessary, if he raises any question then you can say "Well, look, from the bipartisan position of this thing, this is in election time, we have got to keep it bipartisan."

Bundy--You feel there has been some question of Jack's energy and clarity and . . .

Ball--No, no, no.

Bundy--That's nonsense.

Ball--He is very, very clear in what the objectives have to be and he is very firm and tough.

Bundy--OK, good news. I will feed that to the President ahead of the meeting.

Ball--I think it is very important that that point be made because what is happening right now is they haven't given him anything to do.

Bundy--Well then he certainly should say to them at each stage and you should emphasize and the President should and you should bring them both to the 10:00 o'clock.

Ball--Yes, that's right. I think the way to handle it is the President just takes it for granted that McCloy is in on all the talks, because he isn't in on anything at the moment. This has got to be made clear.

Bundy--Otherwise, you will lose him for one thing.

Ball--Knowing my old friend I can tell you that this has got to be made explicit and the bipartisan way is the way to play it.

Bundy--Right. I will pass that to the Boss and I will have a word with you before the meeting if there is any difficulty about it.

Ball--All right.

## **79. Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 26, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Top Secret; Sensitive. McCone's account of this meeting is reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 317-318. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President) See the Supplement. The record of action of the meeting, prepared by McGeorge Bundy, is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10) Gilpatric's 2-page handwritten notes for this meeting are in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, RLG's Notes re Cuba.

Director McCone summarized the attached intelligence memorandum, including a statement on the current status of Soviet air readiness./1/

/1/The summary of this CIA memorandum, [*document number not declassified*] (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10) which recorded information available as of 6 a.m. October 26, is in the Supplement.

Mr. McCone described the celebration which took place in Havana following the arrival of the tanker Bucharest which had been allowed to pass the quarantine line because it was carrying only oil, which is not now contraband. He said non-Bloc ships could be used to carry military materials if they had been chartered on a bare boat basis by the Russians.

Mr. McCone reported that he had stood down a CIA operation which involved sending into Cuba by submarine ten teams involving fifty people. He said he did not believe this should be done by CIA unilaterally./2/

/2/The operation is described in an October 25 memorandum from Carter to McCone; for text, see CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 311-312.

The President agreed and asked that the proposal to put ashore the ten teams be discussed by the Special Group (NSC 5412) today. The President further suggested that the Mongoose operation be reconstituted, possibly as a subcommittee of the Executive Committee, and oriented toward post-Castro Cuban problems. The President stressed the importance of tying together all existing groups engaged in covert activities in order to integrate our planning.

Director McCone raised the question of the location of the SS Oxford, a communications [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] ship which is now standing some ten miles off Cuba. He expressed his concern that this very valuable ship might be destroyed by hostile action. The President said this was an operational problem, the Navy should have the authority to control this ship, but it should take into account CIA's concern.

Mr. Bundy reported that three subcommittees are at work--one on Berlin, chaired by Paul Nitze, one on forward planning, chaired by Walt Rostow, and one on worldwide communications problems, chaired by William Orrick, who is working closely with the Defense Communications Agency.

Mr. Bundy called attention to the civil defense problem and obtained agreement that no crash program would be undertaken now, although preliminary measures are to be initiated. He referred to the amount of sensitive information which has been leaking to the press and urged that information about future actions must be more carefully guarded.

Secretary McNamara reported on the status of the quarantine. The Defense Department was authorized to release information on the boarding of the Lebanese ship, the Marucla, the first dry cargo ship which had been loaded in a Soviet port. In the event that comparisons were made between stopping the Lebanese ship and permitting an East German ship to go through the quarantine line, the point will be made that the East German

ship carried only passengers.

Secretary McNamara read a list of Bloc ships and their locations and noted that there would be no intercepts at sea today. The tanker *Graznyy* is apparently moving but will not cross the line today. He suggested that shortly we should embargo fuel used by bombers and substances from which airplane fuel is made, i.e. petroleum products.

The President suggested that if we decide to embargo bomber fuel, we should also mention the fact that we were embargoing fuel which was contributing to the operational capability of the strategic missiles.

Secretary Rusk asked that POL not be embargoed for at least twenty-four hours in order to avoid upsetting the U Thant talks now under way in New York.

Under Secretary Ball asked for agreement on the embargo of petroleum as the next step in the effort to increase pressures--the timing of the embargo to be decided later in relation to the New York talks.

Secretary Dillon stated his reservations concerning this course of action. He said it ended up in stopping Soviet ships. Thus, a confrontation with the Russians would not be over the missiles, but over Soviet ships. He believed we should go for the missiles rather than force a confrontation with the USSR at sea.

A decision on adding petroleum to the embargo list was delayed until the political path was decided upon.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that construction on the strategic missile sites in Cuba was continuing. He asked that public announcement be made of our continuation of air surveillance. He recommended that daylight reconnaissance measures be flown today and a night mission tonight, including the dropping of flares.

Secretary Rusk asked that the night mission not be flown because of the unfortunate effect which it might have on the U Thant negotiations in New York.

Secretary McNamara thought that one way of avoiding reaction to night reconnaissance was to inform the Cubans and the Russians in advance that we were initiating such flights.

Ambassador Stevenson opposed any public announcement of our surveillance activities.

The President directed that we dramatize the fact that the missile buildup in Cuba is continuing. He authorized daylight reconnaissance measures but decided to delay night flights.

Secretary Rusk praised Ambassador Stevenson's UN performance. He urged that USIA keep the pressure on the Cuban people and mentioned the dropping of leaflets over Cuba.

Acting Director Wilson requested that better aerial pictures be made available to USIA for distribution. The President authorized the use of any reconnaissance pictures, including those used by Ambassador Stevenson in his UN speech.

Secretary Rusk summarized political actions now under way. He said the object of the talks with U Thant today was to set up some form of negotiations with the Russians in New York. The objective would be to obtain a commitment from the Russians that there would be no further construction at the missile sites in Cuba, no further Soviet military shipments, the defusing of existing weapons in Cuba, UN inspection of all nuclear-capable missiles, and an observer corps on the ground in Cuba of 350 technically able inspectors. The U.S. quarantine would continue until a UN quarantine is in place. UN teams would be put into specified Cuban ports. U.S. Navy ships would stay close to all Cuban ports to ensure that there were no landings unknown to the UN inspectors and no cargoes anywhere which UN inspectors did not see.

Mr. McCloy stated that our quarantine was vital and should be kept in place until the Russians had accepted all of our conditions.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that we must make clear to U Thant that the quarantine is related to the Soviet missiles rather than to Soviet military shipments to Cuba.

With respect to the proposed atomic-free zone in Latin America, Secretary Rusk said that Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone would be exempted, but that possibly we might have to accept a ban on the storage of nuclear weapons in the Canal Zone. Conceivably, the proposal would hinder the transit by air of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

Secretary McNamara said the Joint Chiefs were very cool toward the proposal of a Latin American atomic-free zone, but, personally, he favored the idea if it was conditioned on the elimination of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

General Taylor said the Chiefs had no formal position on the proposal, but they were very sceptical as to its efficacy. He felt that discussion of this proposal would divert attention from the Soviet missile program. He was also concerned about its effect on the defense of Panama and on our submarine defense system. He added that, if, as a result, a proposal was made for an atomic-free zone in Africa, the French would have real problems in connection with their weapons testing program. Secretary Rusk said this last point could be met by telling the French they could use our nuclear weapons test sites if their African sites were put off bounds.

Mr. Sorensen pointed out that if the OAS would support the atomic-free zone proposal, Cuba would be in violation and action could be taken to remove nuclear weapons from Cuba.

Secretary Rusk felt that it was better for us not to participate in such action as would be necessary if it were done by an organization, i.e. the OAS, to which we belong.

The President noted that the plan proposed by Brazil not only calls for an atomic-free zone in Latin America,<sup>/3/</sup> but it also encompasses a guarantee of the territorial integrity on all Latin American States. He asked whether we could commit ourselves not to invade Cuba. Secretary Rusk commented that we are committed not to invade Cuba, having signed the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty.

<sup>/3/</sup>This proposal was first made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly by the Brazilian Representative on September 20. It was subsequently submitted to the First Committee as draft resolution A/C.1/L/312.

Secretary Rusk read a draft cable which he wished to send to the Brazilian Ambassador in Cuba outlining an approach to Castro,<sup>/4/</sup> with a view to persuading him to break with the Russians. In commenting on the draft cable, Mr. Nitze called attention to the importance of getting Soviet missiles out urgently.

<sup>/4/</sup>The draft has not been identified, but see Document 81.

Mr. McCone expressed his dislike of a situation involving continued control of Cuba by Castro. Even if the Soviet missiles are removed, Castro, if he is left in control, will be in an excellent position to undertake the Communization of Latin America.

Secretary Rusk said the present position is that Cuba ties to the USSR are not negotiable. Mr. Bundy pointed out, and the President agreed, that our objective was to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

The President said work on the missile sites has to cease and we have to verify what is going on at the sites every day during the talks in New York. As to the message to Castro, he agreed in general, but wanted to have another look at it. He doubted that it would do any good, but it might be undertaken if done now with the greatest

urgency.

Ambassador Stevenson discussed the immediate negotiations now under way with U Thant and the longer talks which would follow if agreement can be reached with the Russians in New York. He said the immediate talks were aimed at getting a 24-48-hour standstill on the missile buildup in Cuba. He acknowledged that in these talks it would be impossible to obtain an agreement to make the weapons inoperable. He wanted to know whether he should seek a standstill on all Soviet arms or only offensive weapons. He would seek to get a commitment that there be no further construction, but it would not be possible to set up a system to ensure that the weapons were made inoperable and kept inoperable. In addition, he needed to know whether in return we would be prepared to suspend the quarantine.

Ambassador Stevenson said the aim of the longer term talks would be the withdrawal from this hemisphere of the strategic missiles and the dismantlement of existing sites. He predicted that the Russians would ask us for a new guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba and the dismantlement of U.S. strategic missiles in Turkey.

Mr. McCone disagreed with Ambassador Stevenson's linking of Soviet missiles in Cuba to U.S. missiles in Turkey. He said the Soviet weapons in Cuba were pointed at our heart and put us under great handicap in continuing to carry out our commitments to the free world. He urged that we do not drop the quarantine until the Soviet missiles are out of Cuba. He believed that we must keep up the momentum so far achieved by the quarantine.

The President said we will get the Soviet strategic missiles out of Cuba only by invading Cuba or by trading. He doubted that the quarantine alone would produce a withdrawal of the weapons. He said our objective should be to prevent further military shipments, further construction at missile sites, and to get some means of inspection.

Mr. McCone urged that any inspectors sent to Cuba be U.S. inspectors knowledgeable about strategic missiles.

The President said he understood Ambassador Stevenson to be asking for time during which he would try to negotiate the withdrawal of the missiles.

Secretary Rusk doubted that we could get any pre-conditions to negotiation.

Secretary Dillon agreed that the Soviets could not back down merely in return for dropping the quarantine.

Mr. Nitze called attention to the importance of obtaining a guarantee that the nuclear missiles would be disassembled from their launchers.

Mr. Bundy said negotiations for a standstill or a standdown were not enough for our security because we must press, in addition, for guaranteed inspection of Cuba.

Secretary Dillon said we could not negotiate for two weeks under the missile threat which now exists in Cuba.

The President noted that there appeared to be little support for Ambassador Stevenson's plan. If the quarantine would not result in the Soviets withdrawing the missiles, what will we do if negotiations break down?

Mr. Bundy said when the interim 24-48-hour talks fail, then our choice would be to expand the blockade or remove the missiles by air attack.

General Taylor urged that we increase our reconnaissance activity in order to keep informed as to what was happening in Cuba.

The President decided to delay night reconnaissance missions, at least until the Soviets turn down U Thant's

proposal. He also agreed that we should announce publicly that construction work at the missile sites in Cuba was going on and that, therefore, we will continue our aerial reconnaissance flights. The President also wanted attention called by a White House spokesman to his earlier speech which insisted that work at the missile sites in Cuba cease. The President decided that a presentation of the current situation should be made to the Congressional Leaders.

Bromley Smith/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **80. Memorandum From ABC Correspondent John Scali to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman)**

Washington, undated.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Elite-Psalm Documents. Confidential; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson, Ball, and Thompson. The source text bears the handwritten notation "Secretary has in hand." For Hilsman's account of drafting of this memorandum and his subsequent discussion with Rusk see *To Move a Nation*, pp. 217-218. Printed in part in Pierre Salinger, *With Kennedy*, p. 274.

Alexander S. Fomin, Sov Emby Counselor, at lunch which he sought urgently, asks if State would be interested in settlement of Cuban crisis along these lines:

Bases would be dismantled under United Nations supervision and Castro would pledge not to accept offensive weapons of any kind, ever, in return for US pledge not to invade Cuba.

I said I didn't know but that perhaps this is something that could be talked about. He said if Stevenson pursued this line, Zorin would be interested. Asked that I check with State and let him know. He gave me his home telephone number so I could call him tonight, if necessary.

Fomin claimed that Cuban delegate to UN during Security Council debate asked for such no-invasion assurances in return for dismantling but that he got no reply. I told him I'd followed the UN debate very carefully but could not recall any such remarks on Cuban's part.

Fomin also said Russia had been forced "to make some concessions" to Communist China in order to convince them to stop the fighting against India. He declined to say what under my questioning. But he recalled they hadn't helped the ChiComs with nuclear weapons or conventional weapons in the past, even tanks, and hinted it might be aid in the conventional field.

Scali/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil**

Washington, October 26, 1962, 2 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2662. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Drafted by Martin, cleared with U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Rusk.

1055. Ambassador from Secretary. We believe time has come for representative friendly country to discuss with Castro alone predicament in which Soviet actions have placed him. We also believe Brazilian Ambassador in

Havana is best person to do this and therefore wish you to see Hermes Lima as soon as possible to secure his agreement to instruction to their Ambassador along following lines. This approach to Castro should be handled in such way as make absolutely clear to Castro it is solely Brazilian initiative. Naturally we would hope matter could be handled by Brazilians with greatest discretion. In this connection we feel strongly that need for complete secrecy between FM and Ambassador in Havana only, and absolute accuracy, is so great that the instructions should be taken to Havana by special courier in special airplane as soon as possible (FYI. Important should not be any Brazilian cables referring this subject. End FYI.) Report reaction niact.

Would wish instructions to Ambassador Luis Batian Pinto to read substantially as follows:

1. The world now knows without any question and in great detail the nature and size of the buildup of Soviet offensive missile capability in Cuba. There can be no valid question in anyone's mind on this point.
2. The action of the Soviet Union in using Cuban soil as sites for offensive nuclear missiles capable of striking most of the Western Hemisphere has placed the future of the Castro regime and the well-being of the Cuban people in great jeopardy.
3. The countries of the Inter-American System have unanimously called for their removal and approved and are participating in the measures being taken to eliminate this Soviet threat to all of them.
4. The Soviet Union is turning around its cargo ships in face of US quarantine which the countries of hemisphere have authorized. Not only is the Soviet Union failing to support Cuba on this matter, but numerous feelers have been put out by high Soviet officials to allied governments for exchanges of their position in Cuba for concessions by the NATO countries in other parts of the world. Thus you are not only being used for purposes of no interest to any Cuban, but deserted and threatened by betrayal.
5. It is also well known that work is proceeding rapidly to complete and make operational the offensive nuclear missile installations and to assemble the IL-28 bombers. The threatened countries clearly cannot sit still while the threat against them is being increased in this fashion. Further steps will have to be taken against Cuba and very soon.
6. Castro might recall that President Kennedy has said publicly that only two issues were nonnegotiable between Castro and the US--the military-political ties to the USSR and the aggressive attitude toward the internal affairs of other Latin American countries. This view will be shared by other members of the Inter-American System. Of course this now means giving up the offensive nuclear capability being established in Cuba and sending home Soviet military personnel, on which help can certainly be given if needed. From such actions many changes in the relations between Cuba and the OAS countries, including the US, could flow.
7. Time is very short for Cuba and for Castro to decide whether to devote his great leadership abilities to the service of his Cuban peoples or to serving as a Soviet pawn in their desperately risky struggle for world domination by force and threat of force.
8. If Castro tries to rationalize the presence of these missiles as due to Cuban fear of a US invasion, Ambassador Batian should reply that he is confident that the OAS would not accept an invasion of Cuba once the missiles were removed and that the US would not risk upsetting hemispheric solidarity by invading a Cuba clearly committed to a peaceful course.

Rusk

## **82. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, October 26, 1962, 2:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented). Top Secret; Eyes Only. The time of the meeting is from McCone's account, which is reproduced in part in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 319-321.

## SUBJECT

Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, 26 October 1962

## PRESENT

Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, General Lansdale, General Johnson; the Attorney General; Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin; Mr. Bundy; Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey; Mr. Wilson

1. The meeting began with a discussion of the considerably-increased activity in the dispatch, and preparation for dispatch, of agent teams. As a result of this discussion, it was agreed that all plans for dispatch should be suspended pending further examination; instructions were issued during the course of the meeting designed to recall the three teams already on the way.

It was agreed that the first order of business with regard to these teams is to examine in detail the requirements toward which they could contribute. General Lansdale will arrange to get CIA into contact with: (a) General Carroll, to examine what military requirements such agents could service; (b) similarly, the State Department for political intelligence requirements; (c) USIA for requirements peculiar to that Agency. After this examination, it will then be decided what the best use of these agent assets actually should be.

2. Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey said during the course of the discussion on agent teams, that the action taken had represented a unilateral decision by CIA and was not in response to specific military requirements. CIA had felt that this was within its sphere of responsibility, and particularly with respect to the first three teams had considered that it was a continuation of previously-approved operations. Mr. McCone commented that internal security in Cuba is now far more stringent than it was two weeks ago, thereby making agent operations much more difficult; he felt, therefore, that agent activity on this scale will only be justified if the responsible departments specifically require it for intelligence purposes.

In this connection, General Taylor brought out that the Chiefs had approved the use of submarines for agent dispatch but had not been asked to review the operation in broader context. The Chiefs had concluded, however, that no revolt should be stimulated unless and until the U.S. is ready to support it and that the military establishment does not wish to take over sabotage and similar operations at this time, although it should be prepared to do so if an invasion should be mounted. Mr. McCone agreed that it is possible that as the situation develops, CIA Cuban operations might move under military control, but that such action is not indicated at this time.

3. Mr. Harvey made the point that the proposed agent dispatches would not use up all existing assets. He said that in the event of invasion, a sizable number of Cubans could be trained quickly.

4. The Attorney General and General Lansdale emphasized that the Cubans are entirely prepared to make the necessary sacrifices if they are in support of an approved plan. The Cubans do want, however, assurances that such activities are in fact approved at a high level.

5. Mr. Bundy emphasized the importance of planning for the use of Cubans in political and civil activities during and after any military action. He felt that there should be established within the government some sort of "Office of Free Cuban Affairs," which probably should be placed within the Department of State. The activities of this office would be distinct from General Lansdale's operations but would be closely related to them. He pointed out



that top priority should be given to selecting a man to head such an office. Mr. Bundy also said that he thought a subcommittee of the NSC Executive Committee should be established to deal with Mongoose affairs.

6. Mr. McNamara thought that Mongoose in the short-term should be considered in the context of (a) providing support for action designed to get rid of the missiles, and (b) support for a possible invasion.

7. Specific discussion took place on points raised in the paper distributed at the meeting, as follows:

a. CIA should continue to develop the balloon propaganda facilities, although it was recognized that by the target date of 1 December this capability might no longer be needed because of other methods of delivery.

b. No major acts of sabotage should be undertaken at this time. This decision will be reviewed in about a week.

c. General Lansdale should develop further plans to "help the Cubans to help themselves." Mr. Morales-Carrion should be brought into this planning.

d. Political planning for the post-Castro period will be assigned to the "Office for Free Cuban Affairs."

e. Establishment of USIA's new 50 KW transmitter in the Florida Keys should be expedited.

8. It was reiterated that General Lansdale is the focal point for all Mongoose activities, that he is charged with their overall management and that he should be kept informed of all significant plans and activities in connection with the project.

Thomas A. Parrott/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

### **83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations**

Washington, October 26, 1962, 5:16 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2662. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Cleveland and cleared in draft by Rusk, U. Alexis Johnson, Chayes, Martin, McCloy, Stevenson, and Nitze. Repeated to Moscow.

1105. For Stevenson. Subject: Cuba: Talks with Acting Secretary General U Thant.

At beginning of first meeting with SYG you should take occasion restate basic US position that early removal nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba is the essence of the matter. We understand that the Secretary General is proposing first a discussion of some form of standstill or freeze (covering arms shipments to Cuba, the build up of offensive weapons in Cuba, and our quarantine action), to be followed by broader talks on peaceful settlement of the larger issue created by Soviet introduction of missiles and other offensive weapons into an island just off our shores.

While we are willing to handle matter in two stages, we would emphasize at the start that the build up must stop, and the weapons must be removed before too long and that these things must be done under inspection arrangements that insure against secrecy and cheating. We would emphasize further that the OAS quarantine action will not be lifted until the threat which provoked it is removed.

Within this framework of policy, following is for your guidance in early discussions with SYG and Soviet delegates.

1. We understand procedural state of affairs to be as follows:

a. Security Council has adjourned sine die and all efforts will be focused for next two or three days on US-USSR discussions through or with Thant.

b. Both U.S. and USSR (not at this stage Cuba) have agreed to meet with Thant for discussion "modalities".

c. What SYG calls discussion of "modalities" is not an attempt to solve basic problem (which from our standpoint is removal of offensive weapons from Cuba) at one stroke, but must at least attempt to achieve a condition which would involve (i) no more offensive arms being delivered to Cuba, (ii) no further build-up of missile sites or bomber facilities, and (iii) any existing Cuban nuclear strike capability being kept inoperable.

d. Achievement of such a standstill will require a substantial administrative effort by SYG with assistance of a number of countries, to put UN in position to guarantee that standstill would be effective while negotiations designed to remove threat to Western Hemisphere could be brought to a conclusion.

2. The problem of "modalities" divides naturally into two parts, (a) UN control of shipments to Cuba and (b) UN observation of Cuban compliance with suspension of further build-up with safeguards to ensure inoperability of any nuclear strike capacity.

3. Control of Shipments to Cuba:

a. FYI. The US Fleet would remain approximately as deployed at the present time. US Naval Force would maintain surveillance to discover any attempt to off-load or trans-ship at locations other than designated UN ports. Responsible US Fleet Commander in the area would report any violation he might observe to Washington which would bring violation to attention of SYG or head of UN observation operation. It would have to be understood by SYG from the outset that US surveillance continues and latent force is in background. End FYI.

b. All Cuba-bound ships would be required to enter Cuba at ports designated by the UN. On present basis, sea traffic to Cuba consists of one or two ships arriving per day.

c. UN inspectors would be stationed at those ports in adequate numbers. With necessary cooperation Cuban authorities they would inspect arriving ships of all nationalities to verify the presence or the absence of any arms as defined by SYG. FYI. A list of "prohibited material" presently included in Presidential Proclamation and supplementary orders under it will be provided for your guidance in discussing this point. End FYI. These UN inspectors would be given full access to all such ships.

4. UN observers would be stationed in the main military and civilian airfields in Cuba. Their mission would be to:

a. examine incoming cargo shipments to verify presence or absence of offensive weapons or components thereof, and

b. assure grounding of bomber aircraft.

5. Observers would be stationed in adequate numbers to ensure no further construction or improvements of MRBM or IRBM sites, and to ensure that any existing missiles are kept inoperable.

6. FYI. Preliminary Department of Defense estimates would require close to 500 persons for the three tasks identified in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5. End FYI.

7. Inspectors to be provided under this procedure must be of such technical competence as to insure that they are

able in fact to identify items of offensive military equipment, and to carry out control functions at airports and missile sites. FYI. Not only must inspectors be physically placed to observe what is there, they must also have the authority to observe separation of components of the missile system to ensure that the missiles are inoperable. End FYI. While many of the personnel would in practice be performing administrative functions, several dozen well-trained technical people would be required and number of countries from which they could come is limited.

Dependable first-rate personnel for this operation will be essential, and US should have a strong voice in their selection. Advance preparation of technical teams would include examination of US advice as to where to go and what to look for. Full and free access for UN teams throughout island should be assured. FYI. Quality and political reliability of inspectors would be key to any inspection system. Likelihood that Soviets will permit real inspection their site is so remote that it would be unwise to concede on quality and reliability in return for paper agreement on access to site. End FYI.

8. Violations or suspected violations of agreed arrangements observed by that UN observer team will be immediately notified to the SYG, and would be passed by him to the parties concerned. "All's well" reports should be made around the clock at frequent intervals (every 2 hours); the absence of such reports would be a signal for immediate surveillance of the site by the United States. The US will, of course, retain the right to reactivate quarantine measures or take other necessary action if agreed arrangements are violated.

9. Legal and parliamentary status in the United Nations of arrangements agreed between the parties directly concerned can only be worked out when it is possible to see what kind of a UN operation would be involved. Security Council action would probably be useful at least to place at SYG's disposal the resources he would require for any substantial UN operation.

10. FYI. During talks on standstill arrangements we do not think it would be useful to start process of bargaining on such wider issues, or on possible terms of final peaceful settlement. End FYI.

Rusk

#### **84. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, October 26, 1962, 7 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Cuba Security, Khrushchev Correspondence. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only; Verbatim Text. Relayed to the White House. The original Russian language text, which bears no classification, is *ibid.* Also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 19, 1973, pp. 640-643. The source text is a translation done at the Embassy in Moscow, which received the letter at 4:43 p.m. Moscow time. The first section arrived in the Department of State at 6 p.m. and the last at 9 p.m. A "formal" translation, done by the Language Services Division of the Department of State, is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163.

1101. Policy. Embassy translation follows of letter from Khrushchev to President delivered to Embassy by messenger 4:43 p.m. Moscow time October 26, under cover of letter from Gromyko to me.

*Begin text.*

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of October 25./1/ From your letter, I got the feeling that you have some understanding of the situation which has developed and a sense of responsibility. I value this.

/1/See Document 68.

Now we have already publicly exchanged our evaluations of the events around Cuba and each of us has set forth his explanation and his understanding of these events. Consequently, I would think that, apparently, a continuation of an exchange of opinions at such a distance, even in the form of secret letters, will hardly add anything to that which one side has already said to the other.

I think you will understand me correctly if you are really concerned about the welfare of the world. Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and, still more, Communists, people who know how to value not only their own lives but, more than anything, the lives of the peoples. We, Communists, are against all wars between states in general and have been defending the cause of peace since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity, and not as a game nor as a means for the attainment of definite goals, nor, all the more, as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the means to attain them is labor. War is our enemy and a calamity for all the peoples.

It is thus that we, Soviet people, and, together with US, other peoples as well, understand the questions of war and peace. I can, in any case, firmly say this for the peoples of the socialist countries, as well as for all progressive people who want peace, happiness, and friendship among peoples.

I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world/<sup>2</sup>/ understanding, and of what war entails. What would a war give you? You are threatening us with war. But you well know that the very least which you would receive in reply would be that you would experience the same consequences as those which you sent us. And that must be clear to us, people invested with authority, trust, and responsibility. We must not succumb to intoxication and petty passions, regardless of whether elections are impending in this or that country, or not impending. These are all transient things, but if indeed war should break out, then it would not be in our power to contain or stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have participated in two wars and know that war ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing death and destruction.

<sup>2</sup>/Garble in the source text. It was subsequently corrected to read "not without an".

In the name of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people, I assure you that your arguments regarding offensive weapons on Cuba are groundless. It is apparent from what you have written me that our conceptions are different on this score, or rather, we have different definitions for these or those military means, indeed, in reality, the same forms of weapons can have different interpretations.

You are a military man and, I hope, will understand me. Let us take for example a simple cannon. What sort of means is this: offensive or defensive? A cannon is a defensive means if it is set up to defend boundaries or a fortified area. But if one concentrates artillery, and adds to it the necessary number of troops, then the same cannons do become an offensive means, because they prepare and clear the way for infantry to advance. The same happens with missile-nuclear weapons as well, with any type of this weapon.

You are mistaken if you think that any of our means on Cuba are offensive. However, let us not argue now, it is apparent that I will not be able to convince you of this, but I say to you: You, Mr. President, are a military man and should understand: can one advance, if one has on one's territory even an enormous quantity of missiles of various effective radiuses and various power, but using only these means. These missiles are a means of extermination and destruction, but one cannot advance with these missiles, even nuclear missiles of a power of 100 megatons because only people, troops, can advance, without people, any means however powerful cannot be offensive.

How can one, consequently, give such a completely incorrect interpretation as you are now giving, to the effect that some sort of means on Cuba are offensive. All the means located there, and I assure you of this, have a defensive character, are on Cuba solely for the purposes of defense, and we have sent them to Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government. You, however, say that these are offensive means.

But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think that Cuba can attack the United States and that even we together with Cuba can advance upon you from the territory of Cuba? Can you really think that way? How is it possible? We do not understand this. Has something so new appeared in military strategy that one can think that it is possible to advance thus. I say precisely advance, and not destroy, since barbarians, people who have lost their sense, destroy.

I believe that you have no basis to think this way. You can regard us with distrust, but, in any case, you can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we attack you, you will respond the same way. But you too will receive the same that you hurl against us. And I think that you also understand this. My conversation with you in Vienna gives me the right to talk to you this way.

This indicates that we are normal people, that we correctly understand and correctly evaluate the situation. Consequently, how can we permit the incorrect actions which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish and to destroy the whole world before they die, could do this. We, however, want to live and do not at all want to destroy your country. We want something quite different: to compete with your country on a peaceful endeavor. We quarrel with you, we have differences in ideological questions. But our view of the world consists in this, that ideological questions, as well as economic problems, should be solved not by military means, they must be solved on the basis of peaceful competition, i.e., as this is understood in capitalist society, on the basis of competition. We have proceeded and are proceeding from the fact that the peaceful co-existence of the two different social-political systems, now existing in the world, is necessary, that it is necessary to assure a stable peace. That is the sort of principle we hold.

You have now proclaimed piratical measures, which were employed in the Middle Ages, when ships proceeding in international waters were attacked, and you have called this "a quarantine" around Cuba. Our vessels, apparently, will soon enter the zone which your Navy is patrolling. I assure you that these vessels, now bound for Cuba, are carrying the most innocent peaceful cargoes. Do you really think that we only occupy ourselves with the carriage of so-called offensive weapons, atomic and hydrogen bombs? Although perhaps your military people imagine that these (cargoes) are some sort of special type of weapon, I assure you that they are the most ordinary peaceful products.

Consequently, Mr. President, let us show good sense. I assure you that on those ships, which are bound for Cuba, there are no weapons at all. The weapons which were necessary for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not want to say that there were not any shipments of weapons at all. No, there were such shipments. But now Cuba has already received the necessary means of defense.

I don't know whether you can understand me and believe me. But I should like to have you believe in yourself and to agree that one cannot give way to passions; it is necessary to control them. And in what direction are events now developing? If you stop the vessels, then, as you yourself know, that would be piracy. If we started to do that with regard to your ships, then you would also be as indignant as we and the whole world now are. One cannot give another interpretation to such actions, because one cannot legalize lawlessness. If this were permitted, then there would be no peace, there would also be no peaceful coexistence. We should then be forced to put into effect the necessary measures of a defensive character to protect our interest in accordance with international law. Why should this be done? To what would all this lead?

Let us normalize relations. We have received an appeal from the Acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, with his proposals. I have already answered him. His proposals come to this, that our side should not transport armaments of any kind to Cuba during a certain period of time, while negotiations are being conducted--and we are ready to enter such negotiations--and the other side should not undertake any sort of piratical actions against vessels engaged in navigation on the high seas. I consider these proposals reasonable. This would be a way out of the situation which has been created, which would give the peoples the possibility of breathing calmly. You have asked what happened, what evoked the delivery of weapons to Cuba? You have spoken about this to our

Minister of Foreign Affairs. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, what evoked it.

We were very grieved by the fact--I spoke about it in Vienna--that a landing took place, that an attack on Cuba was committed, as a result of which many Cubans perished. You yourself told me then that this had been a mistake. I respected that explanation. You repeated it to me several times, hinting that not everybody occupying a high position would acknowledge his mistakes as you had done. I value such frankness. For my part, I told you that we too possess no less courage; we also acknowledged those mistakes which had been committed during the history of our state, and not only acknowledged, but sharply condemned them.

If you are really concerned about the peace and welfare of your people, and this is your responsibility as President, then I, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, am concerned for my people. Moreover, the preservation of world peace should be our joint concern, since if, under contemporary conditions, war should break out, it would be a war not only between the Soviet Union and the United States which have no contentions between them, but a worldwide cruel and destructive war.

Why have we proceeded to assist Cuba with military and economic aid? The answer is: we have proceeded to do so only for reasons of humanitarianism. At one time, our people itself had a revolution, when Russia was still a backward country, we were attacked then. We were the target of attack by many countries. The USA participated in that adventure. This has been recorded by participants in the aggression against our country. A whole book has been written about this by General Graves, who, at that time, commanded the US Expeditionary Corps. Graves called it "The American Adventure in Siberia."

We know how difficult it is to accomplish a revolution and how difficult it is to reconstruct a country on new foundations. We sincerely sympathize with Cuba and the Cuban people, but we are not interfering in questions of domestic structure, we are not interfering in their affairs. The Soviet Union desires to help the Cubans build their life as they themselves wish and that others should not hinder them.

You once said that the United States was not preparing an invasion. But you also declared that you sympathized with the Cuban counter-revolutionary emigrants, that you support them and would help them to realize their plans against the present Government of Cuba. It is also not a secret to anyone that the threat of armed attack, aggression, has constantly hung, and continues to hang over Cuba. It was only this which impelled us to respond to the request of the Cuban Government to furnish it aid for the strengthening of the defensive capacity of this country.

If assurances were given by the President and the Government of the United States that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet, this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the Government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if there is no threat, then armaments are a burden for every people. Then, too, the question of the destruction, not only of the armaments which you call offensive, but of all other armaments as well, would look different.

I spoke in the name of the Soviet Government in the United Nations and introduced a proposal for the disbandment of all armies and for the destruction of all armaments. How then can I now count on those armaments?

Armaments bring only disasters. When one accumulates them, this damages the economy, and if one puts them to use, then they destroy people on both sides. Consequently, only a madman can believe that armaments are the principal means in the life of society. No, they are an enforced loss of human energy, and what is more are for the destruction of man himself. If people do not show wisdom, then in the final analysis they will come to a clash, like blind moles, and then reciprocal extermination will begin.

Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, are not carrying any armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive, piratical actions, which you have declared the USA intends to carry out in international waters, would lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man simply cannot agree with this, cannot recognize your right to such actions.

If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.

We welcome all forces which stand on positions of peace. Consequently, I both expressed gratitude to Mr. Bertrand Russell, who manifests alarm and concern for the fate of the world, and readily responded to the appeal of the Acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant.

There, Mr. President, are my thoughts, which, if you agreed with them, could put an end to that tense situation which is disturbing all peoples.

These thoughts are dictated by a sincere desire to relieve the situation, to remove the threat of war.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ N. Khrushchev

October 26, 1962. *End text.*

Original of letter being air pouched today under transmittal slip to Executive Secretariat.

Kohler

## **85. Editorial Note**

According to a 4-page paper in the Sorensen papers at the Kennedy Library, ABC Correspondent John Scali met with Soviet Counselor Alexandr Fomin at 7:45 p.m. on October 26, 1962, and made the following statement:

"I have reason to believe that the United States Government sees real possibilities in this and supposes that the representatives of the USSR and the United States in New York can work this matter out with U Thant and with each other. My definite impression is that time is very urgent and time is very short."

The paper went on to note that Fomin asked several times if this message came from high sources and Scali replied that it came from very high places. The Soviet Counselor then inquired if it would be possible to have U.N. inspectors also check U.S. bases in Florida and surrounding Caribbean countries. Scali replied that he had

no official information on this possibility, but stated that "he felt it would raise a terrible complication for President Kennedy in a period when time was of the essence." Fomin, who left the meeting in haste, said the information would be communicated simultaneously to the highest Soviet sources and to the Soviet U.N. Representative in New York. (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers Classified Subject Files, Cuba--Subjects) For a similar account including some of the details of the discussion and drafting of the statement, see Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, pages 217-219. For a memorandum by Scali on this second meeting and reports on similar conversations during the next 3 days, see Pierre Salinger, *With Kennedy*, pages 274-279.

## **86. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**

New York, October 26, 1962, 7 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2662. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 8:19 p.m.

1484. Cuba. Stevenson, McCloy, Yost and Plimpton met at 4:30 pm at Secretariat with SYG, Loutfi, Narasimhan and Rikhye.

1. We pointed out that the real essence of the problem was to get the missiles and the nuclear aircraft out of Cuba.
2. Immediate problems were:
  - (A) No further weapons or materiel should be introduced;
  - (B) There should be no further work on the sites;
  - (C) The missiles presently in Cuba should be inoperable; and
  - (D) The suspension of the quarantine.
3. As to shipping, if it were agreed that no bloc ships or bloc-chartered ships were to approach Cuba, the only remaining problem would be the inspection of other ships.
4. This inspection could take place at the ports of embarkation, on the assumption that the ship was not calling at a bloc port, or at the landing ports. Rikhye pointed out that ships declare cargoes at landing ports, which should simplify inspection.
5. We stated that US Fleet would continue to be deployed during interim period, not for purpose of interception but to ensure that there was no trans-shipment at sea or landing at uninspected ports. US Fleet would report any violation to the SYG.
6. It was agreed that the problem of inspection would be quite simple if bloc lived up to Khrushchev agreement to keep bloc shipping away from Cuba.
7. We next raised question of inspection of incoming aircraft at airfields. It was pointed out that few aircraft come in from the bloc, and that the principal problem might relate to incoming cargo planes from other countries.
8. We then raised question of ensuring that IL 28's would be inoperable. Rikhye thought that UN presence might be sufficient check. We pointed out that they were located at a strictly military field, which had previously been closed up. Rikhye agreed it might be practicable to close it up again.



9. As to sites, we said that construction was progressing rapidly through yesterday, and that heavy camouflaging of the sites was being attempted. We pointed out this was vitally important and urgent problem, which required UN inspectors and constant reports by them.
10. SYG said he would send appeal to Castro tonight through Inchaustegui (Cuba) to suspend construction of the sites, and would also speak to Zorin about it.
11. As regards the ultimate dismantling of the sites, SYG said he would insist on a UN team to oversee compliance.
12. We stated that non-operability of existing missiles was a difficult problem which it was essential to deal with. Problem related primarily to medium-range missiles since IRBM missile sites were not yet ready and would not be for some time.
13. We discussed possibility of separating the missiles from the launchers as a guarantee of non-operability. If missiles close to launchers, only a few hours are required for firing, and we must have guarantee against surprise launching.
14. Rikhye said he was sure Soviets would not permit inspectors to look at such equipment. He asked whether UN presence might not give assurance that there would be no attack. Our aerial surveillance was also mentioned as a possible deterrent and a possible Soviet and Cuban guarantee of no attack.
15. We pointed out that problem of crucial importance since the Soviet nuclear striking capacity was estimated to be increased 20 per cent by Cuban installations.
16. SYG again raised question of solving whole problem through assurance by US that it would not attack Cuba and would prevent others from doing so, with resulting dismantling of all Soviet installations, and reiterated that this should be a starting point. He suggested the possibility of the President's writing him a letter to the effect that the US willing to make such a guarantee, if offensive weapons withdrawn, which he would use in negotiations.
17. We pointed out that the OAS would have to be consulted in any such connection, which the SYG said he understood. We also referred to problem of what LA states considered Cuban indirect aggression against them.
18. As regards UN inspection teams in Cuba, SYG said it would be much easier to get Cuba to agree if there were some reciprocity for face-saving purposes, such as UN inspection of Cuban refugee camps to prove no military training, and to ascertain that no evidence of preparations for any invasion of Cuba.
19. With reference to the constitution of the UN inspection teams, we pointed out that they must include sophisticated experts who understand enough of missiles to know what to look for. We pointed out that US ought to be able to designate or nominate people for the team.
20. SYG said it would be difficult to include nationals of US and USSR, and that he was sure that teams would have to be composed of neutrals. It was pointed out that many neutral countries now know quite a bit about missiles as a result of Geneva conferences.
21. It was agreed that the US could brief the teams ahead of time to show them what to look for. Rikhye said that he would be glad to get together with a US expert on missile matters to discuss the inspection problem as related to missiles. Comment: Suggest such expert be sent to New York immediately.
22. As regards publication of SYG's recent letters to and from President and to and from Khrushchev, SYG asked Zorin as to publication. Zorin said he had no instructions and would ask for them. Until agreement to publish was received from Soviet, SYG said publication of such letters should be withheld.

23. General atmosphere was quite relaxed and friendly. SYG much less concerned with blockade than at earlier meeting with Yost and Plimpton,<sup>/1/</sup> and seemed much more aware of site construction and missile operability problems and need for inspection. He clearly putting principal emphasis in his mind on possibility of US guarantee to Cuba as short-circuit solution of whole problem.

<sup>/1/</sup>The Mission to the United Nations had reported on this conversation at 11:30 a.m. in telegram 1479 from New York, transmitted at 4 p.m. (Ibid.) Since Stevenson was still in Washington, Yost and Plimpton had represented the U.S. side. The discussion generally proceeded along the lines above.

Stevenson

### **87. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan**

Washington, October 26, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Macmillan Telephone Conversations. Top Secret. For Macmillan's record of this conversation, see *At the End of the Day*, pp. 209-212.

President: Hello, Prime Minister.

PM: Hello, what's the news now?

President: Well, Governor Stevenson saw U Thant this afternoon<sup>/1/</sup> and made our proposals about the importation of arms ceasing, and that work on these bases stopping and leading to eventual dismemberment. There are some reports around, some Russian conversations, but it's rather unofficial and unreliable, about some thought that it's possible they might do something about withdrawing the weapons if they could get a territorial guarantee of Cuba. But that is so unofficial that I'm not in a position now to know whether there's anything to it or not. Khrushchev told U Thant that he would keep his ships out of there for the time being, but he wouldn't do it very long. He isn't giving us very much because actually he's got no ships in the area anyway. But at least he's made that announcement; he's keeping his ships out of there for the time being. We are continuing the quarantine. The build-up of the sites continues, however. And I put a statement out this afternoon describing how the build-up is going on, so that unless in the next 48 hours we get some political suggestions as to dismantling the base we're then going to be faced with a problem of what to do about this build-up.<sup>/2/</sup>

<sup>/1/</sup>See Document 86.

<sup>/2/</sup>For text of this statement, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962*, p. 812.

PM: (garbled) Well as I see it--one idea you just mentioned is that Cuba might be made like Belgium was--an international guarantee of inviolable country which all of us would guarantee its neutrality and inviolability independently. Is that a possibility?

President: Well, that is a matter that it seems to me we ought to be thinking about and we will be talking about that in the next 24 hours--as to whether there is any room for a settlement on that basis. That would leave Castro in power. It would leave the Russians perhaps free to ship in a good deal more of defensive equipment and they have shipped in a good deal. We now find a good many self-propelled armored vehicles, with very sophisticated conventional equipment, and so on. But it may be a possibility, but I could probably give you more information about that by tomorrow night. But at least there have been a couple of hints but not enough to go on yet.

PM: Yes, well all right. Well, another possibility was that U Thant might himself propose to the United Nations, which I believe they would accept, that he should go with the team and insure that these missiles were made inoperable during the period of any conference or discussion.

President: Yes, that is correct. There would have to be some technical way of determining that these weapons were being made inoperable and that work on the sites was ceasing during these conversations. That's correct.

PM: (garbled) I am quite sure that U Thant would have done such a thing. (more garbled) He might suggest to the UN that he would go . . . with a team of experts which would supervise the matter during the talks.

President: Yes, there's some suggestion of that. Also they want to inspect some of the refugee camps in Florida and Nicaragua, Guatemala and Swan Island. That came up in the conversation with the Governor. I am looking into it. I don't think we've got anything going there that would be difficult to inspect. But this is all part of the political proposals which are now being looked at in view of the Governor's conversation. So I would sum it up, Prime Minister, by saying that by tomorrow morning or noon we should be in a position of knowing whether there is some political proposal that we could agree to, and whether the Russians are interested in it or not. We will know a little more, I think, by tomorrow afternoon. In the meanwhile the quarantine stays; he doesn't send ships in; we let a ship pass this afternoon, but there are no other ships within 48 hours or so, so we don't expect any problems on the sea. The problem that concerns us is the continued build-up, and I issued a statement on that today. I think I could probably get you a little more precise information on the various political proposals than U Thant's conversation with Stevenson. I'll send you a report on that tonight and then you will have it in the morning.

PM: If we want to save face, would it be worthwhile our undertaking to keep open eyes on all exiles which are here in England during the same period, during the conference.

President: Let me put that into the machinery and then I will be in touch with you on that.

PM: (unintelligible)

President: Good, Prime Minister, let me send that over to the Department. I think we don't want to have too many dismantlings, but it's possible that that proposal might help. They might also insist on Turkey and Italy, but I will keep in mind your suggestion here so that if it gets into that that may be advantageous.

PM: (garbled)

President: Yes, that is correct. I will let Stevenson know that and he will have that in mind in the conversation.

PM: That's correct. You will send your message tomorrow and we will continue this tomorrow.

President: That's correct. I think we just have to wait until we fully analyze this conversation. I haven't seen the entire conversation, but I think that there may--and the prospect of a trade of these missiles and some guarantees of Cuba is still so vague that I am not really in a position to say that there is any possibility as yet. Maybe by tomorrow evening at this time we'll know better.

PM: Yes, but of course at this stage any movement by you may produce a result in Berlin which will be . . . (garbled) . . . that's the danger now . . .

President: Well, we're not going to have any problem at sea because he is keeping his ships out of there, and as I say we let one ship pass today for the very reason that you've named. On the other hand, if in the end of 48 hours we are getting no place and the missile sites continue to be constructed, then we are going to be faced with some hard decisions.

PM: (a garbled reference to Berlin)

President: That's correct, and that is really why we have not done more than we have done up until now. But of course on the other hand if the missile sites continue and get constructed and we don't do anything about it, then I would suppose that it would have quite an effect on Berlin anyway.

PM: Yes . . . (garble) I will send you a message concerning them and you will send me U Thant's conversation.

President: Yes, I'll send you a memorandum based on the copy of the conversation that Stevenson had with U Thant. I will also keep in touch with you tomorrow at this time if you--or otherwise I'll send you a message tomorrow. Maybe I'll send you a message unless we have got something immediate; and No. 3, we will not take any further action until I have talked to you in any case. I won't bother to call you tomorrow, because I may be down--I may be away from here tomorrow evening, and I assume you may be too. But I will send you a message if there is anything new, and in any case I will talk to you on the phone before we do anything of a drastic nature.

PM: . . . thank you. . . . (garble)

President: Prime Minister, I'm going to send you a note tonight or tomorrow morning about asking if it's agreeable with you if General Norstad stay on until January 1st, that there be an overlap with Lemnitzer's tour of duty; that Lemnitzer go over there and take over the American forces and be there and have that 60-day period to be sort of adjusted to his new responsibilities. You'll be getting a formal letter, and I didn't want to say anything about it because we haven't been in touch with General de Gaulle as yet, who is very sensitive in these NATO matters. But I will be in touch with you and I would assume probably that that suggestion would be agreeable to you?

PM: It is indeed very sensible. . . .

President: Good. Well, I'll be in touch in a formal way with you tomorrow on that matter and I'll send you tonight the memorandum on the U Thant conversation--and I hope all goes well.

PM: Thank you very much (garble)

President: Good, fine, Prime Minister, and I'll be in touch with you very shortly. Thank you and good night.

PM: Good night.

**88. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, October 26, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Planning Subcommittee. Top Secret. Initialed by Rostow.

SUBJECT

Report Number Three of the Planning Subcommittee/1/

/1/Reports number one and two (ibid.) are included in the Supplement.

1. The Planning Subcommittee considered the situation as of Friday morning, October 26, 1962.
2. It was agreed that, unless the U Thant initiative led to prompt negotiations, the three major requirements were:
  - a. To maintain diplomatic and public focus on the continued exist-ence and expansion of offensive installations in Cuba;
  - b. To increase the degree of our pressure and to build anxiety in all quarters that more decisive action will be required of the U.S. to eliminate the offensive installations; and
  - c. To maintain a diplomatic track which holds open the possibility of a peaceful resolution on terms consistent with the President's speech.
3. The planning process was brought into focus around the following major problems:
  - a. An operational and political scenario for the extension of the blockade to POL. (ARA, Mr. Hurwitch)
  - b. Operational and political track involving progressively increased pressure building up to an airstrike against missile installations. (Amb. Thompson; Messrs. Rowen and Kitchen)
  - c. A consolidated negotiating track. (EUR, NEA, S/P)
  - d. Assessment and recommendations concerning possibilities and dangers in Cuban political situation. (ARA)
  - e. Regular daily reassessment of Soviet intentions and appropriate posture for U.S. (S/P, Mr. Harvey)
  - f. Assessment of Free World political position vis-a-vis the crisis, with recommendations for U.S. action. (Mr. Jorden, USIA, and appropriate State Department bureaus)
  - g. Post-crisis Cuba: conditions of coexistence with Hemisphere. (ARA)
4. The planning tasks listed in Report Number Two are either going forward or will be consolidated into the tasks listed above.

**89. Memorandum Prepared by the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 26, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, WW Rostow. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text is attached to an undated memorandum of transmittal to the President and to an October 26 memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, which states that it was prepared in response to a "direct request" from Bundy on October 24.

**SUBJECT**

Negotiation

1. Background. The optimum setting for US-Soviet negotiations, particularly at the Summit, would be one in which Soviet offensive weapons had already been removed from Cuba. This may not be feasible. If so, the question of how to undertake negotiations with the Soviets will present itself against the background of either:
  - (a) Soviet acceptance of some proposal involving cessation of Soviet site construction and perhaps of Soviet

shipping to Cuba; or

(b) ascending US economic and military pressures on Cuba.

These two alternatives are not wholly mutually exclusive. The actual situation may include both some diplomatic progress and some increased US pressure.

2. Basic Strategy. Our purpose, in negotiations, should be:

(a) To afford the Soviets face-saving cover, if they wish, for a withdrawal of their offensive weapons from Cuba.

(b) To pave the way, if the negotiations fail, for expanded US economic or military action to remove the weapons.

(c) To use the crisis to reach agreement on other measures that would, in any case, be in our interest.

3. Allied Interests. In pursuing these purposes:

(a) We must have full and intimate consultation with our allies.

(b) It is essential to avoid any implication that we are trading off pre-crisis allied or US interests to secure removal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba.

Failure on either of these fronts could undermine the Alliance.

4. Level. The best way to attain the purposes in para 2 may be through a Summit meeting. At this level, it may be easier to widen the scope of the negotiations in such a way as to resolve the crisis without an obvious and humiliating Soviet backdown. Other levels and forums are also available, however, the situation may well develop so as to make these alternatives more feasible and useful.

5. Prior Action. Before any negotiation opens, we should take two actions to help set the stage:

(a) Assuming that negotiations take place before the Cuban issue is settled, we should make clear that, if negotiations do not succeed, we will take early action to remove Soviet offensive weapons.

(b) We should seek an immediate allied decision in principle to set up the small pilot NATO Southern Command multilateral seaborne force (Italians, Turks, Greeks, US, and perhaps Canadians) proposed by Ambassador Finletter in Polto 506./1/ and we should make clear our intent to provide interim coverage with Polaris and other external forces. We should then urge the Turkish and Italian governments to get quietly on the NAC record what we would take to be their intent, in any event, in this circumstance, i.e., to phase out IRBM's in view of both the prospect of a Southern Command force and the interim Polaris and other US coverage.

/1/Document 75.

6. Negotiations. We should make crystal clear, in negotiations, the sharp division between Cuba and other subjects on which we would wish to negotiate regardless of whether there was a Cuban crisis. In negotiations about Cuba, we should demand early agreement on removal of Soviet offensive weapons, possibly in the context of a Latin American (and, if necessary, African) "nuclear free" zone, in return for the end of the quarantine. In respect of other subjects, some of which could be dealt with rapidly and simultaneously with Cuba and some of which would take longer, we might try to do business as follows:

(a) Arms Control.

(i) US and Soviet non-diffusion declarations;

(ii) US and Soviet declarations of intent not to facilitate procurement of MRBM's for land deployment in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries other than US and USSR. (The US would only enter into such an exchange of declarations after full allied consultations, and would base its declaration on the previously stated US policy only to facilitate MRBM procurement for multilateral sea-based force.)

(iii) Safeguards against miscalculations, e.g., exchange of US and Soviet military observation teams, direct communication facilities between US and Soviet national command centers, etc.

(iv) Review of key differences of approach in the Geneva Disarmament and Test Ban negotiations, to determine whether any useful new directive can be given to the US and Soviet negotiators.

(b) Berlin. We would make clear that the troop issue was non-negotiable, but that we were prepared to reach a "Solution C" type agreement, which did not purport to be a final Berlin settlement but which put the matter on ice and allowed East Germans to substitute for the Soviets in access functions. This could be dressed up in various ways--UN observer, no nuclear arms in Berlin, etc.--for face-saving purposes. If the Soviets were interested, this matter could be pursued further at the minister level with other interested parties.

(c) Germany. We might suggest to the Soviets that feasible aspects of the German question--mixed commissions to increase inter-German contacts, and declarations regarding non-use of force to change the demarcation line and change the external frontiers--might be pursued further at the foreign minister level with other interested parties.

(d) Future Summitry. It might be agreed that the heads of the UK and French governments would be invited to meet in a future quadripartite Summit, to review any work done at the foreign minister level in the meantime on Berlin and Germany and to consider new topics, e.g., NATO and Warsaw Pact non-aggression declarations, which might be more appropriately handled in a more relaxed atmosphere than the present crisis.

7. Action. If this general course of action commends itself, we should:

(a) move immediately to consultation with our allies;

(b) then move to negotiations with the Soviets, preferably at the highest level.

Speed is of the essence, since passage of time may make less credible our resolve soon to take action to remove Soviet offensive weapons if negotiations fail.

## **90. Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 27, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Top Secret; Sensitive. A Record of Action of this meeting is in the Supplement. McCone's 2 pages of handwritten notes for the meeting are in the Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. They are also reproduced in *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, pp. 331-332. Tape recording transcripts of this meeting are in the Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Presidential Records, No. 41.1 and 41a.1. For two other accounts of this and other meetings on October 27, see Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, pp. 93 ff. and Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy*, pp. 712-716.

Director McCone highlighted the intelligence information contained in the first two pages of the attached CIA Cuba Crisis Memorandum./1/

/1/A summary of this memorandum, SC No. 08184/62, is reproduced in *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, pp. 328-329. See the Supplement.

Secretary McNamara reported on the positions of Soviet Bloc ships moving toward Cuba. He said we do not know yet whether any such ships will enter the interception area. He recommended that we be prepared to board the *Graznyy*, which is now out about 600 miles. We would put ships alongside her and follow along for about 200 miles. If we asked her to stop and she did, we would inspect the cargo for contraband and release her if, as expected, she had no prohibited material aboard. If she refuses to stop, we would stop her by force and sink her if the cargo included prohibited material.

Under Secretary Ball pointed out that the Soviets did not know the extent of our quarantine zone.

The President agreed that we should ask U Thant to tell the Russians in New York where we are drawing the quarantine line. The Russians would then be in a position to decide whether to turn back their tanker or allow her to enter the quarantine zone sometime later today.

Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President approved, two daylight reconnaissance missions, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Secretary McNamara also recommended that a night reconnaissance mission be flown--Secretary Rusk recommended against a night flight. The President instructed the Defense Department to place the night reconnaissance planes on the alert and to prepare a public announcement of the mission in order that a final decision to be taken this afternoon could be promptly implemented.

The discussion then turned to the question of U.S. missiles in Turkey. Mr. Nitze said it would be an anathema to the Turks to pull the missiles out. He feared the next Soviet step would be a demand for the denuclearization of the entire NATO area. He urged us to focus attention on Cuba rather than on U.S. bases in other countries.

Under Secretary Ball reported that the Turks would be very difficult about withdrawal of their strategic missiles, but the Italians would be easier to persuade if we chose to withdraw Jupiters from Italy.

At this point in the meeting the partial text of a Soviet public statement was read by the President as it was received in the room./2/ The President commented that the statement was a very tough position and varied considerably from the tone of Khrushchev's personal letter to the President received last night./3/ The President felt that the Soviet position would get wide support and said we should consider making public the Khrushchev private letter.

/2/Document 91.

/3/Document 84.

Secretary Rusk returned to the question of U.S. missiles in Turkey and pointed out that this subject must be kept separate from Soviet missiles in Cuba. The Turkish missile problem should be dealt with in the context of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact.

Mr. Bundy said we could not accept the Soviet proposal on Turkish missiles because the Soviet missiles were not out of Cuba.

The President recalled that he had asked that consideration be given to the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey some days previously.



Under Secretary Ball replied that the Department had decided it could not raise this question with the Turks at this time for fear of a disastrous Turkish reaction. He said the question had been raised with Finletter in Paris and study was being given to whether any method could be worked out to reassure the Turks if we were going to offer to withdraw the Jupiter missiles.

Mr. Bundy said we cannot get into the position of appearing to sell out an ally, i.e. Turkey, to serve our own interests, i.e. getting the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

The President commented that the Russians had made the Turkish missile withdrawal proposal in the most difficult possible way. Now that their proposal is public, we have no chance to talk privately to the Turks about the missiles, which, for a long time, we have considered to be obsolete.

Secretary Dillon said that it was possible that the Russians had made their public statement as part of a stalling tactic to provide them with sufficient time for a full-fledged confrontation with us.

The President read a draft statement telephoned from New York by Ambassador Stevenson commenting on the Soviet statement./4/ Ambassador Stevenson argued for releasing his statement in an effort to keep the "peace offensive" from going to the Soviets.

/4/A copy of this statement is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General.

The President left the meeting at this point with Mr. Sorensen. There ensued a discussion of how to handle the discrepancy between the Khrushchev private letter and the Russian offer made public in the Soviet statement. A suggestion was made that the Russian proposals contained in the private Khrushchev letter be made public.

The President returned to the meeting. He said we must ensure that the construction work on the missile sites in Cuba be stopped at once. He suggested that we talk to the Turks about the missiles, pointing out to them the great peril facing them during the next week. He acknowledged that the Turks were now in no position to make a statement to the effect that they would ask that the Jupiters be withdrawn.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we tell the Turks they must say that the Jupiter problem is a NATO problem and is not associated with the Cuban missile problem.

Secretary McNamara called attention to the fact that the missiles belonged to Turkey and that only the nuclear warheads are under our total control.

The President returned to a discussion of where we now find ourselves, i.e. we now have Soviet public proposals and Khrushchev's private proposals. What we must seek is an immediate cessation of the work on offensive missiles in Cuba. Once this work stopped we could talk to the Russians.

Mr. Bundy reiterated the view that the threat to us is Cuba. One explanation for the varying Soviet proposals is that the hard line Russians wanted to make public their preferred demands in order to make impossible progress toward the Khrushchev private offer which may have been drafted by those who are less hard-nosed.

The President noted that it appeared to him that the Russians were making various proposals so fast, one after the other, that they were creating a kind of shield behind which work on the missile sites in Cuba continued. He said we had a perfectly defensible position, i.e. work on the missile sites must stop. Secretary McNamara added the thought that these offensive weapons must be made inoperable.

Mr. Bundy suggested that we tell Khrushchev privately that the position in their public statement was impossible for us, but that the position Khrushchev took in his private letter was different and we were studying these proposals. In the meantime, however, time is running out.

The President interrupted to take a telephone call from Ambassador Stevenson in New York. He resumed the discussion by saying that Khrushchev obviously is attempting to limit our freedom of action in Cuba by introducing the question of the missile bases outside this hemisphere.

Mr. Bundy read a draft press statement and Mr. Gilpatric read a statement which he had prepared./5/

/5/Neither of these drafts has been identified further.

Mr. Alexis Johnson reported that he had just been informed that the Turkish Government had issued a press statement saying that the Russian proposal with respect to Jupiters in Turkey was not conceivable.

(As the remainder of the Soviet public statement was received in the Cabinet Room, it appeared that the Russian base proposal involved not merely Turkey but all of NATO.)

Mr. Sorensen introduced a draft statement which was read by the group./6/

/6/Not found.

Revisions were made in the Gilpatric draft, which was issued shortly thereafter in the form attached./7/ This statement emphasized the offensive weapons buildup in Cuba.

/7/For text of the agreed statement, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 440-441.

The Attorney General said that the statement might make people think that if the Russians stopped the missile buildup in Cuba, we would be willing to withdraw our missiles from Turkey. He desired that we make doubly clear that Turkish NATO missiles were one problem and that Cuba was an entirely separate problem.

Mr. Gilpatric stated that it was crucial for us to stand on the position that we will not negotiate with the Russians while the Soviet missile threat is growing in Cuba.

The President recalled that over a year ago we wanted to get the Jupiter missiles out of Turkey because they had become obsolete and of little military value. If the missiles in Cuba added 50% to Soviet nuclear capability, then to trade these missiles for those in Turkey would be of great military value. But we are now in the position of risking war in Cuba and in Berlin over missiles in Turkey which are of little military value. From the political point of view, it would be hard to get support on an airstrike against Cuba because many would think that we would make a good trade if we offered to take the missiles out of Turkey in the event the Russians would agree to remove the missiles from Cuba. We are in a bad position if we appear to be attacking Cuba for the purpose of keeping useless missiles in Turkey. We cannot propose to withdraw the missiles from Turkey, but the Turks could offer to do so. The Turks must be informed of the great danger in which they will live during the next week and we have to face up to the possibility of some kind of a trade over missiles.

The President left the meeting to meet the State Governors who had been waiting for one-half hour to see him.

The discussion continued in the President's absence. It was not possible to say with certainty whether the Soviet public offer included all NATO bases or referred specifically to Turkey.

The Attorney General expressed his concern as to what our position would be if we talked to the Russians for sixty days and then the Cubans refused to permit UN inspectors to continue to ensure that missiles in Cuba were inoperable. The reply was that we could then decide to attack the bases by air.

There was discussion of a second statement to be put out but this proposal was later abandoned.

A draft message to Khrushchev, which had been prepared by Ambassador Thompson, was read and a final version was to be completed for the President's consideration later in the day./8/ The group agreed to meet at the State Department without the President at 2:30 PM and meet with the President again at 4:00 PM

/8/The draft is not found; for the letter as eventually sent see Document 95.

(Note: At the meeting at the State Department, the Attorney General repeated his view that we should keep the focus on the missile bases. He preferred to let the Soviet tankers through the quarantine line in order to avoid a confrontation with the Soviets over one of their ships. He said if we attack a Soviet tanker, the balloon would go up. He urged that we buy time now in order to launch an air attack Monday or Tuesday./9/)

/9/October 29 or 30.

Secretary McNamara expressed his view that before we attack Cuba we must notify the Cubans.

Bromley Smith/10/

/10/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## **91. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy**

Moscow, October 27, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. Other copies of this letter are *ibid.*: Lot 77 D 163, and in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. This "official translation" prepared by Language Services of the Department of State and an "informal translation" from the Embassy in Moscow are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 19, 1962, pp. 646-649. A note on the source text indicates a copy was sent to Acting Secretary-General U Thant. Problems of Communism reports that this message was broadcast over Moscow radio at 5 p.m., the same time the Russian text was delivered to the Embassy.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I have studied with great satisfaction your reply to Mr. Thant/1/ concerning measures that should be taken to avoid contact between our vessels and thereby avoid irreparable and fatal consequences. This reasonable step on your part strengthens my belief that you are showing concern for the preservation of peace, which I note with satisfaction.

/1/See Document 59.

I have already said that our people, our Government, and I personally, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, are concerned solely with having our country develop and occupy a worthy place among all peoples of the world in economic competition, in the development of culture and the arts, and in raising the living standard of the people. This is the most noble and necessary field for competition, and both the victor and the vanquished will derive only benefit from it, because it means peace and an increase in the means by which man lives and finds enjoyment.

In your statement you expressed the opinion that the main aim was not simply to come to an agreement and take measures to prevent contact between our vessels and consequently a deepening of the crisis which could, as a result of such contacts, spark a military conflict, after which all negotiations would be superfluous because other forces and other laws would then come into play--the laws of war. I agree with you that this is only the first step. The main thing that must be done is to normalize and stabilize the state of peace among states and among peoples.

I understand your concern for the security of the United States, Mr. President, because this is the primary duty of a President. But we too are disturbed about these same questions; I bear these same obligations as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. You have been alarmed by the fact that we have aided Cuba with weapons, in order to strengthen its defense capability--precisely defense capability--because whatever weapons it may possess, Cuba cannot be equated with you since the difference in magnitude is so great, particularly in view of modern means of destruction. Our aim has been and is to help Cuba, and no one can dispute the humanity of our motives, which are oriented toward enabling Cuba to live peacefully and develop in the way its people desire.

You wish to ensure the security of your country, and this is understandable. But Cuba, too, wants the same thing; all countries want to maintain their security. But how are we, the Soviet Union, our Government, to assess your actions which are expressed in the fact that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases; surrounded our allies with military bases; placed military bases literally around our country; and stationed your missile armaments there? This is no secret. Responsible American personages openly declare that it is so. Your missiles are located in Britain, are located in Italy, and are aimed against us. Your missiles are located in Turkey.

You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us; our sentries patrol back and forth and see each other. Do you consider, then, that you have the right to demand security for your own country and the removal of the weapons you call offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? You have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. How then can recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such unequal relations between our great states? This is irreconcilable.

It is good, Mr. President, that you have agreed to have our representatives meet and begin talks, apparently through the mediation of U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations. Consequently, he to some degree has assumed the role of a mediator and we consider that he will be able to cope with this responsible mission, provided, of course, that each party drawn into this controversy displays good will.

I think it would be possible to end the controversy quickly and normalize the situation, and then the people could breathe more easily, considering that statesmen charged with responsibility are of sober mind and have an awareness of their responsibility combined with the ability to solve complex questions and not bring things to a military catastrophe.

I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach agreement as to the period of time needed by you and by us to bring this about. And, after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made. Of course, the permission of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey is necessary for the entry into those countries of these representatives and for the inspection of the fulfillment of the pledge made by each side. Of course it would be best if these representatives enjoyed the confidence of the Security Council, as well as yours and mine--both the United States and the Soviet Union--and also that of Turkey and Cuba. I do not think it would be difficult to select people who would enjoy the trust and respect of all parties concerned.

We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidence in their security, will make a statement within the framework of the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it would also restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey's other neighboring states.

The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework of the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the inviolability of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Cuba itself or make its territory available as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and will also restrain those who might contemplate committing aggression against Cuba, either from the territory of the United States or from the territory of Cuba's other neighboring states.

Of course, for this we would have to come to an agreement with you and specify a certain time limit. Let us agree to some period of time, but without unnecessary delay--say within two or three weeks, not longer than a month.

The means situated in Cuba, of which you speak and which disturb you, as you have stated, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore, any accidental use of them to the detriment of the United States is excluded. These means are situated in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government and are only for defense purposes. Therefore, if there is no invasion of Cuba, or attack on the Soviet Union or any of our other allies, then of course these means are not and will not be a threat to anyone. For they are not for purposes of attack.

If you are agreeable to my proposal, Mr. President, then we would send our representatives to New York, to the United Nations, and would give them comprehensive instructions in order that an agreement may be reached more quickly. If you also select your people and give them the corresponding instructions, then this question can be quickly resolved.

Why would I like to do this? Because the whole world is now apprehensive and expects sensible actions of us. The greatest joy for all peoples would be the announcement of our agreement and of the eradication of the controversy that has arisen. I attach great importance to this agreement in so far as it could serve as a good beginning and could in particular make it easier to reach agreement on banning nuclear weapons tests. The question of the tests could be solved in parallel fashion, without connecting one with the other, because these are different issues. However, it is important that agreement be reached on both these issues so as to present humanity with a fine gift, and also to gladden it with the news that agreement has been reached on the cessation of nuclear tests and that consequently the atmosphere will no longer be poisoned. Our position and yours on this issue are very close together.

All of this could possibly serve as a good impetus toward the finding of mutually acceptable agreements on other controversial issues on which you and I have been exchanging views. These views have so far not been resolved, but they are awaiting urgent solution, which would clear up the international atmosphere. We are prepared for this.

These are my proposals, Mr. President.

Respectfully yours,

N. Khrushchev/2/

Printed from a copy that indicates Khrushchev signed the original.<sup>2</sup>

## **92. Record of the Fourth Meeting of the Berlin-NATO Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 27, 1962, 11 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous. Top Secret. The source text bears no

drafting information.

### 1. Daily Briefing

The situation briefing was omitted today. (Mr. Nitze was detained and Admiral Lee took the chair.)

### 2. U.S.-Berlin Buildup

It was agreed that Paper No. 7 revised on the date of 27 October 1962/1/ would be sent forward to the Executive Committee on Monday morning, 29 October, with the inclusion of a statement indicating that a supporting study is being prepared which assesses the economic implications for the budget and the balance of payments. This study will be provided by the Department of Defense in conjunction with the DOD Comptroller's office. (Action: Admiral Lee.)

/1/For text of this paper, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, vol. XV, pp. 401-402.

### 3. Consultation with Allies

The subject was discussed at length. Mr. Schaetzel stressed the dilemma involved in trying to keep the Allies sufficiently informed to carry them with us while at the same time guarding the security of our deliberations and decisions. He pointed out that it would be highly desirable for the Allies to be kept abreast of the developing situation through official U.S. channels rather than through the press. Proposals were made to have Mr. Thompson and Mr. Nitze give regular briefings to the quadripartite Ambassadors; to have a cable based on these briefings sent to Mr. Finletter for briefing the NAC a few hours later; and to have the Finletter cable used by Defense for briefing the Standing Group and Military Committee. Mr. Schaetzel will have a paper on Monday setting forth this proposal in detail. General Twitchell was asked to put in a paper at the same time on the possibility of supplying screened operational information. Mr. Schaetzel will also look into the question of making similar periodic reports to other nations through our embassies. (Action: Mr. Schaetzel and General Twitchell.)

### 4. Base Trade-Off

The subject was discussed and while no firm and formal judgments were reached the sense of the group was that the door should be closed as quickly as possible on the idea of trading the U.S. position in Turkey for the Soviet position in Cuba. In connection with the nervousness of the Turks on this score, it was proposed that a special envoy, possibly Mr. Livingston Merchant, should be sent to Ankara to consult with the Turkish government and keep them informed of developments in this area.

### 5. Khrushchev Letter

(Mr. Nitze joined the meeting at this point.) Mr. Nitze summarized the contents of the letter sent by Khrushchev last night/2/ to the President and also referred to a subsequent TASS release which linked the Cuban missiles with those in Turkey./3/ Mr. Nitze read a draft of a proposed reply/4/ and there was a brief discussion with particular emphasis on its final paragraph which referred to the security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere. The sense of the group regarding the need to keep Turkish bases from being linked in any way with the Cuban situation was conveyed to Mr. Nitze.

/2/See Document 84.

/3/See the source note, Document 91.

/4/Not found.

## 6. Administrative

There will be no meeting on Sunday, October 28, except at the call of the chair. Future meetings will be scheduled to begin at 11:30.

### **93. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**

New York, October 27, 1962, 2 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2762. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 2:06 p.m.

1494. Cuba. Stevenson, McCloy, Yost and Plimpton had conference with SYG alone at 11:45 this morning.

1. We showed SYG Khrushchev's message of last night to the President,<sup>/1/</sup> pointing out that it contained no reference to Turkey. We also pointed out it in effect conceded existence in Cuba of complete nuclear missile capability. SYG had just seen Reuter despatch regarding Khrushchev's public statement regarding Turkey.<sup>/2/</sup>

<sup>/1/</sup>See Document 84.

<sup>/2/</sup>See the source note, Document 91.

2. We pointed out that effect of Khrushchev's Turkey proposal was that, as the result of his own clandestine nuclear intrusion into the Western Hemisphere, he gets a guarantee of Cuban integrity and the removal of the Turkey base, whereas all we get is removal of intrusion which he should not have made anyway.

3. We also pointed out that the Turkey base is not for the defense of Turkey but for the defense of Europe and is part of the whole NATO defensive structure. The removal of that base would upset the European balance of power.

4. We pointed out that these were informal observations and that we had no positive instructions from Washington.

5. We said the Turkish base might be a proper subject for discussion covering various aspects of the overall disarmament and European situations after the status quo had been restored, and that such restoration requires removal of weapons from Cuba.

6. Since all NATO partners involved in Turkey base any negotiations as to its removal would require a great deal of time whereas removal of nuclear weapons from Cuba was an immediate essential.

7. We said it seemed highly probable that the Cuban issue could be very promptly settled on the basis of Khrushchev's first letter, namely, on basis of immediate withdrawal of nuclear weapons as against US guarantee as to territorial integrity and political independence of Cuba, and we urged SYG to press for such immediate solution and for confining all discussions to Cuba and the exclusion of the Turkish base problem.

8. SYG said he would keep these points in mind, but that he did not wish to make any remarks on substance of the matter.

9. He said he hoped the President's reply to Khrushchev would be cooperative and conciliatory in tone, as the SYG does not want the American image tarnished by any public impression that Khrushchev is reasonable and the US not, and that the reply would evidence willingness to negotiate.

10. SYG mentioned the great concern all over world as to seriousness of situation. He said he had received 620 telegrams, most from US, as to his proposals, only 5 of which were negative.

11. SYG said he had urged both Castro and Zorin to have work on sites stopped immediately. Cuban Rep had said he would communicate SYG's request to his govt. Zorin had turned request aside asking how anyone could rely on US intelligence.

12. SYG also said that as to inspection of ship cargoes arriving in Cuba, Zorin had said this question should be addressed to Cuban authorities.

13. While we believe SYG would prefer to confine discussions to Cuba, we have little confidence he will take firm position with Sovs on this point since he shows every evidence of wanting to avoid being caught in middle.

Stevenson

#### **94. Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 27, 1962, 4 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Top Secret; Sensitive. A copy of McCone's 2-page handwritten notes for this meeting are in the Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. They are reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 333-334. A Record of Actions taken at the meeting is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10) A transcript of this meeting is *ibid.*, President's Office Files, Presidential Recordings, No. 42.1 and 42.2.

Secretary McNamara reported on today's daylight reconnaissance mission. One mission aborted for mechanical reasons, according to preliminary reports. One plane is overdue and several are said to have encountered ground fire.

Secretary McNamara again recommended night reconnaissance missions. The President delayed a decision on night flights pending a full report on today's daylight mission (the night mission was later called off).

There followed a discussion of a draft letter from the President to Khrushchev./1/ The President added to the draft an offer to discuss with the Russians the proposals they had made public./2/ He predicted that Khrushchev would say we had rejected his proposal. The formulation included a comment that Khrushchev must realize that matters relating to NATO must be discussed at a later time. The letter was approved in a revised form.

/1/This draft has not been identified further, but for the final text, see Document 95.

/2/Document 91.

A message to U Thant was discussed and approved. The purpose of the message was to obtain the halting of work on the bases in Cuba as a condition to discussion of various other problems.

Secretary Rusk reported that one of our U-2 planes had overflown the Soviet Union by accident due to navigational error. Soviet fighters were scrambled from a base near Wrangel Island. The Secretary thought that the Russians would make a loud fuss about this incident.

The President decided not to make the incident public, but be prepared to do so as soon as the Soviets publicized



it.

The President asked whether we wanted to continue to say that we would talk only about the missiles in Cuba. He believed that for the next few hours we should emphasize our position that if the Russians will halt missile activity in Cuba we would be prepared to discuss NATO problems with the Russians. He felt that we would not be in a position to offer any trade for several days. He did feel that if we could succeed in freezing the situation in Cuba and rendering the strategic missiles inoperable, then we would be in a position to negotiate with the Russians.

Mr. Bundy pointed out that there would be a serious reaction in NATO countries if we appeared to be trading withdrawal of missiles in Turkey for withdrawal of missiles from Cuba. The President responded that if we refuse to discuss such a trade and then take military action in Cuba, we would also be in a difficult position.

The President left the room to talk to General Norstad on the KY-9 secure telephone to Paris.

In the President's absence the message to U Thant was further discussed. The Attorney General felt we should say to U Thant: "While these and other proposals are being discussed, would you urgently ascertain whether the Soviet Union is prepared to cease work on the bases and render the missiles inoperable?" U Thant would be asked to convey the President's message to the Russians in New York most urgently.

Secretary Rusk questioned whether the Russians are trying at the last minute to obtain more of a quid pro quo from us or whether they are introducing new elements in the picture merely to weaken our public position worldwide.

Secretary McNamara pointed out, in connection with the current military situation, that a limited airstrike on Cuba was now impossible because our reconnaissance planes were being fired on. He felt that we must now look to the major airstrike to be followed by an invasion of Cuba. To do so he said we would need to call up the reserves now.

Secretary McNamara [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]. If we could do this he felt that the Soviets would not attack Turkey when we invaded Cuba. Our objective should be to seek to avoid any Soviet attack in Europe as a response to our invasion of Cuba.

Ambassador Thompson commented that it was impossible to draw any conclusions from the fact that one of our reconnaissance planes over Cuba had been shot at.

The President returned to the meeting, accompanied by General Lemnitzer.

The President approved the final revision of the statement to U Thant, which was to be phoned to U Thant and released here publicly. (Copy attached)/3/

/3/The text of this message is included in the Record of Actions for the meeting.

The President asked whether we should call together the representatives of NATO to report to them what we had done and were planning to do. If we reject Soviet efforts to tie in NATO problems to the Cuban situation, then we could persuade NATO to take the same position. An additional reason for a NATO meeting then is that if the Russians do attack the NATO countries we do not want them to say that they had not been consulted about the actions we were taking in Cuba.

Secretary McNamara said that current military planning provided for 500 sorties to take out the SAM sites, the MIGs in Cuba, and the missiles and missile sites. [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]

The President expressed his concern that the alternatives we are facing have not been presented to NATO. NATO does not realize what may be coming and the Europeans do not realize that we may face a choice of invading Cuba or taking the missiles out of Turkey.

Secretary McNamara urged that a NATO meeting be held tomorrow only if we have decided to launch our strike tomorrow. He repeated his hope that we can act in such a way as to reduce the pressure on the Russians to hit Turkey.

Secretary Rusk recommended that mobilization measures be authorized immediately.

The President suggested that we talk immediately to the Turks, explaining to them what we were planning to do with our missiles and then explain the entire situation to the North Atlantic Council.

Secretary Rusk then read a Stevenson draft of a letter to Khrushchev./4/

/4/Not found.

The President said that the key to any letter to Khrushchev was the demand that work cease on the missile sites in Cuba. He predicted that if we make no mention of Turkey in our letter, Khrushchev will write back to us saying that if we include Turkey, then he would be prepared to settle the Cuban situation. The President said this would mean that we would lose twenty-four hours while they would continue to work on the bases and achieve an operational status for more of their missiles. He suggested that we would be willing to guarantee not to invade Cuba if the Soviet missiles were taken out.

Secretary Rusk returned to the Stevenson draft, which the President approved as revised. The phrase "and assurance of peace in the Caribbean" was discussed and the reference to no invasion of Cuba was omitted. The President also agreed not to call a meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

The Attorney General commented that in his opinion the Stevenson draft letter was defensive. It sounded as if we had been thrown off balance by the Russians. The State Department draft merely said that we accepted Khrushchev's offer.

General Taylor summarized the conclusions of the Joint Chiefs. Unless the missiles are defused immediately, the Chiefs recommended implementation on Monday/5/ of OP Plan 312, i.e. a major air strike, and, seven days later, OP Plan 316, which is the invasion plan. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

/5/October 29.

Secretary McNamara asked what we should do about air surveillance tomorrow. He stated his recommendation, i.e. if our reconnaissance planes are fired on, we will attack the attackers. General Taylor noted that in order to be ready to invade on Monday, we must continue intensive air surveillance.

The President directed that our air reconnaissance missions be flown tomorrow without fighter escort. If our planes are fired on, we must be prepared for a general response or an attack on the SAM site which fired on our planes. We will decide tomorrow how we return fire after we know if they continue their attacks on our planes and after we hear from U Thant the Russian reply to our offer.

The President considered a draft message to the Turks about their missile./6/ His objective was to persuade the Turks to suggest to us that we withdraw our missiles. He noted that negotiations with the Turks were very difficult if there was any life left in the proposal which we had asked U Thant to make to the Russians.

/6/Not found.

General Taylor read a late report of the shooting down of the U-2 reconnaissance plane in Cuba which said that the wreckage of the U-2 was on the ground and that the pilot had been killed. He felt that we should make an air attack tomorrow on the SAM site responsible for shooting down the U-2 plane.

Secretary McNamara said that we must now be ready to attack Cuba by launching 500 sorties on the first day. Invasion had become almost inevitable. If we leave U.S. missiles in Turkey, the Soviets might attack Turkey. If the Soviets do attack the Turks, we must respond in the NATO area. The minimum NATO response to Soviet attack on Turkey would be to use U.S. forces in Turkey to attack, by sea and by air, the Soviet Black Sea fleet. However, we should make every effort to reduce the chance of a Soviet attack on Turkey.

In an informal discussion following the formal end of the meeting, the Vice President asked why we were not prepared to trade the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, if we were prepared to give up the use of U.S. missiles in Turkey. Under Secretary Ball responded that last week we thought it might be acceptable to trade the withdrawal of the missiles in Turkey if such action would save Berlin. He felt that we could accept the Soviet offer and replace the missiles in Turkey by assigning Polaris submarines to the area.

Bromley Smith/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

#### **95. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union**

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2762. Unclassified; Niact. Regarding the drafting of this message, see Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, p. 102, and Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy*, p. 714. Also printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 441-442.

Washington, October 27, 1962, 8:05 p.m.

1015. Following message from President to Khrushchev should be delivered as soon as possible to highest available Soviet official. Text has been handed Soviet Embassy in Washington and has been released to press:

"Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have read your letter of October 26/1/ with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements.

/1/Document 84.

Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this week and--in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative--an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals--which seem generally acceptable as I understand them--are as follows:

1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

2. We, on our part, would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments", as proposed in your second letter which you made public./2/ I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.

/2/Document 91.

But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26.

/s/ John F. Kennedy"

Rusk

## **96. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk**

Washington, October 30, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Cuba Missile Crisis, Khrushchev Correspondence. Top Secret. Drafted by Kennedy. For McGeorge Bundy's recollections of the meeting with the President during the late afternoon of October 27, at which the decision was taken to send Robert Kennedy to talk with Dobrynin, see *Danger and Survival*, pp. 432-434.

At the request of Secretary Rusk, I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin at approximately 7:15 p.m. on Saturday, October 27th. I asked him if he would come to the Justice Department at a quarter of eight.

We met in my office. I told him first that we understood that the work was continuing on the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Further, I explained to him that in the last two hours we had found that our planes flying over Cuba had been fired upon and that one of our U-2's had been shot down and the pilot killed. I said these men were flying unarmed planes.

I told him that this was an extremely serious turn in events. We would have to make certain decisions within the next 12 or possibly 24 hours. There was a very little time left. If the Cubans were shooting at our planes, then we were going to shoot back. This could not help but bring on further incidents and that he had better understand the full implications of this matter.

He raised the point that the argument the Cubans were making was that we were violating Cuban air space. I replied that if we had not been violating Cuban air space then we would still be believing what he and Khrushchev had said--that there were no long-range missiles in Cuba. In any case I said that this matter was far more serious than the air space over Cuba and involved peoples all over the world.

I said that he had better understand the situation and he had better communicate that understanding to Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Khrushchev and he had misled us. The Soviet Union had secretly established missile bases in Cuba while at the same time proclaiming, privately and publicly, that this would never be done. I said those missile bases had to go and they had to go right away. We had to have a commitment by at least tomorrow that those bases would be removed. This was not an ultimatum, I said, but just a statement of fact. He should understand that if they did not remove those bases then we would remove them. His country might take retaliatory action but he should understand that before this was over, while there might be dead Americans there would also be dead Russians.

He asked me then what offer we were making. I said a letter had just been transmitted to the Soviet Embassy which stated in substance that the missile bases should be dismantled and all offensive weapons should be removed from Cuba./1/ In return, if Cuba and Castro and the Communists ended their subversive activities in other Central and Latin American countries, we would agree to keep peace in the Caribbean and not permit an invasion from American soil.

He then asked me about Khrushchev's other proposal dealing with the removal of the missiles from Turkey. I replied that there could be no quid pro quo--no deal of this kind could be made. This was a matter that had to be considered by NATO and that it was up to NATO to make the decision. I said it was completely impossible for NATO to take such a step under the present threatening position of the Soviet Union./2/

/1/See Document 95.

/2/The following typed sentence at the end of this paragraph was crossed out: "If some time elapsed--and per your instructions, I mentioned four or five months--I said I was sure that these matters could be resolved satisfactory."

Per your instructions I repeated that there could be no deal of any kind and that any steps toward easing tensions in other parts of the world largely depended on the Soviet Union and Mr. Khrushchev taking action in Cuba and taking it immediately.

I repeated to him that this matter could not wait and that he had better contact Mr. Khrushchev and have a commitment from him by the next day to withdraw the missile bases under United Nations supervision for otherwise, I said, there would be drastic consequences.

## **97. Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 27, 1962, 9 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Top Secret; Sensitive. McCone's and Gilpatric's 1-page handwritten notes of this meeting are in Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President, and Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2846, Gilpatric's Notes on Cuba. McCone's notes are reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, p. 335. The Record of Action for the Meeting is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10)

Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President approved, the call up of twenty-four air reserve squadrons, involving 14,000 personnel and 300 troop carriers. The call up of the air reserve squadrons is necessary to the invasion plan and will also serve to keep the pressure on the Russians. He said mobilization of private U.S. shipping should be initiated tomorrow in order to have sufficient ships available for an invasion.

The President said that if our reconnaissance planes are fired on tomorrow, and if we know the results of U Thant's talks with the Russians, then we should take out the SAM sites in Cuba by air action.

With respect to the Soviet tanker *Graznyy* approaching the quarantine zone, the Attorney General recommended that we take no action against it.

The President agreed that if the tanker crosses the barrier, we should let it through, but thereafter no Bloc ships would be allowed to cross into the zone.

The President directed that Ambassador Stevenson in New York be asked to tell U Thant of the location of the Soviet tanker and ask him to remind the Russians of their statement that their ships would not enter Cuban waters. A decision on whether to intercept the tanker could be taken tomorrow.

Secretary Rusk agreed, adding that the actions we had taken already had created sufficient pressure on the Russians for today.

The President said that tomorrow we could consider increasing the pressure by adding POL to the list of prohibited goods and by publicly announcing the mobilization of U.S. shipping.

The President read aloud the message from General Norstad concerning the tactics to be followed in a meeting of the North Atlantic Council./1/ The message included a list of questions to be answered and ended with a recommendation to reject Khrushchev's offer to trade European missiles for U.S. missiles in Turkey.

/1/This message has not been identified further.

There followed consideration of a draft cable to Ambassador Finletter in Paris instructing him as to how the NATO meeting should be handled. (A copy of this message is attached.)/2/

/2/Document 100.

Secretary Rusk recommended that we not state our preferred position first but present the various alternatives to the NATO members and oblige them to state their preference. We would make clear that we must stand unified with the NATO countries.

The President agreed that our posture should be that of consulting the NATO countries--not pushing for only one course of action.

The Attorney General recommended that we should not take our final position for a few more hours. In the NATO meeting we would do no more than recite the facts and express our objective of trying to keep the situation limited to the Western Hemisphere. We would report the following day to NATO and hold off one more day a decision on accepting the Turkish/Cuban missile trade offer of the Russians. The President agreed to delete from the message the section on our preferred course of action. The NATO meeting tomorrow is to be a briefing and a request for their views. Ambassador Finletter is not to bring up the question of the possible withdrawal of the Jupiters from Turkey.

The President did not approve a draft message to Khrushchev dealing with the shooting down of a U.S. plane./3/

/3/Not identified further.

The President agreed that Ambassador Hare would not raise with the Turks the question of withdrawing the Jupiters, but that the State Department would inform Ambassador Hare, for his information, of what we are considering./4/

/4/A copy of the instructions to Hare along these lines is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, NATO, Cables, Turkey.

Personal letters to de Gaulle and Adenauer were given to the President for signature./5/

/5/Copies of these 2-paragraph notes are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.

The President asked the group to meet the following morning at 11:00 o'clock.

Low-level reconnaissance missions were authorized. If these planes were attacked, the attacking planes would be fired upon.

Bromley Smith/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## **98. Current Intelligence Memorandum**

OCI No. 2430/62

Washington, October 27, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Materials. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

### **SUBJECT**

Soviet Communications to the US of 26-27 October

1. In response to your request, there follows an analysis, prepared jointly by ONE-OCI, of the two Soviet letters to the US of 26 and 27 October.
2. The likeliest explanation of Soviet behavior in addressing two inconsistent letters to the President in such short succession is that, some time after dispatching the first, the Soviet leaders came to believe that the US intended firm or even radical action against the Cuban bases at a fairly early date. They evidently felt it imperative to send and publicize a second letter, containing a more specific proposal, but one still involving substantial Soviet concessions, in an effort to generate pressures which would head off this US action or, if this failed, to make it as costly as possible in political terms.
3. The US reply today leaves the USSR in a difficult position. The Soviets can, if they choose, repeat their Cuba-Turkey offer and complain that US preconditions amount to an unacceptable ultimatum, but they probably now recognize that this may not deflect the US from its insistence that the sites be immediately dismantled. Or they can alter tactics radically, going over to a threatening line in their statements and buttressing this with a deliberate maritime incident in the Caribbean and moves to globalize the crisis, e.g., some action against Berlin. Their tactics to date, however, and their apparent belief that the US is determined on further actions, argue strongly against this latter course.
4. A third course would be to accept some of the conditions stated by the US today and to continue the search for negotiations which would lay inhibitions on further US unilateral moves. Already, in return for a removal of weapons from Turkey, calculated to raise doubts in that country and in NATO as a whole concerning the US commitment, the Soviets have now offered substantial concessions. These include not only the withdrawal of

offensive weapons from Cuba, but inspection of the process and a time limit volunteered by the USSR. In the process, the Soviets have gone far to acknowledge the truth of the President's original charges. As another result, they have made statements which must seriously undermine Castro's confidence in Soviet support, and even Soviet intentions.

5. Thus the next Soviet position may be less demanding than the Cuba-Turkey swap. We think that they might limit their demands to a US undertaking not to pursue Castro's overthrow. In return, they might agree to cease work on those sites which are not yet operational and to discuss means of "rendering the weapons inoperable," and to move toward some form of international inspection.

## **99. Editorial Note**

In March 1987 former Secretary of State Dean Rusk shed new light on the question of whether the United States would have been prepared ultimately to consider the removal of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey in return for a Soviet agreement to withdraw the missiles in Cuba and defuse the crisis. In a letter to James G. Blight, who helped organize a conference of former participants in the crisis at Hawk's Cay, Florida, Rusk wrote:

"It was clear to me that President Kennedy would not let the Jupiters in Turkey become an obstacle to the removal of the missile sites in Cuba because the Jupiters were coming out in any event. He instructed me to telephone the late Andrew Cordier, then at Columbia University, and dictate to him a statement which would be made by U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, proposing the removal of both the Jupiters and the missiles in Cuba. Mr. Cordier was to put that statement in the hands of U Thant only after further signal from us. That step was never taken and the statement I furnished to Mr. Cordier has never seen the light of day. So far as I know, President Kennedy, Andrew Cordier and I were the only ones who knew of this particular step."

Rusk's letter was read to the conference of former officials and scholars of the crisis by McGeorge Bundy. Bundy added that Cordier was asked to stand by with the contingency plan the night of October 27. The proposal, he noted, intentionally bypassed the U.S. Mission at the United Nations. The intention was to make it appear to be a U.N. proposal, rather than one that originated in Washington. (James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux/Hill and Wang, 1989), pages 83-84)

## **100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

Washington, October 28, 1962, 12:12 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bundy and U. Alexis Johnson, cleared by EUR and NEA, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to all other NATO capitals eyes only info Ambassadors and New York.

Topol 578. USRO pass Embassy.

1. The President desires that your briefing of NATO be essentially factual and reflect clear determination of US Government to press on its present course as reflected in (1) White House statement issued noon Saturday on continuing buildup, (2) President's message to Khrushchev released White House Saturday evening, (3) announcement by DOD of continued surveillance, and (4) DOD announcement call up of Air reserves (all contained wireless file).

2. You can report that message from Khrushchev to President received night October 26 (being repeated Finletter, Paris and London only), while full of polemics, seemed to offer real hope solution could be found within framework supervised withdrawal offensive weapons from Cuba in exchange for commitment by United



States not invade Cuba. U Thant's conversations in New York and broad hints in Cuban speeches at UN also seemed offer hope settlement along these lines could promptly be reached. Khrushchev's message to U Thant agreeing keep Soviet vessels temporarily outside quarantine area also seemed favorable sign.

These hopes have been diminished by subsequent public letter from Khrushchev to the President linking Cuban settlement to withdrawal of NATO Jupiters from Turkey, but we continue to press for solution in Cuban framework alone.

3. The situation as we see it is increasingly serious and time is growing shorter. The United States remains determined to insure removal of offensive installations in Cuba. We are combining reasonable diplomatic offers and military pressure in even balance to this end.

4. But construction on the missile sites continues and there is every indication that more of the missiles are becoming operationally ready. Moreover, unarmed US military aircraft which today were conducting publicly announced surveillance over Cuba were exposed to intensive ground fire and one of these aircraft is missing.

5. At the same time, Soviet vessels are also continuing to proceed toward the quarantine area in direct violation of Khrushchev's assurances to U Thant, although the Soviet Government was officially informed of the limits of the quarantine area by both U Thant and the United States Government. At the present rate of speed the first vessel will reach the quarantine area during daylight Sunday and an incident may occur.

6. In these circumstances the United States Government may find it necessary within a very short time in its own interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary to remove this growing threat to the Hemisphere.

7. In the light of the developing possibility of the necessity for action in Cuba, the President has instructed you to bring this matter fully to the attention of the NAC. You should say that while the US holds to the position that this matter should be settled within framework of the Western Hemisphere, we have taken note of the Soviet public message to President of October 27th in which a connection is made between NATO defenses and Soviet action in Cuba. This Soviet position increases the possibility that US military action in Cuba may result in some Soviet moves against NATO. In these circumstances the US feels it essential to inform its allies and to consult with them on the general situation.

8. FYI. It is of the utmost importance that nothing in your discussion should hint of any readiness to meet Soviet Jupiter exchange proposal, but it is equally important that you should allow free expression of European views, whatever they may be. In stimulating free response, you should strongly press the point that US action in Cuba--if it becomes essential--will be directed at a potential threat to the total strategic balance endangering other NATO countries at least as much as the United States. End FYI.

Rusk

[end of document]

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**FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**  
**1961-1963**  
**Volume XI**  
**Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington

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## **Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

### **101. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State**

Rio de Janeiro, October 28, 1962, 1 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2862. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Received in the Department of State at 2:01 a.m. on October 28.

902. Department telegram 1055./1/ Pursuant Martin telecon Saturday 2145 instructing to proceed on reference telegram./2/ I contacted Hermes Lima and visited him at home from 2330 to 0030. Began by saying this extremely important and sensitive diplomatic initiative being made under direct instructions of Secretary and requiring utmost secrecy, with perhaps vital bearing on peace. Related substance introductory paragraph, emphasizing that talk must be with Fidel alone, [*1 line of source text not declassified*]. Then gave him Portuguese translation eight numbered points, typed on plain paper.

/1/Document 81.

/2/October 27. No record of this telephone conversation has been found.

[*1 paragraph (12 lines of source text) not declassified*]

Hermes felt that new suggestion was a perfectly natural supplement to what they had been doing and said he would undertake it. I pointed out certain essential differences, notably effort to appeal personally to Fidel to divorce himself from Soviet control, referring to our previous talks with Dantas and to evidences some months back of friction between Fidel and Russians. [*5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] I emphasized that Khrushchev speech Saturday should be final proof to Fidel that Soviets interested only in using Cuba to pursue own security interests, while creating new dangers for Cuba.

[*12 lines of source text not declassified*] Promised to advise me on action taken.

Gordon

### **102. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy**

Moscow, October 28, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous. No classification marking. Other copies of this message are *ibid.*: Presidential Correspondence, Lot 66 D 204, and Lot 77 D 163, and in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. The Russian-language

text is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Also printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. II, pp. 995-999. This "informal translation" and an "official translation" prepared by the Department of State are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 19, 1973, pp. 650-654. According to a footnote in the *Bulletin* this message was broadcast over Moscow radio at 5 p.m. and a copy delivered to the Embassy in Moscow at 5:10.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of October 27./1/ I express my satisfaction and thank you for the sense of proportion you have displayed and for realization of the responsibility which now devolves on you for the preservation of the peace of the world.

/1/See Document 95.

I regard with great understanding your concern and the concern of the United States people in connection with the fact that the weapons you describe as offensive are formidable weapons indeed. Both you and we understand what kind of weapons these are.

In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give an assurance to all people who crave peace, and to reassure the American people, who, I am certain, also want peace, as do the people of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, I should like to repeat what I had already written to you in my earlier messages--that the Soviet Government has given economic assistance to the Republic of Cuba, as well as arms, because Cuba and the Cuban people were constantly under the continuous threat of an invasion of Cuba.

A piratic vessel had shelled Havana. They say that this shelling was done by irresponsible Cuban emigres. Perhaps so, however, the question is from where did they shoot. It is a fact that these Cubans have no territory, they are fugitives from their country, and they have no means to conduct military operations.

This means that someone put into their hands these weapons for shelling Havana and for piracy in the Caribbean in Cuban territorial waters. It is impossible in our time not to notice a piratic ship, considering the concentration in the Caribbean of American ships from which everything can be seen and observed.

In these conditions, pirate ships freely roam around and shell Cuba and make piratic attacks on peaceful cargo ships. It is known that they even shelled a British cargo ship. In a word, Cuba was under the continuous threat of aggressive forces, which did not conceal their intention to invade its territory.

The Cuban people want to build their life in their own interests without external interference. This is their right, and they cannot be blamed for wanting to be masters of their own country and disposing of the fruits of their own labor.

The threat of invasion of Cuba and all other schemes for creating tension over Cuba are designed to strike the Cuban people with a sense of insecurity, intimidate them, and prevent them from peacefully building their new life.

Mr. President, I should like to say clearly once more that we could not remain indifferent to this. The Soviet Government decided to render assistance to Cuba with the means of defense against aggression--only with means for defense purposes. We have supplied the defense means which you describe as offensive means. We have supplied them to prevent an attack on Cuba--to prevent rash acts.

I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be

no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

It is for this reason that we instructed our officers--these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers--to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27,<sup>1/2</sup> we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.

<sup>1/2</sup>/Document 91.

Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict.

I note with satisfaction that you have responded to the desire I expressed with regard to elimination of the aforementioned dangerous situation, as well as with regard to providing conditions for a more thoughtful appraisal of the international situation, fraught as it is with great dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocketry, spaceships, global rockets, and other deadly weapons. All people are interested in insuring peace.

Therefore, vested with trust and great responsibility, we must not allow the situation to become aggravated and must stamp out the centers where a dangerous situation fraught with grave consequences to the cause of peace has arisen. If we, together with you, and with the assistance of other people of good will, succeed in eliminating this tense atmosphere, we should also make certain that no other dangerous conflicts which could lead to a world nuclear catastrophe would arise.

In conclusion, I should like to say something about a detente between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries that you have mentioned. We have spoken about this long since and are prepared to continue to exchange views on this question with you and to find a reasonable solution.

We should like to continue the exchange of views on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament, and other problems relating to the relaxation of international tension.

Although I trust your statement, Mr. President, there are irresponsible people who would like to invade Cuba now and thus touch off a war. If we do take practical steps and proclaim the dismantling and evacuation of the means in question from Cuba, in so doing we, at the same time, want the Cuban people to be certain that we are with them and are not absolving ourselves of responsibility for rendering assistance to the Cuban people.

We are confident that the people of all countries, like you, Mr. President, will understand me correctly. We are not threatening. We want nothing but peace. Our country is now on the upsurge.

Our people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful labor. They have achieved tremendous successes since the October Revolution, and created the greatest material, spiritual, and cultural values. Our people are enjoying these values; they want to continue developing their achievements and insure their further development on the way of peace and social progress by their persistent labor.

I should like to remind you, Mr. President, that military reconnaissance planes have violated the borders of the Soviet Union. In connection with this there have been conflicts between us and notes exchanged. In 1960 we shot down your U-2 plane, whose reconnaissance flight over the USSR wrecked the summit meeting in Paris. At that time, you took a correct position and denounced that criminal act of the former U.S. Administration.

But during your term of office as President another violation of our border has occurred, by an American U-2

plane in the Sakhalin area. We wrote you about that violation on 30 August. At that time you replied that that violation had occurred as a result of poor weather, and gave assurances that this would not be repeated. We trusted your assurances, because the weather was indeed poor in that area at that time.

But had not your planes been ordered to fly about our territory, even poor weather could not have brought an American plane into our airspace. Hence, the conclusion that this is being done with the knowledge of the Pentagon, which tramples on international norms and violates the borders of other states.

A still more dangerous case occurred on 28 October, when one of your reconnaissance planes intruded over Soviet borders in the Chukotka Peninsula area in the north and flew over our territory. The question is, Mr. President: How should we regard this? What is this: A provocation? One of your planes violates our frontier during this anxious time we are both experiencing, when everything has been put into combat readiness. Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step? And all the more so since the U.S. Government and Pentagon long ago declared that you are maintaining a continuous nuclear bomber patrol.

Therefore, you can imagine the responsibility you are assuming, especially now, when we are living through such anxious times.

I should like to express the following wish; it concerns the Cuban people. You do not have diplomatic relations. But through my officers in Cuba, I have reports that American planes are making flights over Cuba.

We are interested that there should be no war in the world, and that the Cuban people should live in peace. And besides, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have our people in Cuba. Under such a treaty with the Cuban Government we have sent there officers, instructors, mostly plain people: specialists, agronomists, zoo technicians, irrigators, land reclamation specialists, plain workers, tractor drivers, and others. We are concerned about them.

I should like you to consider, Mr. President, that violation of Cuban airspace by American planes could also lead to dangerous consequences. And if you do not want this to happen, it would be better if no cause is given for a dangerous situation to arise.

We must be careful now and refrain from any steps which would not be useful to the defense of the states involved in the conflict, which could only cause irritation and even serve as a provocation for a fateful step. Therefore, we must display sanity, reason, and refrain from such steps.

We value peace perhaps even more than other peoples because we went through a terrible war with Hitler. But our people will not falter in the face of any test. Our people trust their Government, and we assure our people and world public opinion that the Soviet Government will not allow itself to be provoked. But if the provocateurs unleash a war, they will not evade responsibility and the grave consequences a war would bring upon them. But we are confident that reason will triumph, that war will not be unleashed and peace and the security of the peoples will be insured.

In connection with the current negotiations between Acting Secretary General U Thant and representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Government has sent First Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.

Respectfully yours,

N. Khrushchev/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Khrushchev signed the original.

### **103. Summary Record of the Tenth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 28, 1962, 11:10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Top Secret; Sensitive. McCone's 1-page typed summary of the meeting and Gilpatric's page of handwritten notes on the meeting are in Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01895A, Meetings with the President, and Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, RLG's Notes re Cuba, respectively. McCone's notes are reproduced in *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, p. 345. An account of the meeting as dictated by Walter Elder, based on a debriefing of McCone, is reproduced *ibid.*, p. 347. A Record of Action for the meeting is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10)

The full TASS text of the Khrushchev reply/1/ to the President offering to withdraw Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba under UN supervision had been read by all prior to the opening of the meeting. (It had been received over the FBIS ticker beginning about 9:00 AM--copy attached.)

/1/Document 102.

Secretary Rusk began by making general comments to the effect that everyone present had helped to bring about the highly advantageous resolution of the Cuban missile crisis. Mr. Bundy interrupted to say that everyone knew who were hawks and who were doves, but that today was the doves' day.

Secretary McNamara said we would not have to face a decision on halting a Bloc ship today because the Soviet tanker *Graznyy* was lying dead in the water outside the quarantine zone and no other Bloc ships, if they continued toward Cuba, would be reaching the barrier.

Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk recommended, and the President agreed, that no air reconnaissance missions be flown today.

The President asked what we would substitute for our air surveillance of Cuba.

Secretary McNamara said this surveillance might be by the UN or a joint inspection of U.S./UN inspectors in a neutral plane, flown by Brazilians or Canadians. He said our objective should be to have reconnaissance carried out by the UN tomorrow. Technically, this could be arranged, but we do not know whether the UN would undertake the task.

The President suggested that we tell the UN they must carry out reconnaissance or else we will. He authorized the release to UN officials of classified information on Cuba, including photographs and refugee reports, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. The purpose of the release of this information on Soviet armaments in Cuba was to facilitate the inspection task which we expected the UN to promptly undertake.

Secretary Rusk, in commenting on Khrushchev's reply, called attention to the text which said the Russians would "come to an agreement." He said Kuznetsov was coming to New York to conduct the negotiations. He suggested that we pick up and accept Khrushchev's description of what he was prepared to withdraw from Cuba, i.e. "offensive weapons."

The President called attention to the IL-28 bombers which he said we should ask the Russians to withdraw by making a private approach to Khrushchev. He said we should not get "hung up" on the IL-28 bombers, but we

should seek to include them in the Soviet definition of "offensive weapons" or "weapons we call offensive."

General Taylor said our objective should be the status quo ante.

The President agreed, but added that he did not want to get into a position where we would appear to be going back on our part of the deal. The IL-28 bombers were less important than the strategic missiles. Admittedly, we would face the problem of Soviet armaments in Cuba if the Russians continued to build up their defensive capability there.

At this point the Attorney General arrived./2/

/2/Robert Kennedy had been meeting with the Soviet Ambassador at the former's office. At this time Dobrynin told the Attorney General that Khrushchev had agreed to dismantle and withdraw the missiles. (Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, p. 110)

The President agreed to a statement to be made public, as revised in the meeting./3/ He asked that a draft reply to Khrushchev's statement be prepared for him to consider. He directed that comments by everyone on the Soviet statement be reserved. Our posture is to be one of welcoming the Soviet offer to take out the offensive weapons under UN inspection, but attention should be called to the many problems we would encounter in the implementation of Khrushchev's offer. We should point out that we were under no illusion that the problem of Soviet weapons in Cuba is solved. In addition, he said we should make clear that we can draw no general conclusions about how the Russians will act in the future in areas other than Cuba. He made specific mention of the problem of Communist subversion in Latin America and asked that we refer to this problem either in our letter to Khrushchev or in U Thant's letter to Khrushchev. He directed that Ambassador Stevenson be asked to talk to UN officials about this aspect of the Cuban problem.

/3/For text of this statement, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 444-445.

Bromley Smith/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

#### **104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union**

Washington, October 28, 1962, 5:03 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2862. Unclassified; Niact. Drafted by Thompson and Ball, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated priority to Paris, London, and New York.

1020. Following is text President's reply to Khrushchev letter of October 28/1/ for delivery to highest available Soviet official. Text has been handed to Soviet Embassy and released by White House at 4:35 PM.

/1/Document 102.1

*Begin text*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I am replying at once to your broadcast message of October twenty-eight even though the official text has not yet reached me because of the great importance I attach to moving forward promptly to the settlement of the Cuban crisis. I think that you and I, with our heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, were aware that developments were approaching a point where events could have become unmanageable. So I welcome this

message and consider it an important contribution to peace.

The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter to you of October twenty-seventh<sup>2/</sup> and your reply of today<sup>3/</sup> as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations as your message says, so that the United States in turn can remove the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area.

<sup>2/</sup>See Document 95.

<sup>3/</sup>Document 102.

You referred in your letter to a violation of your frontier by an American aircraft in the area of the Chukotsk Peninsula. I have learned that this plane, without arms or photographic equipment, was engaged in an air sampling mission in connection with your nuclear tests. Its course was direct from Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska to the North Pole and return. In turning south, the pilot made a serious navigational error which carried him over Soviet territory. He immediately made an emergency call on open radio for navigational assistance and was guided back to his home base by the most direct route. I regret this incident and will see to it that every precaution is taken to prevent recurrence.

Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.

I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States Government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere.

John F. Kennedy

Rusk

### **105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations**

Washington, October 28, 1962, 6:05 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5211/10-2862. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and approved by Ball.

1130. For Stevenson. Am seriously disturbed at apparent lack of interest on part Secretariat in great importance of aerial photographic surveillance in carrying out task in Cuba. While we have made available to the Secretariat fullest information (derived almost entirely from aerial photography) on characteristics and locations of weapons as of forty-eight hours or more ago, this by no means is necessarily a complete inventory of offensive weapons in Cuba or their locations as of the time UN begins its operations. While aerial photography does not guarantee one hundred percent knowledge of situation nevertheless it is vastly superior, more thorough, more efficient and economical than Nineteenth Century approach based entirely on observation on the ground confined to



previously established weapon sites. This is particularly true where weapons concerned are of mobile field type not requiring elaborate fixed bases. Thus we consider it essential that every effort be made to impress on Secretariat importance of aerial photography as an essential supplement to ground observation in carrying out its task of verification. As you know, we stand prepared immediately assist UN in any way agreeable to it and have made substantial preparations that would permit UN begin this mission tomorrow including possibility of flying UN marked planes carrying UN observer. If even with this assistance UN unwilling or unable undertake mission tomorrow, we must assert position that we have preserved our freedom of action and will undertake mission ourselves, recognizing however that this politically less desirable than UN mission and physically more dangerous. Only in this manner can we carry out obligation to forestall any chance trickery endangering our national security. Of course results such mission would be made available to UN to assist it in its task. If UN does not intend undertake aerial reconnaissance US may find it necessary in its own protection continue reconnaissance.

Rusk

### **106. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, October 28, 1962, 6:15 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in S on October 30. A memorandum of a similar conversation with Alphand earlier in the afternoon is in the Supplement. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)

#### **SUBJECT**

Cuba

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

The Secretary

Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador

Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

The British Ambassador told the Secretary how gratified HMG was by the present course of events. He said that the most important thing to do now was to consider what the next stage would be (assuming that things continue to go well). His Government thought that it was important to consider what might be done next, and in what forum. Should there be an initiative in terms of NATO-Warsaw Pact discussions, or should we try to do something about Berlin?

The Secretary said he first wished to make it very clear that there had been no "cozy deals" in connection with the change in the Soviet position. The only thing that Khrushchev was getting for his present attitude was that the United States would not intervene militarily in Cuba so long as the offensive weapons were removed under conditions of proper inspection and verification. He added that we were not going to guarantee the Castro Government, and that the Rio Pact still holds.

The British Ambassador said he thought that there might be some value in making the US guarantee dependent on Khrushchev's behavior with regard to Berlin; perhaps Khrushchev could be brought to giving some assurances in this respect.

The Secretary agreed that if developments continued on their present course, this would require a major

consideration of a lot of problems.

The British Ambassador said that Khrushchev would doubtless try to salvage his position by assuming the posture of "a man of peace" who was leading the world in the direction of solutions of problems of disarmament and nuclear testing, etc.

The Secretary agreed and said it was important not to "crow" about the strengthened Western position. He said he had briefed the press on a background basis today to stress the importance of maintaining a tone of moderation as well as caution./1/

/1/A transcript of the background briefing at 1:04 p.m. is *ibid.*, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous.

The Secretary said that the prompt and full support of the British Government, as well as that of our other NATO Allies,/2/ have been a powerful factor in strengthening our position and in bringing home to Khrushchev the danger and the price of continuing on the course he had taken. However, we were not out of the woods yet, and it was not excluded that we would have to face unpleasant surprises tomorrow.

/2/A report on the North Atlantic Council discussion of the Cuban situation on October 28, is in Polto circular 12, October 28. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2862) See the Supplement.

The British Ambassador said he agreed, but that he felt that the chances were all in favor of the West emerging from the present crisis in a greatly strengthened position, and that it was important and urgent to consider how this could be turned to even greater advantage.

### **107. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**

New York, October 28, 1962, 9 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2862. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 10:09 p.m.

1523. Re Cuba. At mtg with U Thant this evening Stevenson received SYG's message to President in regard to his negots with Castro and delivered President's reply (transmitted separately)./1/ Stevenson pointed out reference to attitude other American states toward assurances against invasion of Cuba was based on our understanding their position and should not be understood as committing other govts whose attitude would presumably be relected in early OAS mtg.

/1/U Thant's letter is dated October 28. (*Ibid.*, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438) See the Supplement.

SYG said it would be extremely helpful to him in working out desired arrangements with Castro if Pres could publicly suspend quarantine on Oct 30. He pointed out that he is constantly being belabored by Sovs and Cubans with claim they have complied with his appeal of Oct 25 and that US has not. He felt that US naval units could be left at present stations but would simply not exercise right of search during SYG's two-day visit to Havana. If he should report on his return to New York either that he had not been able to establish adequate inspection or that inspection had revealed Sov failure to comply with their commitments, quarantine could be at once resumed. On other hand if his report was favorable and satisfactory verification arrangements established, suspension would become definitive.

It was also suggested that, without any public announcement, US reconnaissance flights over Cuba might be suspended during his visit there. It was pointed out that any incident caused by such flights during his visit would be extremely embarrassing to him.

In reply to our insistence that verification arrangements must be approved and in place before blockade suspended, SYG said that he simply did not believe there was any likelihood that Sovs would launch missiles on US during next two or three days. He felt it would obviously be suicidal for them and for Cubans if this were done. He expressed grave concern at call-up yesterday of Air Force Reserves and, without explicitly saying so, left impression he thought some of US actions have been excessive. In reply we explained in considerable detail very grave and important character of threat with which we had been confronted.

Stevenson mentioned possibility of Castro as useful gesture of good will restoring body of U-2 pilot.

Stevenson also suggested SYG might, if opportunity occurred, sound out Castro on ceasing his subversive activities in other countries. Stevenson emphasized however that this should not be connected in any way with present situation, which it would undoubtedly complicate but might simply be broached as an important matter to be dealt with in future. Narasimhan expressed view that Castro would almost certainly raise question of US subversion in Cuba and this would give SYG opportunity to respond in manner Stevenson suggested. He also thought Castro might raise question of Guantanamo. Stevenson urged again that all of these matters be firmly excluded from present negot since their introduction into it might cause serious delay and complication.

In closing, SYG said he hopes to leave about 10:00 am Oct 30 either on Brazilian Varig Airline Caravel or on Mexican DC6B.

Stevenson

## **108. Summary Record of the 11th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 29, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. The Record of Action for this meeting (ibid.) is in the Supplement.

Director McCone summarized current intelligence, including evidence that all Cuban military forces have been ordered not to fire at U.S. planes unless fired upon.

The President read and approved the announcement of the creation of a Coordinating Committee which will handle all matters involved in the conclusion of the Cuban crisis. (Text attached)/1/

/1/Not printed. The members of the committee were Ball, Gilpatric, and McCloy.

Secretary Rusk acknowledged that we need aerial reconnaissance missions today, but he recommended that none be flown until after the Russian negotiator Kuznetsov sees the UN Acting Secretary General in New York today.

The President agreed that we could wait today, but that we did face the longer range problem of how we continue surveillance of Cuba, recognizing that we cannot rely on the UN to undertake adequate surveillance.

Under Secretary of the Air Force Charyk reported on a conversation last night with UN officials. He said he had offered them RC-130 planes, which they were prepared to use, but they did not want these planes flown by U.S. crews. Mr. Charyk said the Canadians, South Africans and Indonesians have crews which could fly these planes.

Mr. Charyk said the UN official, Mr. Rikhye, who would be organizing the UN aerial reconnaissance, acknowledged that the UN could not make arrangements to fly reconnaissance missions today, but the UN observers could be on the ground in Cuba by Wednesday morning. The UN official said the UN did not want U.S. reconnaissance planes overflying Cuba during the Secretary General's visit there on Tuesday and

Wednesday./2/

/2/October 30 and 31.

Mr. Charyk said that air reconnaissance could be very efficient. Pictures taken would reveal suspicious locations to which ground observers could be promptly dispatched.

Mr. Charyk said there had been no discussion yesterday of U.S. reconnaissance flights today, but UN officials had asked for our voluntary suspension of the blockade on Tuesday and Wednesday, leaving, however, the U.S. ships on station. UN inspectors would be in all ports and would report to us on incoming and outgoing cargo. We would make available film to the UN reconnaissance missions if they would provide us with copies of the exposed films.

Secretary McNamara recommended that we send reconnaissance missions this afternoon after notice is given to the Cubans and to Kuznetsov. The decision would be final unless new information came out of the U Thant/Kuznetsov discussions in New York. He recommended that U.S. ships remain on station, challenge all ships entering the quarantine zone, and let such ships through because their cargo would be inspected by the UN observers in Cuban ports.

Secretary Rusk emphasized that we must maintain the quarantine until arrangements for UN inspection of offensive weapons in Cuba are completed.

The President made clear that we should have U.S. observers on any planes flown by the UN. He agreed that the U.S. ships should stay on station, but that we should leave ambiguous for the next twenty-four hours whether or not we will maintain the quarantine. He said we should not say that the quarantine was off pending installation of a UN inspection system. He agreed that the call up of the air reserves should not be reversed.

Secretary McNamara urged that the new Coordinating Committee work immediately on the question of Communist covert aggression in Latin America which would be based in Cuba.

The President said he had talked to Ambassador Stevenson yesterday/3/ whose view was that the phrase "peace in the Caribbean" covers subversion. The President said Ambassador Stevenson had discussed this question with U Thant and would try to get back into the formulation of the settlement some specific reference to subversion.

/3/No record of this conversation has been found.

General Taylor urged that we be prepared to fly six to eight low-level missions today, but no high-level missions. He said we had seen nothing from Saturday/4/ until now. He recommended that we announce in advance we were conducting low-level reconnaissance pending satisfactory and effective UN reconnaissance arrangements.

/4/October 27.

The President agreed to the low-level reconnaissance unless he directed otherwise before 2:00 PM. He turned again to the question of what we would do on the surveillance problem for the long run.

Secretary Rusk noted that Khrushchev expressed his wish that reconnaissance cease, but he had not made it a condition to withdrawal of offensive weapons. U Thant will have to deal with this subject in the New York negotiations.

The President decided that no public announcement of the aerial reconnaissance would be made, but that if we decided to fly these missions, we will notify the Cubans and Kuznetsov immediately prior to the overflights.

General Taylor restated the requirement for the reconnaissance missions if we are to know whether the Soviets are actually dismantling the missile sites or whether they are continuing to work on the missile complexes.

Secretary McNamara noted that U Thant believes that the UN observers arriving in Cuba on Wednesday will see no missiles.

The President, saying that we would need aerial pictures on Wednesday, asked the group to consider how this should be done. Aerial missions today are not crucial, but this week we must have aerial pictures of the missile sites.

Secretary McNamara expressed his doubt that we can get the UN to fly reconnaissance missions. Such missions must be flown to satisfy domestic opinion. He recommended that the flights be authorized today, subject to any developments taking place in New York.

Bromley Smith/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**109. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security (Bundy)**

Washington, October 29, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Planning Subcommittee. Top Secret. The source text bears Rostow's handwritten notation: "The President may wish to see what we're up to." A summary of the Berlin/NATO subcommittee's work on October 29 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, vol. XV, pp. 411-419.

**SUBJECT**

Report Number Five of the Planning Subcommittee

1. The Planning Subcommittee reviewed the situation as of Monday morning, October 29, 1962.
2. The only operational issue addressed was the need to maintain continuity in our aerial inspection of the offensive weapons in Cuba, both for evident reasons of national security and as a basis for later movement to legitimize photo reconnaissance on a collective basis (either UN or OAS). This issue, in its longer run aspects, is referred to below.
3. The following tasks were discussed and assigned as follow-up of the crisis:
  - a. It was agreed that the Soviet adventure in Cuba in part reflected a high degree of anxiety concerning the nuclear balance. The most likely assumption is that, having failed in the Cuban ploy, they will consider other methods for retrieving or appearing to retrieve their position in the nuclear arms race; for example, a radically accelerated ICBM program, the positioning of weapons in space, etc. It was judged urgent that these possibilities be explored and that we take countermeasures for two reasons: first, to insure ourselves against some Sputnik-like move which would endanger our present favorable posture; second, to maximize the influence in Moscow of those who may argue that the only realistic road to Russian security is by inspected arms control. This task was assigned to DOD (Mr. Rowen) in consultation with other appropriate parts of the Government.
  - b. The crisis will evidently have implications for Soviet policy: for the Sino-Soviet split; and for the position and policies of Communist parties in every part of the world. The group chaired by Mr. Harvey will continue to

explore these implications and propose courses of U.S. action.

c. The situation inside Cuba, in the wake of the Russian defection, may open to us possibilities of change in the character of the Cuban government or its policy which, evidently, should be fully explored. This task was assigned to Mr. Hurwitch (ARA).

d. It was judged possible that there are certain lessons to be drawn from the recent confrontation over Cuba for our Berlin contingency planning. Mr. Rowen and Mr. Kitchen will seek to formulate these in consultation with Mr. Nitze and his committee.

e. Viet Nam. Although it is probable that the Soviet Union will be extremely sensitive to any further pressures we may mount against the Communist position in the wake of this crisis, it was judged appropriate to consider what political and other measures may be considered to induce or force the Soviet Union to honor its pledge given at Geneva that infiltration into South Viet Nam via Laos would end after the Laos settlement. I will raise this matter with Mr. Harriman.

f. With confidence strengthened in the credibility of the U.S. deterrent, it was judged time to make a major push in the Atlantic partnership. There is an urgent need to improve the machinery of political consultation; to press on with various trade, currency and aid problems within the orbit of the OECD; and to look to a multilateral resolution of the nuclear problem at an earlier date than might have otherwise been envisaged. (Action: EUR)

g. In the wake of the crisis, it was judged essential that we seek to consolidate the new unity and confidence of the OAS; press forward vigorously with the Alliance for Progress; and exploit the crisis to weaken the Communists; to reduce the fear of Communists in Latin America; and to draw leftist and neutralist groups away from the Communists and towards the center. It was noted that, in the face of U.S. strength, there was a danger that right wing groups might now assume that reform and development were less urgent than previously. Steps to discourage this view should be considered. (Action: ARA and AID in consultation with other interested agencies)

h. Negotiations with the USSR. An initial paper on this subject, of October 27th, is available to the Executive Committee./1/ Further staff work will go forward within the Department of State and ACDA. Two observations emerged on the subject of negotiation with the Soviet Union. Historically, the instinctive reaction of the USSR to an international setback is to regroup, to consolidate, and to avoid, for a time, fresh initiatives. If that is their reaction on the present occasion, they may use it merely as an occasion to hold to firm previous positions. In that case, there may be no significant movement forward. On the other hand, it is conceivable that Khrushchev himself may wish to move forward towards a detente on Berlin and to leave behind him some achievement in the field of arms control and disarmament. In this case, some forward movement at a summit is conceivable. There is as yet no basis for a judgment as to the course Moscow will, in fact, follow. In the light of these alternatives, we should be prepared, should a summit take place, with an array of proposals, ranging from a mere reaffirmation of the status quo through limited to quite radical steps forward; and use the occasion of such negotiations as a means of assessing the policy and intention of the Soviet Union.

/1/Attached to an October 28 memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba) See the Supplement.

i. The crisis has implications for every region and virtually every country with which we have relations in the world outside of NATO and the OAS. Courses of action designed to strengthen our position vis-a-vis these countries have to be designed on a case-by-case basis. (Action to be initiated by Mr. Jorden, with relevant regional bureaus and S/P officers.)

j. The crisis bears on future disarmament negotiations and measures in two specific respects. First, the Soviet performance in Cuba dramatizes beyond any doubt the case for inspection. Ways for driving home this lesson

should be devised. (Action: ACDA) In addition, we should explore ways of consolidating the de facto precedent of our unilateral inspection of Cuban bases and the OAS ruling that secrecy is inappropriate in this Hemisphere. (Action: ACDA, IO, ARA)

4. The possibility of a White Paper on the Cuban crisis was discussed. It was universally agreed that such a paper, if it were decided to issue one, should be factual with no elaborate effort to draw lessons for propaganda purposes. The question of whether such a paper should be organized to provide a full record of what now can be made public, both for our own people and for the world, as well as the terms of reference for such a paper, were referred to Mr. U. Alexis Johnson and Mr. Edward Martin.

## **110. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, October 29, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.56311/10-2962. Secret. Drafted by Helseth on October 30 and initialed by Tyler.

### **SUBJECT**

Turkish Missiles and the Cuban Crisis

### **PARTICIPANTS**

Ambassador Turgut Menemencioglu, Turkish Ambassador

William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR

Irwin M. Tobin, Deputy Director, RPM

GTI--William A. Helseth

The Turkish Ambassador, acting on the urgent instructions of his Government, called on Mr. Tyler on October 29. First, he said, he wished to extend the thanks and gratitude of his Government for President Kennedy's refusal of any "deal" with the Soviet Union regarding the missile bases in Turkey.

Secondly, he wished to inform the United States Government that the Turkish Government had instructed its permanent representative in NATO to ask urgently for a special session of the North Atlantic Council. At this special session, the Turkish permanent representative would review the events which led up to the IRBM's being stationed in Turkey and would emphasize that the IRBM's were placed in Turkey not merely for Turkey's defense but for NATO defense. The Turkish permanent representative would state that the Turkish Government regretted that, when dangers subsequently appeared, some seemed to regard Turkey as at fault. Turkey wished to discuss this turn of events with its allies. (The Ambassador then referred to press comments in various allied countries and to some non-United States personalities who spoke in the same tone.)

Mr. Tyler stated his appreciation for the advance information the Ambassador had given us and said he wished to repeat and to reinforce what the Ambassador had said regarding the circumstances that led to the placing of the missiles on Turkish soil. The United States Government, he said, looked at these from the point of view of the NATO complex. These missiles were for the defense of the NATO area and that defense was indivisible. The United States viewed our commitments in all areas of NATO as being equal. Furthermore, he hoped that Ankara would not pay too much attention to our own press comment which had ranged far and wide. Even we, he said, wondered at times whether a given article had been inspired, was a trial balloon or what. Ambassador Menemencioglu interrupted to say that he recognized the freedom of our press but had noticed that it was

disciplined when the facts were known and mentioned particularly that the line taken by the press today (October 29) was a very good one. Mr. Tyler said that the Secretary had recently talked with the press on a background basis.

Mr. Tyler stated that the Cuban crisis was not yet settled and that we would know tonight if work on the bases had been stopped. We had, he said, resumed aerial surveillance today. Mr. Tyler stated that he wished to reassure the Ambassador again that there had been no "deal" regarding Turkey. The Ambassador responded that he had no doubt of that. He remarked upon the audacity of Khrushchev in drawing a parallel between Turkey and Cuba. Mr. Tyler said that there was nothing in the arrangement with the Soviets which implied a guarantee of the Castro regime. We had only stated we would not attack Cuba. We had based our action on the Rio Treaty.

(Note: On the way out of the building, Ambassador Menemencioglu informed Mr. Helseth that his Government would be especially pleased with Mr. Tyler's response to the Ambassador's approach.)

### **111. Summary Record of the 12th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 29, 1962, 6:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. The Record of Action for this meeting (ibid.) is in the Supplement.

Secretary Rusk reported on developments during the day in New York. The Soviet position on inspection, as stated by Kuznetsov, is that the Russians are willing to have the International Red Cross officials inspect all cargoes going to Cuba to ensure that no arms at all are taken to Cuba. The Red Cross officials could inspect cargoes at sea from non-U.S. ships or from the wharves in Cuban ports. The Russians would not permit on-site inspection until all Soviet missiles are removed. Kuznetsov hinted that the missile removal operation would take about a week. (See attached cable.)/1/

/1/Document 112.

Secretary Rusk said that if there was to be no inspection on the ground, air reconnaissance became crucial. He indicated that the Russians might not object to our overflights. He said that U Thant had asked Stevenson how long we wanted the inspection to go on. Permanent inspection would be difficult, but inspection limited to a period of weeks would be easier. He said the Russians were prepared to accept UN inspectors in Cuba.

The President said he approved of the plan to have Red Cross officials inspect all ships from Bloc ports. He also agreed to suspend the quarantine for two days during the visit of the Acting Secretary General to Havana.

Secretary McNamara reported that a Soviet ship, listing its cargo as wheat, but carrying unidentified crates, was about 300 miles off Cuba. Admiral Anderson wanted to stop this ship, but it had been decided not to stop it.

General Taylor commented that what we are asking the Russians to do is to dismantle their missiles immediately. Mr. Bundy added that our request did not include dismantling the SAM sites.

The President returned to the question of air reconnaissance. He agreed that surveillance should be done in the least provocative way, but we must continue to maintain surveillance until a satisfactory UN system is in place. He said he thought we should tell Mr. McCloy in New York of our plans, but no public announcement should be made. He agreed that no reconnaissance flights would be flown tomorrow or Wednesday./2/ He asked that a study be prepared for him as to what we consider a satisfactory inspection system.

/2/October 31.



Secretary McNamara said that if we were to have no on-site inspection in Cuba, we must have high- and low-level reconnaissance.

The President asked whether it would be possible for us to obtain pictures of the outgoing Soviet ships. He asked Secretary Rusk to make clear to our officials in New York that we must continue aerial reconnaissance unless the UN takes over this task.

Secretary Rusk commented that the political situation, as it had developed during the day, appeared to support the belief that Khrushchev's deal is still on, but if pictures from today's reconnaissance mission reveal that the nose cones are on the missiles in Cuba, then we will face a most difficult decision.

Bromley Smith/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## **112. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**

New York, October 29, 1962, 9 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2962. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 9:16 p.m. At 5:22 p.m. McCloy had called Rusk to report on the meeting described in this telegram. A memorandum of that conversation is in the Supplement. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962)

1535. Cuba. At mtg with Stevenson, McCloy and Yost this afternoon SYG gave fol report on discussion with Kuznetsov:

Latter commenced by saying USSR had complied with SYG's appeals by suspending arms shipments and avoiding confrontation at sea but there had been no US response. Thant replied response is that US will suspend blockade when verification established. Thant had suggested to Zorin two days ago that Sov ships submit to verification. Kuznetsov replied "USSR is prepared to agree to proposal that Red Cross visit Sov ships going to Cuba in order to ascertain that they carry no weapons as the US is worried about offensive weapons to Cuba". Kuznetsov added his govt would prefer Red Cross personnel undertaking task should be from neutral nations. Red Cross could board Sov vessels either from neutral ships or Sov ships at sea. When SYG mentioned inspection at Cuban ports Kuznetsov replied he had no objection but this would depend on Cuba. He made clear he was not willing to have UN team inspect Sov ships.

SYG expressed to US personal doubts that Red Cross would undertake this duty, though UN had had offer from high Red Cross official several days ago to help in Cuban crisis. If they did accept he supposed they would fly people from Geneva to some spot near Cuba where they would embark on neutral ships to accost Sov ships. Obviously inspection in Cuban ports if Castro accepts would be far simpler. SYG expressed view Sovs would not submit even to Red Cross inspection if they had any intention of shipping arms and that they would therefore be very unlikely to do so at least during immediate future.

As to sites and missiles, Kuznetsov mentioned reference in Khrushchev's second letter to SC involvement. He said missiles now being dismantled and shipped out. When dismantling has been completed Sovs will report to SC and propose UN team be sent to verify dismantling. No UN team is required until Sovs report to SC. Kuznetsov did not estimate duration of dismantling but SYG got impression it would be no longer than week or two. He is therefore thinking of SC mtg early next week after he has had opportunity for further round of consultations with US, USSR and Cuba following his return. Stevenson made clear it is imperative that US have assurance that dismantling is going on. He did not think we could allow more than 24-hour interval.

SYG expressed hope Sovs might be ready to send teams as early as next Monday. He was not inclined to press Sovs too hard since he could not imagine they would set off rockets at US during next few days. Cubans had refused to state their views on verification until he arrives in Havana but it is clear that Sovs control missile sites, are presumably engaged in rapid dismantling and will not permit verification until dismantling completed. Narasimhan pointed out this would probably be the case while weapons are actually being removed but that verification on the spot might well be permitted in second stage while launching pads and emplacements are being destroyed.

Stevenson made clear that our intense and urgent preoccupation is with weapons being rendered immediately inoperable and with this fact being verified.

SYG referred to fol phrase in second para of President's Oct 27 letter to Khrushchev:/1/"To insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments". He was worried at implications of word "continuation" and feared this meant US expected UN to continue inspection of Cuba for indefinite period. If this were the case he felt it certain that Castro would make counter-demand for inspection of what SYG called "CIA training camps for exiles" in US and certain Caribbean countries. We disabused him of idea that inspection for an indefinite period is contemplated.

/1/See Document 95.

Stevenson and McCloy again referred to necessity of inspection during immediate interim period. If inspection on the spot cannot be obtained, aerial inspection becomes all the more important. SYG said he saw no objection to aerial inspection during interim period if Cuban Govt agrees. McCloy indicated that until UN aerial observation set up US has to reserve right to maintain observation itself.

McCloy also indicated we could give no assurances concerning lifting of quarantine until verification established. Discussion ensued whether quarantine linked only with imports of arms into Cuba or with elimination of offensive weapons from Cuba with UN side maintaining former and US side latter. It was eventually agreed that for immediate purpose of SYG's visit most desirable handling would be issuance by US of simple statement to effect that at SYG's request quarantine being temporarily suspended for the duration of his visit.

Stevenson emphasized importance of dissuading Castro from introducing into negots extraneous elements, such as those covered in yesterday's five-point declaration,/2/ which would only complicate and perhaps even jeopardize settlement reached between US and USSR. He also mentioned that expression in Pres's letter to Khrushchev that he was confident other Western Hemisphere nations would also give assurances against invasion of Cuba was of course merely expression of US conviction and not commitment on behalf other American Republics. Presumably there would be an agreed OAS position on this subject.

/2/For text of this statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 447-448.

Stevenson

### **113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations**

Washington, October 29, 1962, 10:50 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2962. Confidential. Drafted by Cleveland, cleared with the Department of Defense, approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Moscow.

1136. Subject: Cuba.

1. We understand from telcons that Khrushchev has proposed that International Red Cross (ICRC) assume function of monitoring shipments into Cuba to make sure that no arms are coming in from Soviet Union to Cuba. This inspection to be in port of entering if Cuba agrees or at sea if preferred. If at sea, Red Cross personnel should board from neutral or Soviet ships, not American vessels. Red Cross personnel should be citizens of neutral or non-aligned countries.

2. This arrangement on monitoring in shipments is satisfactory. If possible, we would prefer that ICRC operate in some fashion as executive agent of the SYG, in manner analogous work of League of [International] Red Cross Societies (LICROSS) in refugee field.

3. Some continuing reconnaissance from the air seems essential, during period of dismantling and withdrawal of missiles and other major weapons. This will be especially true if no on-site inspection of missile sites can be arranged until dismantling completed. If necessary U.S. will continue its own reconnaissance. If possible, we would still prefer a technically competent reconnaissance done by UN itself. Therefore important to pursue Canadian offer of pilots for RF-101s, or other possibilities accomplishing same purpose.

FYI. One of U.S. planes on today's reconnaissance was fired on by Cubans. End FYI.

4. Statement on quarantine approved for release Monday evening:

"The White House announced tonight that, in response to the request of Acting Secretary General U Thant, enforcement of the quarantine has been voluntarily suspended during the period of his visit to Cuba."

5. Pending examination results of today's reconnaissance, no decision yet on whether to suspend US aerial reconnaissance during period SYGs visit to Cuba.

6. It will be important to have assurance, including if possible photographs, of missiles being packed up and actually leaving on ships. Perhaps as part of monitoring operation in ports, ICRC could likewise monitor export of major weapons.

Rusk

#### **114. Summary Record of the 13th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 30, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. The Record of Action of this meeting (ibid.) is in the Supplement.

Director McCone reported that incomplete interpretation of pictures from yesterday's reconnaissance mission did not reveal whether work on the missile sites had halted or whether dismantlement of the missiles had begun. Construction at the nuclear sites appears to be continuing. Some of the missile launchers have been removed to cover areas./1/

/1/A copy of the CIA memorandum, SC No. 11155/62, with information as of 6 a.m. October 30, from which McCone briefed the Executive Committee, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16.

Secretary McNamara called attention to the reported activities of Alpha 66. The President stated that insofar as we had any control over the actions of Alpha 66, we should try to keep them from doing something that might upset the deal with the Russians. The President noted that anti-Castro groups did have a stake in continuing the

struggle, and, therefore, might make an effort to cause difficulties during the period when it appeared we would be reaching some kind of a solution with the Russians.

The President authorized a public statement to the effect that it was too early to judge whether the missiles were being dismantled and construction at missile sites halted.

Secretary McNamara said he had directed that no U-2 planes fly anywhere until he was satisfied that a system had been developed to safeguard against navigational errors resulting in overflights of Soviet territory. He felt it was important to avoid another incident.

Secretary Rusk reported that U Thant had told our people in New York that he would not go to Havana if we conducted air reconnaissance during the two days he is expected to be in Cuba.

The President agreed that no air reconnaissance missions would be flown over Cuba today or tomorrow, but he directed that every effort be made to get UN surveillance under way as soon as possible. Secretary McNamara said that there were ten or twelve issues connected with the Cuban crisis which were being reviewed and would be ready for Presidential consideration tomorrow.

Turning to the question of guidance for the press, the President directed that no one on the Executive Committee should personally see any reporter and that nobody in the group should say anything except Mr. Bundy, Mr. Salinger, and Mr. Sorensen, who were authorized to talk to reporters. The President said we were not dealing with a finished episode, and, therefore, information going to the press needed to reflect the solidity of the Committee.

Mr. Salinger said that three sanitized versions of the crisis, all of them to be approved by the President, were being prepared by Defense, State, and White House press officers.

The President agreed not to issue the draft Executive Order covering ships engaged in the Cuba trade, but requested the State Department to explain to reporters that the reason for not issuing the order was because it was aimed at a situation which had been radically altered by the discovery of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba.

Acting Director of USIA Wilson reported that Cuban exiles were seeking to buy time on U.S. radio stations. It was expected that if they succeeded, they would make inflammatory statements about present U.S. policy toward Cuba. The President authorized Mr. Wilson to talk to the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission about some way of blocking these broadcasts without appearing to be imposing censorship of the radio stations.

Bromley Smith/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **115. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, October 30, 1962, 6 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-3062. Secret; Niact. Repeated to USUN. Received in the Department of State at 12:15 p.m.

1139. Policy. During courtesy call on Gromyko at 4:00 p.m. today, he introduced subject of Cuba, saying that Soviet Government wished as quickly as possible to reach agreement pursuant to Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters. Agreement should "codify" obligations of both sides, i.e., US obligations to refrain from attack on Cuba and to rescind blockade, "which you call quarantine, but which we regard as inadmissible arbitrary act in peace-time"; Soviet obligation to remove weapons "which President called offensive"; and Cuban obligations.

Agreement should stem from talks now going on at UN in New York. Soviet Government expects US will take steps to bring negotiations quickly to satisfactory end. Gromyko said he did not want to enter upon substantive discussion this matter now, just wanted to mention it in passing.

I said that, while I had no instructions discuss this subject, it was clear US Government desired and intended to proceed as swiftly as possible to overcome crisis. President regards exchange of letters with Khrushchev as constituting agreement on basic principles involved, on basis of which question was prompt execution of obligations. So far as speed of negotiations was concerned, the faster the better, but talk should not delay action.

Kohler

**116. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 30, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive.

There will be a meeting without the President in the Conference Room of the Under Secretary of State at 6:00 p.m. this evening,<sup>/1/</sup> at which time Mr. Ball will lead discussion of some of the outstanding issues. It will be helpful if members can find a little time to think about them beforehand. Among these issues are the following:<sup>/2/</sup>

<sup>/1/</sup>No record of this meeting has been found, but it is noted in Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)

<sup>/2/</sup>Another list of issues for this meeting is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General 10/28/62-10/31/62)

1. What are the conditions for lifting the quarantine, either temporarily or permanently?
2. What other procedures for inbound inspection of shipments from the bloc are practicable?
3. What is our plan for the resumption, the continuance, and the possible abandonment of aerial reconnaissance?
4. What is our policy for the problem of definition of offensive weapons?
5. What verification do we expect before the re-export of offensive weapons?
6. What shape and definition can we give to our undertaking not to disturb the peace of the Caribbean?
7. What are the elements of a new policy toward refugee Cubans?
8. What political action can we take to exploit strains in the Castro regime?
9. What can be the long-term balance of assurance of our undertakings as against those of the USSR?

McGeorge Bundy<sup>/3/</sup>

<sup>/3/</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**117. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**

New York, October 30, 1962, 6 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-3062. Secret; Priority. Received in the Department of State at 6:49 p.m.

1547. Policy. Conversation with Kuznetsov.

At lunch with Kuznetsov today we discussed Cuba and he was very pleased that we would accept Red Cross inspection of the incoming ships. He assured me emphatically that the weapons would be dismantled and removed and that we could count on it, and then have whatever verification at the end of the process we wanted. He found it hard to believe that we would doubt their word in present circumstances, when I explained that surveillance during the interval to confirm compliance was necessary. Then he asked if we could not fly our high-level reconnaissance planes along the coast outside Cuban territorial waters and get good enough pictures. I said I doubted if that would be adequate, and suggested that reconnaissance planes could be transferred to the UN, painted and marked appropriately, and manned by neutrals if available, or even by combined Russian, Cuban and American crews. He was noncommittal, but clearly worried about Cuban objections to over-flights, although they did not appear to bother him. He did, however, say something about compromise of Russian prestige by this evidence of our skepticism. As to time involved to complete dismantling and removal process, he said Khrushchev had told him before he left Moscow that it would probably take two or three weeks.

He seemed to be especially eager to discuss disarmament and other bases and to explore any other possibilities for talks on broader basis. He plans to stay here as long as he can do anything, see people, and talk usefully about our mutual problems. He asked why he and I should not discuss the whole range of problems and added that as peoples we get along very much better than on official level, and that just now relations were badly strained.

On disarmament, he interrogated me closely in reply to suggestion about some bilateral talks on testing here in New York. He feels our positions are now so close that we should be able to reach agreement. In response to my suggestion that agreement on above-ground testing could now be reached quickly, he pressed me on why we insisted on underground inspection and why we seemed to want to make more underground tests when we had made far more tests than they, to our great advantage. Moreover, he felt confident that our scientists could really detect and identify everything. After the usual explanations that all underground tests could not be identified and that there were means to prevent any real danger of espionage, he was noncommittal and proposed a toast to disarmament and that we should talk some more.

He adverted several times to removal of our bases which threaten the Soviet Union as they had removed their base in Cuba which threatened the US.

Mtg was extremely cordial, and we also talked about previous mtgs and my writings on the Soviet Union with which he was familiar. He discussed with great candor the agricultural problem and the slow development of the virgin lands project, where they are consolidating and mechanizing and not increasing acreage. He brought me friendly messages from Khrushchev and Mikoyan.

Arthur Dean is seeing him this afternoon with regard to the disarmament negotiation.

Stevenson

### **118. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)**

October 30, 1962, 7 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking. Rusk was

in Washington; Stevenson was in New York.

Stevenson said that Seamens [Narasimham] (?) called in. He said they had a wonderful code--they talk in Hindi. Riki [Rikhye] reported that the first session which has terminated went very badly. Castro says no intrusion or inspection whatsoever on Cuban soil by anybody. They are now adjourned to meet tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. They will do some work on him tonight and might break him down by tomorrow morning. He asked that further reconnaissance by us be held off for another day so that it would not screw the thing up. He thinks if they don't get results tomorrow and he runs in this stone wall he will come back and call a Security Council meeting Thursday to ask for further instructions. The Cubans have refused Riki any access to inspect the sites and he has no clue as to what has transpired. Kuznetsov seemed alarmed today<sup>1/</sup> about the attitude of the Cubans, but so far as the Russians are concerned, he was confident of progress, but we would have to take a look so far as the Cubans are concerned and we would have to run some high level overflights unless we get a breakthrough. The Security Council thing will be awkward because the absence of an agreement of that kind would, of course, only increase the offense to the Cubans. If this is the only way out we had better have a talk with Kuznetsov and see if we can reach some sort of secret agreement and then go ahead with the Security Council agreement and confer with the Soviets. The Secretary suggested possibly the Cubans and Stevenson asked do we want to do that. The Secretary replied he did not know. Stevenson would think twice about that. There might be an interim meeting of the Latin American group on this. Stevenson is not clear in his mind who it would possibly be--perhaps Mexico.

<sup>1/</sup>See Document 117.

The Secretary said he would report this to the group meeting now<sup>2/</sup> and see where we come out after the session ends. Stevenson said they were having a Delegation meeting tomorrow and he will caution them on any statements.

<sup>2/</sup>See footnote 1, Document 116.

### **119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations**

Washington, October 30, 1962, 9:50 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5211/10-3062. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Sisco, cleared with Hilsman and Ball, and approved by Cleveland.

1141. Please request Narasimhan transmit confidentially to Rikhye by phone in Hindi following information for SYG. This should under no circumstances be sent by UN in clear to U Thant.

1. Before he left for Havana SYG requested information on results US aerial surveillance October 29. SYG should be informed results of October 29 surveillance inconclusive.
2. Moreover, since aerial observation not conducted October 28, pictures resulting from October 29 surveillance merely establish the initial base from which subsequent series of photographs must be made and evaluated.
3. Importance of making sure Soviets are complying with their own commitments will probably make urgent the resumption of air reconnaissance by Thursday, November 1.

Rusk

### **120. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy**

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. The source text bears no classification or indication who made the translation.

Moscow, October 30, 1962.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I want to convey to you confidentially some considerations which, if you agree with them, could serve, in my opinion, our common cause, that is, prompt elimination of the remnants of the dangerous crisis which you and we have in the main liquidated. This would help to finalize the settlement more quickly so that life would resume its normal pace.

First of all, I would like to express a wish that you already now remove the quarantine without waiting for the procedure for the inspection of ships on which an agreement has been reached to be put into effect. It would be very reasonable on your part. You yourself realize that the quarantine will in fact accomplish nothing since those ships that are now heading for Cuba naturally, after we have agreed on the removal of our missiles from Cuba, do not carry not only any offensive weapons, but, as I have already stated it publicly and informed you confidentially, any weapons at all. Immediate lift of the quarantine would be a good gesture. It would be appreciated both by us and world public opinion as a major step to speed up liquidation of the after effects of the crisis. For all practical purposes the quarantine is of no use to you, but being a manifestation of the crisis, it continues to poison relations among states, relations between you and us and Cuba and produces a depressing effect on world public which would like to see a complete relaxation. You would lose nothing but you would score a gain as far as public opinion is concerned.

On the other hand, immediate lift of the quarantine would give us an opportunity to use our ships that are approaching Cuba to take out the weapons which are being dismantled now and, I think, have been already dismantled. After the ships are unloaded the dismantled weapons could be loaded on them and shipped to the Soviet Union.

Naturally, after the elimination of the crisis it is impossible to continue the blockade and discrimination in trade and communications. All this must be done away with. But you, as we know, undertook measures and put pressure on your allies and other countries so that even flights of civilian passenger planes be not permitted. Do you really think that IL-28 carries any means of destruction? This is laughable.

All this is being done not to ensure security, but as pinpricks and cannot but cause irritation and worsening of our relations. Why should it be done? Who needs it? It serves only the aggressive forces to strain nerves and thus to reach their goal which is to push the world into the abyss of thermonuclear war.

Therefore I believe, that you, Mr. President, will understand me correctly and will draw appropriate conclusions aimed at clearing the way for bettering the relations between our states.

Next question. I do not know what you will think about it but if you were prepared already now to proclaim the liquidation of your base in Guantanamo, this would be an act which would give world public opinion real satisfaction and would contribute to the easing of tension. I think that you yourself realize what significance the base in Guantanamo may have now after your statement that you do not pursue the aim of invading Cuba. Then the question arises: at whom this base is aimed, what purposes does it serve, from whom can it guard the approaches to America? I do not see forces that can threaten America from that direction. Therefore the base in Guantanamo is only a burden for your budget, and what is the main thing, it is a great burden of a moral nature for political leaders in the USA. And everybody realizes that the functions of the base in Guantanamo--and this is in fact the case--are aggressive, not defensive.

You know our position with regard to the bases. We are against military bases in general and that's why we liquidated those our bases that we had in Finland and China and we think that we acted rightly. That was an act that manifested our good intentions in ensuring peaceful coexistence. By that we did not diminish our defensive capability but raised our moral prestige among the peoples of all the world. The more true it is now when there are perfect means of war the range and destructive power of which are so great that no bases could in any degree



replace them.

This would be a good preparation to an agreement between you and us on the liquidation of all military bases in general since military bases have lost now their importance. Those are not my words. I think, you yourself said and even stated it publicly that you want to reduce the number of your military bases. Of this spoke Bowles and others, and they spoke correctly.

Such your step would be highly appreciated by world public.

I would like also to tell you my following consideration.

My colleagues and I consider that both sides have displayed restraint and wisdom in liquidating the military conflict which might have resulted in a world thermonuclear war. I take the liberty to think that you evidently held to a restraining position with regard to those forces which suffered from militaristic itching. And we take a notice of that. I don't know, perhaps I am wrong, but in this letter I am making the conclusion on the basis that in your country the situation is such that the decisive word rests with the President and if he took an extreme stand there would be no one to restrain him and war would be unleashed. But as this did not happen and we found a reasonable compromise having made mutual concessions to each other and on this basis eliminated the crisis which could explode in the catastrophe of a thermonuclear war, then, evidently, your role here was restraining. We so believe, and we note and appreciate it.

Our systems are different and my role was simpler than yours because there were no people around me who wanted to unleash war. My efforts aimed at eliminating the conflict were supported by both our military men and my colleagues in the leadership of the party and government.

Mr. President, we have now conditions ripe for finalizing the agreement on signing a treaty on cessation of tests of thermonuclear weapons. We fully agree with regard to three types of tests or, so to say, tests in three environments. This is banning of test in atmosphere, in outer space and under water. In this respect we are of the same opinion and we are ready to sign an agreement.

But there are still some differences with regard to underground explosions. Therefore it would be good if you gave instructions to find a compromise in the decision on the underground test ban, but without inspection. We shall not accept inspection, this I say to you unequivocally and frankly. Of course, if one aims at delaying or torpedoing an agreement then there is sense in insisting on the inspection of underground explosions.

We do not carry on underground tests, we did it but once and we are not going to do it anymore. Maybe such a necessity will arise sometime in future, but in any case I do not envisage it.

It would be very useful to agree on ending tests after such strain when people lived through great anxiety. It would be a great reward for the nervous strain suffered by the peoples of all countries. I think that your people felt as much anxiety as all other peoples expecting that thermonuclear war would break out any moment. And we were very close to such war indeed. That is why it would be good to give satisfaction to the public opinion. This would contribute to easing the tension.

We appreciate it very much that you took the initiative and in such a moment of crisis stated your readiness to conduct negotiations with the purpose of signing a non-aggression treaty between the two military blocs. We responded and supported it. We are prepared to come to an agreement on this question confidentially or through diplomatic channels and then make it public and start negotiations. This also would contribute to lessening tension. The world public would learn with satisfaction that in the moment of crisis not only declarative statements were made but certain commitments with signatures affixed were taken as well.

But the best thing to do would be--I do not know how you will look upon it--to disband all military blocs. We

are not coming up with this now though we spoke of this before; however we believe now too that this would be most reasonable. But if you and your allies are not ready yet for that we are not pressing. However I must say that in the interests of the same elimination of tension this would be greatly useful.

We have eliminated a serious crisis. But in order to foresee and forestall appearance of a new crisis in future which might be impossible to cope with everything in our relations capable of generating a new crisis should be erased now. It would seem that now when we possess thermonuclear weapons, rocket weapons, submarine fleet and other means the situation obliges all states, every state to adhere to such norms of conduct which would not generate conflicts, to say nothing of wars. From our point of view, this is quite obtainable. This would be a big step forward at a time when we in effect have not yet disarmed. I think that this would be not a loss but a gain for the supporters of peaceful coexistence, a mutual benefit which the peoples of the U.S. and other countries participating in military blocs would enjoy. It can also be said with confidence that this would be highly appreciated by all peoples and would give great reassurance and satisfaction to people interested in securing peace. More efforts should be made already now to solve the problem of disarmament. To do it with regard not to one stage but to a real solution of the whole problem.

In our proposals on general and complete disarmament which we have made we have taken into consideration your wishes as well. Our recent proposals on this point were expressed by the USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko at the XVII session of the U.N. General Assembly. In those proposals of ours adjustments were made to take into account your wishes. What we considered to be reasonable we took into consideration.

And of course, Mr. President, I am again reminding you of the necessity to solve the German question because next crisis, possibly of no lesser danger, can be caused by the German question. And the main thing is that that crisis will be foolish as all crises are.

There was war, two German states emerged, or actually three states, which are in existence since the end of World War II. Specific relations among them have already developed. But these relations--economic and political--exist because the German Democratic Republic regulates traffic through its territory on the basis of some substitutes for treaties though in reality, in daily life, in practice such treaties are already operative.

Besides, we and you, our Foreign Minister and your Secretary of State, have agreed on all questions. And the only question which remains unsolved is that of the presence of troops in West Berlin and in effect not even of the troops but under what flag those troops will be and of what states, naturally within certain period of time.

Could not we both understand it? And who needs that the present unsolved situation continue? Not you and not your people. This is not in our or your interests, and not in the interests of our or your allies. This is only--and I repeat again--in the interests of revanchist forces who do not want to recognize the borders and conditions emerged as a result of the defeat of the Hitlerite Germany. Only they benefit from that. Nobody else.

Who expresses such policy now--Adenauer or somebody else--that is of no particular importance to me or to you. But if one takes a realistic view, if you, Mr. President, analyze the situation then you in your heart will undoubtedly agree with me. What you say publicly is another matter. But that comes not from how you personally understand the situation but, so to say, from political expedience, from desire "not to offend" your ally. However it would be better to be guided by a desire not to offend the public opinion and to give satisfaction to it, to give satisfaction to all peoples, the American people included--to eliminate the hotbed of international tension in the center of Europe. And we would be able to eliminate it. If you and we come to an agreement on this question--and we do want it--this would be a great joy for all peoples because this would mean consolidation of peace.

There would remain many unsettled matters in the world but the main thing after that--and I would like to tell you about it--is the question of China. It is anomalous that China is not having her seat in the U.N. Similar anomalies already existed in history and were overwhelmed by life. When the Revolution broke out and won in

America the Russian Emperor showed stubbornness and did not recognize America for 26 years. But America did not cease to exist because of that. So, that was a foolish policy. The United States answered with the same lack of cleverness. But that happened, however, in different times. Therefore the U.S. acted unreasonably for roughly half that time: the Russian Emperor--for 26 years, you--for 16 years. But then the U.S. realized that it was unwise, and your great President Roosevelt took the courage and responsibility and displayed wisdom.

You would greatly raise your prestige, personal and that of your country, in the eyes of the peoples if you take an attitude facilitating China taking its lawful seat in the U.N. This is possible only if it is understood that there cannot be two Chinas. No state which respects itself can agree to a part of its territory, a part of its population being cut off, it applies even more strongly to a great power. This is an internal question of China and let the Chinese decide it among themselves. When China participated in the creation of the U.N. and when it was made a permanent member of the Security Council, then it was one China. And that one China exists now. If China occupies again its lawful seat in the U.N., if you understand the necessity of it--and I think that you do understand it--then it would be good, it would be a great contribution to the cause of peace.

It is impossible to come to an agreement on disarmament without China. There are countries with population of half a million and even less which are members of the U.N. and have voice in this international organization. Iceland, for instance, has the population of 180 thousand people. China has 650 million people and does not have such voice. We have respect for the people of Iceland and their will as well as for all peoples. But from the point of view of ensuring peace--even if there seems to be a contradiction here--the contribution of a given people and that of another people, the real contribution to the cause of ensuring peace may be different.

Therefore it would be proper to solve the question of the restoration of China's rights in the U.N.; the peoples are waiting for it. And this will happen, it is only a matter of time. Therefore in order not to prolong this time, if you understood now the necessity for such a step, then, it would in effect be possible to solve this problem at the present session of General Assembly. What satisfaction it would give to the world public opinion, you would see from the expression of feelings of all peoples because it would be a real step, indeed, towards stabilization and strengthening of peace all over the world.

We, the Soviet people and the peoples of Asian and European countries saw war. War often rolled through our territory. America participated in the two wars but it suffered very small losses in those wars. While huge profits were accumulated as a result of the wars. Of course, it was monopolists who benefited but workers, working people got something out of it, too. War did not touch the soil of the United States. The American people did not experience destruction, sufferings, they only received notifications about deaths of their kin. Now during this crisis war was knocking at the gates of America.

These, in effect, are my considerations after the crisis situation. I want to tell you that in this crisis, as our saying goes, there is no evil without good. Evil has brought some good. The good is that now people have felt more tangibly the breathing of the burning flames of thermonuclear war and have a more clear realization of the threat looming over them if arms race is not stopped. And I would say that what has just happened will serve especially good the American people.

Mr. President, I believe that you as a military man, and your military people understand that we were not preparing for war when we delivered means of defense to Cuba. Those means were not meant against the U.S., but were the means to ensure the security of Cuba. Do you really think that we are so narrow-minded in our understanding of military matters that in preparing for war against the U.S. we picked up Cuba as a bridgehead for such a war? And the means there--a certain number of missiles. This is foolish. For Cuba is no good as a bridgehead for a big war and it cannot be used for those purposes and, of course, nobody ever contemplated that. Those were the means for deterring aggressor, to use the language of the late Dulles.

It is our opinion that the crisis has been eliminated on the compromise basis through reciprocal concessions. We are satisfied with it. We also appreciate your cooperation in the elimination of the crisis and your understanding

of the necessity for reciprocal concessions and compromise so that the conflict be prevented from going beyond the limits that might really break into a thermonuclear war. All the peoples of the world, the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the peoples of all other countries, are interested in eliminating this conflict. In particular, I think, it will be highly appreciated by the people of Cuba who have now been assured that their borders will be respected and there will be no threat of invasion of their land on the part of stronger states. In other words, the Cuban people will have the long-awaited opportunity to enjoy the benefits of their labor and they will have the guarantee of their independence on the basis of the U.N. Charter, which provides for non-interference into internal affairs of other states and respect for sovereignty and integrity of states.

These are the considerations, Mr. President, which I wanted to express to you. I understand that I listed a great number of questions. Therefore, if we started after breakfast we would not have finished solving them before dinner. It would require more time but they have to be solved. They face the world. And the more we delay the solution of these questions, the more of unknown will appear which can prove to be fatal in a future crisis. Therefore, the sooner we clear away the roadblock, the windfallen wood, which has piled up in the international relations, and make clear the roads to correct mutual understanding the better it would be.

Mr. President, you lived through this crisis yourself. For us too, it presented the Rubicon: whether to agree to a compromise, whether to make concessions. Indeed, from the point of view of the legal standards your claims had no grounds whatsoever. Therefore there was a great trial and there were hesitations. We still believed, however, that you might have difficulties too since how could it be that you could not know that the unjustified demands of the USA exposed the world to the hazards of catastrophe. However, we decided to make a compromise proposal which would suit both you and us. We received your assurances that you would not invade Cuba and would not permit others to do it and on this condition we withdraw the weapons which you called offensive. As a result, there has been practically achieved the purpose which had been intended to be achieved through the shipments of means of defense. Now this question is solved on these compromise and reciprocal concessions.

And we consider it to be reasonable. Having eliminated this crisis we gave each other mutual satisfaction: you promised not to attack and not to permit attack against Cuba on the part of others, and we moved forward to make the USA feel confident that we do not contemplate anything bad against it and that there is no threat against the USA on our part. You certainly possess means of destruction. But you know that we also have these means and they are of a different nature than those that were in Cuba. Those were trifles there. Our means were brought to the state of combat readiness, they were of a more serious nature and they were pointed at the USA and your allies.

To our mutual satisfaction we maybe even sacrificed self-esteem. Apparently, there will be such scribblers who will engage in hair-splitting over our agreement, will be digging as to who made greater concessions to whom. As for me, I would say that we both made a concession to reason and found a reasonable solution which enabled us to ensure peace for all including those who will be trying to dig up something.

Such is our understanding of this whole question.

I would like to sum up the above said and express in conclusion the following considerations on the questions touched upon in this letter.

I think it would be possible to pick up from the questions listed by me those which are more ripe and which should, perhaps, be prepared for taking decisions on them. Then it would be possible to meet, maybe, at the U.N. or maybe at a specially arranged meeting. I repeat, I have in mind a meeting in case questions are prepared for taking decisions on them so that the appropriate agreements could be signed during the meeting. It would be a good gift for the peoples of the whole world.

We have a different understanding of the mentioned questions. Therefore I would like to know your considerations as to whether you believe that some or other of the questions raised by me are ripe for decision. If

you do not consider them ripe, then there should be no meeting because a meeting in such conditions would not only fail to justify hopes of the peoples, but would distress them./1/

/1/On October 29 Dobrynin had given Robert Kennedy a different unsigned letter from Khrushchev to the President which spelled out the basis for agreement on Cuba. The Attorney General studied the letter over night before asking Dobrynin to come to his office on October 30 and take it back because it involved a quid pro quo. For an account of this incident, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert Kennedy and His Times*, p. 546. No record of the October 30 meeting has been found. For text of the letter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, vol. VI, Document 70.

Sincerely,

N. Khrushchev/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **121. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, October 31, 1962, 2 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/10-3162. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 7:20 a.m. The source text notes that a copy of the telegram was passed to the White House on October 31.

1149. Policy. Gromyko initiative on Cuba yesterday (Embtel 1139)/1/ appears corroborate estimate of Soviet intentions salvage as much as possible of their position in Cuba. In this respect seems to us to reflect same kind of internal pushing and hauling which must have taken place between despatch Khrushchev private letter October 26 and published letter October 27./2/

/1/Document 115.

/2/See Documents 84 and 91.

Western colleagues incline to view "heads must roll" as result set-back, though neither they nor we are able to identify source of any differences in leadership.

In any event, we believe Khrushchev personally convinced situation was critically dangerous and had to be liquidated. (We are struck by parallel between danger to USSR in which Cuban gamble eventuated and Khrushchev's accusations against Stalin in "secret speech" for having permitted Soviet Union come up to threshold World War II grossly unprepared, both militarily and psychologically.)

On balance we consider selection of Kuznetsov for New York and decision to despatch Mikoyan to Cuba encouraging factors. Seems to us of some importance they chose to send Mikoyan via New York for consultation with Kuznetsov rather than direct, as they could have done (Embtel 1145)./3/

/3/Dated October 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/10-3162)

Factors producing dramatic decision withdraw included not only striking display US determination and unity Western alliances when chips are down, but distaste Soviet populace for Cuban adventures. Sense of relief here following publication exchanges of letters unmistakable.

Kohler

## 122. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, October 31, 1962.

//Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Legere. The source text is initialed by Taylor.

### SUBJECT

Daily White House Staff Meeting--31 October 1962

1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout. DEFCONs no change.

2. The following matters arose:

a. Mr. Bundy devoted most of the meeting to securing ideas on what might come up at the President's press conference tomorrow, and on what ought to be the appropriate responses to these matters. The following were the major items identified and discussed:

(1) The status of dismantling is sure to arise, but the answers are unlikely to be sufficiently "hard" by tomorrow afternoon for a categorical answer. The chances are that the President will say this Government is satisfied that construction has stopped, hoping that the reporters will understand that this judgment rests only partially on hard photographic evidence, the other part being the exercise of a political judgment.

(2) I mentioned that the wolves had already begun to howl about intelligence shortcomings during the period prior to the crisis. The President's answer to this almost-certain question will probably be based on the multiplicity of indicators that must be evaluated, etc.,--i.e., more or less a standard Intelligence Officer's answer.

(3) Someone will probably ask the President whether the US means to guarantee the continuance of the Castro regime. The answer to this will in part refer to the President's statements of September 4 and 13,<sup>/1/</sup> and in part refer in general terms to the fact that the United States and the OAS are permanently committed to resist aggression in the Hemisphere.

<sup>/1/</sup>For texts of these statements, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 369-370 and 373-374.

(4) Any question about the Cuban refugees will be extremely tough to answer. Bundy said that the fact of the matter was that these refugee organizations had been under restraint by US "law enforcement agencies" during the past week or so, but of course this is just about the last thing the President would want to say at the conference. There was no real feeling on how to handle this query.

(5) A few individuals around the table thought that the President might say a few words in a very optimistic vein about the future of world peace, but the consensus was that it would be best at this time to fuzz this over at least or maybe even stay away from it altogether.

(6) A rather abstract discussion on the role of force in international affairs thereupon ensued. Nothing much came out of it except general agreement that the President in his opening statement should steer clear of any discussion of the role of force, concentrating instead on how our Allies and other friends rallied to the cause. Given the general intellectual brilliance of this group, I was amazed to note heads nodding when Arthur Schlesinger gravely remarked that the role of force in this crisis had not been very great because, after all, no force at all had been used--e.g., only one casualty: Major Anderson.

[Here follows discussion of the Congo and Latin America.]

LJL

### **123. Summary Record of the 14th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 31, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. McCone's 1-page summary of this meeting and the Record of Action (both *ibid.*) are in the Supplement.

Director McCone stated that aerial photographs taken on October 29 did not conclusively prove that the missile buildup and construction at missile sites in Cuba had halted.<sup>/1/</sup> The Russians in Cuba had received their orders to withdraw the missiles only on Sunday. There had been some movement but nothing conclusive.

<sup>/1/</sup>The CIA intelligence memorandum, SC No. 11195/62, based on information received as of 6 a.m., October 31, which McCone used to brief the Executive Committee is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16)

Referring to the task which the intelligence community had carried out in connection with the Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba, Director McCone acknowledged that from September 15 on we had failed to evaluate properly the refugee reports and reports from third country representatives in Cuba. He explained this failure in part by referring to a September 19, 1962 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-3-62)<sup>/2/</sup> which stated all the reasons why we did not think the Russians would deploy nuclear weapons to countries outside their borders. This estimate, in effect, prompted evaluators to downgrade the fragmentary reports which we received during the latter part of September and early October.

<sup>/2/</sup>For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, vol. X, Document 433.

Secretary Rusk reported that the Russians apparently are prepared to go along with the general inspection procedures which we think are necessary. However, Castro, during the conversation yesterday with Acting Secretary General U Thant, flatly refused to accept on-site UN inspection. Secretary Rusk said this meant that we must continue to obtain aerial pictures of Cuba. He asked the President to call off his press conference in view of Castro's position.

The President agreed to call off his press conference and inform the press, on a background basis; that Castro's opposition to acceptable inspection procedures created a situation about which he did not wish to speak publicly at this time. The President felt the cancellation of the press conference would have a healthy effect on both the Cubans and on U Thant.

Under Secretary Ball presented draft instructions to Ambassador Stevenson covering negotiations with the Russians and with U Thant on inspection procedures we would accept.<sup>/3/</sup> These instructions, which the President approved, did not cover inspection procedures acceptable to us during the period after the offensive missiles had been removed from Cuba.

<sup>/3/</sup>The draft has not been identified further, but see Document 125 for the final text of Stevenson's instructions.

Secretary Rusk said that on Thursday<sup>/4/</sup> we must fly U-2 and low-level reconnaissance missions over Cuba if Castro remains adamant in his opposition to on-site inspection. He suggested that Mr. McCloy tell Kuznetsov in New York that we intended to overfly Cuba and ask Kuznetsov whether the Russians in Cuba could be

instructed not to fire on our planes. He also suggested that Mr. McCloy tell Kuznetsov that we have encountered real difficulties as a result of Castro's refusal to accept on-site inspection procedures. He might even propose a bilateral arrangement with the Russians for air reconnaissance in view of the fact that UN arrangements did not appear to be possible. He noted that if U Thant extends his stay in Havana, we will be in difficulty because of the UN request not to fly reconnaissance missions during the time U Thant is there.

/4/November 1.

The President agreed that reconnaissance missions should be flown tomorrow unless significant progress was made by U Thant in his negotiations with Castro. If agreement appeared likely, we might postpone further flights until Friday.

Mr. Gilpatric commented that UN reconnaissance flights were very unlikely, but that the New York group would continue efforts to establish a UN surveillance capability.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that the International Red Cross will participate in inspection measures only if Castro approves. If Castro will not approve, then we must reestablish our U.S. quarantine.

Ambassador Thompson mentioned the possibility that the Soviets might go along with our air reconnaissance if we did not reimpose the quarantine.

The President said that if the Castro/U Thant negotiations break down, as we assume they will, we would fly reconnaissance missions, but what would we do about the quarantine?

Secretary Rusk said we might ask the Red Cross to inspect at sea ships bound for Cuba, but he predicted that the Red Cross would not agree to do so in view of Castro's opposition.

The Attorney General said that we must keep our ability to put pressure on the Cubans by means of a blockade. He said the Russians could tell the Cubans that unless they accepted adequate inspection procedures, the U.S. would resume the blockade and expand it to include POL cargoes.

Secretary McNamara reported that all Soviet ships near the quarantine line were now lying dead in the water, but that non-Bloc ships were proceeding toward Cuban ports.

Secretary Rusk suggested that one way of putting pressure on Castro would be to ask free world states to tell the Cubans that Cuba must comply with UN inspection procedures or else they would break diplomatic relations with the Cuban government.

The President said we should consider broadening the blockade because otherwise we would be in the position of stopping only non-Soviet ships. If U Thant stays in Cuba longer than planned, we must decide what we will do then. One proposal would call for hailing all Russian ships but allowing them to proceed. Non-Bloc ships carrying cargoes consisting of goods included on an enlarged prohibited list would be stopped. The President called attention to the importance of keeping the Organization of American States geared up so that if firmer action were required, the Latin Americans would support us. We must keep information about Castro's attitude flowing to OAS members.

Bromley Smith/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**124. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)**



October 31, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking. The conversation probably took place after the 14th meeting of the Executive Committee since Rusk's Appointment Book shows that he met with Ball at 11:09 p.m. (Johnson Library)

Stevenson: When Khrushchev said to Kennedy on Sunday/1/ morning that he was going to dismantle, Castro had not been consulted. He immediately stated five points three hours after Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy./2/ He made it purposely in order to complicate the situation for the Russians. Sooner or later there will be a show-down and that is the reason, of course, for Mikoyan's arrival. So now the question of UN inspection becomes important. He wants everyone to respect our integrity. . . . outside agency to inspect on Cuban soil. No Cuban has been permitted to visit the sites. They don't even know when the construction started of the sites, or when the dismantling started. Today U Thant asked the Soviet Ambassador to come in and asked him two questions. The US is concerned about the launchings of the missiles and want urgent dismantling. When will the dismantling start? Secondly, how long will this take? The Soviet Ambassador's answer was that he would have to refer the question to the military and ask Moscow. This morning, before the second meeting with Castro, the Soviet Ambassador telephoned him. Then he arrived at U Thant's place with the General in charge of the dismantling at 2:30 this afternoon and made the following answer to the question. With regard to Khrushchev's order to dismantle on Sunday "we received it between 1 and 3 p.m. We started the dismantling on Sunday at 5 p.m. It will be all over by tomorrow night, and by the latest on Friday./3/ when we will have finished the bulldozing of the sites by Friday night. We have asked for ships. We don't know when they will be in the ports. But the equipment will be in the ports Thursday night or Friday morning. We are crating the equipment at the ports for sea voyage. Most of it will not have to be crated because of deck loading. The bases no longer exist. Even the pads will be gone, but no Cuban observation of the dismantling is permitted." This is what the Russians say. "By Friday there will be nothing." The instruction of the UN was that this included aircraft. Although they were not very specific as to whether or [not] they have interrogated them about aircraft. As to the aircraft, the Russians assured them that the Cubans had not been trained to fly them. There was no discussion of the SAM sites. Any equipment, Soviet-manned, will go. Anti-aircraft manned by all the anti-aircraft, both SAM and conventional is manned by the Cubans. It was a Cuban Colonel that shot down our plane. Castro says all anti-aircraft commanded by Cubans will stay, including the SAM sites, they assume. Castro was apparently ranting most of the time and pretty sarcastic and kept screaming no inspection would be permitted under any circumstances, either . . . but that they must go through the blockade. Kuznetsov said in Cuba, "We'll tell them at the UN what the ship schedule of arrival will be in Cuba." Castro said "Pushoff should not have promised verification." My notes say that since the Soviet guarantee we can inspect on the high seas. The Cubans won't know what to do with what is left behind. They are using only Russian labor, only Russian equipment, like bulldozers, etc. Castro talked a lot about aerial reconnaissance, even by the United Nations, as a violation of Cuban integrity, soil, airspace, etc., as an intolerable offense. U Thant's suggestion is that the blockade continuation is not necessary if we can establish some system like . . . .

/1/October 28.

/2/For text of the five points, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 447-448; Khrushchev's letter is printed as Document 102.

/3/November 2.

Secretary: We've already done that.

Stevenson: On the incoming ships. He says the economic situation in Havana is incredible. There are no foodstuffs, no meat--all of this confirmed by the Legations there. They are shut off from the outside world. The people are getting desperate. We should be satisfied with these assurances; that the Red Cross inspection on the

seas of incoming vessels. Castro is frustrated, intense, psychotic, infuriated by the US radio constantly stating that the US was coming to inspect instead of the SYG arriving with a large team to inspect. It was impossible to get across anything before 2:15--before the meeting first started. This morning he was in a better mood. U Thant decided to see him alone. He has with him Dorticos and Rowan. He said they would fight to the last man, wanted everybody to inspect their soil, their integrity, etc. They would discuss the future of Cuba only on the basis of the five points, and he distinguished in the future--not the present problem. If the SC, in other words, discusses the Cuban problem, it can only be on the basis of the five points. When the question of Major Anderson was brought up, Castro became much softer and said he would be glad to return him alive, but he is not alive, and "I will return his body under the auspices of the UN." He rejected again and again any United Nations inspection to verify. He said the Soviets have done this whole thing on Cuban soil; but the future of the UN should be involved but only on the basis of the five points. This is the long-term problem which must be done by the UN. It is his impression that the Soviets don't want to stay a single hour; that the General said that he was going at once and that he was glad to leave. There is thought there will be a show-down some time between the Cubans and the Russians. He said the Brazilian would confirm all this in two or three days--after he got back to Rio. He can't suggest what we should do but implied that maybe we should verify on Friday, after the bulldozing has been completed. The Soviet General said "ask us any questions you wish". Now they must arrange for ships to come in. The blockade, if it continues, will make the Cubans more and more angry. I told him that we had already instituted a pass on incoming ships not to in any way interrupt the shipping to get the stuff out of there. He said there is no shortage of conventional hardware in Cuba. There is so much they don't want to know what to do with it--machines, anti-aircraft, etc. What they need is food, not hardware. Then as I left the room with Jack McCloy Rikhye stopped me at the door and sort of whispered to me as a final concluding remark which the SYG apparently never felt it was appropriate to say. He said "Please lay off the aerial reconnaissance until Friday. After that you will find they have bulldozed all of the sites." . . . They will call us after they have talked with . . . in the morning. I don't know what time; I should think it will probably be after they have had a good night's sleep--possibly 10 o'clock. I think that is the substance of the thing.

Sec: Thanks a lot.

## **125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations**

Washington, October 31, 1962, 12:46 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56311/10-3162. Secret; Niact. Drafted by McNaughton and Cleveland and approved by the President at the 14th meeting of the Executive Committee (Document 123). Repeated to Moscow.

1147. Subject: Cuba: New York Negotiations

### **1. General Considerations**

Please be guided by the following in your New York negotiations whose entire purpose is to reach final solution, in framework of exchanges of letters between President and Khrushchev, of problem created by introduction by USSR of offensive weapons into Cuba. In spite of Kuznetsov's eagerness to discuss disarmament, bases, and other broader questions (USUN's 1547)/1/ the present negotiation should not include issues beyond immediate objective, which is verified dismantling and removal of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba at earliest possible date.

/1/Document 117.

Your purpose will be to reach straightforward realistic solutions to practical problems along lines indicated below. We assume that in line with established Soviet doctrine, Kuznetsov's insistence on no physical inspection of dismantling and removal Soviet weapons is essentially non-negotiable. It is probable, therefore, that we shall

have to rely on aerial surveillance and port-removal inspection to satisfy ourselves that missile bases are dismantled and weapons are removed from Cuba or destroyed.

While you should strive for as much pre-removal ground inspection as possible, the formula of post-removal ground inspection together with high and low aerial surveillance during both the dismantling period and the post-evacuation period should, if efficiently carried out, provide adequate evidence of removal and destruction and so could be accepted.

## 2. Definition of Offensive Weapons

The offensive weapons which the United States insists be removed from Cuba and not be further imported into Cuba are those enumerated in the Presidential Proclamation 3504 of October 23.<sup>/2/</sup> The list is as follows: Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items. Also, pursuant to authority granted in the Proclamation, the Secretary of Defense, in Special Warning (Notice to Mariners) No. 31, stated that the prohibition of surface-to-surface missiles covers a prohibition of missile propellants and chemical compounds capable of being used to power missiles.

<sup>/2/</sup>For text, see *Public Papers of the President of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962*, pp. 809-811.

Note that the definition includes short-range surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-surface missiles designed for use at sea. Notice also that mechanical and electronic equipment to operate surface-to-surface missiles includes a wide variety of communications, supply and missile-launching equipment, including Komar class motor torpedo boats.

Suggest you start with wider definition, including supplement to Presidential Proclamation. Fall back position, on which we would insist, would be categories enumerated in Proclamation.

Not included in formal definition are Soviet troops and technicians. However, we should assume on basis Khrushchev letter of October 26/<sup>3/</sup> that "the necessity for the presence of [Soviet]/<sup>4/</sup> military specialists in Cuba would disappear" along with the offensive weapons they are manning and protecting.

<sup>/3/</sup>Document 84.

<sup>/4/</sup>All brackets are in the source text.

Also not included within the definition are fighter aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. Also not included are storage sites or any petroleum products other than missile propellants. It would be desirable to have these items destroyed or removed as well, but the USG is not willing to pay a price to have them destroyed or removed.

## 3. Two-Phase Program

The US envisages two phases in the UN verification program, each requiring specific control measures:

(a) First Phase--This phase should begin immediately and would cover the period up to the Soviet report to the SC that they have dismantled and withdrawn proscribed weapons. Since the Communists will undoubtedly prove chary of UN observation of weapons withdrawal, as Kuznetsov has already indicated, we assume they are unlikely to accept on-site inspection during the period when weapons are being withdrawn. Therefore we probably will need to rely in practice, during the first stage, on (i) US and UN aerial reconnaissance and (ii) UN/ICRC inspection of incoming shipments.

(b) Second Phase--This phase would begin when the SC convened to receive the Soviet report on compliance

and to authorize establishment of a UN on-site inspection system. During this period, verification of compliance would be accomplished through: (i) continued aerial reconnaissance; (ii) continued inspection incoming cargoes; and (iii) ground inspection. This phase would end when the SC has accepted the report of the SYG that offensive weapons have been removed from Cuba.

#### 4. Aerial Reconnaissance

Systematic high and low aerial reconnaissance is essential. This is so particularly if surface inspection is limited or non-existent. The reconnaissance, or any aspect of it, can be done either by the US or by the UN. Our only insistence is that a job be done which is adequate to provide the USG with information sufficient to convince US that compliance is taking place.

We recognize that (unlike US) UN will wish to overfly Cuba only after explicit clearance by Cuban authorities.

US would of course need access to photos resulting from UN reconnaissance.

Two types of air surveillance should be considered--photographic (high and low) and visual monitoring by holding the aircraft in a pattern so as to maintain continuous air surveillance of missile transport movements.

The Canadian Government has offered to have Canadian pilots fly Canadian supplied RF-101 aircraft. USG endorses use of Canadians and RF-101s but recognizes that SYG will be reluctant to accept. Alternatively we could make available C-130s and within two-week period train air crews from one of the following: Mexico, Argentina, Chile or Colombia. Canada (4 crews) and Indonesia (10 crews) already have competent crews which would take only brief period to check out. There are four C-130 aircraft with the UN markings and high quality photographic equipment in Georgia now available to UN on request. In addition, we have sold C-130 aircraft to Australia and are currently in the midst of completing negotiation on providing C-130 aircraft to Argentina and Chile. The UN has been informed that USG prepared provide rapid (jet) transportation for C-130 crews politically acceptable to the UN from anywhere in the world.

Another highly attractive possibility would be for Mexico or Argentina to volunteer squadron of T-11s (C-45s) and crews which DOD believes would be fully capable to do kind of job we want. They have adequate high-quality camera equipment. Mexico has six aircraft and Argentina has comparable number. Also Sweden has made available for Congo operation two reconnaissance PT-9s (single-jet aircraft). It is understood that they have a number such aircraft fully equipped with photographic equipment.

Processing unit with US equipment could be readily provided to operate in Havana or at whatever place UN would wish to use as base of operations.

You should therefore reaffirm all this to SYG, strongly urging him develop a UN reconnaissance capability. Support of UN surveillance, however, should not be tied to US cessation of surveillance. Statements that "the US will reconsider its surveillance requirements based upon the effectiveness of UN operations" can be made, but we should do nothing to suggest that US determination to conduct air surveillance is necessarily limited by UN operations.

It should go without saying that to the extent no adequate substitute has been developed by the UN, the US high and low surveillance will continue throughout entire dismantling and withdrawal operation and as long thereafter as necessary to satisfy us that offensive weapons have been fully removed from Cuba.

#### 5. Incoming Cargoes

As indicated Deptel 1136./5/ we prepared accept ICRC inspection incoming cargoes on all ships, of whatever flag, embarked from bloc ports. According to our projection, \_\_\_\_\_ ships now in transit or scheduled depart bloc

ports shortly to arrive in Cuba during next three or four weeks. Number Red Cross inspectors required to do job will depend on whether inspection at sea or on shore. Most efficient use manpower would be port inspection at agreed ports. This would permit close inspection of vessels, one after another, without transit time required to shuttle between vessels at sea. Accordingly, hope port inspection agreeable to Cubans. If inspection done at ports, we estimate \_\_\_\_\_ personnel needed. If done on high seas, estimate \_\_\_\_\_ would be required. [Estimates to be supplied.]

/5/Document 113.

We expect thorough inspection, including at least selective examination of cargoes abroad to assure that no weapons we consider offensive will enter Cuba. Inspection should provide for masters of incoming ships to notify their cargoes to UN inspectors well in advance of arrival at port. This would expedite checking and clearance and help make entire inspection process more effective.

We believe inspection of incoming cargoes should continue until entire verification process completed (i.e., through end of Phase Two), in order to give us assurance all offensive weapons withdrawn and related facilities dismantled. During this period, enforcement of quarantine would be suspended, but US ships would remain on duty stations. Incoming ships would not be stopped or searched by US, but we would keep a watching brief on all traffic, noting outbound missile-carrying ships and assisting UN inspectors in assuring they informed of all incoming traffic. US would thus be in position to renew immediately the enforcement of the quarantine if circumstances required such action.

## 6. Verification of Removal of Offensive Weapons

When Soviets prepared to say they have removed from Cuba the "weapons US considers offensive", a Security Council meeting would be called to authorize the Acting Secretary General to establish arrangements for verification. Executive organization operating in Cuba for this purpose is here referred to as UN/Cuba.

### (a) Terms of Reference: UN/Cuba

UN teams should inspect on spot, after dismantling, those sites which identified by US as missile bases as any Cuban airport which could accommodate bombers, and any other area where we have reason to believe there may have been concealment of offensive weapons, including storage sites for nuclear warheads. Such teams should have unrestricted confidential communication facilities with their headquarters units, and free access to areas required for the performance of their duties. US will furnish to UN comprehensive list of locations to be covered.

### (b) Number of Observers

The number of observers required to do job satisfactorily will depend on length of time permitted to accomplish task and on the extent of mobility. US would prefer to see such verification accomplished quickly. Assuming for political reasons Communists would prefer keep number UN inspectors relatively small, suggest UN consider possibility utilizing number of helicopters or small planes (which US prepared make available) to permit rapid transit inspection teams maximum number sites in minimum time. It appears to us that team of 50 or 60 men with adequate air transport could accomplish verification job within a week or two. Moreover, any UN aerial observers should participate in verification process.

### (c) Composition

While we assume that probably only citizens of certain types of countries will be acceptable to Communists as sources of UN ground observers, it is important from our standpoint that eligibility be restricted to technically trained personnel of genuinely reliable nations who have demonstrated a reasonable objectivity during crisis. For

example, we would wish to exclude UAR and Ghana citizens in light of distinctly "unneutral" statements made by their Delegates in Security Council meetings on Cuba. On criteria indicated, we would prefer nationals from Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Nigeria, India and Ireland. When it comes to UN air reconnaissance, it is probably not so important to have neutral personnel; Canadians and Argentines, for example, might prove acceptable.

## 7. Administration and Finance

(a) We greatly prefer that any and all of the UN operations that may be created (air reconnaissance group, port inspectors, ground inspection teams) should operate under executive direction of SYG. To the extent the International Committee of the Red Cross is involved, it should (as indicated Deptel 1136) operate as executive agent of SYG. We understand ICRC has operated in similar capacity at UN request in checking compliance with Geneva Convention in US POW camps in Korea. ICRC has acted also as executive agent for High Commissioner for Refugees in Congo.

(b) We believe financing all verification measures should come under \$2,000,000 provision in regular UN budget for small-scale peace and security operations. If total cost likely to exceed one million dollars, financing problem will need to be reviewed in the light of the then U.S. position on financing UN peace-and-security operations./6/

/6/Following a telephone conversation later in the day between officials at the Department of State and the Mission at the United Nations changes were made in sections 3-6 of this instruction. A copy of telegram 1153 to New York at 11:09 p.m. on October 31, which enumerated the revisions, is in the Supplement. (Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office, Secretary of Defense Cable Files, Cuba, Oct. 25-31, 1962)

Rusk

[end of document]

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**FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**  
**1961-1963**  
**Volume XI**  
**Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington

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## **Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

### **126. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, October 31, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Planning Subcommittee.  
Top Secret. Initialed by Rostow.

#### **SUBJECT**

Report Number Six of the Planning Subcommittee

1. The Planning Subcommittee reviewed the situation as of late Wednesday afternoon, October 31, 1962.
2. The situation was assessed as one in which the Soviets were seeking to retrieve diplomatically as much as they could from the debacle: re-raising, at levels short of formal diplomacy, the question of Turkish bases and Guantanamo; seeking to protect the Cuban revolution and maintaining some credibility for the value of Soviet support outside the Bloc; seeking, by propaganda, to make the most of Khrushchev's "statesmanship" and to reaffirm Soviet strength and toughness. The Soviets evidently have a problem with Castro; but it was judged likely that they would seek to salvage the Communist revolution in Cuba, with or without Castro; and that Mikoyan's mission was designed, by means of stick and carrot, to achieve a reconciliation of their commitment to remove the missile bases with this longer run objective.
3. It was judged urgent that we resume a posture of pressure unless there was a radical break in the diplomatic situation, including reconnaissance and maintenance of the blockade. On a contingency basis preparations for putting increased pressure on Castro by extending the blockade to POL were judged urgent. Such measures might be introduced in the first instance by increments, through low-level, informal action.
4. Such measures of increased pressure on Castro might be executed with the knowledge and even connivance of the Soviet Union, if it found Castro too difficult to deal with; although we should refuse any substantial price for Soviet collaboration in this exercise.
5. In the light of Soviet tactics, including Kuznetsov's invitation to Stevenson to widen soon the area of discussion, it was felt more important than ever that we separate all other matters from the three central issues; that is, the removal of offensive missiles, the lifting of the blockade, and a form of assurance that we would not invade, consistent with our OAS commitments and the President's September 13 press conference. As counterpoint to UN negotiations, the OAS should be active on several fronts, including the review of latest

evidence on Cuban indirect aggression in Latin America. If discussions with Soviet officials were to go beyond Cuban problems, the first issue that ought to be raised is the question of the enforcement of the Laos agreement.

6. The eleven tasks listed under 3 a-j in Report Number Five were reviewed./1/ All are in motion.

/1/Document 109.

7. With respect to task 3 a (probable Soviet military policy), it was noted that among the options open to the Soviet Union was a stepped up missile defense system, the possibilities for which should be included in that task, along with other measures for correcting what Moscow evidently regards as the dangerous Soviet nuclear imbalance. In addition, the CIA representative undertook to generate a speculative paper which would attempt roughly to cost out alternative Soviet methods for correcting the nuclear imbalance. (Action: Mr. Whitman)

8. One of the most likely possibilities was judged to be that the Soviet Union would undertake, as after Stalin's death, a prolonged and serious re-evaluation of its military and foreign policy in the light not merely of their Cuban misadventure but the frustration of many lines of policy which they have been pursuing since, roughly, 1957. The decisions at which they finally arrive in this likely reassessment will depend, in part, on our posture and our policy from the present forward, as they perceive it, just as Stalin's policy was shaped after 1945 by his assessment of our strengths and vulnerabilities, and Khrushchev's after 1957, by his assessment as of that time. The cast of our total military and foreign policy in coming months is thus one critical variable in the making of new Soviet dispositions. The implications of this possible interconnection and recommended courses of action and signals to Moscow, designed to produce new Soviet dispositions most in our interest, is a new task assigned to the group chaired by Mr. Harvey.

## **127. Summary Record of the 15th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 31, 1962, 6 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. The Record of Action for this meeting (ibid.) is in the Supplement.

Mr. McCone noted that on an open line between Moscow and Havana, Suslov, speaking for Gromyko, had talked to Abramovich, the Soviet Ambassador in Havana, giving urgent instructions.

Secretary Rusk gave a preliminary report on U Thant's failure to persuade Castro to accept UN inspection procedures in Cuba. He said that McCloy in New York had reported Kuznetsov had said that anti-aircraft complexes in Cuba were controlled by the Cubans.

The President directed that all government officials talking to the Russian officials should talk only about Cuba and the removal of offensive weapons. The Russians should be told that when the Cuban crisis is settled, we will talk about other matters. Our policy is to listen to whatever the Russians have to say on other matters but make no response until the Cuban situation has been resolved. The President asked that Ambassador Stevenson in New York be so informed.

Secretary McNamara reported that U-2 flights had produced no pictures because of bad weather and that there existed a requirement for low-level flights. Secretary Rusk and General Taylor agreed.

Secretary Rusk said the time had come for us to build up pressure on our side.

Secretary McNamara recommended that the quarantine be reinstated for dawn tomorrow. U.S. ships will hail all ships entering the quarantine zone. If they reply, giving their name, port of origin, and cargo, they will be



allowed to proceed to port. If their reply is unsatisfactory, the U.S. Navy ship will report to Washington. No ship would be boarded without specific authorization by the President, which the Secretary of Defense will obtain after consulting the Secretary of State.

With reference to low-level flights, Secretary McNamara said that he favored ten or twelve sorties, General Taylor favored eighteen, and General LeMay recommended thirty.

The President directed that fourteen low-level sorties be made with no more than one pass over each target. Missile sites and roads were acceptable targets, but no ports are to be included.

Returning to the decision on reinstating the quarantine, the President said a final decision would be made after Secretary Rusk reported to him later this evening on the U Thant/Castro talks. If the quarantine was reinstated, we would make a public announcement.

In response to a request by USIA Acting Director Wilson for guidance with respect to official radio broadcasts to Cuba, the President recommended no verbal attacks on Cuba via this media for this week. He asked that emphasis be given to the fact that the OAS decision is the basis for our aerial surveillance of Cuba and that the issue is not U.S. vs. Cuba, but Cuba vs. all the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Wilson read the themes which are being used by USIA on its broadcasts. The President asked Mr. Wilson to get from others, including foreign diplomatic officials in Cuba, their impression of our radio broadcasts.

The President asked that Kuznetsov be informed of the arrest at sea of anti-Castro Cubans heading toward Cuba. (The U.S. ship arresting the Cubans was the PT-109, the ship used in the film of that name.)

The President also asked that McCloy be informed of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] planned sabotage in Venezuela.

The President held for decision tomorrow a proposal which would initiate the next step in the planned U.S./USSR space cooperation program. He asked that the initialed U.S./USSR civil air agreement, which had never been finally signed, be reexamined.

The President commented that we should make known that we are anxious to stop our air surveillance of Cuba if the UN comes up with a satisfactory substitute. However, we must continue surveillance in our own national interests until a satisfactory substitute is found.

Bromley Smith/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## **128. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-3162. Confidential; Eyes Only. Received in the Department of State at 10:59 p.m.

New York, October 31, 1962, 10 p.m.

1579. For Secretary from McCloy. Department pass White House. Immediately after I received from you President's instructions, Akalovsky at my request informed Kuznetsov along following lines:

1. In absence international inspection personnel, such as ICRC, US prepared make gesture re quarantine. While quarantine in full will start tomorrow, we prepared let ships pass on hail-and-pass basis, as in case Sov tanker Bucharest, i.e., no inspection on board vessels would be involved. We prepared use this procedure for a few days

until more solid basis for inspection of ships is developed.

2. Re aerial surveillance, US believes it would be good for everybody if evidence were obtained that dismantling of relevant facilities has started, i.e., if we could show to world pictures attesting to that fact. We hope USSR would do everything to avoid incidents in connection our overflights, because any such incident would create gravest situation and would again put us face to face.

Kuznetsov appreciated information, but with respect to second point stated USSR could not do anything because anti-aircraft defense was in Cuban hands. US was facing Kuznetsov with problem where he could do nothing because problem related to Cuban territory and sovereignty. Akalovsky observed USSR could use its influence with Cuba in order prevent incidents fraught with gravest danger. Kuznetsov replied he could not add anything to what he had already said.

Stevenson

### **129. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**

New York, October 31, 1962, 10:50 p.m.

//Source: USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, October-November Meetings. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and concurred in by McCloy.

1581. Subject: Cuba. Dept pass White House. McCloy had one hour mtg with Kuznetsov today./1/ After exchange of pleasantries, McCloy noted U Thant and his entire party leaving Havana 4:30 p.m. today, and according our info there were difficulties with Castro. While we understood Sov reluctance admit inspection on ground before weapons removed, which might reveal secret technology, US would have to continue aerial surveillance starting tomorrow, and until verification by UN arranged. Most dangerous situation would arise if our planes were to be shot at or downed. We prepared to turn aerial surveillance over to UN, but so long as no adequate UN verification existed US would continue its own flights. Our photographs of day before yesterday did not indicate any marked progress in dismantling, indeed indicated some further construction, although we realized not all sites may have received appropriate orders. We hoped photographs after tomorrow would show such progress.

/1/Gilpatric's 2-page handwritten notes on this meeting are in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Verification of US-USSR Agreements re Cuba, Gilpatric Notes.

Kuznetsov observed all anti-aircraft weapons were in Cuban hands. McCloy said we had thought sophisticated weapons were in Soviet hands. Kuznetsov repeated all anti-aircraft weapons were in Cuban hands. McCloy reiterated most dangerous situation would arise as result US surveillance planes being shot at or downed.

Kuznetsov then said President and Khrushchev had committed themselves to certain steps and it was his and McCloy's job see that arrangements be made for carrying out those steps. Dismantling of relevant facilities would be finished in couple of days, probably by Nov 2 or 3, although he not familiar with details. McCloy asked what he meant by dismantling. Did this include destruction buildings and emplacements? Kuznetsov said he did not know details. As to time required for removal of what US called offensive weapons, that would depend on number of ships available, which in turn depended on US position re quarantine, because if no Sov ships were able go to Havana, removal would obviously be protracted. McCloy observed he believed Sovs would have no difficulty getting enough ships to Havana for purpose of removal offensive weapons. Kuznetsov continued verification arrangements must be worked out with Castro; as to USSR, it prepared fulfill its obligations.

Kuznetsov then said that number other problems must be discussed so as to create a situation precluding recurrence of what happened this time. Suggested McCloy think about them so as to have discussion those

problems at later date. Kuznetsov said under U Thant proposal, USSR had fulfilled its part, i.e., it refrained from sending ships to quarantine area and from sending arms to Cuba. Thus it had also met US desires. On other hand, U Thant's proposal also provided for lifting quarantine, but so far US Govt had agreed to suspend quarantine only for two days. Another problem was that of assurances to Cuba that no invasion would be launched from US or Latin American countries, that no preparations for invasion would take place in territory of US or LA's and that no organization of subversive activities by refugees against Cuba would take place in US or LA's. Important make clear that Cuban people could live in security and peace. President-Khrushchev exchange indicated some assurances should be given to Cuba against subversion and interference in its internal affairs.

McCloy responded he could not tell definitely US attitude on these points; however, Kuznetsov's statement of problems welcome and we would express our views on them at appropriate time. Problem of exiles ticklish, since they anxious make Cuba free so that it could do what it wanted do and be free of pressures by Castro. It would be difficult to control their thoughts. Organizing refugees into units was one thing, but control of their thoughts was a different matter. We could not get into a position of guaranteeing support for Castro, particularly in view Cuba now center of infection of subversive and sabotage activities against Latin American countries as demonstrated by recent events in Venezuela. McCloy then stressed main problem at this time was removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. When this done atmosphere for discussion other problems, including test ban and disarmament, would be much better. Kuznetsov agreed but commented it difficult define defensive and offensive weapons since US called its weapons at foreign bases defensive, although those weapons were same as weapons USSR had placed in Cuba. Suggested however that discussion this subject would serve no useful purpose at this time and that McCloy and he deal with practical matters before them to make arrangements which would preclude recurrence present situation.

McCloy inquired whether USSR thought ICRC would act as agent of UN. Kuznetsov replied definitely yes. Re Kuznetsov's remark USSR had done something under U Thant proposal, McCloy pointed out it had been USSR who had created this situation in first place by introducing offensive weapons Cuba and pointing them at our hearts. It impossible negotiate while gun was on table and therefore removal those weapons was primary problem. As to definition offensive weapons, US had made clear what it meant and Sovs knew it.

Kuznetsov then inquired re US views on what if any UN presence would be required after removal of relevant weapons completed. President's message to Khrushchev contained two points relating to this problem, which needed clarification. McCloy replied he had not given much thought to what would be required after removal completed, but he did not think that any interminable UN presence would be needed. We would give this matter further consideration.

Kuznetsov suggested thought be given to procedure for handling Cuban item in Security Council. Noting USSR had no fixed views on this point as yet, wondered whether might not be possible have a joint US/USSR statement or separate statements by two Govts with Security Council taking note of such statement or statements and appealing to all states to facilitate implementation arrangements. McCloy responded he no UN expert and pointed out Stevenson rather than he US Rep in UN. His own function was merely to coordinate US policy on Cuban problem. Kuznetsov said that his assignment was to assist Acting SYG in resolving Cuban problem as speedily as possible and Zorin was USSR spokesman in UN. McCloy expressed hope Castro would be less recalcitrant and observed US and Sovs might find themselves united vis-a-vis Castro. Kuznetsov smiled.

At one point early in conversation Kuznetsov said Mikoyan arriving NY 2 or 3 p.m. Nov 1 and leaving NY shortly after noon Nov 2. Mikoyan would like meet with McCloy and extended invitation to dinner Nov 1. McCloy said he would of course make himself available for meeting with Mikoyan, but not quite sure whether he had any prior engagement for tomorrow night. Would give definite reply first thing tomorrow morning after checking calendar. Subsequently, after talking with Secretary, McCloy confirmed he would be available for dinner.

Stevenson

### **130. Summary Record of the 16th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, November 1, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 10:40 a.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

Director McCone presented the intelligence summary of developments in Cuba and brief reports on situations in several other areas./1/ The question of who mans the SAM sites in Cuba is still unanswered, but existing evidence indicates that the Russians control and command these missiles. Mr. McCone added that the Russians may be using Castro's obstructionism to serve Soviet interests in connection with on-site inspection. He said the Soviets, in talks with U.N. and U.S. officials, are forthcoming on questions of on-site inspection.

/1/Based in part on CIA memorandum [*document number not declassified*], "The Crisis USSR/Cuba, Information as of 0600, 1 November 1962." (Ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16) See the Supplement.

Secretary Rusk said the most important question to be decided is whether we should make low-level flights over Cuba today. He recommended that if we fly and if we lose a reconnaissance plane, we should not retaliate today.

The President noted that we could expect nothing more from Castro until Mikoyan arrives in Havana.

Secretary McNamara reported that Mr. Gilpatric and our officials in New York recommend that no reconnaissance flights be flown today in view of U Thant's request that nothing be done to interfere with his discussions with Mikoyan. The Soviets are reported to have told U Thant that the missile sites in Cuba would be bulldozed beginning tomorrow.

Secretary McNamara said personally he thought we ought to fly low-level missions today. The Russians have not so far complied with their agreement to withdraw the missiles and the U.S. public needs to be reassured that we know what is going on in Cuba. He said we need more information on the IL-28 bombers in Cuba. He urged that flights be authorized today because Mikoyan would be arriving in Cuba tomorrow. He doubted that there would be any Soviet or Cuban reaction to our flights.

General Taylor stated that we cannot appear to be stopped by Castro's threat to shoot down our reconnaissance planes. He recommended that fourteen flights be authorized over missile sites and Cuban ports. If a reconnaissance plane was shot down, he recommended that we reinstitute the blockade.

The President said he did not favor reinstating the blockade because we would have to stop Soviet ships. He thought that we could carry out low-level reconnaissance missions because our best guess is that there would be no reaction to such flights. He asked how we could deal with the shooting down of one of our planes if the pictures revealed that the Soviet missiles were being dismantled.

Secretary McNamara recommended that there be two flights of two planes each, one over the airfield where the IL-28 planes are based, and the other over the three MRBM sites. The eastern part of Cuba would be covered only by U-2 flights. The purpose of overflying the IL-28 airfield would be to make clear that we consider these bombers "offensive weapons," to be removed by the Russians.

The President asked that Kuznetsov be told that we are making low-level flights. It should be made clear to the Russians that the Cubans are preventing us from establishing inspection procedures accepted by the Russians, and, therefore, we must continue our aerial surveillance.

The Attorney General suggested that we talk to UN officials and get from them a promise to institute a UN inspection system.

The President wanted the Defense Department to provide him with the proposed flight patterns and the time over target of each flight.

Assistant Secretary Nitze said that the IL-28 bombers had been given to the Cubans, and, therefore, if we overflow the bomber bases, we should expect to be fired upon. He doubted that we would be fired upon if we flew over the SAM sites. He recommended that we not fly low-level over the IL-28 base because we have not made clear yet to the Russians that the IL-28 bombers are included in the deal as "offensive weapons." In addition, he noted that we do not intend to include the SAM sites in our discussion of weapons to be withdrawn from Cuba.

Secretary McNamara restated his view that we should get pictures of the IL-28 base, but that no flights need be flown over the Isle of Pines. He said again that chances of losing one of our planes are very small. In his view it is essential that the IL-28 bombers be included among Soviet weapons to be withdrawn, hence, we should have the latest information as to whether they are being dismantled.

The President authorized low-level flights of six planes over the IL-28 base and of several MRBM sites. If a U.S. plane is shot down, no military reprisal will be taken today. The President asked that a full brief be provided to Mr. McCloy in New York in order to reinforce his strong statement to Mikoyan about why we are making low-level flights.

General Taylor asked that the President authorize full photographic coverage of Cuba on Saturday/2/ when the Soviet missiles will supposedly be removed.

/2/November 4.

The President asked for consideration of a longer range surveillance plan. He suggested that we tell the Soviets that if they refuse to take out the IL-28 bombers, we will insist upon on-site inspection.

Secretary Dillon noted that the OAS would support our demand in view of the fact that the Russians have now admitted that their forces are in Cuba. He urged that we make no commitment about not invading Cuba if we do not get satisfactory aerial surveillance and an acceptable inspection system.

The President directed that if one of our planes was hit, we would not announce this fact. We would not announce our intention to make low-level flights, but we would announce the return of our planes after they are back.

Bromley Smith/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **131. Record of Action at the 16th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, November 1, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive.

1. Director McCone presented the intelligence summary covering developments in Cuba, as well as brief reports

on situations in other areas. In response to a question, he said the admittedly confused evidence pointed to the conclusion that SAM sites in Cuba are under Russian control.

2. There followed a discussion of whether aerial reconnaissance should be carried out over Cuba today. The President authorized low-level flights of six planes over the airbase where the IL-28 planes are stationed and over certain MRBM sites. Weather conditions ruled out U-2 flights today. The major reason for overflying the IL-28 base is to make clear that we consider these planes "offensive weapons" to be removed by the Russians, and, therefore, we must know whether they are being dismantled.

3. The President asked that Mr. McCloy make clear to Mikoyan during a conversation later today that we must carry out aerial reconnaissance over Cuba because the Cubans are preventing the implementation of the Soviet agreement to UN inspection of the removal of the missiles. A message to McCloy was to be drafted./1/

4. Following a discussion of reprisals to be taken if a U.S. reconnaissance plane is shot down over Cuba, the President decided that no retaliation would take place today.

5. General Taylor was assured that the full photographic coverage of Cuba planned for a later time--after the reported date of the removal of Soviet missiles from existing sites--would be authorized.

McGeorge Bundy

/1/See Document 132.

### **132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations**

Washington, November 1, 1962, 3 p.m.

//Source: USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Incoming Telegrams, 1952-1963. Confidential; Niact.

1158. Eyes only from Undersecretary Ball. President believes it essential that in conversation with Mikoyan (and Kuznetsov as appropriate) following points be made with utmost emphasis:

1. Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding based on assumption that Sovs would and could deliver on Khrushchev commitment to remove all offensive weapons systems in Cuba and through UN verification satisfy U.S. and other OAS countries. This in fact done and does not recur.

2. Although four days have now passed since understanding reached that U Thant has made best efforts, all we have so far is verbal assurances by Sov reps in NY and Cuba to US and UN without element of verification which in view history of this affair US regards as essential.

3. US has acted expeditiously and in good faith, promptly accepting Soviet proposal that ICRC act as UN agent for inspection incoming vessels. (US believes we should promptly move to put this in effect with or without Cuban agreement. Further instructions on this will come later today.) US also promptly responded SYG request suspend quarantine and recon flights during period his Havana visit. Also as Sovs aware USG has close watch to prevent anti-Castro Cubans from any action which would upset execution of agreement, e.g. arrest of group with boat in Florida yesterday.

4. On question verification USG has expressed willingness accept wide range of possible UN arrangements but there does not yet appear likelihood even any one of these can be implemented.

5. President's responsibility for US security demands that in absence UN verification, US undertake whatever steps it can to provide verification. Subordinate to this overriding consideration but nevertheless important is

assurance to US and LA publics.

6. Thus, although much less satisfactory than UN verification on the ground and from the air with cooperation Sovs and Cuba, US must in elemental interests of safety continue aerial surveillance. This surveillance is being carried out in as unprovocative a manner and on as limited a scale as possible by unarmed aircraft. While US accepts that some conventional anti-aircraft guns may be under Cuban control, it cannot accept that sophisticated weapons and control systems, including SAM's, do not require participation of Sov technicians and thus are not or could not be made subject to Soviet control. If US reconnaissance aircraft fired on or destroyed, serious question appropriate means protect US aircraft will arise. We might thus face a cycle of action and reaction which would put us back where we were last week. Thus of utmost importance Sovs immediately take measures to assure reconnaissance aircraft not fired on.

7. Second sentence of President's letter to Chairman Khrushchev of October 27 is clear in covering "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use." This covers not only systems under Soviet control but also those allegedly under Cuban control. The President considers Khrushchev's reply of October 28 as clear acceptance that all of these arms are to be dismantled, crated and returned to Sov Union (or destroyed). You should seek to elicit a clear confirmation that the IL28's are included and are being dismantled for removal from Cuba.

8. In addition, you should point out that if Sov missiles and bombers are being removed, there seems no need for Soviets to leave in Cuba equipment and military technicians brought to Cuba primarily to protect the offensive weapons. (Note that SAM's use missile fuel which proscribed under quarantine regulations.) President's undertaking against invasion is adequate assurance that these weapons are not needed.

9. The President particularly desires that there should be no discussion of wider issue from our side until the offensive weapons in Cuba are clearly on their way home. You must therefore avoid any exploration of tempting fields like Berlin and disarmament, making it plain that while we look forward to such discussion later, we cannot get anywhere on anything else until we have successfully put in operation the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement on this present matter.

Rusk

### **133. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**

New York, November 2, 1962, 1 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/11-262. Top Secret; Priority. Received at the Department of State at 1:52 a.m. A 21-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which took place at the Soviet Mission, is in USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, IA October/November Meetings.

1604. Eyes only for the Secretary. McCloy, Stevenson and Akalovsky met with Mikoyan, Kuznetsov, Zorin, Dobrynin, Menshikov and Zhukov from 7 to 11 pm Thursday/1/ night. Mikoyan started in aggressive mood, insisting on suspending quarantine now, saying that was U Thant's intention. We repeated that the agreement was embodied in the correspondence between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy and left no uncertainty that the hail and pass quarantine could not be suspended until the Red Cross inspection was in effect. This seemed to bother Mikoyan considerably, but after some further discussion he dropped the matter. When asked how far away the nearest Soviet ships were, he replied four or five days. We pointed out that in that event, if Red Cross inspection was established quickly, few if any Soviet ships would have to pass the present quarantine. He said Thant had agreed with him that the US should suspend quarantine during the interval.

/1/November 1.

Mikoyan then asked if we were working now to formalize the agreement between us. We replied there were only

three questions: Red Cross inspection, inspection and verification of removal of weapons, and the guarantee to Cuba; and saw only one difficulty in reaching an agreement, namely Castro's rejection of verification. Mikoyan made long speech insisting on linking Castro's five points with Soviet-US agreement and charged US with drawing attention to only "temporary" questions while overlooking "cardinal" questions. He said we obviously did not want to hear about interests of others and were only concerned with our own interests. He went on to suggest certain reports should be made to United Nations and that a formal document or protocol should be executed, and that he wanted negotiations to commence formally on basis of the letters, including Castro's five points,<sup>/2/</sup> between the US, Soviet and U Thant. Later he asked if Cuba should not be included in the discussions, repeating again and again that we must discuss Guantanamo and the other points relating to normalizing the situation in the Caribbean with UN presences in Cuba, in the US and in other parts of the area, to see that agreement adhered to. Castro, he said, was Prime Minister of independent state and we can't evade assurances of non-aggression against Cuba, that we were withdrawing from our commitments and must discuss everything, that they must know the US position in order to tell Castro.

<sup>/2/</sup>Castro's five points were made in a letter to U Thant, October 28. Castro stated that U.S. guarantees against an invasion would be ineffective without: 1) cessation of the economic blockade and commercial and economic pressure against Cuba; 2) cessation of subversive activities; 3) cessation of piratical attacks from U.S. and Puerto Rican bases; 4) cessation of violations of Cuban air space and territorial waters; and 5) U.S. withdrawal from the naval base at Guantanamo and its return to Cuba. The text of the letter is in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 447-448.

We repeated over and over that we must stick to this problem and this problem only and could consider no other questions. We added that Castro could raise any questions he pleased and that they would be dealt with at the right time and that we were concerned with one question only and that was between the US and Soviet Union. He went back again and again to his insistence that we were by-passing the other side, including lifting the blockade and normalizing the situation, that the whole understanding would have to be formalized in documents registered with the United Nations and approved by the Security Council, and that we can't disregard the demands of Castro. Following our insistence that we can negotiate only one problem and that any discussion of Guantanamo in connection with it was out of the question, he remarked that the Soviet Union had never raised Guantanamo, which was a Cuba-US problem, but that the US should discuss the other four points.

We explained to him that we needed no documents except the declarations of USSR, US and SYG before Security Council after transaction completed. For that purpose Cuba was not a necessary party, especially if it refused any United Nations inspection as Khrushchev had promised.

We then turned to other forms of inspection and verification, by air recon and tables of organization, and suggested he could argue with Castro that a UN presence would be an assurance to Castro against invasion in interim as well as an assurance to US. Mikoyan was at pains to say that this meeting was not a final negotiation, but merely an exploration to see what everyone had in mind. We said that we felt time was of the essence and that we could agree upon modalities of the Red Cross inspection directly or through our deputies almost at once, on basis of Thant's proposals. We added that we could see no necessity for documentary agreement on aerial inspection, but wanted assurances from him that our planes would not be fired on if that was the only form of inspection and verification available to us. They replied they could not guarantee that the guns would not shoot, because Cuba was an independent country over which they had no control, and adverted again to fact that we should consider everything, but that at least this talk had served to expose our differences. (Later in a summary we had feeling we were really very close together and that if Mikoyan would drop his effort to link Castro's five points our differences were few.)

When we tried to get down to details of the Red Cross and aerial inspection Mikoyan said he was not specialist and these were details, that he had brought a General and Colonel to help Kuznetsov, repeating again and again that he could give us no guarantee regarding the security of our over-flights. We reminded him Khrushchev had agreed to UN inspection and that we understood his difficulties if Cuba refused, in view of its independence, and



were trying reach accommodation for quick and satisfactory results. He reverted again to argument that if we insisted on UN inspection in Cuba, it had a right to insist on inspection of refugee camps and training activities anywhere. He was assured that there were no such camps any longer and that US was not engaged in such activities. Likewise we tried reassure him about training of Cuban citizens in the army and that US wanted to regularize relations in Caribbean for protection of others as well as Castro, but that this was a separate matter that had nothing to do with this question. Mikoyan quickly asked if we were referring to possible restoration economic and diplomatic ties with Cuba, and we explained regional arrangements in this hemisphere through OAS and that such matters were not excluded from future consideration if other aggravations could be relieved, but that we must get the one question before us promptly resolved.

FYI. With regard to SAM sites, we had clear impression they intended to leave them in Cuba, and they also said they had given these guns to a number of other countries, including Indonesia and UAR.

Meeting became more cordial and friendly as it proceeded and was exclusively dominated by Mikoyan. He said he did not know whether he was coming back through New York on way home, but we had impression he intended to.

Their estimate of time to complete removal was ten to fifteen days, including the IL-28's.

At one point he repeated Khrushchev's statement that what we call offensive weapons had been given to Cuba to deter US aggression, but that if non-aggression was guaranteed they would be withdrawn and that they would ship no more weapons.

In summarizing our conclusions, we reviewed the procedure before the Security Council and they suggested we exchange drafts of declarations, which seemed to us to indicate acceptance of this procedure. On the whole our feeling was that we had left no doubt the five points and weapons transaction could not be linked and that he will meet Castro with a clear impression of our position, and understand we will insist on interim inspection by our means if an agreement for UN presence cannot be reached. It is our intention to proceed as promptly as possible with Kuznetsov and his deputy Morozov to try complete modalities on Red Cross inspection pending Mikoyan's return./3/

/3/The morning of November 2 Stevenson sent Mikoyan a letter stating that during last evening's conversation he and McCloy had neglected to discuss with Mikoyan a list of items that the United States considered offensive weapons. See the Supplement. (Telegram 1606 from USUN, November 2; USUN Files: NY FRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963)

Stevenson

### **134. Summary Record of the 17th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, November 2, 1963, 11 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 12:05 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) John McCone also prepared an account of this meeting, memorandum for the record, November 2. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President)

The President referred to a newspaper story by Roland Evans/1/ which reported details of Khrushchev's private letter of October 26./2/ The President said the White House had already issued a denial that the U.S. Government believed this letter was written by an agitated or an overwrought man. He directed that all copies of the letter be returned to the State Department. He added that apparently a copy of the letter had gone to an allied

embassy in Washington. He reaffirmed an earlier instruction that the only sources of information on the Cuban situation are Mr. Bundy and Mr. Sorensen. He indicated his unhappiness with the amount of information which had been given to the press without authorization. He directed that all aerial reconnaissance information be kept out of the Top Secret CIA Bulletin until after he had seen it. He would then decide what circulation within the government was to be given the reconnaissance information. He restated his view that we must make information available to the press in our own way rather than have it leak out.

/1/In the *Herald Tribune*, November 2.

/2/See Document 84.

Director McCone then summarized the intelligence memorandum./3/ He said we now have information of a highly sensitive nature which convinces us that Soviet officers control the Cuban air defense system. In conclusion, he reported on the current Soviet test series. So far there have been fifty Soviet tests, including one yesterday of an estimated 1.2 megatons, at an altitude of fifty nautical miles.

/3/[document number not declassified], "The Crisis USSR/Cuba, Information as of 0600, 2 November 1962"; see the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security File, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 17-24)

Under Secretary Ball reported on a dinner meeting held last night in New York between our officials and Mikoyan, Zorin and Kuznetsov./4/ He said Mikoyan started with a very hard position, but modified this somewhat later in the evening. He repeatedly attempted to tie Castro's five points/5/ to the agreement between President Kennedy and Khrushchev. He proposed that there be a formal exchange of documents which would conclude the Cuban missile negotiations. We opposed such a proposal and suggested instead that there be a UN Security Council meeting which would be called to hear three unilateral declarations--one by U Thant, another by the Soviets, and a third by the U.S.

/4/See Document 129.

/5/See footnote 1, Document 129.

There was a discussion of some UN presence in the form of a peace commission. The Russians were ambiguous on the status of the SAM sites. One of the Russians said that the Cubans might agree to the dismantlement of the SAM sites in return for our promise to stop overflights. The IL-28 bomber issue was not pinned down in the conversations. The Russians said repeatedly that they could not force Castro to accept on-site inspection. There was no decision on how inspection will be carried out after the missiles have been withdrawn. Mikoyan did not ask us not to overfly, but he did admit that he could not get Castro to accept ground inspection.

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric urged that we insist upon UN inspection as promised by Khrushchev. He noted that KOMAR missiles have been given to the Cubans and recommended that we keep our quarantine until a satisfactory substitute was in place.

The President decided that in view of the unsatisfactory discussions with the Cubans and the Russians, he would cancel his planned press conference in order not to be obliged to reply to questions about what guarantees we have that Russian missiles had been withdrawn from Cuba. Under Secretary Ball read a six-point statement which he recommended the President issue in lieu of a press conference.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we not call attention to the IL-28 bombers at this point because we may want to retaliate against these planes if one of our reconnaissance planes is shot down.

The President directed that a statement be prepared for issuance by the White House or the State Department. It

should include what the Russians have agreed to and what we have agreed to./6/ He asked what had been discussed in New York about the quarantine and about our overflights. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric reported that UN officials have given up on a UN surveillance system because Castro won't accept it.

/6/Apparent reference to the statement released by the White House on November 2; for text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 451-452.

The President asked how we were going to check on Soviet missiles being withdrawn.

Secretary Rusk said we could ask the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] in Cuba check on Soviet equipment there, and where it was being moved to in Cuba.

The President noted that inspection of incoming material could be achieved, but we must develop some way of inspecting outgoing Soviet missiles.

The President asked that instructions to McCloy be prepared which would lay down the line he is to follow for the next three days./7/

/7/Telegram 1177 to USUN, November 2, 7 p.m., in which Stevenson and McCloy were told that the President wanted to tie down the Soviets on inclusion of IL-28 bombers as offensive weapons. The President also instructed Stevenson and McCloy to stress that it was the Soviet responsibility to provide acceptable verification, that Soviet cargo ships should not seek to enter the quarantine area until ICRC inspection procedures were in effect unless they were prepared to accept U.S. inspection, and that after removal of weapons, continuing arrangements would be required to assure against reintroduction. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Incoming Telegrams, 1952-1963) See the Supplement.

Secretary McNamara recommended that we continue limited but daily overflights. He asked authorization for two flights of two planes each to cover different areas than were photographed yesterday. Targets would include Cuban ports and the IL-28 airfield. He opposed high altitude flights until we are certain that the Soviets do control the SAM sites. In answer to a question, he said we could use a drone for overflights, but the Air Force was opposed because of the possible loss and compromise of the highly classified drone.

In answer to a question, Director McCone said it was conceivable but improbable that missiles fired from SAM sites in Cuba could reach the U.S.

The President authorized the release to the press of the pictures of the missile sites taken yesterday, but not the pictures of the IL-28 bombers. He agreed that the quarantine should be continued until a satisfactory substitute was found.

Secretary McNamara reported on the current shipping situation and recommended that our ships hail all Bloc ships crossing the quarantine line but board none of them. He said Admiral Dennison had asked permission to board a Soviet ship, but had been denied this authority. The President agreed that we should not now board Bloc ships.

The President again called attention to the necessity of inspecting Soviet ships leaving Cuba with Soviet missiles as cargo. This inspection must be carried out either by the International Red Cross or by the U.S.

The President then turned to a discussion of atomic testing. He asked that consideration be given to what we will say publicly when our current test series ends and what we should say about our plans for future tests. He asked whether we should announce that we were prepared to halt tests until there was a test ban agreement. He said he opposed any pledge to refrain from testing for an indefinite period.

In response to the President's question, Mr. Bundy stated that our scientists doubt that the "black box" method of detecting nuclear tests is promising. The President asked that he be provided an evaluation of these unmanned seismic stations as a means of monitoring an atomic test ban.

Acting USIA Director Wilson asked the President for guidance for USIA during the next few days. The President instructed that USIA emphasize that Castro was obstructing peace in the Caribbean by blocking UN inspection measures. For the time being, USIA should not use the theme that Castro is a Soviet stooge.

The President asked for a report on the fighting between the Indians and the Communist Chinese, along with an estimate of what we thought would develop in this area./8/

/8/According to a memorandum for the record of this meeting by McCone, November 2, the CIA "was asked to prepare an immediate report on the effectiveness of the blockade" so as "to have some indication of its effect on the Cuban economy, if any." McCone's record indicated that "it was decided that a drone should be flown promptly" over the objections of McNamara and the Air Force. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B1285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962)

Bromley Smith/9/

/9/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **135. Record of Action Taken at the 17th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, November 2, 1962, 11 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive.

1. Referring to a newspaper story giving alleged details of Premier Khrushchev's October 26th letter, the President said the White House had issued a denial that the U.S. government believed it was written by an agitated or overwrought man. He instructed that henceforth information obtained from aerial reconnaissance of Cuba should not be released within the Government until after it had been presented to him for decision as to whom it would be made available. He reemphasized the importance of preventing unauthorized release to the press of information about the Cuban situation.
2. Director McCone summarized the intelligence memorandum, emphasizing the sensitive nature of information in our possession which convinces us that Soviet officers control the air defense system established in Cuba. He also reported on the Soviet nuclear test series, including yesterday's test of a 1.2 megaton weapon at 50 nautical miles.
3. There followed a report and a discussion of the meeting last night in New York of U.S. officials with Messrs. Mikoyan, Zorin and Kuznetsov. It was decided that, in lieu of a press conference, a White House statement would be prepared for release today summarizing where we are in the Cuban situation.
4. The President authorized two aerial reconnaissance missions consisting of our planes, the first over Cuban ports and the second over the IL-28 airfield. The President authorized the release to the press of pictures of the missile sites taken yesterday. Yesterday's pictures of the IL-28 bombers will not be released.
5. Following a discussion of the current status of the quarantine, the President instructed that until further orders U.S. naval ships should not board Bloc ships, but U.S. ships should continue to hail all vessels entering the quarantine zone.

6. The President asked that draft instructions to Mr. McCloy covering the negotiations for the next few days be prepared for his approval. These instructions would make clear that we want the IL-28s removed, that our quarantine must be maintained until a satisfactory substitute is provided, and that ships coming from the USSR to take the Soviet missiles out of Cuba must be inspected by the U.S. or by the International Red Cross.

7. The President asked that consideration be given to what we will say publicly about the ending of our test series and about our policy toward future nuclear tests. He also asked for an evaluation of unmanned seismic stations as a means of inspecting an atomic test agreement.

8. In response to a request for guidance, the President instructed USIA, for the time being, to emphasize Castro's obstruction to UN inspection and to measures necessary to restore peace to the Caribbean rather than to depict Castro as a Soviet puppet.

9. The President asked for a full report on Indian-Chinese fighting and an estimate of future developments.

McGeorge Bundy

### **136. Summary Record of the 18th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, November 3, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret. The meeting lasted until 10:52 a.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is *ibid.*, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. See the Supplement.

Director McCone presented the intelligence summary, emphasizing reports about the construction of a submarine base in Cuba. He called attention to the increasing number of reports of missiles being stored in Cuban caves./1/

/1/McCone prepared an account of this meeting in which he described his presentation in more detail. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962) See the Supplement.

Secretary McNamara reported that a peripheral flight of a U-2 about five miles off the west coast of Cuba had been authorized by the President. The weather for reconnaissance was poor. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated a requirement for fourteen low-level sorties, covering harbors, roads, storage areas, the IL-28 air base, and Banos, which is suspect as a possible submarine base site. Secretary McNamara said he recommended fewer low-level flights.

Mr. McCone predicted that it would take from two weeks to a month to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

The President, commenting on the recommended low-level flight over the port of Havana, said he thought this target would be a day off and deferred authorizing this reconnaissance mission.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the presence in Havana of Mikoyan and stated his view that the port of Havana was not a good target for today. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

The President authorized three low-level sorties of two planes each, one over the IL-28 base, the second over the Banos area, and the third over the San Julian port area.

General Taylor asked that the President authorize a major aerial reconnaissance mission Sunday or Monday/2/ in

order to see what had been moved in Cuba. He said we need pictures of the ports in order to know what was being loaded on outgoing ships and pictures of assembly areas where Soviet equipment is being moved prior to being shipped out.

/2/November 4 or 5.

The President said that he wanted by Sunday or Monday a recommendation on the future use of U-2 planes. Secretary Rusk said daily pictures of the IL-28 planes are most important.

Secretary Rusk referred to a preliminary draft of inspection arrangements./3/ Certain measures can be taken if Cuba agrees, but other measures will have to be taken if Cuba refuses to accept inspection arrangements satisfactory to us. He noted that there was no real resistance from anywhere except Cuba to the continuance of overflights.

/3/Apparent reference to "Draft Instruction to USUN, Cuba: Inspection Arrangements," for use by the Executive Committee and submitted for consideration at this meeting. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Verification of US-USSR Agreements re Cuba) Text in the Supplement.

The President said the major issue is the inspection of outgoing Soviet ships which will be returning Soviet missiles to the USSR. He said he believed we would have to work out some way of counting the outgoing missiles in order to be certain that all were removed. He asked that we work out what arrangements we think we must have and what we think the Soviets would accept.

Deputy Under Secretary Johnson suggested that the International Red Cross inspectors might look at cargo being loaded on outgoing Soviet ships to be certain that it had been properly identified on the ships' manifests.

Director McCone said we had seen thirty missiles in Cuba and we estimate that forty-eight were brought in. He agreed that we must work out some way of counting the outgoing missiles.

Secretary Rusk said one major problem was how to inspect armaments in Cuba after the strategic missiles had been removed. One way to do this would be to propose an atom-free zone in Latin America. Treaty inspectors could go to Cuba to ensure that no nuclear weapons remained on the island or were introduced.

The President requested a paper stating exactly how we understand the agreement we have reached with the Russians. He wanted for his consideration the instructions to be sent to McCloy to govern McCloy's talk with Kuznetsov. He suggested that we raise with the Russians the question of Cuban caves as an illustration of the need for an inspection procedure which would reassure us that the missiles were removed, even if we did not inspect each missile. He suggested that the New York negotiating group, including Ambassador Stevenson, be asked to come to Washington later today to discuss inspection arrangements with the Executive Committee./4/ He made it clear that we could not live with a Soviet submarine base in Cuba. He wanted to hold Khrushchev to every single one of the points he had agreed to. He felt that we should insist on the general demilitarization of Cuba and he emphasized again the serious situation which would arise if there were an incident involving one of our U-2 planes and the SAM sites in Cuba.

/4/See Document 138.

Secretary Rusk commented that we must have acceptable inspection on the ground in Cuba before we make any commitment about our not invading the island.

Mr. McCone noted that evidence to date indicates the missiles are being dismantled, but apparently everything else is being built up, including communication complexes and possibly even a submarine base.

The President said he wanted to see detailed instructions covering the negotiations on inspection. He thought that we should give the Russians the impression that because the missiles are mobile and can be put back in place, we will have to insist on demilitarization of Cuba.

Ambassador Thompson suggested that we ask the Russians if they intend to keep a military base in Cuba. We would tell the Russians that this was not negotiable.

At this point the following joined the Executive Committee: AEC Chairman Seaborg; Commissioner Haworth; Dr. Wiesner; and Mr. Kaysen.

A draft announcement of the ending of our current nuclear test series was read and discussed.

In response to the President's question, Dr. Seaborg said that the Commission tests in 1963 would be for the purpose of exploiting the Ripple development. He thought that by May we would be in a position to resume tests above ground. He acknowledged that weapons development would be possible if testing were limited to underground shots.

Secretary Rusk opposed stating in the announcement a time limit on our suspension of testing. He did not want us to tie our hands because at a later time we might have to resume tests in order to keep pressure on the Russians.

The President commented that we had a greater capability than the Russians to conduct useful underground tests. He felt that we would not lose if the Russians did not conduct atmospheric tests and we continued our underground testing.

The draft release was revised and approved, it being understood that underground tests would continue.

Bromley Smith/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **137. Editorial Note**

On November 3, 1962, John Scali of the American Broadcasting Corporation met with Alexander S. Fomin, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington and reputedly head of Soviet intelligence in Washington. Fomin made five points to Scali. First, the United States must be patient with Soviet efforts to moderate Castro; second, the Soviet Union required reciprocal concessions; third, as Castro was adamantly opposed to inspection, the United States and Soviet Union should resolve the issue themselves, by inspection of Soviet ships at sea in international waters; fourth, the Soviet Union could not withdraw its surface-to-air missiles from Cuba for fear of leaving Castro defenseless; and fifth, the Soviet Union planned to leave some technicians in Cuba to train Cubans in the operation of defensive weapons.

Although original records of certain other Scali-Fomin conversations have been found, none for November 3 has been discovered. Pierre Salinger paraphrases and quotes from Scali's report of this meeting in *With Kennedy*, pages 279-280. Salinger notes that Scali's reports were regularly transmitted to members of the Executive Committee and that President Kennedy jokingly suggested that Scali should attend the sessions.

### **138. Summary Record of the 19th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, November 3, 1962, 4:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee,

Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret. According to the President's Appointment Book the meeting lasted until 6:25 p.m. (Ibid.)

Prior to the reading of a summary of the latest intelligence on Cuba by Director McCone, Secretary Rusk said we may be experiencing the greatest deception in our history if the Russians are not removing their strategic missiles from Cuba. (Mr. McCone's summary was apparently a special intelligence estimate prepared by USIB.)/1/

/1/See Document 139 for additional information on McCone's briefing.

The President suggested that the summary be sanitized and given to Mr. McCloy to use in his conversations with Soviet representative Kuznetsov.

The President then read the attached instruction to all officials concerned with the present negotiations with the Russians on Cuba./2/ Ambassador Thompson pointed out that the reference to no Soviet missile base in Cuba is a reinterpretation of what Khrushchev agreed to.

/2/See Document 141.

Ambassador Stevenson read a list of questions which he hoped would be answered./3/ Ambassador Yost of the USUN mission reported on negotiations with the International Red Cross aimed at establishing inspection at sea of Soviet ships leaving Cuba. Red Cross inspectors aboard neutral ships would go alongside the Soviet ships, board them and inspect them. It was hoped that the Russians would accept this sea inspection system.

/3/Not found.

Ambassador Stevenson reported efforts to set up a verification system on the ground in Cuba. The Russians are prepared to have UN inspectors look at the missile sites after the removal of the missiles and the destruction of the sites. We have insisted on inspection in the interim during the time the missiles are being dismantled and the sites destroyed.

Mr. McCloy reported on his talks with Mikoyan and Kuznetsov. The big problem is to get verification which covers all of the island. The Soviets appear to be stringing out the negotiations. Castro may well refuse to accept arrangements agreeable to the Russians. Examination of cargo at sea is very difficult and reading ship manifests in ports is not very helpful. One suggestion is that we ask the Soviets for the list of weapons and missiles they sent to Cuba. We would check outgoing equipment and missiles against this list. If we cannot arrange an inspection system at the docks in Cuba, we will have to work out some kind of inspection system at sea.

Secretary Rusk commented that the Soviets are under an obligation to see that the offer they made to us is implemented.

Ambassador Stevenson said there was little difficulty in seeing the missiles, but seeing the equipment is considerably more difficult. He felt that we should try to get an ex post facto inspection of all of Cuba. If we cannot get this, we should accept inspection at sea. Our last resort position would be to seek inspection at the home port of the Soviet ships taking the missiles from Cuba.

General Taylor suggested that we should ask the Russians for their withdrawal plan.

The President said we must insist on UN inspection on the ground. Ambassador Stevenson replied that we had no difficulty on this point with the Russians, but the Cubans were being recalcitrant. He believed that we would eventually have to accept an inspection at sea or inspection at the debarkation port.

With reference to our overflights, Ambassador Stevenson said the Russian position was that they could not agree



because the Cubans refuse to permit overflights. The Russians say Cuba is an independent country which they cannot force to accept actions which are an invasion of their sovereign air space. It may be necessary for us to drop back to inspection at sea or at debarkation ports.

Mr. McCone noted that the SAM sites appeared to be under Soviet control.

The President asked whether we could obtain a sampling of outgoing cargoes by UN inspectors on docks at each of five ports. However, this procedure does not provide permanent safeguards against reintroduction of strategic missiles.

Ambassador Stevenson suggested that one way to deal with the future would be to support the nuclear-free zone for Latin America. Cuba might accept inspectors enforcing a nuclear-free zone treaty because inspectors would be visiting all Latin American countries.

The President said we should ask for the removal of the IL-28 bombers. Ambassador Stevenson commented that he believed the IL-28s would be removed, possibly by air.

Mr. McCloy raised the question of whether the President should see Mikoyan. A decision is to be made later after McCloy had talked to Mikoyan.

Ambassador Stevenson predicted that the Cubans and the Russians would insist on a Security Council meeting. He linked this meeting to actions which we plan to take with the OAS. Secretary Rusk commented that we were in no position to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba because no procedures had yet been worked out for the inspection of the withdrawal of the strategic missiles. He felt we should insist upon performance before giving any guarantee.

The President said he wanted any wording of a non-invasion guarantee to be approved by him before being discussed. He preferred that we limit any commitment to that included in our letter to Khrushchev/<sup>4</sup>/ rather than making a reference to our obligations under the UN charter. He pointed out that our commitment would refer only to invasion and not exclude use of the threat of force. He asked for a paper which would summarize what we expect the Cubans to agree to, what we expect the Russians to agree to, and what we ourselves are prepared to agree to.

<sup>4</sup>/See Document 95.

Secretary Rusk referred to reports of sabotage in Venezuela apparently instigated by a pro-Castro group or Cubans. The President said we should be as tough as we can in dealing with such situations.

Secretary McNamara asked that the New York negotiations repeat our insistence that the IL-28 bombers be removed from Cuba. He said he thought we should force the Russians to answer whether they intended to withdraw the bombers. Until the Russians answer on this point, he recommended that we reach no agreement of any kind.

Mr. McCone estimates there are forty IL-28s in Cuba. We have seen nine on the ground and additional planes still in their crates.

The President said he was willing to talk to Mikoyan if Mikoyan's attitude was reasonable in his discussions with McCloy.

The President discussed our public attitude toward the Cuban crisis. He was not certain how much concern we wanted to surface. He felt that our attitude should be one of vigilance and watchful waiting. We should publicly make clear that we were insisting on implementation of all of the deal made by Khrushchev. We could say that

we were sticking firmly to the terms of our offer. So far, Khrushchev has not denied the position we have taken in the letter to him. However, he has never said that he specifically accepted our offer. Thus, the deal we have with Khrushchev consists of what we say it is.

The President raised the question of what we should say about the IL-28s. He believed we should say publicly that we considered bombers as part of the deal, i.e. weapons offensive to us which would be withdrawn from Cuba. He agreed that we should delay announcing our public position on the bombers until tomorrow./5/

/5/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action dated November 3 for this meeting. It stated that the President authorized preparation of a sanitized version of McCone's intelligence briefing for McCloy to use in his discussions with Kuznetsov; that the President approved the general instruction containing a restatement of basic U.S. policy; noted that in the negotiations at the UN there should be insistence on on-site on-the-ground inspection of missile sites; and stated that the President insisted that the basis of negotiations must be his October 27 letter to Khrushchev, and that U.S. posture, both publicly and privately, should be one of carrying out the specifics of that letter. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24) See the Supplement.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the President revised and approved an announcement to be made tomorrow upon the conclusion of our current nuclear test series.

Bromley Smith/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **139. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, November 3, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone on November 5.

#### **SUBJECT**

Meeting of the Executive Committee of NSC--Saturday, November 3, 1962--4:30 p.m.

Attended by all members

Also in attendance:

Ambassador Stevenson, McCloy, Yost and several of their staff from the United Nations

The President opened the meeting, stating the purpose was to clearly outline U.S. policy to be sure "all were on the same wave length".

McCone then read a November 3rd memorandum summarizing intelligence information--copy attached./1/ The President requested this memorandum, which he expressed as being very comprehensive, be sanitized for use in further negotiations and discussions with the Soviets./2/

/1/CIA Memorandum, "The Crisis, USSR/Cuba, Information as of 0600 3 November." The memorandum reported that the whereabouts of missiles and equipment that had been removed was still unknown, and that uncrating and assembling of IL-28 bombers at San Julien was continuing. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24)

/2/The sanitized version of the CIA memorandum of November 3 was sent to Kuznetsov under cover of a letter from Stevenson, November 3. It reads:

"The analyses of the photographic reconnaissance conducted by us yesterday over Cuban missile sites shows definitive evidence of dismantling of the sites and removal of missiles and related equipment from the area. Destination of the equipment is as yet not apparent.

"On the other hand, there is clear evidence of progressive work on degrading and assembling of the IL-28's." (Telegram 1625 from USUN, November 3; USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963)

Secretary Rusk emphasized the dangers of deception.

The President then read a draft of his instructions to all concerned with present negotiations in Cuba, a November 3rd copy of which is attached./3/

/3/See Document 141.

There followed a long discussion of various means of verification, the importance of ground inspection, the dangers of deception and the difficult question of verifying that this operation would not be repeated at some future time. Included in these discussions were the disposition of the IL 28s, the manning and ultimate disposition of the SAM sites, the MIG 21 problem and most particularly the responsibilities to the OAS countries to make suitable arrangements for their protection against continuation of subversion, insurgency, sabotage, etc. stemming out of Cuba.

Preparation for the McCloy/Kuznetsov meeting on November 4th/4/--CIA arranged sanitized versions of a number of points covered in the attached memorandum of 3 November. This information was developed overnight and on Sunday morning early Mr. Sheldon and others visited Mr. McCloy in Stamford, Connecticut and briefed him thoroughly on all subjects.

/4/See Document 142.

At about 11 o'clock McCone talked with McCloy who expressed appreciation for the briefing and seemed satisfied that he was armed with all necessary information to carry on his talks with Kuznetsov.

In the evening, Rusk called McCone, stating that Kuznetsov had indicated a willingness to have us look at the crates of the large missiles and that there were 42 missiles in Cuba. He asked that CIA study all pertinent data in the interests of verifying this figure. It will be recalled that CIA estimate had run to a probable 48 missiles in Cuba. McCone called Sheldon who agreed to study this matter.

In the discussion with McCloy, McCone was advised that Kuznetsov would agree that we could inspect and photograph a number of crates on board ships as they departed from Havana; the crates would be dock loaded so that they would be readily visible from a ship pulling alongside, or from the air; however we would not be permitted to board the ships. Apparently Kuznetsov did not feel he could arrange on-site inspection within Cuba.

Apparently Kuznetsov confirmed that there were a total of 40 launchers (10 sites) and that 24 launchers were operational at the time the whole matter was surfaced.

McCloy stated that Kuznetsov was non-responsive with respect to the operation of the SAM sites, to the withdrawal of the SAM sites; withdrawal of the IL 28s and the MIGs were not mentioned. Full telegraphic report is due 11:05./5/

/5/Attached to this memorandum for the record was a November 2 memorandum from the Deputy Director for Intelligence Cline to McCone entitled, "Time Factors in Construction of Soviet Missiles Bases in Cuba." It estimated how long it would take to make a MRBM site operational and how soon U.S. reconnaissance could discover them. See the Supplement.

John A. McCone/6/

Director

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

#### **140. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev**

Washington, November 3, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A note on the source text indicates that a copy went to Thompson who "took it w/him." Thompson and Bundy met with the President on November 2, from 6:10 to 6:23 p.m. for an "off the record meeting." (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) The letter could have been drafted then.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I wish to thank you for your letter of October 30./1/ I am commenting now only on a problem raised in your letter which relates to the Cuban affair.

/1/Document 120.

With respect to the quarantine on shipments to Cuba, I am hopeful that arrangements can be worked out quickly by the United Nations which would permit its removal. We were happy to agree to your suggestion that the International Committee of the Red Cross undertake responsibility for inspection. You are, of course, aware that Premier Castro has announced his opposition to measures of verification on the territory of Cuba. If he maintains this position this would raise very serious problems. So far as incoming shipments are concerned, I understand that efforts are being made to have the International Red Cross carry out the necessary measures at sea and I hope that these will be successful. In the meantime, perhaps the existence of the quarantine can be of assistance to Mr. Mikoyan in his negotiations with Premier Castro. I should also like to point out that in an effort to facilitate matters, I instructed our delegation in New York to inform your representative there, Mr. Kuznetsov, that for the next few days any Soviet ships in the quarantine area would be passed without inspection and only the hailing procedure which was carried out in the case of your vessel, the Bucharest, would be applied.

I am hopeful we can dispose of this pressing matter quickly so that we can go on in a better atmosphere to the broader questions. We both must make our best efforts to this end.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates President Kennedy signed the original.

#### **141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations**

Washington, November 3, 1962, 8:44 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-362. Top Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy,

cleared by Rusk, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson.

1189. Eyes only for Stevenson and McCloy. Following is text of an instruction from the President to all concerned with present negotiations in Cuba:

"It is time for a review of our basic position in these negotiations and for a clear restatement of our policy and purpose.

We have good evidence that the Russians are dismantling the missile bases. We have no decisive evidence of what they will do with this equipment. The assembly of IL-28's continues. There is some evidence of an intent to establish a submarine-tending facility. The future of the SAM sites is unclear. We have no satisfactory assurances on verification. Our aerial surveillance still proceeds without guarantee of safety.

This crisis is likely to move in one of two major directions in the next few weeks. On the one hand, we may be able to make arrangements which will in fact ensure the verified removal of all Soviet offensive weapons systems from Cuba and establish reliable safeguards against their reintroduction. This is the object of our policy and it is precisely stated in my letter to Khrushchev of October 27:<sup>1/</sup> "You would agree to remove these weapons systems (previously defined as "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use") from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba." Chairman Khrushchev's message of 28 October<sup>2/</sup> contained an explicit undertaking to dismantle, crate and return to the Soviet Union "the weapons which you describe as "offensive" under UN verification. It is the position of the United States Government that this is a clear acceptance of my proposal of October 27.

<sup>1/</sup>See Document 95.

<sup>2/</sup>Document 102.

This requirement means removal of all offensive missiles and supporting equipment, and of all bombers and their equipment. These items and associated equipment are generally described in my statement of September 13 and in my address of October 22; they are clearly defined in my Proclamation of October 23.<sup>3/</sup> All Americans should stick firmly to this position. We should add that a submarine base is equally unacceptable--as Chairman Khrushchev has acknowledged by clear inference in his assurances on the fishing facility.

<sup>3/</sup>For texts, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962*, pp. 674-681, 806-809, and 809-811, respectively.

In blunt summary, we want no offensive weapons and no Soviet military base in Cuba, and that is how we understand the agreements of October 27 and 28.

If in fact the Soviet Government executes this kind of removal with the associated and necessary inspection, supervision, and safeguards against reintroduction, then we in turn will hold with equal clarity to the undertaking given in my letter of October 27, as follows: "(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba." We also have an obligation to work with other Western Hemisphere countries to get them to take a similar position. The exact terms and meaning of this undertaking require further work, but its broad implication is clear: in the absence of other provocation or justification, we will give an undertaking not to invade Cuba if we are properly assured that Cuba ceases to be a Soviet military base and ceases to harbor weapons. This commitment in no way derogates from our Hemispheric obligations to deal with aggressive or subversive activities by the present regime in Cuba.

There is another major course which events may take. It is one with which all who have negotiated with the Soviet Government in the past are familiar. It is a course in which bargains are fudged, secrecy prevents

verification, agreements are reinterpreted, and by one means or another the Soviet Government seeks to sustain and advance the very policy which it has apparently undertaken to give up.

There is much evidence to support the conclusion that this is what is now beginning.

This second line of Soviet conduct is unacceptable to the United States. To prevent it we must make it very clear, at every stage, by both word and act, that the United States Government will not accept a mere gentlemen's agreement relating only to visible missiles on identified launch pads. We must have adequate arrangements for verification and inspection to be sure both that offensive weapons are removed and that no more are introduced. Without them, both surveillance and the quarantine must be continued and both may need to be extended. (This condition does not exclude temporary relaxation of either quarantine or surveillance in return for useful steps toward fully effective arrangements. Such a relaxation is foreseen in connection with our plans for ICRC inspection of certain inbound cargoes.) All the offensive weapons systems, including anything related to a submarine base, must be removed, or we shall have to consider further action of our own to remove them.

Finally, and most generally, the undertaking of the United States against invasion cannot take effect in any atmosphere of ambiguity or uncertainty such that the American Government or the American people would lack proper assurance against the existence in Cuba now, or at any future time, of any Soviet military base or offensive weapons. The Soviet Government must recognize that the events of the last three weeks have made it impossible for opinion in this Hemisphere to be satisfied with Soviet assurances alone. Verification is essential if the Governments of the Western Hemisphere are to be able to live with this situation without further action.

I repeat that this statement of policy should be taken as binding guidance by all who are engaged in the framing of instructions or the conduct of negotiations on this matter. It is of fundamental importance that we speak as one voice and continue to keep it entirely clear to all Soviet representatives that the agreements of October 27 and 28 must be carried out in full--and that otherwise the United States Government will find it necessary to move again by its own means to insure itself against a repetition of the extraordinary act of deception which initiated this crisis. In this situation the Soviet Government has a clear choice between verified removal of all offensive weapons systems and renewed action by the United States. It has no middle choice, and we believe its own interests should lead it to accept the honest and full execution of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, and to see to it that Castro provides the necessary cooperation.

Detailed guidance in support of this general policy has been provided in approved instructions to USUN earlier this week. The basic messages are 1147 of October 31,<sup>/4/</sup> as amended, 1159 of November 1,<sup>/5/</sup> 1166 of November 1,<sup>/6/</sup> and 1177 of November 2.<sup>/7/</sup> A codification of this guidance is planned. My only addition at present is that I now believe we should not be satisfied, as 1147 suggests, with aerial surveillance and post-removal ground inspection for departing offensive weapons. We must also have some way of verifying the reexport of the missiles, and the best practicable way seems to be to count them on departing ships. This can be done with no violation of Soviet security by reliable and non-technical non-Americans, and we should insist on this or an equally effective verification."

<sup>/4/</sup>Document 125.

<sup>/5/</sup>Telegram 1159, November 1, instructed Ball to stress to Soviet negotiators the importance of verification, the consequences of attacks on U.S. reconnaissance planes, and the fact that IL-28 bombers were part of the agreement and should be dismantled. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Incoming Telegrams, Top Secret, Exdis, etc.)

<sup>/6/</sup>Telegram 1166 contained instructions and suggestions on how to get ICRC inspectors into action as soon as possible. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-162)

/7/See footnote 7, Document 134.

Rusk

#### **142. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**

New York, November 4, 1962, 11:50 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-562). Top Secret; Priority. According to the USUN copy, it was drafted by McCloy. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002 Outgoing Telegrams, 1962 (Top Secret, exdis, etc.))

1630. Eyes only for the Secretary. Meeting between McCloy and Kuznetsov, Sunday, November 4. Kuznetsov came to lunch at McCloy's home at Stamford. En famille, most informal, no other officials or any translator present. After lunch took a long walk during the course of which talk was conducted lasting until about 5:00 PM. McCloy started out with a resume of our aerial surveillance of yesterday of Cuba again expressing great concern over the evidence of the assembly of the IL-28's. The buildup of these planes was in sharp contrast to the dismantling of the sites and largely nullified the good impression we were getting from the rapidity with which the missile sites were being dismantled. K said that this had been something of a new subject to him and had been recently notified of it. He said he had notified Moscow of the importance we placed on it and that he had doubted that these were properly classified as offensive weapons but this was only his opinion. K would report Moscow attitude as soon as he received it.

McCloy told him that the President had refrained from publicly referring to the buildup of the IL-28's as he was sure there would be a sharp reaction if it were made public. McCloy also stated that there could be no doubt of the inclusion of these bombers in the list of offensive weapons and if any documentation were needed it would be easy to provide it. Mc gave him our position on verification following the lines of 1189/1/ stating we had been deceived by assurances given our officials in respect to the weapons introduced in Cuba and it was impossible for us now to act merely on a gentlemen's agreement. McCloy said he was seriously troubled by the problem of verification as it seemed as if the Soviet Union would not be able to make good on their Chairman's commitment for UN observation of dismantling and removal although Mc felt certain that they could get Fidel's compliance if they really set about it. K said this was not by any means certain. Mc repeated we could not be satisfied with our reconnaissance alone (to which incidentally they still continue to object) and we would not be satisfied with the mere inspection of the abandoned missile sites. We had to have evidence of the disposition and the removal of the weapons. Mc referred to the stories about weapons in caves and said such stories were bound to arise if we did not have opportunity for inspection on the ground. We had to have evidence which would convince us as practical men that the commitments to remove these weapons had been carried out. K said they had been giving thought to this matter and the Chairman himself had been preoccupied with it as he was fully aware of his commitments and he wished to negotiate this thing honestly both in what he called the short run and the long run. K referred to a suggestion that Mc had made regarding manifests that they had followed up. He said manifests of what was going out would not be any good unless it was known what had come in, but in order to give us reasonable and practical assurance of their determination to fulfill their commitment and on instructions directly from the Chairman he wanted to submit the figures.

/1/Document 141.

There were as of October 22, 24 completed sites and 16 in incomplete form, or a total of 40, and they had introduced a total of 42 missiles into Cuba. All of these sites had been dismantled and rendered inoperable by November 2. They were prepared to find reasonable means to convince us that these missiles had been removed and their suggestion was as follows: (1) They would give us photographs of the sites in dismantled form. (2) They would give us their schedule of removal to the ports and shipping schedules. He said that we could bring our own vessels along side the Soviet ships which were taking the missiles out in such a way as to enable us to

see and count the missiles. They would also give us photographs of 42 missiles on the way out. Mc pointed out that the commitment to remove the missiles would include launching pads, trucks and other paraphernalia that goes with the missile and K said that he would assume this to be so. K said if we did not raise too many questions, insist on looking into every box and otherwise raise objections which would convince them that we were merely trying to find obstacles to the fulfillment of our own guaranties, he was certain we would be able to work out reasonable details involved in this verification process without friction.

Mc asked him whether as an alternative they would permit inspection in Soviet ports of the off-loading. K thought this might involve complications and from all points of view it seemed better to do it at sea where we could be sure the ships had just come from Cuba. He wanted us to know that what they had done and what they were prepared to do was not a result of weakness--simply a desire to do all possible to maintain and consolidate the peace. The balance would remain the same as it was before but he repeated that the Soviet Government wants honestly to negotiate this matter of the removal of the weapons at once. They want to normalize the situation very promptly. They want the quarantine lifted as it is a wartime rather than a peacetime measure. They want to remove the atmosphere of war. K gave Mc a rough translation of a message from the Chairman<sup>2/</sup> to the effect that the Soviet Union seriously and sincerely sought to find a solution and make an effort to solve all the questions quickly on a basis of mutual conciliation and on the conditions which were stated in the letters of the President and the Chairman; and the Soviet Union expected that the United States will cooperate completely and promptly and lift the quarantine. The US should not doubt the full sincerity of the Soviet's statement regarding the dismantling and shipping out of the offensive weapons.

<sup>2/</sup>Document 145.

K indicated that if Castro gave his consent to an on-site inspection they might be willing to accept verification of the shipment at the docks in Cuba, but he said it was necessary to plan for other eventualities. He repeated that the whole job of dismantling and preparation for removal could be effected by November 10 and presumably the shipping schedule would begin then.

There were other questions in addition to this matter of verification, particularly the one as to the form of the protocol or the declaration giving the United States guaranties. Those guaranties would have to be clearly expressed against invasion by the United States, in accordance with the President's letter or permitting the mounting of an attack from the soil of the United States together with the use of the good offices of the United States to induce other Latin American countries to adopt the same attitude. K said there should also be some guaranties given against subversive activities against Cuba, at which point Mc interposed that this would be very difficult indeed to comply with inasmuch as Cuba was a hotbed of subversion itself and that we would and could do nothing which could be interpreted as support of Castro or his regime.

K also mentioned Guantanamo and Mc told him that it was out of the question that the United States would permit Guantanamo to be in any way related to the solution of the present Cuban problem. K rather pressed for a commitment on the part of the US to be willing to discuss the subject at sometime in the future but Mc told him that no joining of the Guantanamo question with this incident was feasible. As to the form of the US guaranty, K said he was not particularly concerned as to whether it was by protocol or by declaration although Zorin felt very strongly about this. Mc brought up the question of submarines and possible submarine bases and K said that this was something he was familiar with and he felt sure, particularly since the Chairman himself had given assurances on this subject, that the port was presently a fishing port with no intention of making it a submarine port. Mc referred to the presence of submarines in the area and stated that we were quite concerned about this as they seemed to be appearing in conjunction with the whole weapons buildup. Mc said he must realize what we object to is the establishment of a Soviet military base in Cuba--that defensive weapons can be supplied to the Cubans if they want to but they must be in the hands of Cubans and not Soviet troops or technicians. K said he understood this point of view--and how about Turkey. At this point K made quite an argument about our characterization of weapons in Turkey as defensive that we were calling offensive in Cuba. Mc said that we would be glad to talk to him about our bases abroad at some other time.



Mc also referred to the SAM sites and repeated that we could not give any credit to the statement that this weapons system was manned and operated by Cubans rather than Soviet technicians. Mc stated the evidence was conclusive of Soviet operations and that it was apparent that the whole complex was part and parcel of the buildup of the missile sites. K did not respond to this.

In regard to the President's requirement that there should be some safeguards against the re-introduction of these weapons beyond a mere undertaking by the Soviet Union, he made reference to U Thant's idea of a UN presence in the Caribbean on a reciprocal basis which should include UN observers in some sections of the United States. Mc told him that he thought this was out of the question. What then should be the form of the safeguards against the reintroduction of weapons? Mc told him that he hadn't come to any conclusions in this regard although this might be dealt with in some way by a declaration of nuclear free zones, a thought to which K had previously referred. K again came back to the question of subversion and a guaranty against subversion. Mc again repeated that we could not take any steps which would mean support of Castro or establishment of a safe haven for Castro's subversive activities against the rest of the hemisphere. Mc also told him that his representative, Morozov, in working out the Red Cross deal seemed to be rather sticky in regard to ships from which Red Cross personnel could inspect incoming vessels as well as in some other matters. Mc told him that K should be prepared to induce the Bloc ships to agree to the same procedures that the Soviet ships would agree to. Talk then turned to the type of ship which would be used by the Red Cross personnel. Mc urged him to accept a US ship rather than a neutral ship as a US ship would cost less and could be put into operation more expeditiously. K immediately countered with a Soviet ship stating that one could probably be made available just as rapidly from Havana as any US ship. Mc told him that he could not tell him whether a Soviet ship would be acceptable and argued in favor of a US ship such as a hospital ship or any other US ship utilizing a tender bearing a Red Cross or UN flag which tender would actually serve as the means by which incoming ships were boarded.

K then brought up the hail and pass formula and said that he understood that all the Red Cross would do would be to hail and pass. Mc disabused him of this and said that there would be no sense in having Red Cross personnel if this were all that was to be done. The hail and pass formula had been intended as a temporary measure to permit Soviet ships for a brief interval to enter Cuban ports carrying food or other innocent cargo until the Red Cross operation could be put into effect provided this could be done reasonably promptly. K seemed to accept this.

Finally K registered an objection to our constant reference to the deception that the officials of this country had been exposed. There had been no obligation to tell us of the character of weapons they were introducing into the Island of Cuba. Mc said that this was probably so but there was an obligation among the friendly countries to respond truthfully to an inquiry when so much was at stake.

At the end K asked Mc what his reaction was to his earlier proposal to which Mc replied that it showed evidence of their effort to try to meet the problem of their inability to obtain the on-the-ground inspection to which the Soviet Union had been committed, but he could not say more until after Mc again had consulted his Government.

K said we must take this as the basis for other long range negotiations because it is clear we should not risk the danger involved in another such confrontation. Mc refrained from asking what these long range negotiations might cover for fear of having them complicate the immediate problem, but he agreed as to the necessity of eventual long range discussions and hoped that the constructive solution of the present difficulty would lead to them.

Stevenson

### **143. Summary Record of the 20th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, November 5, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret. The meeting lasted until 10:40 a.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

Director McCone presented the intelligence summary./1/ He then compared our figures on strategic missiles in Cuba with the Russian figures which Kuznetsov gave to McCloy yesterday./2/ Kuznetsov says the Russians sent forty-two missiles to Cuba. We had estimated that there were forty-eight Soviet missiles in Cuba, thirty-three of which we have actually seen.

/1/Based in part on CIA memorandum, "The Crisis, USSR/Cuba," Information as of 6 a.m. November 5, in which the lack of agreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba on inspection in Cuba and verification of the removal of Soviet missiles was highlighted. (Ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24) McCone's memorandum for the record of this meeting, November 5, indicated that he also summarized other intelligence reports, including the SC 11157/62, a special memorandum on offensive missile strength in Cuba. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President) See the Supplement.

/2/See Document 142.

Secretary McNamara reported on the aerial reconnaissance missions of yesterday. Two U-2 missions aborted yesterday because of mechanical failure. Five more U-2s are flying today.

Secretary Rusk reported on the McCloy/Kuznetsov conversation yesterday. The Russians are prepared to give us an actual missile inventory, including the shipping schedules, so that we can count the missiles on their way out. Secretary Rusk said he continued to believe that we must have inspection arrangements on the ground in Cuba. We need a UN presence in Cuba, plus a Latin American atom-free treaty zone, if Castro will accept such. If not, we must refuse to give a commitment not to invade and we must continue aerial reconnaissance missions and our present intelligence efforts on the ground in Cuba. We are unable to put forward an inspection plan until we know what Mikoyan has proposed to the Cubans and what Castro has agreed to accept.

The President recalled that Zorin wanted a protocol covering the agreement on the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles. He asked that thought be given to how this might be done.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the difficulty of legislating on Communist subversion in the hemisphere.

The President asked:

1. How we would get a guarantee that no Soviet submarine base would be built in Cuba.
2. How to get out the IL-28 bombers.
3. What was our position if a demand were made that UN observers inspect refugee camps in the U.S. and in other areas where Cuban nationalists might receive military training.
4. How the U.S. or the UN would continue reconnaissance flights.

The President's basic question was how much should we give for a permanent UN presence in Cuba. He believed that we should keep open the question of accepting UN observers in the U.S. until we knew exactly what we would get in return.

Secretary Rusk emphasized that all arrangements arising out of the current situation must focus on Cuba. Comparable actions such as inspection in Cuba in return for the UN investigation of complaints about the U.S.

were difficult, not only for the U.S., but for other members of the OAS. As to future assurances, we want a permanent UN presence in Cuba for which we would guarantee that we would not invade. For us, the UN presence would be a guarantee against the reintroduction of strategic missiles. We should think about overflights of Cuba and the U.S. and about a UN presence in Florida as well as in Cuba.

Mr. Bundy said that the UN route to the demilitarization of Cuba would lead to a realignment of our relations with Castro.

Secretary Rusk said we must under all circumstances continue to overfly Cuba. The President asked how we would continue to overfly as long as the SAM sites were operational. Secretary Rusk replied that our overflights would continue by tacit agreement of the Cubans and the Russians.

The President asked whether a group was at work on what to tell McCloy in answer to questions raised by Kuznetsov. He believed that if Mikoyan asks Kuznetsov about our future assurances with respect to Cuba, McCloy should be in a position to respond. Secretary Rusk preferred to delay sending our final position to McCloy until after we knew what took place in Havana.

The President agreed that no release should be made to the press of pictures which reveal Soviet activity yesterday in Cuban ports. He added that we might have the International Red Cross inspect incoming ships and we would look at ships leaving Cuba. He agreed that we could delay reaching a final position on the permanent arrangements, but we should not discuss any arrangements for the time being with Mikoyan./3/

/3/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting. It summarized the decisions and major points of the discussion and noted that a cable would be sent to McCloy which would give answers to the questions posed by Kuznetsov on November 4. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24) See the Supplement. For the cable to McCloy, see Document 147.

Bromley Smith/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

#### **144. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to President Kennedy**

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62. Top Secret. Drafted and initialed by Robert Kennedy. Copies sent to McGeorge Bundy and Rusk.

Washington, November 5, 1962.

Dobrynin asked earlier this morning if I could see him and I made arrangements to have him come to the office at 12 o'clock Noon.

He delivered another letter from Mr. Khrushchev./1/ I read it and found that it concerned our list of offensive weapons that Stevenson had submitted.

/1/Document 145.

I explained to Dobrynin that from the first it had been made clear by the Soviet Union that they would get rid of any weapons which we considered offensive and certainly it was very clear that the bombers, the IL 28's, had to go. Dobrynin replied that he was not familiar with that position and also did not know what was on the list that Khrushchev mentioned in his letter. I told him I would get a copy of it; that it was basically the same list of

weapons that had been listed in the President's Quarantine Proclamation. He replied he would obtain a copy from Kuznetsov.

During the middle of the conversation the President called and said that he had just received some preliminary information which indicated that several of our planes over Cuba had been fired upon. In ending my conversation with Dobrynin, therefore, I stressed the fact that any arrangements that were made were dependent upon there not being any incidents in the air above Cuba.

#### **145. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy**

Moscow, undated.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62. No classification marking. According to *Problems of Communism* the Russian text was transmitted by the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Embassy in Washington on November 4. A note on the source text indicates it was received on November 5. Other copies are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, and *ibid.*: Lot 66 D 204.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I have just received information from Mr. V. Kuznetsov, our representative at the negotiations in New York for liquidation of the tense situation around Cuba, that Mr. Stevenson handed him a list of weapons which your side calls offensive.<sup>/1/</sup> I have studied the list and, I must confess, the approach of the American side to this matter has seriously worried me. In such a move, I will say frankly, I see a wish to complicate the situation, because it is impossible indeed to place into the category of "offensive" weapons such types of weapons which have always been referred to as defensive weapons even by a man uneducated militarily--by a common soldier, not to say of an officer.

<sup>/1/</sup>See footnote 3, Document 133.

It is hard for us to understand what aim is being pursued by the introduction of that list, by setting forth such a demand--in any case it must be some other aim, but not a desire for a speediest clearing of the atmosphere. And it is being done at a moment when we have already agreed with you on the main questions and when we on our part have already fulfilled what we agreed upon--have dismantled rocket weapons, are loading them now on ships and these weapons will be soon shipped from Cuba. That is why I feel greatly concerned with the advancing of such demand by the American side, concerned with its possible consequences, if necessary reasonableness is not displayed.

The demand which has been set forth is evidently pursuing, as I have already said, some other aims and that--I would wish, Mr. President, that you understand me correctly--can lead not to the betterment of our relations but, on the contrary, to their new aggravation. We should understand the position each side is in and take it into consideration but not overburden, not complicate our relations, especially at such an important moment when measures are being taken to eliminate the acute tension and bring these relations to a normal state.

That is why I would ask you, Mr. President, to meet our anxiety with understanding, to take measures on your side in order not to complicate the situation and to give your representatives a directive to eliminate the existing tension on the basis upon which both of us have agreed by having exchanged public messages. You spoke to the effect that missiles which you called offensive should be removed from Cuba. We agreed to that. You in your turn gave assurances that the so-called "quarantine" would be promptly removed and that no invasion of Cuba would be made, not only by the U.S. but by other countries of the Western hemisphere either.

Let us then bring the achieved understanding to a completion, so that we could consider that each side has fulfilled its pledges and the question has been settled. If, however, additional demands are made, then that means only one thing--the danger that the difficulties on the way to eliminating tension created around Cuba will not be

removed. But that may raise then new consequences.

I think that you will understand me correctly. For you and I will evidently have to deal not only with elimination of the remnants of the present tension--there lies ahead for you and me a great, serious talk on other questions. Why then start now complicating the situation by minor things. May be there exist some considerations, but they are beyond our comprehension. As for us, we view the introduction of additional demands as a wish to bring our relations back again into a heated state in which they were but several days ago.

Sincerely,

N. Khrushchev/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

#### **146. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, November 5, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B10285A, Memos for the Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone.

#### **SUBJECT**

Discussion with Mr. Bundy at 1:45 this date

I commented on Governor Stevenson's report #1630, November 4th, midnight,/1/ summarizing the McCloy/Kuznetsov meeting. I stated that we felt that the meeting was constructive, stating McCloy had adhered to policy but pointed out that the examination of missile cases on ships would not necessarily constitute convincing proof that missiles were actually exported; that no arrangement has been agreed on IL 28s, and that no form of verification short of a combination of aerial and on-site inspection would give us final answer. Bundy gave me a copy of draft of President Kennedy's cable to Stevenson and McCloy, November 5, copy attached./2/ I commented as follows:

/1/Document 142.

/2/Not attached, but see Document 147.

I felt that we faced a serious problem in the future of Cuba and read my memo of 5 November (copy attached). In addition I stated that it seemed to me that we were going too far in assuming that we would have to grant reciprocal rights if we insisted on UN on-site inspection, of which my point was that the Kennedy/Khrushchev agreement provided for inspection of the dismantling, removal and continuing absence of offensive weapons and this agreement in no way referred to inspection of U.S. territory. Therefore it seems to me that the effect of the negotiation is to set up a situation in which we will have to submit to a situation not anticipated in the agreement if we are going to force the other sides to fulfill their obligations. Secondly, the question of the SAM sites. I advised Bundy that the building of the expensive SAM installation and the large number of operators required were the principal reasons that I suspected installation of offensive missiles. I could not rationalize the Soviet move on any other basis. I was now equally disturbed at the Soviet's insistence that the SAMs remain in being and operational and their obvious deception in claiming they are operated by Cubans and not by Soviet personnel. I explained that I now feel that the SAMs are being left there to shield the reintroduction of missiles at some future time or the emplacement of missiles which are secretly detained on the Island. There can be no other explanation. The SAMs are useless as a defense against our military action as our attacking planes can come up in low undetected and destroy them instantly. Therefore they are targeted against U-2s. By leaving them on the

Island the gravest situation faces us. We will be in complete ignorance of their activities and the reintroduction of weapons at a future time is a distinct possibility.

In later conversation with the AG I made both of these points very emphatically. He said he would discuss them personally with the President.

John A. McCone/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**Attachment/4/**

/4/Secret. Prepared by McCone.

#### PROBLEMS WE FACE IN THE FUTURE IN CUBA

1. Castro will retain power. He will be given Soviet assurances and economic assistance to permit him to "ride through" the recent fiasco. He will hold his political organization together. It will be more violent than it has in the past.
2. Militarily he will be stronger. Undoubtedly vast quantities of armament has been received recently (Note: we should enumerate types and quantities identified from pictures). He therefore has more for his own defense and to pass out to insurgent groups throughout the hemisphere.
3. He will have a maritime capacity against Central America and the northern tier of Latin American by the utilization of 6 Khronstad and 18 Komar vessels.
4. He will have an air strike capability against this same area with IL 28s.
5. By retaining the SAMs, he will provide a shield against aerial inspection and therefore can arrange with the Soviets for the re-introduction of MRBMs and IRBMs with reasonable safety as the SAMs will protect him against our U-2 photography. This was the original purpose of the installation of the SAMs and there can be no question but that their retention is for no other purpose than to provide this same protection for the installation of MRBMs in the future.
6. Sophisticated communication equipment will give him an improved capability to communicate with Moscow and also to broadcast instructions to his agents and operators throughout the Hemisphere.

John A. McCone/5/

Director

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

#### **147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations**

Washington, November 5, 1962, 3:20 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-562. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy and cleared by Ball. A draft of this telegram with Bundy's handwritten revisions is *ibid*.

1194. Eyes only Stevenson and McCloy from President. Your conversation with Kuznetsov/1/ shows progress

on one important point but raises a number of questions on which I wish to comment.

/1/See Document 142.

If we can see and count for ourselves departing missiles and associated equipment, that will be an important forward step and we see promise in the procedures Kuznetsov proposed as long as it is clear that reliable observation, not Soviet photography alone, is essential.

One serious gap in Kuznetsov's proposal respecting missiles is the absence of any reference to nuclear warheads. Our interest in their absence is intense, and you should emphasize to all Soviets that since Khrushchev spoke to Knox of the presence of such warheads in Cuba, we need assurances on warheads as much as on missiles themselves. Moreover, we need to know about possible warheads for IL28's and even MIG 21's.

This warhead problem highlights the general importance of post-removal verification in Cuba itself. Forty-two missiles is a plausible number and not inconsistent with our own reports, but Soviet figures, while genuinely useful, are not a wholly reliable basis for action. In this connection you should not hesitate to press home with Kuznetsov the fact that past Soviet deception remains a major element in our reaction to this whole episode. It may be true, as Kuznetsov argues, that the Soviets had no obligation to tell us exactly what they were doing in a country like Cuba, but what actually happened in this case was that they repeatedly gave us assurances of what they were not doing. These assurances came from highest levels, and proved absolutely false.

Your insistence on the removal of IL28's, the unacceptability of any submarine support facility, and obvious Soviet involvement in SAM complex are all correct and worth repeating insistently. You are also right to resist guarantees on subversion and to keep Guantanamo out of it.

With respect to U.S. guarantees, we are not yet ready to give you more detailed instructions, but these three general points may be helpful:

(1) No long-term arrangements can be settled until after we have reached clear understanding on verified removal of offensive weapons systems, including IL28's.

(2) OAS-approved right of surveillance will be kept intact and is important to both sides as last week's flights showed. In this connection you should report to Kuznetsov that today one of our low-level flights was harassed by MIG's apparently manned by Soviets. No damage was done, and it is not clear that MIG's fired, but episode provides good basis for you to drive home our view of critical importance of unimpeded surveillance unless and until better arrangements can be made. You should remind Kuznetsov that surveillance must and will continue, and that further interference will be sure to bring prompt reaction including armed action if necessary.

(3) We do not wholly exclude some form of international inspection involving Caribbean areas outside Cuba, at a later stage. Ours is an open society, and the principle of reciprocal inspection is one of high value to us if it can be established in the right circumstances. You should emphasize that such reciprocal inspection can only be considered in return for permanently verified absence of any significant Soviet military presence in Cuba. You might try out the notion of removal of SAM sites in this connection./2/

/2/In telegram 1200 to USUN, November 5, 10:59 p.m., the Department of State provided Stevenson and McCloy with a long guidance, as a followup to Kuznetsov's suggested procedures and as a guide to the kind of inspection procedures required to check out-going cargoes. These procedures were prepared by an interagency panel. In discussing these procedures, Stevenson and McCloy were to stress that the United States still insisted on UN inspection in Cuba to guard against hidden or reintroduced offensive weapons. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-562) See the Supplement.

Rusk

#### **148. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamara**

Washington, November 5, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Cuba, General, 11/1/62-11/6/62. Top Secret.

We must operate on the presumption that the Russians may try again. This time they may prepare themselves for action on the sea in the Cuban area. Does Admiral Anderson think they could build up a secret subterranean base which will put them on a near parity with us if we should once again blockade. If he thinks there is substantial danger of this what suggestions would he now make?

John F. Kennedy/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates President Kennedy signed the original. Another note in the same hand reads: "Despatched by receipt #1073--11/15/63--3:30 p.m."

#### **149. Telegram From President Kennedy to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)**

Washington, November 5, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/1/62-11/6/62. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Urgent. This message was ostensibly from Bromley Smith, but it was sent apparently at the instruction of the President. The following times are handwritten on the source text: 3:30 p.m., 4:05, 4:35. It was received in the White House situation room at 5:20 p.m.

CAP 55515-62. Deliver immediately to Executive Secretariat for Ball and Alexis Johnson. Begin message: Your conversation with Kuznetsov/1/ shows progress on one important point but raises a number of questions on which I wish to comment.

/1/Presumably a reference to the discussion in Document 142.

If we can see and count for ourselves departing missiles and associated equipment, that will be an important forward step and we see promise in the procedures Kuznetsov proposed as long as it is clear that reliable observation, not Soviet photography alone, is essential. End of message.

#### **150. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamara**

Washington, November 5, 1962.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962 (McNamara's working papers). Top Secret.

As I have communicated to General Wheeler, through General Clifton, the plans for X/1/ seem thin. Considering the size of the problem, the equipment that is involved on the other side, the nationalistic fervor which may be engendered, it seems to me we could end up bogged down.

/1/The reference to "plans for X" was to CINCLANT OPLAN 316, designed to exploit an unforeseen turn of events in Cuba that offered a worthwhile opportunity for exploitation by the United States. The range of circumstances in which this plan would be implemented ranged from support of a widespread rebellion of the Cuban population to military action to divert Castro from military adventure against Guantanamo. The reaction



time for the plan was 5 days. The concept called for airborne assault in the vicinity of Havana by two airborne divisions, followed as quickly as possible by an amphibious assault by the 2d Marine Division/Wing Team over beaches to the east of Havana. Depending upon the amount of time for build-up, additional forces would be committed incrementally until approximately five full divisions, with necessary supporting troops, would be engaged. This plan was known as "quick reaction plan." (Cuban Crisis, Operational Aspects, December 26; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Cuba, High-level Exchange)

I think we should keep constantly in mind the British in Boer War, the Russians in the last war with the Finnish and our own experience with the North Koreans. We are keeping, as I understand it, three divisions in reserve. I think we should plan to use them and call up any guard divisions we have available. This may require us to build additional divisions.

John Kennedy

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