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Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

151. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, November 6, 1962, 1 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Background Papers--Cuba. Secret. Received at the Department of State at 1:50 a.m. According to the USUN copy of this telegram, it was drafted by Akalovsky and cleared in substance by Stevenson. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963)

1642. Dept pass White House. Eyes only for Secretary. Cuba. Stevenson and McCloy had a three-and-a-half hour meeting with Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelevich today. Following summary based on uncleared memcon./1/

/1/A 19-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which took place on November 5, from 6 to 9:30 p.m. at the Soviet Mission in New York, is *ibid.*, 1A October/November Meetings.

1. Stevenson and McCloy referred to Kuznetsov's conversation with McCloy yesterday,/2/ in which former expressed misgivings re inclusion IL-28 aircraft in armaments subject to removal. Kuznetsov, frequently drawing upon prepared text, stated following:

/2/November 4, an apparent reference to Document 142.

A. Sov Govt displeased with Stevenson's Nov 2 letter to Mikoyan;/3/

/3/See footnote 3, Document 133.

B. Sovs surprised IL-28 aircraft regarded by US as offensive, because they basically obsolete in view their low ceiling and low speed. These aircraft, which 15 years old, belong to coastal defenses and cannot be used in combat over enemy territory;

C. US demands this respect can be regarded only as attempt delay solution of problem and continue tense relations between US and USSR;

D. USSR conducting present negotiations in good faith and wishes speedy agreement and normalization situation in Caribbean; if US also honest in its pledge re non-invasion, it should not be disturbed by exist-ence IL-28 aircraft in Cuban hands, since they defensive and subsidiary arms;

E. Cuba sovereign state and can determine itself its defensive needs; no offensive weapons exist in Cuba;

F. Negotiations should center on main problem at hand and raising additional questions can only complicate matters.

Stevenson and McCloy stressed question IL-28 aircraft not new, since President's October 22 statement, quarantine proclamation, as well as October 28 letter contained either specific or general reference to offensive weapons other than missiles. Pointed out jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear warheads could hardly be qualified as obsolete. Noted such armaments in hands of man like Castro could create gravest situation, and LA countries deeply concerned by this. Denied Kuznetsov's insinuation US seeking obstruct negotiations by raising this very important question. After prolonged exchange, in course of which Stevenson and McCloy continued press for removal IL-28 aircraft and Kuznetsov reiterated essentially same points as listed above, Kuznetsov contended negotiations must not depart from President-Khrushchev agreement, substance of which he described as follows:

A. US is to give assurances against invasion of Cuba either by US or by its Allies, or by any state in Western hemisphere; Kuznetsov commented US trying evade this subject;

B. As evident from Khrushchev's message, USSR will remove missiles which President regards as offensive. He commented there no question that missiles had been subject President-Khrushchev exchange, Security Council debate, and current talks.

In response to direct question whether USSR would include IL-28's in arms to be removed, Kuznetsov replied in negative, stating that they not offensive arms and SovGov would act accordingly. Suggested both sides report problem to their govts.

2. Kuznetsov referred to schedule of removal, saying first Soviet vessel, Labinsk, due to leave November 6, with eight other ships, Bratsk, Leninskiy Komsomol, Kurchatov, Asosov, Divnogorsk, Volgoles, Polzunov, Alapayevsk, to leave November 7. Said he had no information whether this would complete removal operation.

3. Kuznetsov said USSR had decided make Sov vessel Almata available for verification inbound ships by ICRC. Details re signals and identification would have [to] be worked out and appropriate information had been given to member UN Secretariat. This vessel would be stationed north of Cuba and all Sov ships bound for Cuba would use only northern route, although southern route might be used after November 12.

McCloy and Stevenson pointed out no commitment had been made re US willingness accept Soviet ship, and noted neutral, i.e., Swedish, ship could also be used. Kuznetsov professed surprise, claiming US had not objected to Soviet ship. McCloy reiterated he had expressly stated he could not commit US Govt re use of Soviet ship.

4. McCloy then raised subject of removal of warheads, pointing out this very important matter, and wondered how USSR could satisfy US re their removal. Kuznetsov asserted this question of detail; USSR's actions clearly indicate that all equipment related to what US calls offensive missiles will be removed. Thus, there should be no doubt re warheads, if warheads are indeed in Cuba. USSR intends fulfill all these commitments in good faith, but US raising these questions in order postpone final solution of problem. Stevenson and McCloy stressed importance removal warheads, pointing out that with some modification they could also be used on bombers. Suggested verification removal of warheads could perhaps be done on see-and-count basis as Kuznetsov had suggested for missiles. Stevenson noted problem of warheads highlighted importance ground inspection, and wondered what progress Mikoyan had made in Havana. Asked when Mikoyan returning. Kuznetsov replied he did not know. McCloy said President regarded McCloy-Kuznetsov conversation yesterday as useful and indicating progress, to which Kuznetsov replied he gratified hear this and observed such appraisal fully justified, particularly since USSR doing everything necessary to resolve problem ASAP. Reiterated that as to warheads, USSR would remove from Cuba everything related to "so-called" offensive missiles, but noted he could not say anything beyond that.

5. In summing up conversation Stevenson listed following questions as remaining open: Removal IL-28 aircraft, nationality inspection ship, and verification removal of warheads, although Kuznetsov had given assurances warheads would be removed. Kuznetsov disagreed, saying there no open question from Sov standpoint. Concluded US should consider Soviet deeds and respond in kind.

Stevenson

152. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.

Washington, November 6, 1962, 9:50 a.m.

Ball reported the Secretary's conversation to Bundy/1/ saying the Secretary suggested the three of them sort this thing out and decide what we want to do. Ball is reluctant because we also have McCone and Bobby. Bundy said that Bobby was away today and the President doesn't get back until the middle of the afternoon. It doesn't seem complicated to him, but he would be glad to sit down with Ball and Bob. Ball said he was concerned as 90% of them might be at sea by tonight. Bundy said we only have to say "We know you are going to sea." Whatever happens, let it happen at sea. They won't cross the Atlantic overnight. All we have to do today is to point out the rapid departure and emphasize the speed in the verification procedure. Ball thought the farther out to sea they get the more difficult it would be for psychological reasons.

/1/In this telephone conversation, November 6, 9:45 a.m., Rusk suggested that since McNamara could not attend a meeting, Ball, Bundy, and McNamara should work out the policy for verification of missiles leaving on Soviet ships that day. (Ibid.)

Bundy thought rather than have the Executive Committee meeting, he would like to have a clear sense that Ball, the Secretary, Bob and Bundy know what we want to do and check it out with the President; then proceed on that basis.

Ball told him that Bob thought we ought to make immediate representation to Kuznetsov; that since they are leaving, it is urgent to get a neutral observer on board. The easiest way to do it is to take a US ship alongside, and if they won't do it, would we take a Soviet ship to do it. We ought to have someone alongside to take a picture. Bundy asked if they were willing to have a US ship alongside and Ball replied they talked like they were prepared to do it. We could also get good photographs of the cargo. These missiles are not crated; they are under tarps, so that it is pretty good from that point of view. Also if we could get the tarp rolled back to make sure they are not duds, and take some pictures. Bundy would be inclined to take up Kuznetsov on his offer yesterday for UN ships alongside and if we can't count through the tarps ask to see under them. Bundy will check this out with Bob and the President and call Ball back./2/ Bundy said he did not get the impression from the conversation that they talked hard about the danger of the MIG business. He suggested that Ball go into that with Ros--he said he meant the MIGs scramble. He will report back to Ball after talking with Bob.

/2/Bundy telephoned Ball at 10 a.m. to report that McNamara agreed to Ball's suggestion. Bundy could not reach the President, but he expected that Kennedy would call when he arrived at Hyannisport. Bundy suggested Ball proceed and promised to call after talking to the President. (Ibid.) Bundy called Ball at 10:25 a.m. to say that the President agreed, but "he would like to get a little neutrality on board if it could work." Bundy thought it would be too complicated, and Ball agreed it would be "unrealistic" to try to get neutral observers on board Soviet ships. Both men concluded that the only plan was to get alongside the Soviet ships, "haggle from there." The President wanted Gilpatric to do the haggling in New York. (Ibid.)

153. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Among the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson), the Under Secretary of State (Ball), and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

November 6, 1962, 11:30 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking. Stevenson was in New York; Ball and Johnson were in Washington. Yost also participated in the conversation.

Stevenson--When does Gilpatric get here?

Ball--He is on the other line now. He is in New York, I will find out where he is. He is in New York and calling in on another phone. Alex Johnson is talking to him./1/ He is at the Waldorf Towers.

/1/Ball and Johnson talked to Gilpatric at 11:15 a.m., apparently Johnson stayed on the line while Ball talked to Stevenson. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

Stevenson--All right. We will get him over here as quickly as we can.

Ball--What we should do is to get back to the Russians and this is what Gilpatric is being told to get in touch with you about and since these things are going out of there we want to arrange to get these things photographed at close range and look at them. This is probably the best we can do under the circumstances.

Stevenson--I got a long God damn thing from the Department today./2/

/2/Telegram 1200 to USUN, November 5, 10:59 p.m., see footnote 2, Document 147.

Ball--Let me put Alex Johnson on because he wrote this long damn thing from the Department today./3/

/3/Captain Elmo Zumwalt and Joseph Sisco drafted the telegram and Johnson cleared it.

Stevenson--There is one ship already sailing. We have to get on to that one I suspect right away. This thing--5--requires a verification at sea and a loading time which we don't have. I think maybe we can start with "D"--inspection from along side./4/ Can we skip everything before that?

/4/Section 5, "Required Verification at Sea," subsection d, "Inspection from Along Side," was considered in this telegram as an acceptable fall-back position. If this was to be the verification mode, then the guidelines in this telegram suggested that all offensive equipment had to be on deck and uncrated.

Johnson--Yes, skip everything before that and go to "D".

Stevenson--All right. I think--if the United States is limited to inspect from along side the vessel, how the hell can we do that if they loaded from below?

Ball--What we really need is this--what we really need to see are the missiles. The photographs we have indicate that they are in the process of loading the 26 out of the 42. We have to tell them we have to see all the missiles and if we can pull along side and see the missiles and make sure they are not dummies.

Stevenson--This telegram goes into such minute detail. Should we just disregard this and decide now what we want to do?

Ball--All right. I think we can. First, have a ship pull along side these ships and we will photograph from the ship or helicopter, or something like that, but at close range so that we can count for each missile; and have the tarpaulin pulled back so that we can see there are missiles under there.

Stevenson--We are not going to insist on boarding or uncrating.

Johnson--They are being loaded and covered with tarpaulins. It would be easy to the advantage of everyone if we could go on board and examine them, but if we could come along side and check that there actually is a missile under the tarpaulin that would be OK.

Stevenson--You want to see what is above deck on the associated equipment?

Ball--Yes, but we don't have to account for all of it.

Stevenson--We are going to have a hard time getting that. We will have to move awfully fast on this. I think we ought to see if we can get a loading plan.

Ball--Yes.

Stevenson--What else about this?

Ball--Plus the instructions that the ships--we pull a ship along side and the right to take the picture from a helicopter.

Stevenson--All right.

Ball--Hold on, I will make sure about Gilpatric. Gilpatric will come right over.

Stevenson--All right. You told me about the ship inspection from along side. What about this associated equipment and missiles, do we have to see all of these things?

Ball--No, we just want to make sure that enough of it is going on board. Some will be deck loaded.

Stevenson--That is they are not holding back what they said they have?

Ball--That's right. We are not going to try to take an inventory or count it on a piece-by-piece basis. I think this is what we will have to settle for.

Stevenson--Yes, I think this is what we will have to settle for. They are going to try to short circuit the ground inspection. This thing got so vicious last night/5/--we have got to pull our wits together. If I can't get some instructions pretty soon on the guaranty they are going to clam up. I have been waiting for some instructions for the guaranty for weeks.

/5/See Document 151.

Ball--We are going to have a meeting this afternoon/6/ and we will try to get something out.

/6/See Document 154.

Stevenson--I wish they would talk to me before they send these instructions out.

Ball--I think this thing I have just given you is fairly realistic.

Stevenson--Yes, I think this is all right.

Ball--I don't think we give up on the ground inspection.

Stevenson--You mean on the shipments or verification after the fact?

Ball--Verification after the fact.

Stevenson--Yes. The other thing we are going to have to take up again is this warhead business. What is your position on that? How can you tell if they have warheads?

Ball--One with a Geiger counter, I would think. I think our chances on doing anything on that are very slight. I think we should keep it for conversational purposes.

Stevenson--I don't know. If we don't have anything to say it is not very good conversation.

Ball--Ros is on his way there now. I think you should sit down and talk to him and see what you ought to recommend and get back here and I will see if I can clear it out.

Stevenson--Have we got any great signal forms on the ships?

Ball--Great signal forms on the ships?

Stevenson--Yes.

Johnson--Oh, you mean signaling from our ships to theirs?

Stevenson--Yes.

Johnson--No, I don't think anyone contemplated that it would be used.

Stevenson--Telling them that our ship so and so will come by at a certain time.

Ball--We could furnish them that.

Stevenson--It is going to be rough. Most of the details I don't know about and I would like to know about. I am going to have to proceed in writing or God knows where we will be. I want to know all the details about this particular aspect of it.

Johnson--We will undertake to get those details.

Ball--I think you should talk to Gilpatric about that and he can work it out directly with the Navy people and Defense. We would have to go back through them anyway on this.

Stevenson--On the warheads, you have given up I gather.

Ball--No, I don't think, we are going to get it. We want to be satisfied the warheads are out. What suggestions can they make?

Stevenson--They say they haven't any except their commitment that they would remove from the island anything that is offensive. I gather, by some small modification, you could use a missile warhead on an airplane. We can't

go on this way, George, it is intolerable, by having a lot of ambiguous talk. Yesterday they insisted that McCloy had agreed to the Soviet ship on Sunday and bitter accusations of bad faith. I think all McCloy said was he didn't personally care if it was a Soviet ship or not but that he couldn't commit the Government. I think we have to have a much higher degree of realism. They are going to stall on this ground verification because they can't get it.

Ball--Right.

Stevenson--You see what I mean?

Ball--Sure.

Stevenson--They are going to say "No more overflights." We will have to face this one in the course of the negotiations. They were insistent on bringing it up last night and I am sure they are going to say we have a few things you know about.

Ball--Did they get into the overflights last night?

Stevenson--No, but they got into the guarantees. I can ask questions like where will the warheads be and on what missiles and can we work out some scheme of identifying them above deck.

Ball--I think that is good.

Stevenson--Let's talk about the IL-28's here. Mikoyan ran into trouble on the IL-28's after he got down there. They now have gotten sticky as hell on this. They may be introducing this as a bargaining point on something else. In all events we have to make up our minds and I think on the removal of the IL-28's and that raises the question of airing nuclear bombs and how to get removal and also whether conventional bombs are going to be removed. I think all of these things I have to have some broad general sort of objective to obtain they are realistic. But I am pretty familiar with the other kind. We might as well forget the thing on conventional bombs. If we could just disregard that and get the record clear then we could concentrate on the thing which we can insist on more legitimately. The IL-28 as an aircraft and any nuclear weapons they carry.

Ball--I think that is fine.

Stevenson--If anyone has any ideas of what we can ask for or how many it should bring in and give us some assurance that you have taken them out . . .

Ball--We have a way of getting that at a high level.

Stevenson--You mean a message to Khrushchev?

Ball--Yes.

Stevenson--I think that is the only way really. I would think if we are going to do anything about this we should move on this promptly.

Ball--What I think would be most helpful for us--Ros is on his way down there now and if you could work something out and put it to us and we could get answers for you and he could interpret back to McNamara the way it looks from New York.

Ball--I think on this one point of these arrangements on these ships that you and Ros should go to work on that right away.

Stevenson--And you will be working on the guarantees. We have to button up on the Red Cross coming in, which is nonsense anyway, we will have to reach an agreement actually within hours as to if it will be a Swedish ship or a Soviet ship. We opened that one up again last night and any remarks that McCloy made about a Soviet ship have been erased. The negotiators are waiting here to see what they are to negotiate about.

Ball--I think the Swedish ship could be made available.

Stevenson--Is that what we want?

Ball--Yes.

Stevenson--All right, we will reject the Soviet ship. We will instruct the UN to charter the Swedish ship.

Ball--Gilpatric knows where the Swedish ship is.

Stevenson--All right. I would make this as simple as possible. I would tie it to the invasion and to the commitments in the inter-American agreement and then let me present it along with a demand for a reciprocal promise from them that they won't reintroduce these weapons into Cuba. We have never let any doubt but that we were not going to make any guaranty at all.

Johnson--Yes. We want some verification of not introducing these then we can make one kind of a guaranty. If it is simple the removal of the missile without any

Stevenson--When you say guaranty against reintroduction, what do you mean?

Johnson--Some arrangement in Cuba on missiles--something to verify that these weapons are not being reintroduced.

Stevenson--If we are ready for that I think we can get something. That would mean inspection of the United States and on intervening countries.

Ball--In the message we sent up yesterday/7/ we didn't reject

/7/Apparent reference to Document 147.

Stevenson--I think it would be helpful if we could proceed on the assumption that mutual inspection is something that will have to be worked out over a period of time by the Caribbean Defense Committee. We will guaranty against invasion by the United States in exchange for Soviet guaranty that they will not reintroduce these weapons in Cuba.

Johnson--What would the Cubans do under that?

Stevenson--They wouldn't do anything. Let's get this transaction completed first and then we will sit down and negotiate what we can do and undertake with Cuba on all of these things. Unless we have some very clear line that we ought to pursue right now it is difficult to deal with this. I don't want to go over with a lot of vague alternatives. We can say if you don't give us grounds and verification then we must ask for this. If you do and I don't know what that could be, I don't think they will ever buy it. They will immediately charge us with bad faith. They will say we have introduced new matter and we will have another bad time. I do think that probably we should separate two things--one is the immediate deal with the Russians and the other is future arrangements with Cuba. On the one with the Russians if we settle with a simple guaranty now and then assume we will run our air reconnaissance, this will present a very serious problem. It will be asserted into the Security Council over and over, regardless of what we promised. What we could do is for the future we will have to preserve the line to

run reconnaissance flights to assure these weapons will not be reintroduced.

Johnson--Isn't it very difficult for us to give--it seems to me it is very difficult for us to give that guaranty without Cuba in turn having done something.

Stevenson--I think we could ask Cuba to give us a guaranty that she won't introduce these weapons. It is the verification procedure. I don't want to get in a position where they now want to trade off Guantanamo for something more. It is the sort of thing we should get some of your views on as promptly as possible. Somehow we have been able to go through these meetings by saying you will get your guarantees; and then they get into the subject of protocol and a registered agreement.

Johnson--We hope to get to this at the meeting this afternoon, then we will get something to you.

Stevenson--I can hold it off today.

Johnson--They haven't given us ground verification.

Stevenson--That is the one big handle we have got.

Johnson--If we get the IL-28's and ground verification

Stevenson--That is only one verification for compliance it doesn't take care of the future. McCloy has come to the conclusion that the ground verification is a lot of nonsense and he is against doing it. They are going to be almost impossible to find.

Johnson--That is the problem on it.

Stevenson--I have one other point--this business of the press stories that come from Washington, when we manage to keep this place silent, has caused us grief for two weeks. Every day there is a new story in the newspapers coming from Washington. I must have some knowledge in advance of what they are putting out down there, in the State Department, the Defense Department and the White House.

Ball--I don't think any of it is going out through official channels. The Department is not putting anything out.

Stevenson--Isn't Sylvester and Manning briefing people all the time?

Ball--No.

Yost--What about the Maggie Higgins story this morning about the Kuznetsov-McCloy talks?

Stevenson--It didn't come from here. We maintain total silence here and down there there is a gush of talk. It goes to the Secretary General and we have to unwrap it, it goes to the Russians and we have to clear it up with them.

Ball--It causes me as much pain and anguish as it does you.

Stevenson--Well, the resentment of the press here

Ball--Yes, I understand. It is a problem.

Stevenson--We are at the point here where no one sees anything but Yost and me and our own Mission doesn't know what is going on. I am a pitiful beggar here to get some kind of coordination.

Ball--This is an old problem and we were able to solve it for a week and we have not been able to solve it since. I don't know where the stuff gets out.

Stevenson--Well this Rowan-Evans stuff got out. I was told that Bundy was telling Alphant what was in the telegram.

Ball--Well a copy of the telegram was given to the Ambassador.

Stevenson--Well that is like publishing it in the New York Times.

Ball--I agree.

Stevenson--I would like for you to take it up with Kennedy or Rusk or some one. Maybe we could do some backgrounding here and leaking of the right stuff to come out. Maybe we could get some of our stories planted and have the right thing come out at the right time. I don't like to do it, but we did it years ago when we didn't have any control. It is time consuming to me and to most of us likewise.

Ball--Let me talk to the President about that this afternoon.

Stevenson--OK, I will talk to Gilpatric.

154. Summary Record of the 21st Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 6, 1962, 6:15 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 7:23 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is *ibid.*, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. See the Supplement.

The meeting was opened by the Vice President at the President's request. The President joined the group twenty minutes after the meeting began.

Secretary Rusk summarized a draft reply to Khrushchev (copy attached, as well as a copy of the final outgoing letter).^{1/} The letter was revised, approved and later delivered to the Soviet Ambassador here. Secretary Rusk said that Khrushchev had not mentioned IL-28 bombers but referred to a list of weapons which we considered offensive. The Secretary said that the reply contained no ultimatum. The following proposed sentence was deleted: "But I cannot accept this view; I think you would not either if the activities being carried on in a third country were such as to threaten a major alteration in the world balance of power upon which our present uneasy peace depends."

^{1/}Dated November 5. (Ibid., Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62) See the Supplement. For the letter as sent, see Document 155.

A proposed paragraph on Finland was deleted, which read:

"As you think about this matter, let me ask you to consider how you would have felt if the situation had been reversed and if a similar effort had been made by us in a country like Finland. If in Finland, or even Sweden, there had developed a government increasingly hostile to you and if then, during a very short period of time--while public and private reassurances were being given--there had been secretly sent to Finland a whole variety of dangerous means of destruction which were discovered only at the last moment, I am sure you know how the

Soviet Government and people would have reacted. And that is how the action of your side in Cuba appears to us."

The following sentence was also deleted: "The same consideration will face the American people as they frame their attitudes toward Cuba after this immediate crisis is surmounted."

At this point the discussion was interrupted and the President brought into the Cabinet Room Mr. Aramburu, the former President of Argentina, and introduced him to those present.

Resuming the discussion, the following concluding sentence was approved: "This is the first necessary step away from the crisis to open the door through which we can move to restore confidence and to give attention to other problems necessary to restore peace."

The President interrupted to call attention to a news report prominently displayed on page one of the Washington Evening Star alleging that Soviet missiles were being hidden in caves in Cuba. Mr. McCone said the source of this story has been interviewed, but is unwilling or unable to say anything more than he told the press. The President suggested that Mr. McCloy talk to Mr. McKelway of the Star and other editors in an effort to persuade responsible editors to check such stories with the government before they print them and to include in the story a statement to the effect that the government has no information to substantiate the report, if such is the case.

The President then began reading the revised draft reply to Khrushchev. In commenting on the reference to a shift in the balance of power, the President said this statement was not persuasive unless the IL-28 bombers were linked to the entire Soviet action. He suggested that the reference in the first paragraph to the IL-28 bombers was not obnoxious. He felt that the letter could be toned down. He argued that the reference to Finland should be left in. Others said that the Finland paragraph should be saved and used, if necessary, in the next letter.

Secretary Rusk said that we did not have a good contract with Khrushchev but we have to get everything out of their language that we possibly can.

The President commented that the situation was capable of becoming dangerous very quickly. He thought reference should be made to Soviet military personnel in Cuba and he again stated his support of the reference to Finland. Both Mr. Nitze and Ambassador Thompson disagreed and the Finland paragraph was finally deleted.

There followed a discussion as to whether the public should be informed of our efforts to induce the Russians to take out the IL-28 bombers. Some felt that our public posture should be calm and not one which would hot things up. Others felt that we should tell the public of the instructions we had sent last Saturday in an effort to get the Russians to agree to remove the bombers. Mr. Bundy thought we should say publicly that we were discussing the removal of the IL-28 bombers. Secretary Rusk recommended that we say nothing about the bombers until all the missiles were out. The President decided that no official comment on the bombers should be made tonight.

The President was informed that Soviet missiles are actually being removed by Soviet ships. He commented that it was more important to get positive proof of the missiles leaving than it was to get the Soviet bombers out now.

Mr. Ball reported that the Russians are permitting us to take pictures of the departing missile ships from helicopters or from U.S. ships which come along side the Soviet ships.

The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Mr. Minow, joined the group to discuss the use of two 50-watt medium-wave radio stations, one operated by the USIA and the other by the Navy, to broadcast to Cuba. Acting Director Wilson of USIA reported that nine commercial stations have been broadcasting nightly to Cuba. The radio time has been purchased by the U.S. These stations are now anxious to return to their regular programs. Mr. Wilson joined Mr. Minow in recommending that the two government-owned stations begin

broadcasting this week end under the umbrella of the existing broadcasting of the commercial stations. Mr. Minow said the standard radio band had never before been used by U.S.-owned stations but there was a compelling need to go ahead as recommended. The President agreed.

There followed a discussion about the feasibility of using airborne television to get through to the Cubans. Mr. Wilson reported that the plane carrying equipment would have to fly within thirty miles from Havana. In about three weeks after the first telecast, the Cubans could jam the programs so that they could not be received. Mr. Wilson recommended that the airborne television be saved for an emergency. The President agreed.

The program for air reconnaissance tomorrow was discussed.

1. Three U-2 flights over Cuban ports were authorized by the President.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended ten low-level missions, four over the Port of Havana, two over the IL-28 bomber bases, two over the Port of Isabella, and two over Guantanamo and Santiago. Secretary McNamara suggested that the President turn down the request for low-level missions over Havana. The President agreed.

General Taylor reported on an abort of a U-2 reconnaissance plane which was half way through its mission when a Soviet radar locked on. Under the existing rule the U-2 broke off. Existing rules call for only one U-2 over the island at a time. It is not possible to obtain good pictures from planes flying outside the territorial limits of Cuba even from a U-2.

The President asked what we would do if a reconnaissance plane were shot down. General Taylor said we would halt further missions and try to find out if the Soviets ordered the shoot-down. If so, we would make an air attack on a SAM site.

Secretary Rusk urged that we do nothing which would upset the Castro/Mikoyan negotiations now under way in Havana. If one of our planes were shot down, we would have to respond. This would be awkward in view of the presence in Havana of Mikoyan.

Secretary McNamara said we really did not need the low-level missions over Havana because we were checking on the ships as they move out of Cuba. All Soviet missiles must go as deck cargo because no missile-carrying ships are available to the Russians as of now.

The President returned to his question as to what we would do if a reconnaissance plane were shot at or shot down. He asked for recommendations within the next twenty-four hours.

Mr. McNamara reminded the President that we had told the Russians that they were responsible if any of our planes were shot at or shot down.

The President asked the group to remain subject to call and suggested that we try to get the press to act more responsibly by playing down unsubstantiated reports from Cuban refugees about Soviet missiles being hidden in Cuban caves.

Bromley Smith/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

155. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, November 6, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. No classification marking.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am surprised that in your letter, which I received yesterday,^{/1/} you suggest that in giving your representative in New York a list of the weapons we consider offensive there was any desire on our part to complicate the situation. Our intention was just the opposite: to stick to a well-known list, and not to introduce any new factors. But there is really only one major item on the list, beyond the missiles and their equipment, and that is the light bombers with their equipment. This item is indeed of great importance to us.

^{/1/}Document 145.

The solution of the Cuban affair was established by my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of October twenty-eighth.^{/2/} You will recall that in my letter of October twenty-seventh, I referred to "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use." You will also recall that in my broadcast address of October twenty-second,^{/3/} in addition to medium-range ballistic missiles, I mentioned specifically "jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons," as "an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas." Finally, my proclamation of October twenty-third entitled "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba"^{/4/} specifically listed bomber aircraft. These facts were all known at the time of our exchange of letters on Cuba, and so it seems clear to me that our exchange of letters covers the IL-28s, since your undertaking was to remove the weapons we described as offensive.

^{/2/}See Documents 95 and 102.

^{/3/}For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962*, pp. 806-809.

^{/4/}For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 809-811.

Your letter says--and I agree--that we should not complicate the situation by minor things. But I assure you that this matter of IL-28s is not a minor matter for us at all. It is true, of course, that these bombers are not the most modern of weapons, but they are distinctly capable of offensive use against the United States and other Western Hemispheric countries, and I am sure your own military men would inform you that the continued existence of such bombers in Cuba would require substantial measures of military defense in response by the United States. Thus, in simple logic these are weapons capable of offensive use. But there is more in it than that, Mr. Chairman. These bombers could carry nuclear weapons for long distances, and they are clearly not needed, any more than missiles, for purely defensive purposes on the island of Cuba. Thus in the present context their continued presence would sustain the grave tension that has been created, and their removal, in my view, is necessary to a good start on ending the recent crisis.

I am not clear as to what items you object to on the list which Ambassador Stevenson handed to Mr. Kuznetsov. I can assure you I have no desire to cause you difficulties by any wide interpretation of the definitions of weapons which we consider offensive and I am instructing my representative in New York to confer promptly with Mr. Kuznetsov and to be as forthcoming as possible in order to meet any legitimate complaints you may have in order to reach a quick solution which would enable our agreement to be carried to completion. I entirely agree with your statement that we should wind up the immediate crisis promptly, and I assure you that on our side we are insisting only on what is immediately essential for progress in this matter. In order to make our position clear, I think I should go on to give you a full sense of the very strong feelings we have about this whole affair here in the United States.

These recent events have given a profound shock to relations between our two countries. It may be said, as Mr. Kuznetsov said the other day to Mr. McCloy, that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to inform us of any activities it was carrying on in a third country. I cannot accept this view; not only did this action threaten the

whole safety of this hemisphere, but it was, in a broader sense, a dangerous attempt to change the world-wide status quo. Secret action of this kind seems to me both hazardous and unjustified. But however one may judge that argument, what actually happened in this case was not simply that the action of your side was secret. Your Government repeatedly gave us assurances of what it was not doing; these assurances were announced as coming from the highest levels, and they proved inaccurate.

I do not refer here only to the TASS article of September, but also to communications which were addressed to the highest levels of our Government through channels which heretofore had been used for confidential messages from the highest levels of your Government. Through these channels we were specifically informed that no missiles would be placed in Cuba which would have a range capable of reaching the United States. In reliance upon these assurances I attempted, as you know, to restrain those who were giving warnings in this country about the trend of events in Cuba. Thus undeniable photographic evidence that offensive weapons were being installed was a deep and dangerous shock, first to this Government and then to our whole people.

In the aftermath of this shock, to which we replied with a measured but necessary response, I believe it is vital that we should re-establish some degree of confidence in communication between the two of us. If the leaders of the two great nuclear powers cannot judge with some accuracy the intentions of each other, we shall find ourselves in a period of gravely increasing danger--not only for our two countries but for the whole world.

I therefore hope that you will promptly recognize that when we speak of the need to remove missiles and bombers, with their immediate supporting equipment, we are not trying to complicate the situation but simply stating what was clearly included in our understanding of October twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth. I shall continue to abide fully by the undertakings in my letter of October twenty-seventh, and specifically, under the conditions stated in that letter I will hold to my undertaking "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba." This undertaking has already come under attack here and is likely to become increasingly an object of criticism by a great many of my countrymen. And the very minimum that is necessary in regard to these assurances is, as we agreed, the verified removal of the missile and bomber systems, together with real safeguards against their reintroduction.

I should emphasize to you directly, Mr. Chairman, that in this respect there is another problem immediately ahead of us which could become very serious indeed, and that is the problem of continuing verification in Cuba. Your representatives have spoken as if this were entirely a problem for the Castro regime to settle, but the continuing verification of the absence of offensive weapons in Cuba is an essential safeguard for the United States and the other countries of this hemisphere, and is an explicit condition for the undertakings which we in our turn have agreed to. The need for this verification is, I regret to say, convincingly demonstrated by what happened in Cuba in the months of September and October.

For the present we are having to rely on our own methods of surveillance, and this surveillance will surely have to be continued unless, as we much prefer, a better and durable method can be found. We believe that it is a serious responsibility of your Government to insure that weapons which you have provided to Cuba are not employed to interfere with this surveillance which is so important to us all in obtaining reliable information on which improvements in the situation can be based. It was of great importance, for example, for me last week to be able to announce with confidence that dismantling of missiles has begun.

Finally, I would like to say a word about longer range matters. I think we must both recognize that it will be very difficult for any of us in this hemisphere to look forward to any real improvement in our relations with Cuba if it continues to be a military outpost of the Soviet Union. We have limited our action at present to the problem of offensive weapons, but I do think it may be important for you to consider whether a real normalization of the Cuba problem can be envisaged while there remains in Cuba large numbers of Soviet military technicians, and major weapons systems and communications complexes under Soviet control, all with the recurrent possibility that offensive weapons might be secretly and rapidly reintroduced. That is why I think there is much wisdom in the conclusion expressed in your letter of October 26th, that when our undertakings against invasion are effective

the need for your military specialists in Cuba will disappear. That is the real path to progress in the Cuban problem. And in this connection in particular, I hope you will understand that we must attach the greatest importance to the personal assurances you have given that submarine bases will not be established in Cuba.

I believe that Cuba can never have normal relations with the other nations of this hemisphere unless it ceases to appear to be a foreign military base and adopts a peaceful course of non-interference in the affairs of its sister nations. These wider considerations may belong to a later phase of the problem, but I hope that you will give them careful thought.

In the immediate situation, however, I repeat that it is the withdrawal of the missiles and bombers, with their supporting equipment, under adequate verification, and with a proper system for continued safeguards in the future, that is essential. This is the first necessary step away from the crisis to open the door through which we can move to restore confidence and give attention to other problems which ought to be resolved in the interest of peace.

Sincerely,/5/

/5/Printed from an unsigned copy.

156. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, November 7, 1962, 12:45 a.m.

//Source: USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963. Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky and cleared by Yost. This telegram was incorrectly dated November 6. It was drafted the evening of November 6, but not sent until early the following day.

1660. Subject: Cuba. Eyes only for Secretary. Dept pass White House. Stevenson, Gilpatric and Yost had a five and half hour mtg with Kuznetsov, Zorin and Mendelevich today. Fol summary based on uncleared memcon./1/

/1/A 38-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which lasted from 4-9:30 p.m., is *ibid.*, 1A October/November meetings.

1. ICRC inspection. Stevenson informed Sovs US not prepared agree to employment Sov ship and preferred UN chartered neutral ship, i.e., Swedish vessel available in Carribean area. Noted ICRC would verify all Sov flag ships, Sov chartered ships, bloc ships, and bloc chartered ships. Kuznetsov argued at length Sovs could speak only for their own ships and perhaps Sov chartered ships, but could not speak for any other country, since that would be violation sovereignty those countries. Claimed US approach this problem at variance with Pres's Oct 23 message,/2/ which spoke of "your" i.e., Sov ships only. Stevenson explained quarantine against offensive weapons imposed on all shipping to Cuba regardless of nationality and US willing replace quarantine temporarily ICRC verification. Kuznetsov claimed quarantine illegal and USSR could not be expected assist US in making arrangements which would be substitution for it. Discussion this subject concluded with Stevenson saying if Sovs refused apply ICRC verification to all vessels with bloc cargoes, US would have to continue use quarantine with respect all ships other than Sov. Kuznetsov responded USSR agreed to ICRC "observation" Sov Cuba-bound ships and if US wished use quarantine for other ships, that its own business.

/2/See Document 52.

After further exchange re nationality ship to carry ICRC team, Kuznetsov admitted Sov original proposal had been to use either Sov or neutral ship. Finally indicated neutral ship would probably be satisfactory and agreed give USUN final word shortly. (Subsequently phoned to confirm Swedish vessel OK and ask name and location.)

2. Inspection procedure outgoing Sov ships. Stevenson suggested Sovs give US schedule shipment 42 missiles Kuznetsov had told had been or were in Cuba, as well as time and place for rendezvous with US Navy ships for verification purposes. He outlined verification procedure as follows: Depending upon operational conditions, presence of missiles on board Sov ships would be verified either from US vessel or unarmed helicopter through visual observation and photography; one or two missiles should be sufficiently exposed so as to identify them as such but without revealing technical specifications. Photography necessary for purpose of verifying number outgoing missiles. Kuznetsov referred to list outgoing Sov ships he had given Stevenson yesterday/3/ and said his understanding was those ships were carrying what US called offensive arms, including missiles. Had no info re ships and cargoes after Nov 7. Noted prompt action required since one ship already left Havana. Re use of helicopters, observed this new point but said it would be communicated to Sov Govt. Promised prompt reply./4/ Gilpatric and Kuznetsov agreed exchange call signals both Sov ships and US Navy vessels concerned, and masters would arrange between themselves time and place rendezvous.

/3/The list of the ships, given on November 5, is in telegram 1646 from USUN, November 6, 7 p.m. Labinsk would sail on November 6, and Bratsk, Lenin Komsomol, Kurchatov, Anosov, Divnogosk, Volgoles, Polzunov, and Alapaevsk would depart on November 7. Also in this letter Kuznetsov stated that the Soviet Union had "no objections to the setting in motion by Mr. McCloy of the proposal for US ships to observe at closer range removal of the rockets on Soviet vessels." (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-662)

/4/In telegram 1681 from USUN, November 7, 10 p.m., the mission reported that Mendelevich approached Akalovsky and, reading from a prepared text, stated that agreement had been reached on U.S. visual observation. Masters of the Soviet ships had been instructed to inform the U.S. ships that came along side of the number of missiles they were carrying. If needed, canvas could be partly removed. If the United States insisted upon using helicopters in case of bad weather, the Soviet Union had no objection. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Telegrams 1962 (Top Secret; Exdis, etc.))

3. Removal of warheads. Stevenson suggested Sovs furnish number of warheads and schedule their removal, following pattern envisaged for missiles. Said verification procedure for missiles could be applied to warheads as well, with one difference, i.e., Geiger counters should be placed close enough to warhead containers to detect radio active material therein. Gilpatric noted we assumed warheads would be transported in such containers as would not reveal nature of their contents, and we did not ask that they be opened.

Kuznetsov replied he could only repeat what he had said yesterday on subject of warheads, and went on rehashing arguments he had advanced yesterday, stressing that US complicating matters by raising additional questions while USSR honestly conducting negots and intended scrupulously fulfill its obligations with respect removal what Pres called offensive weapons and all equipment related thereto. In response to further pressing by Stevenson and Gilpatric, Kuznetsov said he regretted say Sov and US views on question warheads entirely different. Stevenson and Gilpatric stressed vital importance question removal warheads, which essential element offensive weapons, and need revert to it at first opportunity.

4. Activation of SAM sites. Stevenson said another very serious situation had arisen in connection with activation SAM sites in Cuba this AM. Protested such interference with conduct our aerial surveillance, which we obliged conduct in absence ground verification to monitor removal of weapons. Requested Sovs ensure non-recurrence such interference during completion of agreements. Gilpatric noted this very important matter and if SAM sites continued be deactivated as they had been during past ten days, that would avoid need for US taking other measures to make its aerial surveillance effective.

Kuznetsov agreed this major question, but claimed it merely demonstrated US pursuing policy of gross violation sovereignty other states. Reiterated this and similar arguments which he had used in conversation on this subject with McCloy last week. Suggested US stop over-flights now because "so-called" offensive weapons now removed and would be shipped out in couple of days; thus no need for over-flights existed. Refused accept US statement USSR must take steps to prevent recurrence, on grounds Cuba sovereign state. Suggested best way

resolve this question and improve US-Cuban relations was to formalize guarantees to Cuba to be submitted to UN and to include assurances re: (a) non-aggression by US, (b) US steps to prevent its allies in Western Hemisphere from committing aggression against Cuba, (c) non-support by US of refugee attacks against Cuba, and (d) cessation subversive activities from US territory. Also said wishes Cuban people re Guantanamo should be satisfied. Claimed that all this would promote friendly US-Cuban relations and prevent another crisis. Said if such obligations were assumed, UN presence in Caribbean, including territory of US, Cuba and other Latin American countries, should be instituted as proposed by U Thant, for purpose of verifying compliance. Stevenson and Gilpatric reverted to question over-flights and emphasized extreme gravity with which US regard any interference over-flights and that we would hold USSR accountable for whatever occurred. Kuznetsov replied USSR could not take any responsibility; US would be responsible.

5. IL-28 aircraft. Stevenson recalled yesterday's conversation this subject and quoted relevant portions Pres's and own statements to prove jet bombers had always been included in category offensive weapons. Stated question IL-28 aircraft was being taken up by Pres with Khrushchev today. Noted all other matters on which Sovs negative would also have to be taken up in Moscow unless they could be resolved here. Kuznetsov denied Pres-Khrushchev correspondence referred to IL-28 aircraft and contended US and USSR had been talking about IRBMs and MRBMs. While US had made certain declarations and submitted lists of items, they were unilateral documents and could not be regarded as part of agreement. Reiterated arguments re obsolescence and non-offensive nature IL-28, and contended only reason why US raising these additional questions was to complicate matters and protract situation of crisis. Appealed US be reasonable and take into account fact steps taken by USSR clearly showed it wished implement agreement. Stevenson and Gilpatric asked Sovs reflect on unresolved problems so that they could be settled; otherwise sharp, profound and grave disagreement would exist which would have to be referred to higher authority. Kuznetsov concluded by stating USSR's most sincere desire was not to sharpen US-USSR relations but to take any possible measures to resolve problems and eliminate tensions. Regretted he had failed convince Stevenson and Gilpatric position correct and expressed hope they would consider Sov views so as to find such solutions as were in interests both sides.

Stevenson

157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, November 7, 1962, 2:48 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Background Papers--Cuba. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Thompson; cleared by Cleveland, U. Alexis Johnson, and Rusk; and approved by Thompson. Repeated to Moscow.

1210. Dobrynin in conversation with Thompson last night repeated arguments advanced by Kuznetsov on IL-28's. He said Soviets considered that agreement between President and Khrushchev concerned only missiles. He said IL-28 was fifteen-year-old model incapable of being sent on long-range mission and would be sitting duck for modern air defense system. He stated Soviets considered quarantine proclamation illegal and therefore could not take into consideration its list of prohibited weapons.

Thompson pointed out we did not agree with their appraisal of offensive capabilities IL-28's and observed that most Latin American countries did not have modern air defenses. He said it was clear on our side that bombers were included in the agreement on Cuba and cited specific mention of them in President's October twenty-second address/^{1/} as well as language in President's letter to Khrushchev of October twenty-seventh./^{2/}

/^{1/}See footnote 3, Document 155.

/^{2/}See Document 95.

Dobrynin said Soviets had the feeling they were moving promptly to carry out agreement. He understood removal of MRBM's had started November second and was expected to be completed by November tenth. The United States had not only done nothing to carry out agreement but was endeavoring to expand its scope. Dobrynin asked when and in what form non-invasion guarantee would be made.

Thompson drew attention to fact that invasion had not taken place, and that we had facilitated Soviet ships in quarantine area proceeding to Cuba. He said negotiations on guarantee declaration were going on in New York but it appeared to him that difficulty was caused by attitude of Cuban Government. The agreement specifically provided for verification of removal of offensive weapons and Cuban Government appeared to be blocking any UN effort to carry this out. He pointed out that there appeared to be at least two phases to the problem. The first was the dismantling and removal of the weapons and the second was assurances against their reintroduction. Dobrynin asked whether US guarantee would be given at the end of phase one. Thompson replied that the Soviets could be sure that we would not invade but he did not see how any formal action on a guarantee of indefinite duration could be taken until longer-range arrangements could be agreed upon. In this connection, he inquired whether Dobrynin thought some regional arrangement such as an atom-free Latin America or a Caribbean agreement would facilitate Cuban acceptance to verification and control measures, stressing that he was speaking personally and had no information on what US policy would be on such matters. Dobrynin replied this possibility had been raised by U Thant when he was in Cuba and he personally thought this was hopeful approach. He inquired whether it would be possible to include Florida or part of Southeastern United States in a Caribbean arrangement. Thompson replied that while this might raise a number of problems, we had nothing to hide and he would not exclude such possibility.

Rusk

158. Summary Record of the 22d Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 7, 1962, 5 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 6:10 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

Deputy Director Carter of CIA summarized the current intelligence./1/ Deputy Secretary Gilpatric explained our method of inspecting outgoing missiles. We will have pictures certainly of missiles aboard six outgoing Soviet ships. About 90 percent of the missile erectors have been moved to Cuban ports. Some Soviet troops are leaving. Photographs will be available in Washington tomorrow.

/1/In his record of action of this meeting, November 7, Bundy noted that Carter reported that three ships had loaded 17 Soviet missiles, 11 of which were on the two ships already on the high seas. (Ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 17-24) See the Supplement.

The President asked whether we should say something tonight about the outgoing missiles. Mr. Salinger said he thought something had to be said. The President authorized the Defense Department to say that ships with missiles are leaving Cuba./2/ The President suggested that an attempt be made to take pictures of a passenger boat returning to the Soviet Union with Russian troops.

/2/For text of the statement, November 8, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, p. 458.

Secretary McNamara reported there had been no reaction to today's aerial reconnaissance mission. The weather was bad. A request was made and permission granted to fly five U-2 flights and twelve low-level flights, some to photograph cave areas.

Secretary Rusk said we were heading toward a UN Security Council meeting during which the Russians would announce that there are no Soviet missiles in Cuba. Secretary General U Thant has put forward a suggestion that the five Latin American Ambassadors in Havana be named as inspectors and travel throughout Cuba./3/ Our problem is how to manage recurrent rumors in the U.S. and Latin America that the Russians are not moving out their missiles but merely putting them into caves. He said we must have evidence to reply to such allegations.

/3/As reported in telegram 1661 from USUN, November 7, 6:30 p.m. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Telegrams 1962 (Top Secret, Exdis, etc.)) The Department of State responded that it would be prepared to have U Thant make such a proposal with certain provisos: that Castro not learn that it had been first discussed with the United States; that U.S. aerial surveillance would continue; that the inspection team have full freedom of movement in Cuba; that it be an agent of and report to U Thant; that it have adequate logistical and technical support; and that it would be supplemental to ICRC inspection of incoming cargoes and U.S. along-side inspection of outgoing cargoes. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Background Papers--Cuba)

Secretary Dillon asked whether we were trying to get a bargain with the Russians or avoid one. The President replied that we have a little time now and we should play out our negotiations slowly. He said we wouldn't invade with the Soviet missiles out of Cuba. We might make a formal commitment not to invade when the Soviets comply fully by removing the IL-28 bombers and we have assurances that there will be no reintroduction of strategic missiles. We must continue aerial reconnaissance until a UN substitute is in place or until we have ground inspection. He asked State to draft a statement covering our plans for continuing inspection. He said our posture with the Soviets should be such as to avoid the appearance of holding back in the light of the rapid withdrawal of Soviet missiles.

Mr. Bundy said the only weapons in the proclaimed list which we must really get out are the IL-28 bombers. Secretary McNamara agreed.

The President said we must continue aerial surveillance. The Soviets say that inspection is now a Cuban problem. But we must make clear to the Russians that if they retaliate against our surveillance planes they will be held responsible. We are supporting a Latin American atom-free zone. The UN is discussing a proposal to send teams to carry out on-the-ground inspection in Cuba. If we get the IL-28 bombers out we might be prepared to lift the quarantine.

The President then asked for a memorandum spelling out what the Russians had agreed to and what we had agreed to.

Secretary Rusk said the proposal to use the Latin American Ambassadors in Havana as inspectors is a help but it is not complete. The President said these Ambassadors could look at caves and inspect possible Soviet submarine base sites. The problem is how we can hurt Castro without a quarantine which stops Soviet ships.

Secretary Rusk said we might ask the Latin American States to break relations and we might tell our allies to get their ships out of the Cuban trade.

Mr. Nitze circulated a Defense Department paper on what we would do if a reconnaissance plane were shot down./4/ General Taylor orally stated the Chiefs' views./5/ We must first find out whether a shoot-down is an isolated incident or whether it is the first of a series of actions undertaken with deliberate intent. We have a choice of hitting the offending source or if the shoot-down were deliberate, an air attack destroying the IL-28 bombers and the SAM sites. The President asked at what point we would give up low-level reconnaissance missions. We appeared to be running out of targets. He asked for a surveillance plan adequate to meet our interests on the assumption that the bombers remain and on the assumption that the bombers are taken out. He asked the group to meet again tomorrow/6/ to decide whether we should go to the mat on the IL-28 bombers or whether we should say the Soviets have now completed their agreement to remove the missiles and move on to

other problems.

/4/In the paper, November 7, Nitze's courses of action included private and public warnings to the Soviet Union, reimposition of the quarantine, and, if additional reconnaissance planes were shot down, U.S. attacks on the specific SAM sites. If attacks continued, all SAM sites in Cuba would be destroyed. (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Cuba, Material Used at Hyannis, 11/22-11/23/62) See the Supplement.

/5/The Joint Chief's views were sent to McNamara in JCSM-872-62, November 7. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba (Sensitive) 1962) See the Supplement.

/6/See Document 162.

Bromley Smith/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, November 7, 1962, 9:32 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-762. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Thompson and U. Alexis Johnson; cleared by Cleveland, Gilpatric, Bundy, and Rusk; and approved by Johnson.

1223. Eyes only Stevenson and McCloy. We have received from the Soviet Ambassador here a confidential indication/1/ that the Soviet Government takes strong exception to the list of weapons we consider offensive in accordance with the exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev which you furnished Mr. Kuznetsov (Urtel 1606, November 2)./2/

/1/See Document 157.

/2/See footnote 3, Document 133.

The Soviets take position that Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement related only to missiles. They also consider quarantine proclamation an illegal act and that they will ignore list of offensive weapons in that document.

Our primary purpose is to get the MRBM's and IL-28 bombers out and we would be prepared to go far in reducing the list of offensive weapons in order to achieve this purpose. When Kuznetsov is in a position to negotiate (which may not be until Moscow gets him instructions following our approach to the Soviet Ambassador here last night) you may go as far as necessary toward the following minimum list:

1. Surface-to-surface missiles. (We are prepared limit these to MRBM's and IRBM's and drop mention of those designed for use at sea, and propellants.)
2. Bomber aircraft.
3. Any nuclear warheads for missiles, nuclear bombs for aircraft, or any other type nuclear weapon.

With regard to the Komar-class torpedo boats you might, however, inquire whether Soviets intend to furnish any additional craft of this kind. What we are concerned about are the missiles and bombers with their immediate supporting equipment, and you could explain that point five in your letter to Mikoyan was included to prevent setting up of bases complete except for missiles which could quickly and secretly be brought in.

This modifies the instructions contained in section 2 Deptel 1034,^{3/} "Definition of Offensive Weapons."

^{3/}Reference is to telegram 1147 to USUN, October 31, repeated to Moscow as 1034; Document 125.

On submarines you should take the position that we are relying on Soviet assurances against the establishment of submarine bases in Cuba and our assumption that they did not intend to furnish such offensive weapons system to Cuba.

Rusk

160. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Among the Under Secretary of State (Ball), the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, November 8, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.

Ball told Bundy about the call from Stevenson saying he was concerned they have not seen the President's reply to Mr. K.^{1/} Ball knows it was agreed it not be sent up to them. Someone will have to placate him because he is upset about the fact they can't conduct their business unless they at least know what the exchanges are at all levels. Bundy thought they were too leaky and Ball said he couldn't say that to him because his answer would be they haven't leaked anything and Washington has leaked everything.

^{1/}Johnson called Ball at 9:55 a.m. to report that he had just spoken to Stevenson who complained that he had not received the President's answer to Khrushchev's letter of November 5 (Document 145). Johnson told Stevenson that there was agreement in Washington not to send Kennedy's response of November 6 (see Document 155) to the Mission at the United Nations. Stevenson told Johnson the Mission could not operate without it. Johnson asked Ball what should be done. (Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba)

Bundy said he knew the substance of what was in the message. He could read it when he is down here. Bundy was afraid if it were sent to him it would be all over the place. Ball suggested we send it up to him with someone who could show it to him and bring it back. Bundy thought that was all right. Ball told him we should do something because he was upset about it, and he is a member of the Cabinet. Bundy suggested it for his eyes only^{2/} and Ball should explain to him the reason we are being edgy about this is the very existence of secret correspondence with K has been a nuisance in the past; the moment anyone says there is a message, we have to show it to Alphan; then we are in trouble--as the message of the 26th shows. That is the reason for the absolute rigid rule; they don't go anywhere but to people working in Washington and Moscow on the list approved by the President personally. Ball suggested that Bundy mention this to the President.

Johnson said the Secretary wants to get together at 12 over here.^{3/} We are waiting for confirmation from Bob. We would be happy if Ted and Bundy could come. Bundy replied he would come.

^{2/}At 10:15 on November 8, Ball called Stevenson to tell him that the President's letter "was an attempt to nail it down to the IL-28's," and that only 4 or 5 people know of it. Stevenson said that unless the Mission knew what was being said at other levels, they could not operate. Ball told Stevenson he was "sure this was an oversight." He would check it out and get the message to Stevenson right away. (Ibid.)

^{3/}Rusk met with McNamara, Nitze, Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, Cleveland, Gilpatric, Martin, Thompson, and Manning from noon to approximately 2 p.m. McGeorge Bundy joined the meeting at 12:45 p.m. (Johnson

Library, Rusk Appointment Book) No other record of the meeting has been found.

161. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze)

Washington, November 8, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Cuba, Material Used at Hyannis, 11/22/62-11/23/63. Top Secret.

LONG TERM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

Problem: What kind of continuing surveillance is required for our protection if offensive weapons are withdrawn with and without some inspection on the ground?

1. In general, it can be stated that our continuing aerial surveillance requirement is to obtain complete high level coverage of Cuba and of the Isle of Pines each thirty days, plus a sufficient number of low-level flights or on site ground inspections to check out specific locations which may appear, from high-level photography or from other intelligence, to be suspicious.
2. It is estimated that a schedule providing complete higher level coverage of Cuba once every thirty days would allow elasticity in the scheduling of overflights. This should permit selecting days for flight when the weather was relatively good and therefore should lead to a requirement for no more than approximately six flights per month to produce complete coverage of the island. In perfect weather conditions, complete coverage of the island could be obtained in one day by four U-2 aircraft.
3. We do not yet have the capability to provide search coverage of Cuba by oblique photography. There is a shortage of cameras for this purpose, and for the foreseeable future the oblique technique will not provide adequate coverage of interior locations.
4. The number of flights required for low-level photography would depend almost entirely on the extent to which suspicions about specific locations arise as a result of high level surveillance or other intelligence and the adequacy of on site ground inspection. In the absence of reliable ground inspection, low-level surveillance would be required as needed to check suspicious locations. The minimum requirement would seem to be to schedule a sufficient number of such low-level flights to protect the "right" to them even if no suspicious locations were indicated by U-2 photography or other intelligence. This political consideration would indicate a requirement for perhaps two such overflights a month.
5. In addition to aerial, and such on site inspection as may be available, we would plan to continue all other avenues of intelligence including continuing surveillance at sea of shipping bound for Cuba. Any unexplained increase in such shipping would be a ground for increased suspicion.

162. Summary Record of the 23d Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 8, 1962, 4:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 5:30 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is *ibid.*, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. See the Supplement.

A press release was revised and approved for the Defense Department to issue, copy attached./1/

/1/Attached, but not printed, for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 458.

The problem of long-term surveillance requirements was discussed. A paper by Mr. Nitze was circulated./2/
Another surveillance paper will be prepared covering three contingencies:

/2/Document 161.

- a. The missiles are out and we obtain satisfactory on-the-ground inspection.
- b. The missiles are out but we do not obtain satisfaction on ground inspection.
- c. The missiles and the IL-28 bombers are taken out.

There followed discussion on how pressure could be kept on Cuba without continuing the quarantine. None of the suggestions were quick acting. A proposal was made to ask the allies to put the maximum pressure on Castro so as to avoid a situation in which we would be retaliating for a shoot-down of one of our reconnaissance planes. Ambassador Thompson urged that we keep the maximum amount of flexibility until Khrushchev replies to our last letter/3/ and until the Mikoyan talks with Castro in Havana are completed.

/3/Document 155.

The President said the key issue is whether we lift the quarantine if the IL-28 bombers don't come out. Do we resume the quarantine and stop Soviet ships if we don't get the bombers out? He thought we would know more in twenty-four hours about what we should do. He was inclined not to reimpose the quarantine, but he did favor pressure on our allies to keep their ships out of Cuba.

Secretary Rusk suggested that two courses be studied. The first, reimposition of the quarantine, and the second, covert actions against Castro.

Five U-2 flights and ten low-level flights were authorized for tomorrow. Secretary McNamara reported that there was no reaction to today's flights, but the weather had been bad, i.e., clouds had obscured the targets.

Bromley Smith/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

163. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, November 8, 1962, 11 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-862. Top Secret; Priority. According to the USUN copy, Yost was the drafter. (USUN Files: FRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Telegrams (Top Secret, Exdis, etc.))
Received at the Department of State at 11:04 p.m. and relayed to the White House at 11:14 p.m.

1697. Dept pass White House. Eyes only for the Secretary. Cuba. Fol is summary of this evening's meeting of Stevenson, McCloy, and Yost with Kuznetsov, Zorin and Mendelevich. Full report follows:/1/

/1/An 18-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which took place at the Soviet Mission from 5 to 8:30 p.m., is *ibid.*, 1-A October/November meetings.

Sovs gave us position as of today of nine vessels leaving Cuba carrying 42 missiles. They pointed out vessels, while commencing voyage in Florida Strait, in fact turning eastward and proceeding through Bahama Strait by

Crooked Island. They said masters of vessels have been given instructions concerning uncovering some missiles and concerning use of helicopters. (This info being telephoned this evening to Navy Department.)

Kuznetsov, after declaring Sovs have complied with their commitment to withdraw offensive weapons and that it is now up to us to comply with its commitments of guarantees to Cuba, read list of seven points which he felt should be embodied in our commitment. These seven points were elaboration of Castro's five points/^{2/} supplemented by US acceptance of what Kuznetsov described as U Thant's plan for UN presence in Caribbean, including US, Cuba, and other LA states, to observe carrying out of obligations by all parties. Stevenson made clear guarantees we envisaged are those defined in exchange of letters between Pres and Khrushchev.

^{2/}See footnote 2, Document 133.

In reply to Stevenson's repeated inquiries about IL-28s and rehearsal of record defining bomber aircraft as offensive weapons, Kuznetsov rigidly maintained Sov position that these were never included in definition of offensive weapons and that Sovs had now fully complied with their commitments to remove offensive weapons from Cuba.

As to warheads Kuznetsov said that Khrushchev's statement that all offensive weapons will be removed from Cuba means that there will be on Cuba no warheads related to such weapons. He went on to specify that "such weapons" means those loaded on vessels and now proceeding to the Soviet Union. He added that in fact warheads were loaded on board ship and carried out of Cuba immediately after decision to remove missiles had been taken. This being the case any further talk about verification of removal of warheads is pointless. Moreover it would be absurd to suggest warheads might be left behind after missiles removed since warheads without missiles are not weapons and cannot be used.

When Stevenson pointed out Sovs had not kept commitments made by Khrushchev for UN verification of dismantling of sites in Cuba Kuznetsov replied that implementation of this verification of course depended on Cuban agreement, which had not been forthcoming. Para in summing up Stevenson pointed out (1) that in so far as concerns IL-28s Pres's letter of Oct 27/^{3/} had referred not only to missiles but to "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use" and that Khrushchev's reply had made no objection to this stipulation; (2) that verification of withdrawal of warheads is no more "pointless" to US than verification of removal of rockets and that furthermore no reference had been made to nuclear aerial bombs; (3) that US guarantee to Cuba in terms set forth in exchange of correspondence between Pres and Khrushchev would be forthcoming when conditions are met, conditions being removal of all offensive weapons systems from Cuba and appropriate verification. Guarantee is clear and conditions are clear, he concluded, but transaction is not yet complete. If Soviet Union would help to complete transaction by removal of bombers and by enabling US to verify removals of all nuclear components, then we will give guarantees pursuant to exchange of correspondence, in form of declaration in the SC if that appears to be most suitable means.

^{3/}See Document 95.

Stevenson

164. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, November 9, 1962, 9:25 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.

Bundy: Who is going to take the planning burden on the business the President clearly wants to work through of

what we do short of direct reimposition of the quarantine in the event of IL-28 trouble?

Ball: I thought I would get together with Alex over the weekend,^{/1/} and we will try to figure out something.

^{/1/}November 10 and 11.

Bundy: Is that good enough timing? That is really the puzzle in my mind. Are we going to want to do more this weekend or do we want to let this thing sit a few days.

Ball: There are two big unknowns in this. One is the reply from Moscow,^{/2/} and the second is the Mikoyan report.^{/3/}

^{/2/}Reference is to Khrushchev's November 12 reply (Document 171) to Kennedy's letter of November 6 (Document 155).

^{/3/}The report of his discussions with Castro.

Bundy: Yes, it would be hard to make a concrete plan.

Ball: It is hard to go too far without knowing at least one of the two. On the other hand, we can come out with some planning on assumptions. This business of reimposition of a quarantine is much too brutal and much too hazardous. This is the last resort of solution because it would have to be undertaken in an atmosphere where we would be really going it alone, I think. But there are other things; I wasn't at all satisfied with what we came up with yesterday. I was not feeling well the last couple of days.

Bundy: I know. The raw materials are in these papers, but someone has to go work and actually develop the scenario. One of the immediate questions is how soon do we begin to say in a relatively disagreeable tone that if the bombers don't go the deal is off. Our view is it is not only off but pressure needs to be applied on this.

Ball: That is right. Furthermore I think we have to have a fairly definite philosophy about where we are going to aim our barrage--whether we are going to try to let the Russians off the hook to some extent and concentrate on the Cubans, or whether we are going to try to hold their nose strictly to it with whatever consequence there may be.

Bundy: It might be better--one could just make a shift--OK, we are now going to treat this as a Cuban problem.

Ball: That's right, and much could be said about that, I think. As a matter of fact this is what I put forward with McNamara before you came in the meeting yesterday.^{/4/} That it would be better to try to move it over and then treat it as a Cuban problem and help the Russians themselves to disengage from the situation, get maximum freedom of action there ourselves, so that we can really bring that problem to a solution without prejudicing our larger interests with the Russians, is the way I would see it. Now the Russians are helping it this way, and particularly the Cuban assertion yesterday in the UN which was reported that the bombers were theirs; if we could build up this kind of a set of documentation, then we would be in a position to say we appreciate the Soviet Union had done what it could; that the Cubans are being recalcitrant, and we couldn't possibly give assurances. Furthermore, since the Soviet Union has indicated that they are not in control of the situation, we must have freedom of action.

^{/4/}See footnote 3, Document 160.

Bundy: Yes. Would you press on to direct action against Cuba?

Ball: Well, I think it could lead there. But leave the second stage business; then we would start in on pressures on

the Cubans. In the meantime, with a kind of tacit understanding with the SU, this may be the best course. I don't think that is an impossible direction.

Bundy: Nor do I.

Ball: I will get some of this stuff pulled together.

Bundy: I think we would do better not to try to do contingency planning; although the President wants work to go on, he won't sit still for the thing that he doesn't know and what I would say to him today is what I would like to do is to ask the Department, let your office be the center, to be the center of production of a respectable plan for a situation in which these things become Cuban property and we react accordingly. I think that probably is the likeliest development. If they say they will get them out, our whole planning problem changes. I think the President's view is that he would buy this if it doesn't lead him to a nose-to-nose with the Soviets, and he would want the strongest program that doesn't do that. I'll talk to him along those lines.

Ball: This, I think, is the best possibility.

Bundy: I'll talk to him along those lines. I think we will probably have to have an Executive Committee meeting later this afternoon,^{/5/} for news and wrap up for the weekend the best we can. He is not going to Glen Ora until tomorrow midday. I think he would probably want to get the thing organized this afternoon if he can. Do you see any objection to that? The President does not want to take a weekend, I am sure, in any way that would complicate process, but the UN isn't going to be a lively forum, and Mikoyan hasn't come back, etc.

^{/5/}There was no Executive Committee meeting the afternoon of November 9.

Ball: We just have too many unknowns in the equation.

Bundy: That is the way I feel about it.

165. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Among the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson), the Under Secretary of State (Ball), and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

November 9, 1962, 12:30 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking. Stevenson was in New York; Ball and Johnson were in Washington.

AES: We had a long one last night. The report was sketchy on it.^{/1/} They started off by trying to inject right away at the outset the guarantees and wanted to know why we evaded the subject, etc. Then we brought it around to the IL-28s and the other items we were interested in, and they keep pulling it back to the guarantee and set forth all of Castro's points in their language. We kept it right on the language of the letters. We broke up with another deadlock. Now they have asked for an emergency meeting for 1:30.^{/2/} I think we are at a point where unless something breaks in Havana or Moscow, or unless they have something new to present today (it might be Mikoyan's return or something from Moscow, I don't know), we are at the point that they have said all the warheads relating to the missiles have been withdrawn. Whether there are any aerial bombs withdrawn they don't say on that. We are at a point where we have [to] decide on the subject of the warheads. Whether we are willing to accept a certification that all warheads from planes have been withdrawn and won't be reintroduced, or whether we have to take a position later on the IL-28s; and then do we have another problem in the post-facto verification. Then the question of continuing safeguards. On that we have come to the conclusion there is nothing we can do [sic] their promise they won't reintroduce these weapons until we get around to some inspection system regarding a nuclear-free zone or some other action through the UN. If there is some other idea on that,

we would like to know what it is.

/1/See Document 163.

/2/The emergency meeting turned out to be merely a protest by Kuznetsov over the way that three U.S. naval commanders were intercepting Russian ships, see Document 166.

Ball: I think that here it is certainly not accepted that we could simply take their word for it because of the fact that in the President's letter itself he specified as one of the conditions some continuing safeguards. I think what the real posture probably is that unless they are willing to provide for some kind of continuing inspection on the ground which, with Cuban cooperation, might be worked out under the UN arrangement, that we would have to continue to assure ourselves of the situation through the closest kind of surveillance, which would mean continued aerial reconnaissance, etc. I would hope we would not have to be too specific at the moment.

AES: I wouldn't agree altogether, if I may say so. I think we would continue the surveillance without arguing and announce publicly.

Ball: I think that is probably right, as far as any specifications of the surveillance is concerned, but I think that we reserve the point on safeguards on the assumption that they have to be some kind of arrangements or something of the sort on the ground.

AES: That immediately becomes reciprocal with them, and they say, well how about mutual observation on your ground?

Ball: On this one, I would avoid getting into any specification on the thing.

AES: We can't avoid it.

Ball: The reason why they are pressing so hard on Castro's five points, etc. is to make a record for the negotiations in Cuba that they want to be able to go back and tell Castro that they fought his battle to the bitter end, but that there is no give on our side. I think the way to get a clear definition of position here, which we are going to try to do later this afternoon, but certainly our tentative strategic direction is to say that as far as the Russians are concerned they are doing what they can subject to their being able to control Castro. We have the option of accepting their arguments that they can't control Castro or trying to take the position that Castro is, after all, just a creature of theirs and holding them to the performance themselves. We should insist that we still have to have the safeguards provided in the arrangement, which means some form of ground inspection and some form of being able to satisfy ourselves against reintroduction. This is something we would then have to work out with Castro. But since the guarantees are for the benefit of Castro, without Castro's cooperation in these things, we couldn't possibly give securities. The advantage of this course is that it permits the Russians to disengage if they want to which would leave us free to pursue other subjects with them without the embarrassment of the Cuban problem, while reserving freedom of action on our own part to deal with Castro.

AES: There are two problems here. One is how we liquidate our deal with the Russians as to ground inspection. I don't think we should talk about surveillance.

Ball: I agree. What we have to say to them is that we obviously cannot give assurances as long as Castro is in position on the IL-28s which are an offensive weapon and could be used against the other LA countries and against us, nor can we give such assurances unless we have some ability to safeguard ourselves against the reintroduction of weapons into Cuba. If we are unable to work these things out with Castro, then there is really a problem if the decision is in Castro's hands and it leaves the problem between Castro and ourselves.

AES: All right. This is exactly where we are. We are not a fraction of an inch ahead. The question is whether we

go any farther today.

Johnson: I think we have to wait to see what they say at 1:30, whether there has been any reflection from the exchange.

AES: I wonder if you think the time has come that we talk about the alternative of verification of warheads by ship inspection as we proposed and the aerial bombs, or whether we would be inclined to take their certification.

Johnson: I wouldn't do that yet.

Ball: I don't see how we can. I don't see how we could ever defend it.

Johnson: If we get the IL-28 question resolved, then we might consider what is fact--that you have no way of verification. They have no means of delivery.

AES: Your feeling is as far as today's meeting is concerned you don't go any farther than we have?

Ball: Right.

166. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)

Washington, November 9, 1962, 2:15 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.

Gilpatric said AES wanted him to tell Ball that the emergency meeting Kuznetsov called was simply for the purpose of registering a protest about the way three naval ships were acting in intercepting the Russian ships. They were trying to stop the ships, and one ship wasn't even on the list--Alexandraska. They wanted us to do something about it and Gilpatric said they were. It was an over-zealous Commander. They thought it was going very well this morning. There was no word about Mikoyan's return, and the Russian Ambassador made a fine speech about Mrs. Roosevelt this morning, which is interesting.

Ball asked if they pulled the tarps off and Gilpatric said they have been pulling the tarps off, getting down to what they call the rubber pants, which is enough to get an identification. Ball asked if the picture looked good enough to be persuasive and Gilpatric replied they thought so; they haven't received them yet. They show, for example, fins and they show where the conduits were run. He thought they would correspond with the Red Square pictures sufficiently. The dimensions are right. They think it is going along pretty well.

167. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)

November 9, 1962, 4:15 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking. Stevenson was in New York; Ball was in Washington.

AES: I wonder if you would care to submit this afternoon at the meeting/1/ a suggestion which I could dictate.

/1/The Executive Committee meeting.

GWB: I think the meeting has been called off.

AES: Maybe you could send it over to Kennedy to be reflecting on.

GWB: OK.

AES: You know about our meeting today and the protest on the ships?/2/

/2/See Document 166.

GWB: Yes.

AES: That is all it amounted to. It seems to me highly desirable to liquidate--this is all pending, no developments from Moscow or from Castro, I mean Havana. If this continues this way indefinitely, we are going to start to lose ground here; talks are going to start, and it will reverberate around the country. I think that is good reason to try to cut this off with the Russians and liquidate this part of it if we can and then see what is left in the way of possibilities for negotiation with the Cubans through the OAS. In any event, I could dictate the memo:

(Memo written up separately)/3/

/3/Printed as an attachment.

Just chew on that for a while and extricate us from the deadlock we are in now. This would give them their five Castro points in the forum where we can handle it best--in the OAS, and meanwhile get the munitions out of there and the only verification we will ever get on the warheads anyway.

GB: The thing about that is it leaves Castro in an extremely favorable position, doesn't it.

AES: He has lost his aircraft, his missiles, his nuclear striking capability; he has a guarantee against invasion by the US and nothing else.

GB: He still has his SAM sites and the missiles he never really thought were his anyway.

AES: We are never going to get them, I don't think, without knocking them out.

GB: What disturbs me is from the point of view of the whole American state system, he has come out in a good position. He has guarantee with no obligations.

AES: No, he has given us a guarantee he won't reintroduce these weapons into Cuba and the Soviets have given guarantee that they won't reinstitute. The point is the problem of verification at the completion of the present transaction is in Castro hands and he isn't playing ball. Now, mind you this is only contingency planning in the event we don't get any break from Moscow now or ever.

GB: Let me say the majority view here is in favor of doing what you are trying to do which is to draw a line under the Russian undertakings and say we are prepared to accept at face value your statement that you have gone as far as you can go. The difference here is how Castro will proceed from there. It is then what we do as far as Castro is concerned. First, are we prepared to give him any undertakings at all until he does something himself which would be, I think, from the point of view of most of the people in Washington, which would require more than simply mutual undertakings. He would really have to provide for some kind of on the spot inspection or something of the sort of continuing presence that would provide some real safeguards or at least the appearance of safeguards. The alternative approach is maybe the thing to do is to let the Russians disengage along the line that you suggest and say to them you have done everything you can do and thanks very much; we still have the

problem of dealing with Castro because our guarantee is with Castro and we may have to deal with him by ourselves and see if the Russians would not be prepared to let it go at that.

AES: As to the future safeguards, the only thing we will get is a promise the Russians won't reintroduce unless we get ground inspection from Castro and Castro will put that on a reciprocal basis. Therefore tying to liquidate the Russian deal and if we come off with everything we anticipated, then that leaves us with dealing directly with Castro on any future assurances beyond his promise not to reintroduce.

GB: I think you will find there is a great deal of accord on the first part.

AES: You can't impose on Castro obligations to do things because the Russians didn't comply.

GB: Well, but the whole business of giving him an assurance was conditioned upon certain things being done, some of which are in his behalf.

AES: That is what worries me. You can withhold the assurance on invasion and cut off now and say we didn't get strict compliance and therefore we are not ground inspection, and the people will say over here they have had virtual support of everything they expect and they are now renegeing on their promise. I just don't want to get in the position of anybody charging us with bad faith or nonperformance on our part. I don't want to get so close to that line.

GB: Let me think this over.

AES: Of course this may all change when word comes from Moscow.

GB: No intimation from your friend as to when Mikoyan might have something.

AES: No, I think we are stuck here for the present and I think he has got down there and they are just going to work us over on these five points and we won't really achieve anything.

GB: I'll have this thing typed up and give it some thought.

Attachment/4/

/4/No classification marking. This paper was discussed at the 24th meeting of the Executive Committee, November 12, 11 a.m., see Document 170. The Department of State sent this memorandum to the White House on November 14. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/11/62-11/15/62)

Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy

I won't review the negotiations to date with which you are generally familiar.

Unless there is some break from Moscow or Havana--I think the situation is deadlocked, and I suggest trying to conclude the transaction with the Russians to enable us to get into contact with Cuba through the OAS or directly. Realizing that the Soviets may not be able to control Cuba, I suggest consideration as a contingency of a formula for terminating the present transaction somewhat as follows:

1. If the Soviets will remove the IL-28 bombers and give us some means of verification (fuselages at sea) and formal assurance (in the Security Council) that all nuclear warheads for missiles and air nuclear bombs have been removed, and

2. If the Soviets will give us some means (through the five Latin countries having diplomatic relations, for example) verify compliances above ex post facto (I assume our reconnaissance will also verify without any agreement by the Soviets or Cubans), and

3. If the Soviets and Cuba will give us a formal public promise (in the Security Council) not to reintroduce these weapons into Cuba,

4. We will call off the quarantine and give Cuba the formal guarantee (in the Security Council) against invasion and ask other Latin States to do likewise.

The open question then would be: reciprocal guarantees by Cuba and other Latins and the United States against interference, subversion, sabotage, support for attacks, etc., together with some system of mutual verification by international inspection. This should be worked out through the OAS, if the other Latin states think it worthwhile.

Adlai E. Stevenson/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

168. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, November 9, 1962, 5:30 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.

Ball told Bundy he hoped to get over to him by 10 a.m. tomorrow a memorandum/1/ which is a general kind of planning memo which incorporates some views of the DOD which came out of their meeting this afternoon./2/ It sets up various courses of action based on pretty much the same assumption that we if we don't get the IL-28s out or any security against reentry, but that we take the Russians at their word. It amounts to a consideration of direct military action to achieve it or a continued system of surveillance with the expectation of Cuba drawing fire and then taking some action on that. He is attaching a proposal of Stevenson,/3/ which Ball does not endorse, but which he wanted the President to see on negotiating with Castro. It will give good plane reading if he wants it.

/1/Document 169.

/2/No other record of this meeting has been found.

/3/See the attachment to Document 167.

169. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy

Washington, November 10, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Cuba, General, 11/7/62-11/30/62. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that it was part of the President's weekend reading for November 10.

SUBJECT

Suggested Policy Line for Cuban Crisis/1/

/1/Under a covering memorandum of November 10, Ball sent a copy of this memorandum to the Executive Committee "for information and comment." He noted that it "was hastily prepared at the request of the White House" and that it had been slightly revised since submission to the President. Ball also noted that the memorandum created the impression that the optional courses of action were mutually exclusive. They were not and combinations were "possible and perhaps desirable." (Ibid.)

Assumptions

Until we have received a definitive Soviet answer regarding the IL-28s and a reliable report as to the progress of the Mikoyan-Castro discussions, we must be ready to proceed on any one of four assumptions:

Assumption A. That the USSR will remove the IL-28s and will arrange adequate ground inspection.

If the removal of the bombers is sufficiently assured and the inspection arrangements adequate, we could presumably regard the incident as closed and give some form of guaranty regarding the invasion of Cuba. These arrangements would, of course, need to include more than a provision for Second-Phase inspection by the five Ambassadors. But even that limited progress might indicate a sufficiently forthcoming attitude to make possible some Third-Phase solution through a nuclear-free zone or otherwise.

Assumption B. That the USSR will arrange ground inspection, but will refuse to remove the IL-28s on the ground that these are Cuban property.

This seems rather unlikely. If the Cubans should agree to yield on the question of adequate ground inspection, (which means something more than mere Second-Phase arrangements for inspection by the five Ambassadors) then it is hardly likely that they would insist upon the retention of the IL-28s.

Assumption C. That the USSR will agree to withdraw the IL-28s, but will assert that they are unable to arrange ground inspection because of alleged Cuban objections.

Assumption D. That the USSR will neither remove the IL-28s nor provide arrangements for ground inspection and continuing safeguards. Khrushchev will excuse his non-performance on the ground that Cuba is a sovereign country, the IL-28s belong to the Cubans, and Castro is unwilling to permit any form of ground inspection.

Under either assumption C or D we would be presented with a major choice of policy. Stated in large terms, two available lines of policy would seem worth consideration:

First, we might take the position that Cuba is effectively a puppet of the Soviet Union since it is economically dependent on Moscow; therefore, regardless of Cuban intransigence, we would continue to look to the Soviet Union to enforce the Kennedy-Khrushchev undertakings.

Or second, we might take at face value the Soviet assertion that Russia cannot control Castro. In that event we would tacitly or explicitly accept the fact or fiction (whichever it might be) that Khrushchev had complied to the extent of his ability and thereafter concentrate our pressure on Cuba. In that event, not only would we refuse to give any assurance of noninvasion, but we would make it clear that we could not tolerate--for reasons not only of our own security but of the security of the Hemisphere--that Castro be left in the possession of offensive weapons.

Advantages of Second Line of Policy

The second line of policy seems preferable from the point of view of the total American interest, for the

following reasons:

1. The shifting of the burden of responsibility would minimize the dangers of a direct confrontation with the USSR, which might escalate into a larger conflict.
2. It would assist Khrushchev in extricating the USSR from an involvement in Cuba which is proving progressively more costly and less profitable.
3. It would eliminate the Cuban question from the US-USSR dialogue and thus permit progress on other major issues.
4. It would provide freedom of action for the United States to deal with Castro directly, both on its own behalf and on behalf of the other American states.

Continuing Course of Action Regarding Cuba

If the United States should encourage the de facto disengagement of the USSR from its Cuban involvement and thus achieve a measure of freedom of action against Castro, the question would remain: What course of action should we then elect to follow?

Presumably that course of action should include the following elements:

- (a) It should be consistent with our position that the United States cannot accept either the continuance of offensive weapons in Cuba or the absence of adequate safeguards against the introduction of new offensive weapons.
- (b) It should be designed to undermine the authority and prestige of Castro, both in Cuba and in the eyes of the world.
- (c) It should be directed towards setting in motion a train of events that would progressively enhance the American ability to deal decisively with Castro.
- (d) It should involve the least possible direct challenge to the prestige or authority of Chairman Khrushchev and the USSR.

Available Options

Four possible courses of action would appear worthy of serious consideration:

1. Direct military action against Cuba.
2. Resumption of the quarantine on the basis of an expanded list.
3. Continued systematic aerial surveillance with the strong possibility of provoking interference that might lead to limited or general military action.
4. Solution through Security Council Arrangements.

I--Direct Military Action

As contemplated in a paper prepared by the Department of Defense, direct military action would be taken against the IL-28s./2/ Preparation for this action would consist of an announcement indicating the measures thus far

taken by the USSR to comply with the agreement but emphasizing that the United States would have to take necessary actions to eliminate the threat created by the bombers. The President would, however, be "prepared to ensure that these actions will not include an invasion of Cuba." The actions described in the Department of Defense memorandum are as follows:

/2/The "Defense paper," which is quoted from extensively, has not been found.

"1. Issue a warning that action to remove the bomber threat is about to be taken, that the areas where these aircraft are located should be evacuated by all personnel, and that any attack on U.S. aircraft will be met with appropriate counter action.

"2. Conduct the air attack by selective and discriminate attack:

"a. At the present time it is estimated that such action within the next few days would require attacks (1) on San Julian Air Base with 16 F101 strike aircraft (includes local suppression aircraft) armed with napalm, 2.75" rockets and 20mm ammunition, accompanied by 8 F-104/F8U aircraft equipped with GAR 8 missile to fly low level CAP, (2) on Holguin Air Base with 8A4D aircraft armed with napalm and Zuni rockets and 8F8U-2/F4H aircraft as CAP equipped with Sidewinder/Sparrow missiles and 20mm ammunition (with suppression provided by 8F8Us armed with Zuni rockets and 20mm).

"b. If the attack is delayed beyond the next 48 hours, dispersal of IL28s may require attack on additional airfields.

"3. In the absence of air counter action, the attack should be strictly confined to the destruction or serious damaging of the IL-28 aircraft by the most precise air attack means available. If there is air counter action, the suppression of this action by the assigned suppression aircraft would be required."

Arguments for Direct Military Action

(a) Such action would presumably be effective in eliminating the threat from these offensive aircraft;

(b) It would be action consistent with our conduct of the Cuban affair, i.e., it would be "clear cut, forthright and have been fairly signaled in advance".

(c) With its preponderant military strength the United States could promptly deal with any Cuban reaction.

Arguments Against Direct Military Action

(a) It would be regarded as a direct attack against Cuba and the Soviet Union might feel compelled to intervene on Cuba's behalf in order to save face, or react elsewhere.

(b) In the absence of any direct Cuban attack on the United States or any other OAS country, world opinion might tend to regard the United States action as excessive--particularly in view of our own maintenance of bomber bases around the world and the disparity in size and resources between the United States and Cuba.

(c) It might well provoke Cuban reaction against Guantanamo and possibly even against the Southeastern United States (presumably by MIGs).

II--Resumption of Quarantine on an Expanded Basis

The scenario for the reimposition of the quarantine is described in a Department of Defense memorandum as follows:

"(1) A public announcement should be made by the President, or other high government official, that:

- a. Uncrating, assembling and readying of IL-28 jet bombers has continued.
- b. The UN has been frustrated in its attempt to establish adequate inspection of incoming ships.
- c. The UN has been frustrated in its attempts to establish adequate on-site inspections.

These aircraft with a combat radius of 740 miles remain a threat to the entire Caribbean, the northern portion of South America, Mexico, and the southern portion of the United States.

(2) The United States will maintain the present quarantine until the bombers are removed and adequate on-site inspections, including appropriate long term agreements, are achieved. The United States supports the Brazilian Resolution and believes that it may offer an adequate long term solution, not only to the present crisis, but to future crises of this kind. If the Cubans fail to comply, the United States will have to consider taking additional steps.

(3)

a. If no steps are taken to remove the bombers as a result of this statement, then the US should extend the quarantine to petroleum, reiterating our position that we will lift the quarantine if the bombers are removed and adequate inspection is permitted. The inclusion of petroleum under the quarantine would have immediate and sharp reflections within Cuba. Not only normal oil consumption, but nearly all electric power production in Cuba is dependent upon fuel oil. The Cubans are estimated to have 60 days' supply of gas and diesel fuel oil, and approximately 110 days' supply for power and industrial use. Sabotage could further reduce this stockpile if necessary. For this reason, it would seem very likely that if such a quarantine were established, compliance should be forthcoming shortly thereafter."

Arguments for Quarantine

(a) At the present time not only the OAS but the NATO countries strongly support our insistence on adequate inspection--and, perhaps to a lesser extent, on the removal of the IL-28s.

(b) The Soviet Union might be willing to withhold the further supply to Cuba of items on the proscribed list in order to reduce its investment in a rapidly wasting asset; for this reason it might secretly welcome a US blockade.

(c) The quarantine might result in the strangulation of the Castro regime without any direct loss of life.

(d) The imposition of a quarantine on shipments of POL would be directly relevant to the immobilization of the IL-28s.

(d) Even were the Soviet Union to run the blockade, the resulting confrontation could perhaps be restricted to sea warfare--an arena in which we have a clear advantage. The danger of escalation might, therefore, be less than in the case of any form of bombing attack on Cuba which might result in bombing reprisals elsewhere.

Arguments Against Quarantine

(a) The renewed quarantine would be a direct challenge to the Soviet right of free sea transit. It would thus fail to meet one of the criteria listed earlier--an action directly operating only on Cuba.

(b) Khrushchev yielded to the threat of our quarantine once by turning his ships around. He could not afford the

humiliation of doing so a second time--especially after the missiles have been removed and he has claimed to have complied fully with his undertakings.

(c) Khrushchev was willing to pull back his ships carrying sophisticated weapons to safeguard USSR technology. He would not have a similar motive for holding back tankers filled with POL.

(d) The USSR could not stand idly by while the economy of a Socialist state was slowly strangled; the loss of face and appearance of impotence would be too high a price for it to pay.

(e) The quarantine would be resented by several of our NATO friends, including the UK, which never acknowledged its legality. They acquiesced before because the limited quarantine did not affect their trade; they might well refuse to recognize a blockade which cut off valuable shipping of POL--particularly since there is a fairly widespread feeling that we have already won our point by expelling the missiles.

III--Enforced Aerial Surveillance

It is suggested that, instead of reimposing the blockade, we should undertake a systematic and unremitting air reconnaissance over Cuba, both high and low until such time as

(1) Castro yielded on inspection and the removal of the IL-28's;

(2) Castro was overthrown; or

(3) The reconnaissance provoked an armed response that justified our taking direct military action enabling us, at least, to eliminate the IL-28's.

Arguments for Reconnaissance

(a) This course could be justified under the authority of OAS action.

(b) It would be thoroughly consistent with our position that we could not tolerate a situation in which we neither had safeguards against the introduction of offensive weapons nor adequate observation to insure that offensive weapons presently in Cuban hands would not be used.

(c) It would--hopefully--avoid direct confrontation with the USSR.

(d) It would provide a means for imposing a constant public humiliation on Castro. No Government can permit national air space to be constantly invaded without demonstrating its weakness, both at home and abroad.

(e) Castro could not continue for very long to stand down his planes and restrain his anti-aircraft fire without publicly acknowledging his own weakness. The result would be that sooner or later he would almost certainly attack our planes, which would permit an escalating scale of reprisal and counter-reprisal that could permit us to deal conclusively with the problem of Castro.

IV--Solution Through Security Council Arrangements

This course of action is explained and recommended in the attached memorandum of Governor Stevenson./3/

/3/See the attachment to Document 167.

CONCLUSION

The Problem of Choice

Direct action against Cuba on the basis suggested in Section I can probably be ruled out. Such a course of action would probably be regarded by world opinion as excessive, and it would involve grave risks of provoking retaliation elsewhere in the world.

Realistically, the choice would appear to be between an expanded quarantine, as recommended in Section II, or enforced surveillance, as recommended in Section III.

The decision between these alternative lines of policy turns in large part on a judgment as to the extent to which Khrushchev might in fact be prepared and able to disengage from Cuba. If, as a result of Castro's obduracy, he could cut his investment and leave Cuba without specific security commitments, he might be willing to turn his back while the United States took advantage of the opportunities provided by Castro's response to continued--and necessarily harassing--low and high level surveillance.

On the other hand, if it is felt that Khrushchev could not sit idly by while we forcibly eliminated the IL-28's and wiped out the SAM sites, the surveillance course might appear too dangerous.

On this assumption an expanded quarantine has much to recommend it. If the quarantine route is followed no military action need be taken directly against Cuba; therefore, Khrushchev would not be called upon to respond to what he must necessarily denounce as imperialist aggression. Under these circumstances Khrushchev might be prepared to see Cuba go down the drain through the slow strangulation of a blockade.

But the vice of the blockade is that it directly engaged the prestige of the USSR since it interferes with the freedom of movement of the Soviet merchant fleet. Khrushchev would have to denounce the United States for piracy--as he has already done--and for seeking to starve a small country whose only fault is its allegiance to Communism, and his supine acquiescence in that piracy would be read by all the world as a humiliating confession of impotence.

Against the background of these considerations, the questions for decision must include the following:

1. Would Khrushchev be ready to absorb the prestige loss of acquiescing in a reimposed quarantine or would he feel compelled to use his submarines against our naval vessels?

The existence of substantial doubt regarding the answer to this question suggests that before a quarantine were reimposed some effort might be made to sound out Soviet reactions.

2. If the quarantine did result in limited naval action, how would this affect other US-USSR relationships?

3. Even assuming that we encouraged Khrushchev to disengage from Cuba, if surveillance led to even limited bombing, could the Soviet Union afford to stand by while a nation was attacked that the USSR had vowed to defend? Might not the prestige costs be too great?/4/

/4/On November 12 Nitze prepared for McNamara a suggested Department of Defense position paper on Ball's memorandum to the President. It dealt with Ball's memorandum on a section-by-section basis. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962, McNamara's Working Papers) See the Supplement.

George W. Ball

170. Summary Record of the 24th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 12, 1962, 11 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 12:24 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is *ibid.*, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. See the Supplement.

In response to the President's question, General Taylor said that SAC is still on DEFCON 2. Other forces have been reduced to DEFCON 3. The President suggested that the level of alert might be reduced toward the end of the week, but he did not wish to make a decision now.

Secretary McNamara said any reduction in the state of readiness of U.S. forces would be a sign to the Soviet Union. The Russians would know immediately if our state of alert was reduced. He suggested that no reduction be made today. However, SAC should stand down as soon as possible because the present alert involves burning out large amounts of spare parts. The air defense units should also stand down, but this could not be done without giving a signal to the Russians. Secretary McNamara said he would recommend later this week when the reserve air defense units called up last month should be returned to civilian life.

Director McCone summarized current intelligence./1/ He called attention to NIE 84-4-62 [SNIE 85-4-62] which summarizes Castro's capability for subversion in Latin America and lists military equipment which the Russians have given to Castro./2/ The President commented that we should watch very carefully the use of Cuban arms to promote subversion in the hemisphere.

/1/In McCone's memorandum of this meeting, which was mistakenly thought to have taken place at 4 p.m., the Director of Central Intelligence described his intelligence briefing. McCone noted that assembly of IL-28s was continuing, that the Soviet Union had given Cuba \$550 million in military equipment and spare parts since August 1, 1962, and therefore Castro had the ability to support subversion all over Central America and the Caribbean as well as in the northern tier of South American countries. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President)

/2/The conclusions of this SNIE, November 9, are summarized in footnote 1 above. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry) For text of SNIE 85-4-62, see vol. XII, pp. 234-235.

Secretary Rusk reported there had been no change over the week end on the political side. We had received no reply from the Russians on the withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers from Cuba. We had heard nothing about the Castro/Mikoyan negotiations in Havana.

Ambassador Stevenson reviewed the deadlocked negotiations with the Russians in New York. His talking paper is attached./3/ It contains the specifics of a package to be presented to the Russians in an effort to end the New York negotiations and to seek a solution by negotiating with the Cubans directly or through the OAS. He commented that no proposals were being made in New York and the momentum of the negotiations there was slowing down. U Thant's proposal to name five Latin American Ambassadors as inspectors has encountered Cuban objections. An effort is being made to sell the idea of choosing any five Ambassadors agreeable to the parties concerned. The Soviets are refusing to give in on the withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers and are insisting on the five points which Castro put forward some time ago.

/3/See the attachment to Document 167.

Ambassador Stevenson said his proposal was aimed at ending the negotiations. He felt that the Russians would probably reject his package. Before presenting it to the Russians we would consult the major Latin American states to see if it was acceptable to them. If the Russians accepted, the transaction would be ended. If they came back with counterproposals, we might have to add to the package such things as an agreement to allow

inspection of Cuban camps in the U.S. If it is rejected, we should avoid unilateral action as is proposed in the State Department papers./4/ We should make every effort to go with the Latin American states and keep them unified with us.

/4/See Document 169.

Secretary Rusk said he agreed we should continue to follow a policy of seeking multilateral actions. He urged that we stay on our original course until we get a reply from Khrushchev. He preferred this course to Stevenson's suggestion of putting forward a new proposal now.

The President asked whether we should give a guarantee against invading Cuba if the Russians refused to withdraw the IL-28 bombers. Ambassador Stevenson replied that we should not. If the Soviets refused to withdraw the bombers, we should make a full statement in the UN Security Council.

Mr. McCloy, who has been taking an active part in the negotiations, recommended that we make the following offer to Kuznetsov. If the Russians would agree to take out the IL-28 bombers by fixed future date, we would lift our quarantine at once. He asked whether we should give a guarantee covering only invasion. He said he believed Khrushchev was under real pressure and urged that we deal with the Cuban problem from a world point of view and with regard to U.S./USSR relations rather than as a U.S./Cuba problem. He believed we should make the Russians an offer covering Cuba. Khrushchev then might be easier to deal with on Berlin. He suggested that we talk about normalization in the Caribbean and offer to talk to the Russians about other problems. Khrushchev needs a facesaving device. He can't back down again. We should make an informal approach to him now before he comes down very hard in opposition to further measures necessary to resolve the Cuban crisis.

The President commented that the quarantine was losing credibility. He added that in all papers discussing a no-invasion pledge the word "assurances" be used rather than the word "guarantee."

Ambassador Stevenson again urged that we put our final position to the Russians before they put their final position to us.

Secretary Dillon asked how the U.S. could give an assurance not to invade Cuba without some safeguard covering the reintroduction of strategic missiles to Cuba. Ambassador Stevenson replied that we could rely on aerial reconnaissance plus promises from the Cubans and the Russians.

Secretary Rusk asked whether we should lift the quarantine if the Russians promised to withdraw the IL-28 bombers. He felt we should maintain our insistence on aerial surveillance and on on-site inspection but lift the quarantine if the Russians promise to take out the IL-28s.

Mr. McCloy suggested that we tell the Russians we would give a guarantee if they took certain actions.

The President said he did not want any assurances we might give to be included in any document more formal than a letter.

In response to the President's comment that the ideal arrangement would be a monthly on-site inspection, Ambassador Stevenson said we can't get on-site inspection. Our only hope is to reach some mutual understanding about inspection, such as counting the missiles as they go out on Soviet ships. He doubted we could get approval for a Latin American atom-free zone.

Secretary Rusk said we must have some way in which to answer the waves of reports that offensive missiles are still being put into Cuba by the Russians. Mr. McCloy suggested that we could hold the Russians to the commitment made in the October 26th Khrushchev letter,/5/ i.e., that the Russians would not bring in any weapons.

/5/See Document 84.

The Attorney General raised again the question of how we could prove that the Russians are not delivering new arms to Cuba.

Referring to the TV Today show,/6/ the President asked that within twenty-four hours our officials interrogate every Cuban refugee who was making statements about arms going to Cuba. The refugees are naturally trying to build up their story in an effort to get us to invade. We must get to the people the fact that the refugees have no evidence which we do not have. Such refugee statements, if they continue, could make the problem almost unmanageable. He suggested again that we arrange to check every press, radio and TV report made by a refugee and promptly report back to the media involved if there was no evidence behind the refugee allegations.

/6/On the Today show on NBC, a Cuban refugee stated that he knew positively there were 82 missiles in Cuba. As only 42 were removed, 40 remained hidden in caves.

General Taylor raised the question of how we ensure the continuation of necessary aerial reconnaissance in the long range. Mr. McCone pointed out that if the SAM sites are operational, we cannot ensure the continuance of aerial reconnaissance with U-2s.

The President said we should conduct the aerial reconnaissance we consider necessary. We must continue to do this because a UN system has not been created. He asked whether we should tell the Cubans we are continuing reconnaissance or just go ahead and do it. Ambassador Stevenson replied that we cannot tell the Cubans because they would oppose our reconnaissance. The President said our reconnaissance can be based on the OAS resolution/7/ if no other position is acceptable to the Russians. The question is whether we surface our current aerial surveillance.

/7/The resolution of October 23; for text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 408-410.

Secretary Rusk commented that no secrecy is possible in this hemisphere. Our air reconnaissance does not come under the OAS resolution.

Under Secretary Ball cautioned against building up Castro as being able to defy both the U.S. and the USSR. He felt such an impression would have a bad effect in Latin America.

Ambassador Stevenson said ex post facto verification of the removal of the Soviet missiles is one problem. Such verification we cannot get. Continuing verification that missiles are not being reintroduced is another problem.

The Attorney General pointed out that these two problems were not separable. He wanted to know what we tell the American people we are doing to prevent the reintroduction into Cuba of Soviet strategic missiles. Khrushchev lied once and he could lie again. We must have an acceptable guarantee that there will be no reintroduction of missiles. We can't live without taking some action which ensures us that we know whether or not he is complying with a statement on non-reintroduction of missiles.

The President suggested that we say we are taking every means to ensure that there is no reintroduction of missiles. These actions were taken under the OAS resolution. We would not need to say we were overflying Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson agreed that we should just overfly Cuba and not say we were doing so. We should get the OAS to say that this hemisphere cannot live with a Cuba which is promoting subversion and action will be taken, if necessary, to prevent Cuban subversion.

The President commented that an assurance covering invasion does not ban covert actions or an economic blockade or tie our hands completely. We can't give the impression that Castro is home free.

Secretary Rusk said we cannot unilaterally amend the Rio Treaty./8/ Any assurance which we would give does not affect the provision in the Rio Treaty which allows invasion under certain circumstances.

/8/The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocity Assistance of 1947; for text, see *ibid.*, *Basic Documents, 1950-1955*, pp. 789-796.

Ambassador Stevenson said we had to decide whether to give the Soviets a package proposal before hearing from Khrushchev or hold off until we had the Russian reply. If we decide on making a package proposal we must decide whether it is a full package or a partial package.

The President read the proposed wording of an assurance we would give against invasion. He suggested that any assurance which is made should appear as a restatement of undertakings in the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty rather than as a new commitment.

Secretary Rusk suggested that no formal statement be given to the press today.

The President asked that a short statement be prepared for him to look at at a 4:00 meeting which would say we are waiting for a Russian reply to our demand that they remove the IL-28 bombers.

Bromley Smith/9/

/9/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

171. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, November 12, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR File, 1962. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A note on this message indicated it was first given orally.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I would like to express my satisfaction that the mutual obligations taken in accordance with the exchange of messages between us are being carried out both by your side and our side. One can say that certain favourable results are already seen at this time. We appreciate your understanding of the situation and your cooperation in carrying out the obligations taken by our side. We, on our part, will as always honor our obligations. And I would like to inform you that our obligations with regard to dismantling and removal of both missiles and warheads have already been fulfilled.

We appreciate that we must come to an agreement with you regarding the mutually acceptable means for your side to ascertain that we really carry out our obligations. What has already been achieved in the course of negotiations between our representatives--Kuznetsov, McCloy and Stevenson--and the cooperation reached in the process of these negotiations is a good thing. The same should be said about the cooperation between captains of our ships, which were taking our missiles from Cuba, and corresponding U.S. ships. This is very good, this has created an impression that your side also wishes to cooperate, eliminating the remnants of the tension which only yesterday were very dangerous both for our two peoples and for the peoples of the whole world. Thus, if we proceed from our understanding which was expressed in your message of October 27/1/ and in our reply of October 28,/2/ then we, the Soviet side, have carried out our obligations and thereby have created possibility for complete elimination of tension in the Caribbean. Consequently, now it is your turn, it is for your side to carry out precisely your obligations. We have in mind that apart from the long term obligations that the United States itself will not attack Cuba and will restrain other countries of the Western Hemisphere from doing that, the most

important thing which is required today is to give moral satisfaction to world public opinion and tranquility to peoples. And what is required from your side to that end is to lift the so-called quarantine and of course to stop violating the territorial waters and air space of Cuba. If this continues confidence in your obligations will thus be undermined which can only grieve world public and throw us back to the positions to which we must not return after the liquidation of such a dangerous situation. To say nothing of the fact that it would hamper us in the future.

/1/See Document 95.

/2/Document 102.

At present, we must--and we are convinced in that--look forward and draw necessary conclusions from what has happened up till now and from the good which followed due to the efforts of both sides. Therefore, we believe that conditions are emerging now for reaching an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, cessation of all types of nuclear weapons tests and on all other questions which are ripe and require solution. You have already ended your tests and we shall probably also end our tests in November or at least before the end of this year.

Now it is also necessary to think of some real measures with regard to the question of ensuring more stable security in the world. In this connection we attach great importance to your statement that the US is ready to support idea of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw treaty countries. But the basic question, of course, remains that of disarmament, of destroying the whole war machine of states. To give more assurance on the first stage it might be expedient to return to the proposals forwarded by us some time ago on the establishment of observation posts on mutual basis at airfields, in major sea-ports, at railway junctions, on highways. This would exclude a possibility of a surprise attack if any side does not behave honestly, if it wants to concentrate military equipment and its troops for an attack. Precisely this is pursued by the suggestion made recently by Mr. Thant.

It goes without saying that the question of a German peace treaty still remains and we can not escape from solving it. Moreover what we and you have lived through makes a speediest solution of this question still more imperative.

I do not name other unresolved questions, we have plenty of them, I name only the main problems, on the solution of which the destinies of the world largely depend.

Now about the matter that, as you state, worries you today--about the IL-28 planes which you call an offensive weapon. We have already given you our clarification on this point and I think you can not but agree with us. However, if you do not agree--and this is your right--ask your intelligence after all and let it give you an answer based not on guesswork but on facts. If it really knows anything it must tell you the truth and namely that it is long since the IL-28's have been taken out of production and out of use in our armed forces. And if some planes still remain now--and a certain number of them have been brought by us to Cuba--that was done as a result of your action last year when you increased the budget and called up reservists. We on our part had to take measures in response at that time, having postponed taking those planes out of use as well.

Had there been no such action on your part we would not have IL-28's in existence because they would have been used for scrap. Such is this "formidable offensive" weapon. If your intelligence is objective it must give a correct appraisal of these 12-year-old planes and report to you that they are incapable of offensive actions. We brought them to Cuba only because they can be used as a mobile means of coastal defense under the cover of anti-aircraft fire from their own territory. They can not however fly beyond the limits of that cover since they will be immediately destroyed either by modern anti-aircraft means or by simple conventional artillery; not to speak of interceptors before which they are entirely defenseless. But all this must be known not only to the intelligence but to all engaged in military matters.

Nevertheless we regard your concern with understanding, though on our part we share the desire of the Government of Cuba to possess defensive weapons which would permit [it] to defend the territorial integrity of its country.

Therefore if you meet this with understanding and if we agreed with you on solving other questions in implementing the mutually assumed obligations then the question of IL-28 bombers would be solved without difficulties.

In what way should this cooperation, in our understanding, find its expression and what would facilitate the solution of this question?

We state to you that these bombers are piloted solely by our fliers. Consequently you should not have any fears that they can be used to do harm to the United States or other neighboring countries in Western Hemisphere. And since you and your allies in Western Hemisphere have taken an obligation not to invade Cuba then it would seem this weapon should not pose any threat for you. Moreover, we are aware of what military means are in your possession. If the enemy were threatening us with such weapon we would ignore that threat completely for it would cause us no anxiety whatsoever.

But because you express apprehension that this weapon can be some sort of a threat to the US or other countries of Western Hemisphere which do not possess adequate defensive means we state to you as a guarantee that those planes are piloted by our fliers and therefore there should be no misgivings that they could be used to the detriment of any state.

As you ascertained yourself we have removed the missiles, we also removed everything else related to missiles, all the equipment necessary for their use and recalled the personnel manning those missiles. Now that the missiles are removed the question of IL-28's is an incomprehensible argument because that weapon as I have already said is of no value as a combat weapon at present, to say nothing of the future. Let us come to an agreement on this question as well, let us do away with tension, let us fulfill the mutual pledges made in our messages. We will not insist on permanently keeping those planes on Cuba. We have our difficulties in this question. Therefore we give a gentleman's word that we will remove the IL-28 planes with all the personnel and equipment related to those planes, although not now but later. We would like to do that some time later when we determine that the conditions are ripe to remove them. We will advise you of that.

I think that an agreement on such basis will enable us to complete the elimination of all the tension that existed and will create conditions for life to resume its normal course, that is the blockade would be immediately removed; the pledges of the sides would be registered in the appropriate documents in the United Nations Organization; non-invasion of Cuba and strict observance of her sovereignty guaranteed; the UN posts established in the countries of the Caribbean so that neither one nor the other side would indeed undertake any unexpected actions to the detriment of another state.

This would be the best solution which can be anticipated especially having in mind the tension that we lived through and the abyss we came to. And I believe, Mr. President, that you yourself understand that we were very close to that abyss. But you and we soberly and wisely appraised the situation and maintained self-control. Let us now give a complete satisfaction to the public.

What happened should now prompt us to make new great efforts so that no repetition of such events should be allowed because if we succeeded in finding a way out of a dangerous situation this time, next time we might not safely untie the tightly made knot. And the knot that we are now untying has been tied rather tightly, almost to the limit.

We displayed an understanding with regard to the positions of each other and came out of a critical situation

through mutual concessions to the satisfaction of all peoples of the world. Let us now give joy to all peoples of the world and show that this conflict really became a matter of yesterday, let us normalize the situation. And it would be good if on your part efforts were made to make the normalization a complete, real normalization and it is necessary to do this in the interests of all peoples and this is within our power.

Sincerely,/3/

/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.

172. Summary Record of the 25th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 12, 1962, 5 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32A. Top Secret; Sensitive. According to the President's Appointment Book, this meeting began at 5:30 p.m. and lasted until 6:15 p.m. (Ibid.) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32A. See the Supplement.

Mr. Bundy summarized Khrushchev's reply/1/ to the President's message of November 6th./2/ The strategic missiles and warheads are out of Cuba. The IL-28 bombers might come out at some point, but would be removed under Soviet control.

/1/Document 171.

/2/Document 155.

There was a discussion of the McCloy offer which involved lifting the quarantine in return for the Russian promise to take out the IL-28 bombers. The question of safeguards against the reintroduction of strategic weapons would not be raised now because we have a limited set of unilateral safeguards to use which we do not want to lose.

Secretary Rusk said that there was an issue over whether the Soviet commitment on missiles and warheads was to be public or private. We would wish it to be public and Khrushchev wishes it to be private.

The President said we could live for two weeks with no public knowledge of the Soviet commitment.

Secretary McNamara asked if we are not willing to accept the situation as it now exists on the basis of the Soviet reply, would we reimpose the quarantine?

Mr. Bundy commented that the IL-28 bombers appear not to be a sticking point.

The President said we still have the questions of continued surveillance and the form of an assurance against invasion. The quarantine is not our only move. We could set the IL-28s off against the quarantine and our assurances against invasion off against safeguards covering reintroduction of missiles.

Ambassador Stevenson referred to the words in Khrushchev's reply "at some point" and commented that this was not a specific time but meant that the bombers would come out when Khrushchev gets what he wants, such as assurances against an invasion.

Ambassador Thompson said that the timing of our commitment not to invade was important to Khrushchev because the Communist Central Committee will be meeting in Moscow soon.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we concentrate on a deal involving the quarantine offset against withdrawal of the bombers, but that we add that to the other subjects to be discussed.

Mr. Bundy suggested we might tell Khrushchev that he should give the order to remove the bombers, that we would then check on their removal, and verifying that the bombers had left, we would lift the quarantine. He proposed that an informal note be sent now and a letter later.

There was a discussion of the alternatives which consist of a public announcement that the bombers are coming out or verifiable proof that the bombers are being recreated, plus private assurances that they will be removed. The question of whether we should ask the Russians to remove them within thirty days was raised. The consensus was that Khrushchev should be told that he should give the order to remove the bombers, and when we observe the crated bombers leaving Cuba on Soviet ships, we will lift the quarantine./3/

The President decided that we should not announce any message from Khrushchev. The public reason a second meeting had been held today was because the group's business had not been finished in the morning.

The President approved up to five U-2 flights and ten low-level sorties for tomorrow.

Bromley Smith/4/

/3/For the message as passed to the Soviet Union, see Document 173.

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

173. Editorial Note

At 8:30 p.m., on November 12, 1962, Robert F. Kennedy went to the Soviet Embassy's reception for the Bolshoi Ballet. The Attorney General gave Ambassador Dobrynin an oral message. According to a typed note with a handwritten note by Bromley Smith, the message was: "if the Soviet Union will at once give the order to start removing IL-28's and complete the removal in 30 days we would be prepared immediately to announce the removal of the quarantine." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/11/62-11/15/62)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the former Soviet Union has made available the following version of what Robert Kennedy proposed to Dobrynin:

"During the second meeting with A.F. Dobrynin on the evening of November 12, R. Kennedy, under instruction from the President, formulated the US proposal in this way: 'N.S. Khrushchev and the President agree in principle that the IL-28 aircraft shall be withdrawn within a certain period of time. Following this agreement the US will immediately, even tomorrow, lift all quarantine, without waiting for the completion of the aircraft pullout. The US side would, of course, prefer that the agreed time period for withdrawing the IL-28 aircraft were made public. However, if the Soviet side has any objections to making it public, the President will not insist. N.S. Khrushchev's word would be quite suffice. As for the period of time, it would be good if the aircraft were withdrawn within, say, 30 days.'" (This proposal was received in Moscow on November 13.)

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in *Robert Kennedy and His Times*, writes an account of the Kennedy-Dobrynin meeting, page 549.

174. Memorandum of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 13, 1962, 11 a.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone. A note on the source text indicates the meeting was "Held at State Dept." This was not one of the official numbered Executive Committee meetings. According to Rusk's Appointment Book, he and Ball--and apparently the rest of the Committee minus the President--met in Ball's office from 11 a.m. to noon. (Johnson Library)

Purpose of the meeting was to crystalize policy concerning procedures to be followed in view of information received on November 12th concerning the disposition of IL 28s and other matters.

Kuznetsov requested meeting with McCloy at 3:00 o'clock;/1/ it was expected that this meeting might reveal Soviet position. In view of this, no firm policy position was developed, although there was an extended discussion of our position with regard to the IL 28s and also the question of inspection.

/1/See Document 175.

It was agreed that the IL 28s must be removed, and if they were removed, we could remove the quarantine. If the IL 28s are not removed, then it was felt we could take several steps to exert more pressure on Castro and the Soviets, and these would involve a meeting of the OAS to restate their policy, a statement by the President indicating non-compliance on the part of the Soviets, economic measures by the OAS, and a tightening of the quarantine. It was felt that one or several of these steps could be taken to extract a commitment to remove the bombers. However, we should not make a "no invasion" commitment unless appropriate measures for inspection were agreed upon by the Soviets and Castro.

McCone took a strong position covering the points outlined in attached memorandum of November 13th, warning against the serious long term outlook for Cuba and indicating that he felt the Soviets were trading on Castro's position and they in effect, could dictate Castro's terms if they so desired. Meeting did not seem disposed to go as far as McCone recommended, although the Vice President strongly supported this position.

The attached notes are pertinent./2/

/2/The notes were not attached.

Also at a meeting on Monday, November the 12th at 5:30 in the White House with all present,/3/ Mr. Bundy outlined the substance of a communication which had been received, expressing Khrushchev's views in response to the exchange of letters of November 5th and 6th. It was decided that the communication needed study and hence its receipt was noted and a meeting arranged for the following day.

/3/See Document 172.

The attached notes are pertinent./2/

John A. McCone/4/

Director

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared by Director of Central Intelligence McCone

LONG TERM OUTLOOK FOR CUBA

It is my belief that a Castro-Soviet Communist Cuba, whose stated intentions and past actions are to support and spread subversion throughout Latin America, is unacceptable to the United States and should be unacceptable to most, if not all, Latin American states.

It can be said that through the removal of the missiles (and we must assume but do not know positively that all are removed) and the removal of the IL 28s (if this can be negotiated) the threat to the security of the United States and the Latin American states from a nuclear strike is removed. However, two serious problems remain:

One, no means have been established to reasonably guarantee that offensive missiles will not be reintroduced or, if offensive missiles remain on the island, that they will not be secretly placed in operational status. Aerial surveillance will help, but will not guarantee our ability to detect such an activity. Ground inspection would if properly organized and granted freedom of movement. But this has been denied by Castro and the denial is now supported by Mikoyan.

Furthermore, the SAM sites if operating can effectively deny aerial inspection. There can be no explanation for Soviet insistence on leaving the SAM sites except to shield future clandestine emplacement of offensive weapons such as MRBMs and IRBMs if the Soviets choose at some future time to reintroduce these weapons systems.

A combination of aerial inspection and properly organized ground inspection would give an effective guarantee against reintroduction of missile systems. The ground inspectors would have to have freedom of action so that they could make on-site checks of the ever increasing refugee and agent reports of the storing of missiles and their equipment in caves, which cannot be totally dismissed.

Therefore prior to a "no invasion" commitment we must have complete arrangements for inspections and they cannot be frustrated by either the Soviets or Castro.

Secondly, Castro remains over-equipped with ground equipment. He also now has amphibious equipment capable of supporting insurgency movements against any of the Caribbean, Central American states or states in the northern tier of South America. Castro has never changed in his determined effort to subvert these states. He has trained insurgents by the thousands; there are large numbers, they are in Cuba now in training. His insurgents are directed against a number of Central and South American states. He repeatedly expresses violent intentions against the organized governments of these states. Therefore one can only conclude that he would use his newly acquired amphibious lift and a substantial part of his excess arms to support insurgents who can readily overthrow neighboring governments. Our policy should anticipate this and should be designed to take action regardless of how extreme to remove this threat if the eventualities mentioned above materialize.

J.A.M.

175. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Permanent Representative to the Mission to the United Nations (Stevenson) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)

November 13, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking. Stevenson was in New York; Ball was in Washington. There is no time on the dateline of the memorandum, but the call had to have taken place after 6:40 p.m. when the meeting between Stevenson and Kuznetsov concluded.

Stevenson--Kuznetsov started by saying that he had a very serious protest against the over-flights over Cuba./1/ They were unlawful in that they violated Cuban airspace, and they would only make negotiations more difficult.

The Soviets understood the categorical objections of the Cubans, and these were a violation of the feelings and integrity of the Cubans. They complicated settlement, and we should stop them now. The Soviets have fulfilled all their obligations. The Americans have no convincing arguments for continuing such over-flights which only injure the feelings of the Cubans and increase tension. He hopes the US will consider this protest with due attention. Our answer was that the President's letter provides for UN observation and supervision of the fulfillment of this agreement. That has not been possible because the Soviet Union was unable to make such arrangements; we have had to use this means of reassuring ourselves that there was in fact compliance. These flights are in fact, Jack McCloy said, an element of stability. They have given us our only assurance of compliance. They have enabled us to detect what went, what was going on in Cuba, and we must continue to use these over-flights until the IL-28's are removed and any suggestion that they should be ended is most disquieting.

/1/This meeting was summarized in telegram 1762 from USUN, November 13, 8 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1362) See the Supplement. There is also a 25-page memorandum of conversation of the meeting, which lasted from 3:15 to 6:40 p.m., in USUN airgram 24, November 14, 2:30 a.m. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963)

Ball--Did we just put it on the removal of the IL-28's?

Stevenson--No, that they should be ended. He said is most disquieting.

Ball--But you didn't say that we would have to continue until the IL-28's were removed.

Stevenson--That was sort of the tenor of what was said. Had it not been for these, we might have been at war, etc. Kuznetsov said regarding on-site inspection by the UN and the allegations that the Soviets did not fulfill its obligation, the obligation stated in Khrushchev's letters of Oct. 27 and 28/2/ on which they base their position. In the letter of the 27th he spoke of agreement in principal for verification and stressed that it could be done only by agreement of the Cubans. On Oct. 28, he referred to the letter of the 27th, and then he went on to say that he believes that the Soviets have made many efforts to prove that they are doing everything to come to an agreement with the US in order to assure us that the obligations would be fulfilled. They have made many steps forward. They permitted ship-side verification of the removal of the missiles, and that he is here to explain our position and settle this problem. He believes that all conditions have been created to solve all of our questions in a spirit of mutual confidence in order to normalize the situation in the Caribbean. All the Soviet acts show is, that its obligations have been fulfilled. They had gone further than the agreement in the letter in fact by removing the missiles when the President had only asked for them to be rendered inoperative and the sites dismantled. Then he started off on the usual say about the IL-28's not being offensive, but only defensive, and he volunteered to tell us in detail why they could not be included, were not included, in the agreement between Khrushchev and Kennedy. He said that the flights over Cuba don't create stability. They are over foreign territories; they create indignation and disrespect for the sovereignty and are a violation of the Charter and international law. They can lead only to further aggravation of the situation. If the parties could come to an agreement, all people would be relieved. As to the proposition that the U-2 had prevented war, what had prevented war was the patience and understanding of K and K, and that they had noted that the leaders could come to agreement quickly, so all questions could be decided if there was a desire to settle them on both sides. They don't think that the U-2 violation of air-space eases tensions; it only aggravates them. He recalled the incident of May, 1960 and the increased tensions resulting from the failure of the Summit Conference in Paris. Also, the recent U-2 flights over the Soviet Union didn't make the situation more favorable. Also the low altitude planes before the eyes of the Cubans are a source of great irritation. Continued flights indicate that the US does not recognize international law and that they are not in the interest of peace or settlement about Cuba. They cannot be justified. In answer we said, we quoted the letters of Oct. 27 and 28 on the agreement for UN observation and supervision to verify compliance. This position was not objected to by Khrushchev in his final letter. We had tried to accommodate the USSR by ship-side inspection and aerial reconnaissance in lieu of on-site inspection by the UN. McCloy referred again to the fact that these photos had helped stability; they disclosed facts that had been denied and the secrecy with which these weapons had been placed, and suggested that they now be stopped before other assurances

contemplated by the agreement were completed would be very disquieting. I said that the way to stop these aggravations of Cuba is to conclude this agreement to remove the weapons as quickly as possible. We had tried to accommodate the realities of the situation to help conclude it, and that we expected them to do the same. The best hope for an improved climate is to end this episode as quickly as possible, and to let us hear the Soviet proposals for safeguards against reintroduction of these weapons in the future. As long as these negotiations go on, people are not reassured. All differences have in fact been isolated. We know our respective positions; now let's settle them. Kuznetsov said that he agreed on desirability of prompt solution; that they were making every effort to solve; if the matter were still prolonged, it was the US that doesn't show the same approach to the desirability of the solution that they did. I referred to the President's letter of Oct. 27 with regard to the removal of the quarantine without delay and as to the UN, that they had agreed to stop building the bases and to dismantle them, and that he had gone even further, that they had actually withdrawn the weapons, the missiles from Cuba. That that could have been done only on a final settlement after verification by the UN, had they chosen to interpret the agreement that way. In other words, the Soviet Union has done everything possible to complete the agreement. Then he went on to say--what shall we do to come to a quick agreement. We have been waiting to hear from you so long. The US had fulfilled obligations in some document to be presented to the Security Council. The Soviets bear no responsibility toward the delay. That they too could put forward many questions to prolong the agony if they wanted to. The time has come to agree on all matters and draft a document for the Security Council. They said they wanted to clarify the position of the Soviets on other questions. They discussed McCloy's thing (the open sky proposal) that there should be no secrecy and that to achieve this we have to complete disarmament. The US had refused to accept their proposals to start such observation over some parts of the United States and the SU; also the Soviet proposal to establish observation posts together with certain disarmament measures. These had also been rejected by the United States. Regarding the reconnaissance flights over Cuba, what would be the reaction of the United States if the Soviets overflew our bases all around the Soviet Union? They said that Mr. McCloy said that flights over the Caribbean clarified the situation. If that is so, why do we continue? The way out is to compromise constructive proposals. They asked us what to do to come to quick agreement. That the way to do it was that we would engage in no recriminations about who was responsible to the prolongation of the discussion. That if they didn't know how to do it, we could only repeat what we have said before on many occasions. That was to remove the IL-28s and give assurances with respect to removal of all nuclear components, obtain from Cuba its cooperation for observation, verification, give us their assurances against reintroduction of such weapons and their suggestions for the safeguards for the future. As to what we, the United States, would do--as the agreement says, we would lift the quarantine and then we would give assurances regarding no invasion. Then I went on to say indeed we would lift the quarantine now if the Soviet Union would give us the promise that it was going to remove the IL-28 bombers within, say, three weeks--and the warheads. This was yesterday's proposition, you will recall.

/2/Documents 91 and 102.

GWB--Yes.

AES--That I would defer any discussions of the open skies until some other time as we had all we could manage to resolve this problem at the present. Jack [McCloy] enlarged on the ending of the quarantine on the assurances of the removal of the IL-28s now. This was a further concession on our part and meanwhile we would have to continue the reconnaissance flights to confirm the fact of removal of the 28s. Then Kuznetsov came back and said regarding the 28s you know our position--that they are defensive weapons and can't be regarded otherwise. And if your experts say to the contrary they are deceiving you and they are deceiving the President; that they are used only for training purposes and coastal defense under anti-aircraft cover (almost the same language, by the way, as from the latter). We must be trying to delay working out the final guarantees; that we should be talking about a document containing all of our obligations to be presented to the Security Council. That the United States should say to them how we envision working out such a document contemplated by the letter. Regarding the reintroduction of these weapons into Cuba that they would obey strictly the letter of Chairman Khrushchev. Now as to the IL-28s they will study and they will consider the US suggestion, but they want us to know that the Soviet position (and here are some significant words) "as it now stands" is clear. That we should now discuss the

longstanding, outstanding issues (I wasn't sure what he meant). Discuss all the questions to see if we can agree. How do we propose to implement our obligation? In response I listed the things that we expected the Soviet Union to do; that the quarantine was already lifted; that we had only one remaining obligation and that was the declaration of the SC regarding the assurances on invasion. I summarized the outstanding obligations of the Soviet Union--the position that we were in now, which was: (1) that the Soviet Union study the removal of the IL-28s; (2) that if they agreed to remove them, we would lift the quarantine at the time that was proper; (3) that we would expect assurances on the removal of the nuclears; that we would expect assurances against reintroduction of the weapons; that we would expect verification in Cuba; that we would expect proposals regarding future safeguards regarding the reintroduction by anyone; and finally that with all of these accomplished that we would make a declaration regarding assurances on invasion in the SC. As to the language on assurances and safeguards we would refer the matter to Washington and we would be glad to discuss our language along with theirs. Kuznetsov said he was not going to deal with the previous questions which had been reviewed during the afternoon but regarding the IL-28s that he must make a further clarification. He wished the US to understand that they reaffirm their position; that the IL-28s are defensive but that he would report the consideration advanced by the US to his Government and then we adjourned. We got the impression today for the first time it looked as though Mikoyan might be waiting to hear from Kuznetsov on what he could get on the overflights and on the guarantees. I thought on the whole it was a more constructive meeting than we had had since the beginning. At least we isolated the problems that are outstanding and that we got on the table all of the things we expected from them and made it clear that the quarantine was already lifted and our declaration on the invasion would be made in SC. I don't think we are through with Zorin on that. He will probably want to have a further argument on that ahead of us. That was about it. He obviously had been fully briefed on the letter and knew it by heart. He spoke again from documents much of the time (position papers) rather than just free style. I think that you can report to the President that we are back where I was talking about on Friday/3/ by getting the whole package before him, and I think personally it is a very good thing and we will now begin to hear one by one as to what they are going to reject and what they are going to take. I rather think they are going to go along on the ILs but we will have arguments on the form of assurance and probably they will never be able to concede the aerial surveillance. They can't do that and we will just have to go on arguing that.

/3/November 9; see Document 165.

GWB--They are probably doing this so that they can tell Mikoyan they made a protest.

AES--Yes, I think that is right. It did occur to me that while they were making this protest that depending on what other considerations may be involved that I am not clear about that if we can slow up a little for a day and run high instead of low it might be a good thing--to see if we can bring them along on agreement on the ILs.

GWB--Well, let me see what we can do on that.

AES--If you can just tell them to leave out the low flights tomorrow and to confine it to the U-2s At least that is my judgment.

GWB--I think there may be something in that.

AES--I think Jack disagrees with me on that. He doesn't think we ought to change our practices. It seems to me that maybe this is the time when they might be in a crisis there with Castro and that anything that would help there to get agreement on the ILs. I don't know if it is the thing (checking with McCloy) He feels that if they think they should run low, go ahead and do it. If they don't feel that they have to, then it would be a good idea to ease up a bit. We will send you an overnight on this.

GWB--I'll report this to the President. I think it sounds a little encouraging.

AES--If he wants anything directly on atmosphere, etc. he can call me.



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume XI
Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

176. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, November 14, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62. No classification marking. At 4:35 p.m., Ball telephoned McGeorge Bundy to say that "Bobby [Kennedy] has an answer [from Khrushchev], which is not too encouraging. It keeps it wrapped up." Bundy told Ball that the President wanted the Under Secretary and Thompson to come to the White House to look over Khrushchev's message with the President and Rusk. (Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and Bundy; November 14; Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba)

I have read with great satisfaction the reply of the President of the United States/^{1/} and I agree with the considerations expressed by the President. It is of particular pleasure to me that we seem to have the same desire to liquidate as soon as possible the state of tension and normalize the situation so that to untie our hands for normal work and for solving those questions that are awaiting their solution. And this depends in the main on agreement between us--the two greatest powers in the world with whom special responsibility for ensuring peace lies to a greater degree than with other countries.

/^{1/}Apparent reference to Document 155.

The question of the withdrawal of the IL-28's within mentioned 30 days does not constitute any complicated question. Yet this period will probably not be sufficient. As I already said in my oral message/^{2/} I can assure the President that those planes will be removed from Cuba with all the equipment and flying personnel. It can be done in 2-3 months. But for me, for our country, it would be a great relief if the state of tension that evolved in the Caribbean were liquidated as soon as possible. I have in mind what I have already said, namely: to lift immediately the quarantine, that is, blockade; to stop the flights of the US planes over Cuba; to write down the mutual commitments ensuing from the messages of the President and mine of October 27 and 28/^{3/} to which end your representatives and ours have to prepare with the participation of the UN acting Secretary General U Thant an appropriate document. This is the main thing now.

/^{2/}Document 171.

/^{3/}See Documents 95 and 102.

You understand that when we say that it is necessary to announce now the withdrawal of the IL-28's at the time when your planes are flying over Cuba it creates for us no small difficulties. I have no doubt that you will understand--and the Cuban Government understands this--that such actions constitute violation of sovereignty of

the Cuban state. Therefore it would be a reasonable step to create in this respect also conditions for the normalization of the situation and this in a great degree would make it easier to meet your wish of expediting the withdrawal of the IL-28 planes from Cuba.

If we attained all that now and if this were announced, then more favourable conditions would be created for our country to solve the question of time table for the withdrawal of IL-28 planes.

Now our main difficulties lie precisely in the fact that, as it is well known to everybody and it is being rightfully pointed out to us, we have removed from Cuba missiles and warheads, that is, we have fulfilled our commitments while the US is not carrying out its commitments--the quarantine continues, the US planes continue to fly over Cuba and there is no agreement that would register the pledges of the US. And all this finds ears that are listening and listening attentively. It is difficult for us to give explanations to such unjustifiable state of affairs. Therefore to carry out the final procedure after the missiles and warheads have been removed, already now the quarantine must be lifted, the flights of the American planes over Cuba must be stopped and mutual commitments of the sides must be written down in an appropriate document with the participation of the UN.

It is hard to say for me what specific agreement is possible on the question of UN observation posts. But we as well as the Government of Cuba have already expressed a desire to come to terms on this question. If the question of the observation posts is of interest to the US--and I think it must be of interest--then I consider it wise to come to an agreement on this. I think that the Government of Cuba will not object to the UN posts, of course on the condition of respect for the sovereignty of Cuba, on the condition of treating her as equal which must mean that on the territory of other countries of the Caribbean and in a corresponding region of the US there will be also set up similar UN posts, that is on the condition that reciprocity will be observed in this question.

You understand, Mr. President, that no country can assume unilateral commitments, and it would be wise to make them mutual.

I have already said that perhaps it will be necessary for us in the negotiations on disarmament between our countries at the first stage to return to our proposals providing for the establishment of posts at airfields, in major sea-ports, at railway junctions, on highways in order to give guarantees to all the countries of the world that no country will be able to secretly concentrate troops and get prepared for an attack against or invasion of another country. It is wise, it appeals to us.

If you would give your representatives--McCloy, Stevenson and others--appropriate instructions on the question of UN posts in the Caribbean region and adjoining regions of the US--and our representatives have such instructions--and if they would come to an agreement then all this could be made public. Then there would be removed the difficulties connected with making a public announcement on the withdrawal of IL-28 planes and we would name then specific dates. These dates will be probably much closer than those which I name and maybe even closer than those which were named by you.

That is why we should make a final step in this direction. Then we would really cut the knot which was tied tightly enough and having cut it we would create normal relations between our countries to which our people aspire and which your people, we are sure of that, also want.

I will allow myself to express some other considerations and I believe you will not take offense and will not consider that I intrude too much into the sphere of our internal affairs. Voting in the elections to the Senate, the House of Representatives and in gubernatorial elections which just took place has resulted in the defeat of your former rival who was clearly preparing again for the next presidential elections. It is significant that as a result of the elections precisely those candidates were defeated who, if I may use such an expression, were making most frenzied bellicose speeches.

This indicates that the American people already begin to feel that if the arms race continues further, if a

reasonable solution is not found and an understanding is not achieved between our countries then our peoples will feel still more strongly the threat of the dreadful catastrophe of a thermo-nuclear war.

Let us then not keep people of peace all over the world in suspense, let us give them joyous satisfaction. Having cut the knot in the Caribbean we would thereby immediately create better conditions and would reinforce people's hope for coping with other questions which are now awaiting their solution. Peoples expect wisdom from us, first of all from our two states. Of course our two states can not do everything, but all that depends on us in the sense of reaching an understanding will be of decisive importance. Needless to prove that other states would be also satisfied. And he who was especially displeased will have to agree after this understanding is reached that there is no other way of meeting the aspirations of all states, all peoples.

Sincerely,/4/

/4/Printed from an unsigned copy.

177. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy)

November 14, 1962, 10:10 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.

McCloy--You have seen this report./1/ This is my reading on it. In the first place on the overflights, I haven't been quite able to make up my mind whether it was just a formal protest or whether it is something we have to look rather seriously at. But it might be no more than the former, although it is not too clear.

/1/Regarding the report of Stevenson and McCloy's meeting with Kuznetsov and Zorin, see footnote 1, Document 175.

Ball--It is possible that it is something they had to do to help Mikoyan out.

McCloy--Well I wouldn't be surprised. But they are going to put that in as a condition of their taking out the IL-28's.

Ball--That is your impression?

McCloy--That is my impression. I think we should resist that.

Ball--Yes.

McCloy--But this is what is coming and it perfectly clear to me, after reading that full message from K the other day./2/ together with this thing here, that they are going to take the IL-28's out but they want to take them out now at the end of the road rather than immediately. My instinct on this would be to tell Kuznetsov and not tell him at one of these formal meetings, to say "Now look here, we have done our damndest here to relieve your situation, you are talking a lot about the quarantine, you have balled up the business on the Red Cross because you kind of insist on your definition of offensive weapons, we have done something now that is really beyond what we agreed to do." Respond to that, don't talk to us any more about your having done everything and we have done nothing. "And that you get those things out of there and we will do as we say, we will raise the quarantine the minute that you give the order."

/2/Document 171.

Ball--Right.

McCloy--But I would do that on a sort of another walk basis rather than on one of these damn meetings at which Zorin is present and the whole damn works are present.

Ball--Yes. I think that is right.

McCloy--You all get tensed up and the hell with this feeling of dignity. This is just an oil--it is just a different approach that may very well bring the thing about. Now that is what I would do, if I had a free hand on this thing.

Ball--Let me talk to Dean and the President about it. I am going to be seeing them both in a few minutes.

McCloy--Yes. I would just go in and say "Look Mr. K come on down and I will give you lunch and I will show you downtown New York" and incidentally put that in his ear.

Ball--Yes.

McCloy--Now that would be my way of coping with this. And then the second thing I have got in mind is I am damn sure that we are going to be faced with the necessity of drafting something on the guaranty or the assurances. To put something down on paper.

Ball--Yes.

McCloy--Because we are trying to get it very shortly from the Soviets and it is going to be a pretty elaborate document.

Ball--Right.

McCloy--I always believe in getting out first draft. I think we shouldn't postpone that any longer.

Ball--Well we have got a draft of some stuff.

McCloy--Get it crystallized if you can, as soon as you can because I think that is going to be the first order of business.

Ball--Right. Don't you think we can avoid any kind of protocol?

McCloy--Yes. I would--Zorin is the devil in the play on that. I would just say no, and fortunately we have got the UN with us on it and we will hold out on that. In the last analysis I would suppose--I don't know what you mean by protocol--the form of the thing doesn't make a great deal of difference, but I think we are going to get away with a declaration.

Ball--Yes. The only difference is if you get into a highly formal argument then the amount of comments is going to be terrific.

McCloy--Yes, and moreover I got a letter from Herman Phleger/3/ that caused me a little concern. He said you know if you make a pledge of non-invasion that that has to take the form of a treaty because it is the impairment of the Congress' authority to declare war and that this has to be approved by the Senate. That is something that I think Chayes ought to be looking at.

/3/Not found.

Ball--All right.

McCloy--You know Phleger is a pretty good lawyer and he was very serious about this because he didn't see how we could get around it, in view of Congress' authority to declare war.

Ball--Well, I will get the boys working on it.

McCloy--Yes, get them working on that. There is one thought that they all take comfort in, they say well all we are doing is what we have already done under the Rio Pact and the UN Charter. But that may not be so because we are in an awkward position there because under the UN Charter and the Rio Pact we still supported an invasion from the Bay of Pigs and we defended it. Now is this something more or how do you avoid going to Congress. I think the lawyers ought to be looking at it.

Ball--OK, fine.

178. Memorandum of Conversation Between Attorney General Kennedy and Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, November 14, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Copy sent to Carter.

NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE CUBAN PRISONERS

The meeting took place at the residence of the Attorney General at 10:30 a.m., on Thursday, November 14, at the DCI's request.

McCone explained that he had dinner the evening before with Mr. Edward Foley (former Under Secretary of the Treasury, legal representative and a Director of the Drug Industry Association).

Mr. Foley had questioned DCI concerning the negotiations for release of Cuban prisoners in exchange for some 50 million dollars in drugs, and stated that Mr. Donovan had been in touch with members of the Industry (presumably Pfizer and Merck) in the past few days, that indications were that the transaction was to be worked out promptly, and the subject would undoubtedly be discussed at length at the Industry's Board of Trustees meeting in New York on November 16th.

Mr. Foley stated that the Industry had no clear understanding of the Government's position, most particularly in view of Cuban developments of the last three weeks.

After explaining to Foley the background of the transaction I told him that Mr. Donovan had been told to do absolutely nothing in this matter and expressed great surprise that the subject was a topic of current discussion among members of the Industry.

In the meeting with the Attorney General I expressed grave concern over the situation, pointing out that CIA had 20 million dollars on covert deposit [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and that two letters of credit had been issued [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] one in the amount of 10 million dollars to Pfizer, and one for seven million dollars to Merck. As long as this money was on deposit and the letters outstanding, there was a danger of publicity emanating from either Donovan or the drug industry, or both. Despite the fact that no official government connection had ever been admitted, publicity would implicate the Administration and

CIA in the negotiation because of recent press stories (most particularly the Herald Tribune articles) identifying Administration and CIA activities and citing the exact amount of 17 million dollars as representing the Government cost of the drugs. I pointed out that certain elements of competition between the members of the drug industry made it almost a certainty that "leaks" would come from industry sources as long as the letter of credit were outstanding, regardless of Mr. Donovan's denials.

Furthermore, consummation of the transaction seemed totally unrealistic in view of current difficulties with Castro and if an article appeared indicating we were still pursuing this transaction, the American public and a great many others would be confused and disenchanted.

For the above reasons, and feeling that damaging publicity undoubtedly would appear, I strongly recommended that we arrange for the bank to withdraw the letters of credit, and for the withdrawal of a substantial part of the money [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Also advise Mr. Donovan that the pursuit of this effort must await a better climate although our interest remained constant. I urged that action be commenced today.

The Attorney General, after some discussion involving an exploration of possible alternatives, agreed with the course of action.

We agreed that we should carefully explain to the Families Committee and possibly to Miro Cardona that we were in no way abandoning our intention to secure the release of the prisoners but were forced because of circumstances beyond our control to set the negotiation aside pending further developments on other important problems involving our Cuban relationship.

McCone discussed the above with Mr. Bundy who personally approved the action and, in turn, received approval from higher authority. The latter was communicated to the DCI by telephone at 1:45 p.m.

John A. McCone/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

179. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy)

Washington, November 15, 1962, 9:25 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 62 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba.

McCloy told Ball he thought he would call the fellow/1/ for lunch if it is the desirable thing to do. He asked if Ball had anything new over night that might have some effect on it. There are rumors that Mikoyan is coming back tomorrow. If McCloy did this it would be mainly on a contact basis, but he is not so sure he would offer what Ball had suggested yesterday. He would simply tell him he was disturbed by his continuous talk that they have done everything and we have done nothing. Ball agreed this would be the thing to do and might be helpful at this time.

/1/Kuznetsov.

McCloy asked about the Fowler Hamilton business and Ball told him some time when he sees him he will give him a sketch of what he has in mind there.

180. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy)

Washington, November 15, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 62 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba.

McCloy said he had invited the fellow/1/ to lunch but he told McCloy he had a date he could not cancel. He invited McCloy to come out to his place on Long Island some time during the weekend, and it was left that way. Ball asked if this would imply that Mikoyan might be there and McCloy said he didn't know; that he could not get anything out of him about Mikoyan. McCloy said he thought this would be cleared up in the next 24 hours. We can bear this in mind should the opportunity come up.

Ball told McCloy he would tell the President.

/1/Kuznetsov.

181. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, November 15, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C. 11/3/62-11/16/62. No classification marking. This message was considered an "oral" exchange, but a written copy was given to Dobrynin. Copies of this message were sent to Thompson, McNamara, and McCone. A note on the first page of the source text reads: "(This copy is as it actually went)."

I am glad to learn of your assurance of agreement that the IL-28s should be withdrawn./1/ All that remains is to reach understanding on the timing.

/1/See Document 176.

Let me review the undertakings in my letter of October twenty-seventh and your letter of October twenty-eighth./2/ You agreed to remove the weapons systems we described as offensive and with suitable safeguards to halt the further introduction of such weapons into Cuba. On our side, we undertook to agree to remove the quarantine measures in effect and to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. There were two conditions attached to our undertaking. The first was that the weapons systems would be removed "under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision," and, second, that there would be established "adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments."

/2/See Documents 95 and 102.

I cannot agree with your statement that you have fulfilled your commitments and that we have not fulfilled ours. Let us recall what, in fact, has occurred. You have removed a certain number of missiles from Cuba--not under United Nations supervision--but you did cooperate in arrangements which enabled us to be reasonably sure that forty-two missiles were in fact taken out of Cuba. There has been no United Nations verification that other missiles were not left behind and, in fact, there have been many reports of their being concealed in caves and elsewhere, and we have no way of satisfying those who are concerned about these reports. The IL-28's are still in Cuba and are of deep concern to the people of our entire Hemisphere. Thus, three major parts of the undertakings on your side--the removal of the IL-28's, the arrangements for verification, and safeguards against introduction--have not yet been carried out.

We suppose that part of the trouble here may be in Cuba. The Secretary General of the United Nations was not allowed to make arrangements for the experts he took with him to Cuba to verify removal of the offensive weapons; the Cuban Government did not agree to international Red Cross inspection at ports; they have refused the Secretary General's suggestion that the Latin American Ambassadors in Havana undertake this verification;

they have rejected a further suggestion of the Secretary General concerning the use of various non-aligned Chiefs of Mission in Havana for this purpose. It is difficult for me to understand why the Cubans are so resistant to the series of reasonable proposals that have been made to them by U Thant unless, for reasons of their own, they are determined to see the crisis prolonged and worsened. We both have means of influencing the Cuban Government and I do not believe that we can allow that Government to frustrate the clear understandings our two governments have reached in the interests of peace.

In these circumstances we have so far been patient and careful, as we have been, indeed, at every stage. As you know from your own reports, we have always applied the quarantine with care and with regard for the position of others, and in recent days we have relied on the oral assurances of the masters of your ships and other ships. Moreover I myself held back orders for more forceful action right to the limit of possibility during the week of October 27th and 28th. But we cannot make progress from here--or avoid a return of danger to this situation--if your side now should fall into the mistake of claiming that it has met all its commitments, and refusing to help with the real business of carrying out our purpose of untying the Cuban knot.

What, in those circumstances, should be done? We are entitled to insist on removal of the IL-28's and on safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons before we lift the quarantine or give assurances of any sort. But we are interested in making rapid progress, step-by-step, and that is why we have proposed an arrangement more favorable from your standpoint: that as soon as you give the order for the removal of the IL-28's and their men and equipment, to be completed within thirty days, (and I am glad you say the length of time is not the real problem) we will announce the lifting of the quarantine. That is more than we agreed to on October twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth, but we wish to end this crisis promptly.

Beyond that, we are quite willing to instruct our negotiators in New York to work closely with yours in order to reach agreement on other matters affecting this problem. We believe, again, that these matters should follow the removal of offensive weapons systems, but just as we have been able to discuss other matters while a number of missiles were leaving, we believe the urgently needed talks can and should go forward while the bombers are leaving. We do not insist that everything wait its exact turn--but only that the essential first steps be clearly going forward.

But what is most urgent, after we can agree that offensive weapons are leaving, and after the quarantine is lifted, is to make some real progress on continuing observations and verification. It will be essential to have such arrangements--and this again is clear in the letters of October 27 and 28--before our assurances can be more formally stated. Our undertaking on this point remains firm and clear, and we want nothing better than to be able to give our assurances, just as we said we would, when the necessary conditions exist.

In the absence of any arrangements under the United Nations or otherwise for international verification or safeguards, we have of course been obliged to rely upon our own resources for surveillance of the situation in Cuba, although this course is unsatisfactory. Just today we learned of new threats by Castro against this necessary surveillance. I should make it very clear that if there is any interference with this surveillance, we shall have to take the necessary action in reply, and it is for just this reason that it is so urgent to obtain better safeguards.

We note with interest that in your last message the arrangement of observation and verification is enlarged from Cuba to include certain other areas. This is a substantial change from the terms of our exchange of messages, and as we see it any such wider arrangements would necessarily require careful discussion. For example, if we move outside Cuba to observe what is happening in other countries which have been involved in the recent tensions, there might have to be observation posts at the appropriate ports in the Soviet Union from which weapons could be shipped to Cuba, as well as in appropriate places in the United States. This is a matter which deserves close study and it may offer a chance of real progress in the long run, but for the immediate future it seems to us better to work within the framework of our understanding of October 27 and 28.

We also think that the Brazilian proposal for a verified Denuclearized Zone in Latin America/3/ could, with the cooperation of Cuba and if acceptable to the other Latin American countries, in the long run offer an acceptable means for a broader approach. However, the immediate problem is, I repeat, the carrying out of our understanding with regard to verification that offensive weapons have in fact been removed from Cuba and the establishing of safeguards against their reintroduction pending the coming into effect of longer-term arrangements. Even apart from our understanding, given the history of this matter, I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that you can understand that this is a real necessity if we are to move to the settlement of other matters.

/3/Draft U.N. Resolution A/C.1/L.312. A revised version of it, U.N. Document A/C.1/L.312/Rev. 2, was submitted to the First Committee of the United Nations by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador, November 15. (*Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. II, pp. 1056-1057)

But the first step is to get the bombers started out, and the quarantine lifted--for both are sources of tension. Meanwhile discussion can continue on other aspects of the problem.

182. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 15, 1962, 6 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Macmillan Telephone Conversations, 10/62-11/62. Top Secret.

Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Macmillan 15 November 1962, 6 pm

President: Did you get my two messages?/1/

/1/The messages have not been found. On November 14 Kennedy called Macmillan to discuss the issue. Macmillan quotes from the November 14 telephone call in *At the End of the Day, 1961-1963*, p. 215.

Prime Minister spoke, and obviously said yes.

President: Yes, except that he still wants us to make a "no invasion" pledge and there can be no agreement on how to maintain surveillance. We may have to do so with disagreement. The other question, the IL-28's must be removed before we make an agreement on invasion. You realize that here this is a major political step. What happens if he doesn't agree to remove the IL-28's without our agreement on the quarantine and invasion? What is your view on our re-imposing the quarantine?

Prime Minister spoke, but apparently did not answer the question.

President: We must have him take out the bombers. Perhaps we will agree to disagree on overflights. We continue them and they won't shoot. Then we will agree, no invasion. We must have some type of inspection of sites, even though it won't mean much with all the caves and cellars in Cuba. This just becomes an action for the record.

Prime Minister spoke.

President: Now on the subject of Laos. Our information is that it is coming apart. It would be bad if Souvanna left because Laos is an example of something negotiated with the Russians. It is the one ornament of the last two years.

Prime Minister spoke.

President: We can't bring this up until Cuba is settled. So what about your going to him and pointing out that if fighting breaks out and we have partition, everyone will say that no agreement with the Russians will last more than a few months.

Prime Minister spoke.

President: Well, I thought if we got Cuba settled and if Laos will stay together, then we may have a good chance on Berlin. If he will agree to have the IL-28's out before Christmas or New Year's, and will give some type of on-site inspection for the record and understand that we will continue overflights, we will lift the quarantine and make a "no invasion" pledge.

Prime Minister spoke.

President: You go ahead on Laos. We will continue hard on Cuba.

Prime Minister spoke.

President: His conversation with Roberts gives promise. If we can get Cuba settled, we may make progress on Berlin. But from our information it looks like Laos is coming apart. If we can keep Laos together, go ahead on Berlin, we can look at Laos again six months from now.

[Here follows discussion on Yemen and Germany.]

183. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, November 15, 1962, midnight.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1562. Confidential; Priority. Received at 1:22 a.m. and passed to the White House at 1:43 a.m.

1818. Department pass White House. Eyes only for Secretary. Cuba. Policy. In course three-hour meeting with Stevenson and Yost tonight/1/ at his request Kuznetsov stated he was instructed to tell us that "all nuclear weapons have been removed from Cuba." Also stated that offensive weapons will not be reintroduced and that USSR was prepared cooperate in seeking suitable formula and to speak about guarantees about their non-reintroduction. At outset of meeting, before Kuznetsov spoke, Stevenson expressed vigorous reaction to Castro letter to SYG/2/ threatening to shoot down US observation planes. Stevenson said this would be very serious matter with predictable consequences. Aerial surveillance was only means we had to assure ourselves in light Soviet failure produce verification in Cuba. He was certain we would issue counter-protest to Cuban protest and hoped this would end issue because consequences would not be our responsibility. Kuznetsov said he had nothing to add to previous Soviet position on overflights.

/1/A 23-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which lasted from 6 to 9:20 p.m. and was held at the Soviet Mission, is in USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, 1A October/November Meetings.

/2/Dated November 15, in which Castro also rejected any inspection of Cuban territory. For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 459-460.

Reading originally from typewritten text, and frequently reiterating point throughout conversation, Kuznetsov took firm position that time had come to deal with entire settlement of Cuban problem, maintaining all remaining questions must be dealt with together and would then be more easily resolved.

Kuznetsov referred to Soviet-Cuban protocol/3/ previously given SYG, gave us copy and reviewed its general

terms listing obligations mainly directed at US. He referred to suggestion for UN Caribbean presence as means verification these obligations as proposal from U Thant and stated Cuban Government was prepared to support UN presence in Caribbean including parts of US and Western Hemisphere with corresponding control of Cuban territory. Noting this was at present scheme only in principle, Kuznetsov maintained that its spelling out would not be difficult for U Thant to arrange on basis equal rights, obligations and verification.

/3/The proposed protocol was transmitted in telegram 1798 from USUN, November 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1562) See the Supplement.

Kuznetsov also suggested that Cuba should be brought into discussions inasmuch as they affected Cuba and dealt with obligations of three governments. He added he was "expressing Soviet opinion for US consideration, of course." Stevenson rejected proposal pointing out agreement was only between US and USSR.

Stevenson said we had studied Soviet protocol and found it "wholly unsatisfactory". We did not agree to idea of a protocol and had said on many occasions we were prepared to have mutual declarations in SC in accordance with correspondence.

Stevenson noted Kuznetsov had said nothing about most important question--withdrawal of IL-28's. Throughout rest of conversation he stressed that this was key issue which now needed to be resolved. Stevenson reiterated we were prepared to lift quarantine when Kuznetsov assured us IL-28's would be taken out within limited period of time. Kuznetsov said he had nothing to add on IL-28's.

In response to repeated Kuznetsov position that USSR had fulfilled its obligations and time had come for US to do something Stevenson said that we had made accommodations to Soviets on ship-side inspection and were prepared to lift quarantine when Soviets promised to take IL-28's out. When all offensive weapons were out and appropriate inspection arranged we would make declaration on invasion. We would also be prepared to recommend in OAS that LA states restore status quo prior October 22 by repealing resolution authorizing quarantine. This would mean all rights and obligations under Rio Pact would apply, including obligations with respect to attack of one state against another. Kuznetsov said USSR did not recognize OAS decisions and was not interested in being involved in how we obtain LA adherence to President's letter; if US stated it and LA's would not invade Cuba that would be in accord with spirit of President's letter.

Re UN presence in Caribbean to which Kuznetsov had referred, Stevenson said we were not aware of any proposal from SYG. We were unable therefore to comment on Kuznetsov's remarks. We would have to find out more and talk about it later. Kuznetsov took note of this reply and he said he would expect to hear from us further on this point.

Re on-site inspection in Cuba, Kuznetsov reiterated that USSR did not object but agreement of Government of Cuba was required.

Toward end of conversation Stevenson listed unfulfilled obligations as follows:

On part of USSR:

1. Removal of IL-28's;
2. Assurances all nuclear components, warheads and nuclear aerial bombs, had been removed; (it was in response to this that Kuznetsov made statement that "All nuclear weapons had been removed from Cuba", adding that he hoped this would be sufficient to put an end to this question.)
3. Provision for on-site inspection in Cuba;

4. Assurances against reintroduction offensive weapons; (thereupon reiterated by Kuznetsov)
5. Soviet suggestions re safeguards on non-reintroduction weapons. (Stevenson subsequently made point that Kuznetsov's assurances re points 2 and 4 should be repeated in SC.)

On part of US:

1. Lifting of blockade;
2. Assurances against invasion;
3. Seeking cooperation of other LA states with respect to assurances against invasion.

Stevenson concluded with statement that US had assumed no other obligations either to USSR or to Cuba.

At conclusion of meeting Kuznetsov said that their draft protocol contained provisions which should be in any document but that he would appreciate our opinion on their protocol and other suggestions, adding that if all issues were dealt with simultaneously we could reach agreement on form and wording.

Stevenson said we would be glad to prepare and show them statement we would be willing make in SC re assurances against invasion Cuba when USSR had fulfilled its obligations; he hoped we would be able to do so tomorrow. Stressed however no final conclusion could be reached before IL-28's removed and verification of transaction worked out.

Stevenson also reiterated toward end of conversation that USSR should take careful note of our protest on Cuban threat to shoot at US planes.

Stevenson

184. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

/ Washington, November 16, 1962.

/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Status of the negotiations on removal of IL-28's

We have exchanged a series of messages with Moscow in recent days, and the sum and substance is as follows:

The Soviets say that they will take the IL-28's out, not now but at some later point, and the offer so far appears to be tied to a series of prior actions on our part: lifting of the blockade, registering assurances, etc. We have made it clear that this is quite unacceptable. Our view is that the first step must be a Soviet order to remove the IL-28's within a period of 30 days. We have said that when that order is given, we are willing to announce the lifting of the quarantine. We have given a tone of increasing urgency to our messages on this subject, and yesterday we informed Ambassador Dobrynin that this matter was reaching a turning point and that if progress cannot be made, we may soon find ourselves back in a position of increasing tension./1/

/1/Apparent reference to Document 181.

These exchanges with Moscow have included reiteration of our position on the present urgent need for surveillance, and they have produced on the Russian side support for UN observation posts in the Caribbean area, including the U.S. We have replied to this last proposal by indicating that any reciprocal inspection which included the U.S. should logically include appropriate ports of the Soviet Union.

We have strongly attacked the Soviet claim that its part of the bargain has been fulfilled. Our position is that the Soviets are in default on three points: 1) removal of the IL-28's; 2) on the spot verification of removal; and 3) adequate safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons.

The one piece of information not on the Washington-Moscow channel, which is some novelty, is the statement of Kuznetsov to Stevenson last night that he was instructed to report that "all nuclear weapons have been removed from Cuba."/2/

McGeorge Bundy/3/

/2/See Document 183.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

185. Summary Record of the 26th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 16, 1962, 11 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32a. Top Secret; Sensitive.

Director McCone presented the intelligence summary.

Upon being informed that Castro's letter to the UN Acting Secretary General had been released to the press,/1/ the President authorized the immediate release of a statement covering our continuing aerial surveillance of Cuba. The President asked that any reply to Castro's letter be made by the OAS./2/

/1/See footnote 2, Document 183.

/2/A statement justifying surveillance and promising continuation of aircraft surveillance of Cuba was released by the Department of State through spokesman Joseph Reap at 12:23 p.m. on November 16.

The members read a summary of the current status of the negotiations on the removal from Cuba of the IL-28 bombers./3/

/3/Document 184.

The President asked how we would prove that strategic missiles would not be reintroduced into Cuba. Secretary Rusk said we could watch the Russian ships with big hatches and [1 line of source text not declassified] monitor the unloading of Russian ships. General Taylor said we should continue low-level reconnaissance. As to a Latin American nuclear-free zone, the President said Ambassador Stevenson had predicted that the UN would not accept this idea.

There was a discussion of the Soviet suggestion that the inspection of Cuba by the UN be matched by similar inspection of the U.S./4/ The point was made that inspection of Cuba and the U.S. cannot be equated. If inspection of the U.S. were to be allowed, we would have to insist on inspecting Russian ports from which the

missile ships could sail. The question was asked whether we would be prepared to accept inspection of Guantanamo Base, of Cuban camps in the U.S. and of Puerto Rico.

/4/See Document 183.

Secretary Rusk said that the short-term problem of inspection of offensive missiles related only to Cuba. The long-term problem of inspecting to prevent the reintroduction of missiles might be done by a UN commission charged with maintaining peace in the Caribbean. This commission might look at all complaints that peace in the area was being disturbed. Thus, the commission would not be limited geographically to Cuba but could inspect in the U.S. and in Latin American countries.

The President said that it appeared the Soviets were offering inspection in Cuba in return for inspection in Florida. Mr. Bundy said we might discuss some reciprocal inspection which we would not be prepared to implement as long as Castro was in Cuba.

The Attorney General commented that aerial reconnaissance upsets both the Russians and Castro. He predicted that Castro would accept inspection.

The President repeated his view that we should not give a pledge not to invade Cuba until we have adequate assurances protecting us against the reintroduction of strategic missiles. He asked whether we could not insist that only Cuba be inspected.

The Attorney General said he did not think that we could sell to the American people an inspection of Florida. Any adequate inspection must include not only Cuba but also two or three Soviet ports.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we not try to spell out the geographical limitations of the inspection. The President responded that we would have to limit inspection to Florida in any proposal that we might consider.

Mr. McCone expressed his concern that the Soviet military base would remain in Cuba. He considered this a more important consideration than the IL-28 bombers. If we allow a continuing Soviet military presence in Cuba we must have an inspection system. The SAM sites could ensure that we could not use U-2s to tell us of any military buildup. Without the U-2s, the Russians could secretly build up their forces in the interior of Cuba.

Mr. McCloy expressed his view that the Soviet military presence in Cuba will die on the vine. With the missiles and the IL-28 bombers removed, the remainder of the Soviet forces would then be withdrawn. The best Russian equipment now in Cuba will gradually be withdrawn because it was put there to guard the strategic missiles.

Mr. McCone expressed a reservation by pointing out that the Russians may have decided to use Cuba as a staging area for subversion in Latin America.

The President said we had the alternative of making a realistic proposal or a proposal which we know in advance they would reject and therefore provide grounds for us to hold back on any assurance against invasion. He asked what effect the two courses of action would have on our worldwide policy toward the USSR.

Ambassador Thompson replied that Khrushchev must decide shortly which road to go down. He needs to get the Cuban problem buttoned down and go on to other problems in order to continue along the existing coexistence line.

Secretary Rusk argued that we should stay put on our present position of lifting the quarantine in return for getting the IL-28 bombers out of Cuba. He would hold off on proposals covering the long-term inspection problem. He pointed out that a UN presence in Cuba had been turned down, that the proposal to have the International Red Cross conduct the inspection had been turned down, that the UN proposal to name five Latin

American Ambassadors as inspectors, and later any five Ambassadors as inspectors, had also been rejected. He said it was not necessary for us to keep on making new proposals. He opposed any Cuba/Florida inspection deal now. He urged that we stay where we are and felt that we should continue to support an arrangement based on reciprocity rather than on geography.

The President pointed out that our policy of not giving an invasion assurance until we have acceptable inspection arrangements puts Khrushchev under heavy pressure. Secretary Rusk replied that we should be in no hurry to work out long-range arrangements. Khrushchev knows we are not going to invade Cuba. We should keep the situation fluid in the event that the Soviets come to favor a coup in Cuba. In such event they would want assurances that we would not interfere with their staged coup.

The President said it would be all right to wait unless Khrushchev is blocked on negotiations on other problems and if he is not further pushed by the Communist Chinese.

Secretary Dillon doubted that our negotiations with the Russians over Cuba would affect the Russians' worldwide policy.

Mr. McCloy expressed Ambassador Stevenson's view of the current situation:

- a. The negotiations in New York are deadlocked.
- b. The Soviets can't deliver arrangements for on-site inspection because of Castro's opposition, and hence, we can't give assurances against invasion. We can give a conditional assurance if the Soviets continue to behave, i.e., take out the missiles, move to take out the IL-28 bombers, and assure us there are no nuclear warheads in Cuba.
- c. There has been considerable talk about a nuclear-free zone, but if we choose to support this idea, we will have to go through the OAS and this will take a considerable amount of time.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the difficulty of formulating any statement about our not invading Cuba. If we put in the conditions which we must, the statement comes out sounding as if we were all ready to invade.

The President asked that a statement covering our policy toward invasion be prepared for his use at his Tuesday press conference.^{/5/} If we have no agreement from the Russians, the statement would take one form. If the Russians have agreed in New York to our current position, Mr. McCloy could tell the Russians what the President was planning to say at his press conference, namely, we will invade Cuba only if it becomes a military threat to its neighbors or if civil war develops. The President said that we would understand privately that such a position would cover only the next two years. Reference should be made to the President's September 13th statement which said that pending arms verification arrangements in Cuba, we would continue our overflights unobtrusively.

^{/5/}For text of the statement as made on Tuesday, November 20, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 461-462.

The President suggested that we give to Kuznetsov the evidence we have of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. He asked that the State Department spell out exactly what we would accept as verification of Soviet arms in Cuba.

Mr. McCloy said we scared the Russians off their insistence on a protocol containing our invasion assurances by telling them that a protocol would require Congressional approval.

The President said he did not want any protocol on the invasion guarantee but merely a statement of our position. He asked that by Tuesday there be a detailed response to accusations that Soviet missiles are being

hidden in Cuban caves. He said Mr. McCloy should ask the Russians in New York what their intentions are concerning their continued military presence in Cuba. He also said we needed to be in a position to respond to a Brazilian proposal for an atom-free zone.

The President asked for an analysis of the Soviet-Chinese differences including an estimate of the effect of the split on Khrushchev's authority and on Communist parties worldwide.

Secretary McNamara requested authority for high-level flights but said he did not favor flying low-level missions. General Taylor reported that the Chiefs wanted to continue low-level missions. Secretary McNamara said the decision should be made on political grounds rather than military. The President decided to suspend low-level flights planned for tomorrow in the expectation that we might receive a reply from Khrushchev today. High-level flights were authorized.

Concluding a discussion on what we would do if a surveillance plane were shot at or destroyed, the President accepted Secretary McNamara's recommendation that we defer a decision on the proposed courses of action until we have further word from Khrushchev with respect to the negotiations in New York./6/

/6/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting, November 16. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 24-32a)

Bromley Smith/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

186. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President Kennedy

JCSM-910-62

Washington, November 16, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Status of Readiness for the Cuban Operation (C)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are glad to report that our Armed Forces are in an optimum posture to execute CINCLANT OPLANS 312-62 (Air Attack in Cuba)/1/ and 316-62 (Invasion of Cuba)./2/ We are not only ready to take any action you may order in Cuba, we are also in an excellent condition world-wide to counter any Soviet military response to such action. Our status of readiness includes:

/1/OPLAN 312-62 evolved during the summer and early fall of 1962 as the build up of air-power in Cuba became apparent. The plan entailed the use of 500 tactical fighter aircraft and carrier aircraft in a series of strikes against Cuban offensive weapons. Initial strikes would eliminate SAM sites and associated conventional AA defenses. These strikes would be followed by massive attacks on Cuban hostile aircraft and other offensive weapons including, after their presence was discovered and until they were withdrawn, MRBMs and IRBMs. Subsequent attacks would target troop concentrations, artillery, and armor. (Cuban Crisis, Operational Aspects, December 26, 1962; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Cuba, High-level Exchange)

/2/For a description of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62, see footnote 1, Document 150.

a. SAC is maintaining 1/8 airborne alert and has implemented its force dispersal plan. An increased SIOP generation rate--1,456 aircraft and 355 missiles, including 80 Polaris missiles--is being maintained.

b. Continental Air Defense Command interceptor forces have occupied their wartime dispersal bases and are partially deployed at increased alert (about 1/3). Special defensive measures have been taken to protect the Southeast, with particular attention to Florida.

c. Air forces involved in CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62 in daylight hours can respond for selective attack in graduated increments from two to twelve hours, according to the application of force desired.

d. Amphibious and assault forces are at a high state of readiness, providing a seven-day reaction capability for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62 following the air strike (CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62), with accelerated introduction of follow-on forces.

e. All naval units are in a high state of readiness.

2. In response to your request, we have studied the need for augmentation of forces for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62 and have concluded that while the forces originally included in the plan are probably adequate, it would be prudent to earmark additional forces as a ready reserve for the operation. Accordingly, we are planning to earmark the 5th Infantry Division, at approximately 20,000 strength including supporting forces, and a combat command (strength 6,800) of the 2nd Armored Division for possible commitment as reserve forces for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62; but these units will not be moved from home stations until S-day for OPLAN 312-62. Utilization of the increased Army and Marine forces will require an additional 16 transports, 68 cargo ships, and 11 LSTs. The LSTs and 15 transports would come from the Reserve Fleet, would require approximately 45 days to activate and assemble on the east coast, and would cost an estimated \$28 million. For the total shipping requirements of the augmented Plan, chartering, requisitioning, and prepositioning of 60 cargo ships must be accomplished well in advance of execution of the Plan. The chartering/requisitioning of the remaining 105 cargo ships would require at least 30 days. The 5th MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade), at approximately 9,000 strength, has transited the Panama Canal, is in the Caribbean and has been added to the assault force.

3. The advanced alert levels, if maintained for a protracted period, can reduce the over-all capability of the force because of maintenance and training short-falls. The current status of alert can be maintained for about 30 more days without adverse effect. After that time we could maintain the following reaction capability:

a. With forces in present posture (Defense Condition 3)

(1) OPLAN 312-62 (Air Attack in Cuba)--12 hours

(2) OPLAN 316-62 (Invasion of Cuba)--7 days

b. With forces largely returned to home bases (Defense Condition 5)

(1) OPLAN 312-62--2 days

(2) OPLAN 316-62/3/--10 to 12 days

/3/"5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its organic shipping excepted." [Footnote in the source text.]

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend staying in the present posture for the immediate future.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

187. Paper Prepared for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) for a Meeting With President Kennedy

Washington, November 16, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

CHAIRMAN'S TALKING PAPER FOR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

1. The Chiefs appreciate the opportunity to discuss some aspects of the current negotiations bearing on the IL-28's and other matters related

to Cuba. To lead-off, they would like to express their unqualified support for the insistence of our government upon the withdrawal of the IL-28's. While these aircraft are of less military significance than the IRBM's and MRBM's which have withdrawn, their continued presence in Cuba would present a long-term threat to the continental United States, would consequently require a higher level of air defense of our southeastern states and would give deep concern to many parts of Latin America. These factors added to the public statements of our Government on the need for their withdrawal convince the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the IL-28's must go.

2. The Chiefs are aware of the offer to exchange a lifting of the quarantine for Khrushchev's removal of the IL-28's and will regret the possible loss of this useful naval tool if the offer is accepted. If the Soviets decline the offer, the quarantine will provide an immediate means to apply pressure both on Khrushchev and on Castro not only to remove the IL-28's but also to obtain other ends such as the withdrawal of Soviet technicians and the acceptance of an inspection system. After appropriate warning to Khrushchev of our intentions, the Chiefs would favor a general extension of the quarantine to include a complete blockade of POL products. Concurrently, we should continue air surveillance and withhold any assurance against the invasion of Cuba. If the expanded quarantine did not succeed in obtaining the withdrawal of the IL-28s, we should be prepared to take them out by air attack.

3. Even if the IL-28's are negotiated out of Cuba, there will remain weapons systems of significant military importance; the MIG's, the SAM's, the air defense control system, and the large stocks of modern Army equipment which we have seen in our recent photography. The air defense weapons will be a constant threat to our surveillance of Cuba while the Army weapons may be used against Guantanamo or against any invasion attempt. But more important than this equipment are the thousands of Soviet military personnel who remain in Cuba to man it. The Soviet presence in Cuba poses a particularly sensitive problem to the United States. When the extent of this presence is known and the weapons systems remaining in Soviet hands are thoroughly appreciated, it will be clear to the Western Hemisphere that it has indeed been invaded and remains invaded by the Soviet Union. Under these conditions, we may anticipate a loud popular demand in the United States and in Latin America for the removal of the Soviet personnel and neutralization of their weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the United States should generate now all the pressure possible to get the Soviet personnel out, feeling that their eviction is far more important than that of the equipment.

4. The Chiefs are very much interested in the terms in which any assurance to Castro may eventually be couched, feeling that it would be damaging to our national interest and to the sense of security of our Latin American allies

to create the impression of underwriting Castro for an indefinite period without careful qualification. If it is considered necessary to give Castro any assurance, the Chiefs feel that it should be tied to Khrushchev's proposal in his 26 October letter to withdraw Soviet forces from Cuba, and to cease giving military aid to Castro. Also the assurance should be given without affecting our commitments under the Rio Pact and should be linked to concurrent good behavior on the part of Castro and to acceptance by the Castro government of continued air surveillance.

5. The Chiefs recognize both the importance and the difficulty of obtaining an adequate verification system in Cuba. While sympathetic with their purpose, the Chiefs do not like two of the current proposals for inspection and verification. The first is the proposal from Ambassador Stevenson for a UN inspection system of the Caribbean or Central America. The Chiefs do not favor it because of its reciprocal features, its doubtful effectiveness and the danger of having it regarded as a substitute for effective aerial surveillance. The second is the Brazilian suggestion for the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Latin America. Apart from objections to the precedent of supporting such a proposal for any part of the world, and the divided opinion among our allies on this subject, we do not see any way to obtain from the proposal a satisfactory verification system for Cuba. Consequently, we would advise against supporting it.

6. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend at this juncture:

a. That the IL-28's be removed from Cuba, preferably by negotiation--otherwise by blockade followed, if need be, by military action.

b. That the removal of Soviet personnel from Cuba be made an immediate objective of negotiations with the USSR.

c. That any assurance to Castro be hedged by conditions protecting our obligations under the Rio Pact and linking the duration of the assurance to good behavior by Castro and the acceptance of air surveillance.

d. That in seeking a means of long-term verification and inspection, which we consider essential, we oppose the proposals for a reciprocal UN inspection of the Caribbean and for a nuclear free zone in Latin America.

188. Memorandum of a Conference With President Kennedy

Washington, November 16, 1962, 4 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Clifton Series, JCS Meetings with the President, 10/61-11/62. Secret. The meeting lasted until 4:55 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

OTHERS PRESENT

General Taylor

General Wheeler

Admiral Anderson

General LeMay

General Shoup

General Clifton

The meeting opened by General Taylor presenting three papers to the President in response to some of the President's inquiries. One paper concerned the level of readiness that we have achieved and the ability to hold this level./1/ All the Chiefs reported that they could maintain this readiness without any hardship for another month, and so recommended.

/1/The paper on the issue of level of readiness is Document 186; the other papers have not been further identified.

General Taylor and General LeMay reported that they had altered the SAC readiness so that each crew is getting one training sortie per week. They said that this was satisfactory for the moment.

General Taylor then led an additional discussion on plans and their modification, if necessary./2/

/2/See Document 187.

The President asked several questions about leave and rest policies for men away from home, and the Air Force reserves that had been called up recently.

There was considerable discussion about Soviet ground forces in Cuba.

There was a lengthy discussion of shipping and LSTs, and the President approved a recommendation that they get the LSTs out and maintain them.

Admiral Anderson reported on a meeting between the head of MSTs and shipowners and labor unions.

General Taylor summarized the views of the Joint Chiefs on the present situation, and each Chief in turn spoke about his particular zone of interest. General Wheeler showed pictures and gave a considerable discussion.

The President read to the Chiefs the letter from Chairman Khrushchev and the President's reply which went out this morning./3/ He gave the Chiefs a resume of his present feeling and disposition in regard to this situation.

The President thanked the Chiefs for coming to the meeting.

C.V. Clifton/4/

/3/Documents 176 and 181.

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

189. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Kennedy and Former President Eisenhower

November 17, 1962, 9 to 10:10 a.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone, who was present at the meeting. The meeting was held at McCone's residence.

The meeting was arranged as a result of a decision reached between K and E at Mrs. Roosevelt's funeral, that they should meet at an early date and the meeting should be with me present, but under circumstances in which there would be no Press or public recognition that the meeting had taken place./1/

/1/Kennedy and Eisenhower were attending the inauguration of Dulles Airport. This meeting apparently took

place there, but it is not included in Kennedy's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)

President explained to E the present status of the Cuban situation and the problems attendant to the removal of the IL 28s, the inspection to verify that all offensive missiles had gone, and inspection arrangements against reintroduction. Kennedy reviewed all of the various proposals that had been made, each one of which had been rejected by Castro, and concluded, stating that as matters stood at the present time, we would have to depend for the immediate future on aerial surveillance.

The President throughout the conversation expressed the thought that while it was possible there was some deception in connection with the 42 missiles removed, the probability was strong that this number were actually removed, that having had to withdraw it would be probably most unlikely that the Soviets would make a further attempt to introduce offensive missiles. There was general agreement on this point. General Eisenhower raised the question of deception and the possibility, however remote, that what we looked at were sections of large diameter pipe and that the missiles were actually retained. McCone made the point that the examination of the photography gave reasonable assurance that what we were looking at was missiles and furthermore there were accompanying the shipments of missiles, which were stored on deck, large quantities of clearly identifiable related equipment as well as personnel and hence it was reasonable to conclude that missiles had actually been taken away.

The conversation then turned to the rumors and reports which were disturbing to the American public of missiles being hidden in caves, etc. McCone stated that these reports were bound to remain because in addition to the offensive missiles there were four other types of missiles, and these did remain in Cuba and they would be seen from time to time and therefore we would always be confronted with the problem of "missiles in Cuba".

It was Eisenhower's very strong recommendation that the President at an early opportunity make a very positive statement that we were taking actions which would guarantee insofar as possible our knowledge of what was going on in Cuba and that he was going to insist that these actions, which included aerial surveillance, be continued and that he can give the American public some confidence in assurances that their security was not being endangered by clandestine Soviet activities. The President responded that he intended to make such a statement on Tuesday./2/ It was agreed that this statement should reflect initiative on the part of the President and the Administration.

/2/On Tuesday, November 20, Kennedy read a statement at his press conference announcing the lifting of the blockade. In that statement, he said that as Cuba had not permitted U.N. verification and there were no safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons, "this Government has no choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962*, pp. 830-838)

[Here follows discussion of Berlin and reorganization of the National Security Council.]

The meeting was cordial and constructive. Both President Kennedy and General Eisenhower expressed their appreciation to me and their desire to continue communication one with the other in about the same form and in the manner of this meeting.

John A. McCone/3/

Director

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Add 11/19/62:

During the conversation General Eisenhower stated with some emphasis that he did not believe that our actions in Cuba would necessarily cause the Soviets to react in a retaliatory manner in some other tense location: Eisenhower presented many examples. He pointed out for instance that many Soviet experts predicted that his initiative in Lebanon would be met by Soviet actions in Berlin or elsewhere, however the reverse was true. The same situation developed elsewhere. Eisenhower therefore urged the President not to permit his course of action in Cuba to be dictated by fear of Soviet action elsewhere or an attempt to appraise in advance the type of actions Soviets might take elsewhere. Note: This point appealed to me as being particularly significant because it is the direct opposite of the advice that the President has been given by Ambassador Thompson and others who are presumably Soviet experts.

JAM/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

190. Summary Record of the 26th-A Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 17, 1962, 2:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. III, 25-32a. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting, which took place in Secretary Rusk's conference room in the Department of State, lasted until 4:08, although Rusk continued to meet with Cleveland, Bundy, Johnson, and Ball for the rest of the afternoon until 5:40 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)

President and Vice President absent

Others attending: Rusk, Thompson, A. Johnson, Cleveland, Bundy, Murrow, Nitze, Taylor, McNamara, Gilpatric, Dillon, McCone

1. The members revised and recommended to the President a press statement to be made Tuesday^{1/} in the event the Russians have agreed to withdraw the IL-28 bombers within the next 3-4 weeks.

^{1/}November 20; see footnote 2, Document 189.

2. The members discussed and revised a draft letter and declaration (USUN 1835)^{2/} but decided not to send it to Kuznetsov now or to authorize McCloy to inform Kuznetsov tomorrow of its contents. A decision as to when to give the Russians the letter is to be made Monday.

^{2/}Dated November 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-1662) See the Supplement.

3. Secretary Rusk will inform McCloy that in his talk with Kuznetsov tomorrow he is to stay within the limits of our last two letters to Khrushchev and not discuss a package proposal. McCloy may discuss the situation which will exist Tuesday if we have not received a favorable decision on the IL-28 bombers before the President makes a statement to the American people on the Cuban crisis.^{3/}

^{3/}Rusk did so in a November 17 letter to McCloy. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-1762) See the Supplement.

4. There was a prolonged discussion as to whether low-level reconnaissance flights should be made tomorrow and Monday. Secretary Rusk will recommend to the President that no low-level flights should be made tomorrow and a decision can be made later as to Monday's low-level flights.^{4/} Among the factors discussed were:

/4/McCone prepared a brief memorandum of this meeting in which he noted that McNamara was opposed to low-level reconnaissance, stating that "there were no targets which demanded immediate surveillance and he preferred to depend on high-level flying." McCone noted that he, Bundy, and Thompson advocated high-level flights, but the decision was made not to fly on Sunday, November 18. (Memorandum for the record by McCone, November 19; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962)

- a. There is no military requirement for low-level flights on Sunday and Monday.
- b. If a plane is shot down, we must react.
- c. If many more days go by without low-level flights, the Cubans and others might think that the Cuban threat to shoot down our reconnaissance planes has scared us away from further missions.
- d. The effect of reconnaissance missions on the IL-28 negotiations--some believe this keeps pressure on; others believe we should tell the Russians we are not flying low-level missions in order to avoid complicating the IL-28 decision.
- e. Missions could be flown over heavily fortified areas with some risk of being shot down by Cuban anti-aircraft fire or could be flown over rural areas where risk of hostile Cuban action would be very low but the Cubans and the Soviets would know we were flying low-level missions.

5. State Department circulated a paper for later consideration on Caribbean security arrangements./5/

/5/Not found.

Bromley Smith/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

191. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, November 19, 1962, 1 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-1962. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 2:32 a.m. Passed to the White House at 2:44 a.m.

1856. Department pass White House. Eyes only for the Secretary. Cuba--meeting between McCloy and Kuznetsov, Sunday, November 18, 1962.

Arrived at Soviet residence, old George Pratt Estate at Locust Valley, accompanied by Mrs. McCloy and son. Met by Kuznetsov, Zorin, Mrs. Zorin, Mendelevich, Morozov and translator Zherebtsov. Played Russian billiards and then had lunch. After lunch in presence of Kuznetsov, Zorin, Mendelevich and translator we had coffee and talk, which was conducted entirely in English.

Kuznetsov said he thought we were stalling in our negotiations; that they felt they had done all that could be expected of them and we had done very little to bring about rapid solution of Cuban problem. Then Kuznetsov said he would like to ask McCloy his impression of where we stood. McCloy said that he was glad to have opportunity to tell Kuznetsov just where he thought we stood.

In first place, we were getting nowhere by constant repetition on their part that they had done everything and we had done nothing. This simply not case and reiteration merely interfered with progress. It was necessary state

what we had done.

In spite of assurances we had received directly from highest levels of Soviet Government no offensive weapons in Cuba and more specifically no weapons there capable of reaching targets in U.S. Soviet nuclear weapons had been secretly introduced into Cuba at same time we were receiving these assurances. Yet President, who was shocked by this revelation, did not thereupon take direct action against these weapons as we had full capacity to do. Instead President, although misled by these assurances, determined upon action which gave both sides time to work matter out. This was first important thing that we had done. This was done in spite of continuation of Mr. Zorin's false position in UN.

Next, we had advised Kuznetsov that on temporary basis and in order to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships we had worked out hail and pass arrangement in connection with quarantine on Soviet assurance that no more weapons were being introduced into Cuba from Soviet Union. President had done this to relieve tensions and we were glad to note that Soviet Premier had responded in kind by prompt action in taking out 42 missiles which Soviets stated they had introduced into Cuba, as well as providing for reasonable means checkout at sea.

Next, President, in spite of fact that Soviet Premier had committed himself to removal of jet bombers as weapons that we considered offensive, offered to raise quarantine on assurance from Soviet Premier that orders had been given to remove bombers within limited period. This major concession on part of President as he had stated and it had been agreed in the October 27-28 exchange that quarantine would not be lifted and assurance against invasion given until there had been UN verification on ground of removal of weapons and adequate assurance against their reintroduction. Soviet Premier had stated that weapons were to be removed under UN observation but no steps leading to this observation had been accomplished due large part to obduracy of Cuban Government. Although we felt Soviet Union in position to compel Cuba to permit such observation we aware irresponsibility of Castro and have sincerely attempted to cooperate with Soviet Union pending such time as verification worked out. This problem related to Soviet commitment to provide adequate arrangements to guard against reintroduction of weapons. We aware this not easy problem but must be solved and does no good to pretend that problem does not exist or that one can act as if prior conditions had already been fulfilled. They have not been.

Removal of bombers cannot be indefinitely postponed based on accomplishment of some vague future event. Offer to lift quarantine very difficult step for President to take inasmuch as he had announced to nation that lifting of quarantine was dependent upon UN observation and upon receipt of adequate assurance against reintroduction of weapons. In other words, President was prepared to waive one of preconditions even though public opinion throughout US demanding that no relief from quarantine be given until all conditions met. President had taken this action largely in response to Soviet Premier's prompt and effective action largely in regard to missiles. This action shows we are neither trying to starve out Cubans nor to be unresponsive to any constructive action taken by Soviet Union. If this offer does not result in removal of bombers President will have no choice but to reimpose quarantine in fully effective form. Effort to relate removal of bombers to some final conclusions regarding verification and arrangements for guaranteeing against reintroduction is no more appropriate than it would have been to delay removal of missiles. McCloy suggested though he could not commit his government it might be possible to work arrangements out for checking out bombers without stopping Soviet ships as had been arrangement with missiles. McCloy then stated that President was going to have a press conference this Tuesday;^{1/} that he had postponed it in the interest of giving Soviets ample opportunity to respond to his request regarding IL-28's but on Tuesday he will have to say something about bombers. President will be placed in very difficult position if not able to say that Soviets have agreed to get bombers out without further conditions. If he cannot do this it will put in question whether in fact we have an agreement with Soviet Union in regard to removal of offensive weapons from Cuba.

^{1/}See footnote 2, Document 189.

McCloy next referred to assurances that we were prepared to give in regard to invasion. First, he made it clear

we were not going to have anything to do with so-called document for which Zorin had been pressing,^{/2/} presenting as it does a lot of things never mentioned or covered in letters of October 27-28 and including in very thinly disguised form conditions Castro has insisted upon before he will cooperate in any way with settlement of issue which he did so much to create. We will not sign any document embodying these or any other such conditions. We prepared to give our solemn declaration in UN based upon Soviet declaration and fulfillment of conditions precedent that have so often been specifically stated. Cubans can make any declarations they see fit in UN or elsewhere but we will not be a party to them. Castro has defied Soviet Union, US and UN and any proposal to conform to his wishes in return for this defiance is out of the question. Certainly it is nothing with which US can be associated.

^{/2/}The text of this document was transmitted in telegram 1798 from USUN, November 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1562) See the Supplement.

US prepared, assuming we can dispose of the IL-28 matter, to sit down with Soviet representatives and attempt to draw our respective declarations in UN. We will do all we can to hasten and record them. US declaration will be very simple. It will be not to invade, assuming fulfillment of conditions and we will be prepared to recommend to or use our good offices in connection with other Western Hemisphere countries to take same position as we do assuming Cuba does not institute aggression against them. We should not have much trouble in dealing with wording of declaration but are only wasting time in talking about any such document as has been presented to US by Kuznetsov. McCloy also referred to fact that any suggestion of document with two or three signatories appended to it such as was suggested by Soviet Union would take on character of treaty which might well require consent of two-thirds of Senate and it might be years before such consent could be obtained. Moreover, in McCloy's judgment would never be recommended to Senate by President. Way to proceed is to get IL-28 issue settled and they would find US quick to give our best thought to next steps to wind up whole transaction.

There was no doubt that we have problem in connection with verification and reintroduction but suggestion that in order to obtain Castro's consent we should have reciprocal UN observation in US as well as in Cuba is something entirely new and never contemplated by October 27-28 exchange. We should not attempt to appease Castro in this form. No inspection of US would be reciprocal without inspection also of Soviet Union.

At this point McCloy said that one of reasons that caused US to look carefully at assurances regarding reintroduction of weapons into Cuba was full development now of our information in regard to extent of Soviet military presence in Cuba. We were not introducing any new conditions but we were pointing out that military presence there so far transcended any technician status that we had to be cautious about this matter of reintroduction. We had confirmed presence of Soviet combat command and presence of number of fully manned Soviet combat teams organized in precisely same manner as army units in Soviet Union. We have identified units and at proper time we would be prepared to give evidence of this military command before UN or elsewhere. We were convinced that introduction of these units and formation of this command was component of whole attempt to change nuclear balance by introduction of nuclear weapons into Cuba. They bore no relation to the defense of Cuba as such but were part of defense of Soviet missile batteries that have been installed in Cuba.

There could be no hope of "normalization" of conditions in Caribbean as long as these units were there in this form and quantity. As long as they were there possibility of another surreptitious reintroduction of nuclear weapons into Cuba which these units would again be in position to defend, exists. Soviet Union must therefore understand our caution in regard to assurance against reintroduction of these weapons and giving of our own assurance against invasion. McCloy emphasized we were not introducing any new conditions but were simply pointing out emphasis which we had to place on presence of these units and their relation to matter of reintroduction of nuclear weapons.

We are quite as anxious as Soviet Union to wind up this transaction for there are number of things we ought to be discussing in order to keep this situation from arising again. Today it is Cuba and combination of this bearded figure who is dictator in Cuba and certain miscalculation on part of Soviet Union that almost brought us to war.

Tomorrow it may be something else. In this connection McCloy said he was concerned about Chinese-Indian war. This seemed to be reaching very substantial proportions. It could easily develop into something that would cause both of us trouble in future and he wondered what thinking of Soviet Union was in regard to this. It may not be too soon for us to exchange some thoughts about it so that we would not have to act hastily and without careful prior thought if we were faced with some development there that again challenged peace of the world. Did Kuznetsov have any thoughts about China and how this war could be kept from becoming new threat to peace?

To this Kuznetsov responded that this situation caused them some concern. That was problem that troubled them and perhaps at some time some discussion could be undertaken about it. Said that this was his view but he could not speak for his government at this point. He added, however, that it was situations such as this that pointed to necessity for concluding Cuban affair promptly so that other matters and problems of concern to us both could be faced with benefit of successful solution of Cuban problem behind us.

Kuznetsov then repeated position of Soviet Union; namely, that they were prepared to consider removal of IL-28's but that this must be done in connection with solution of other problems relating to Cuba. They would like to have removal coincide with final solution. He repeated that they had impression that we were merely putting up one obstacle after another and if IL-28 matter were solved we would have another precondition. At this point he said that we should undertake at time IL-28's were removed to stop our overflights.

McCloy said he was disappointed Soviets were still attempting to postpone dealing with bombers until all problems connected with verification and reintroduction were settled. This would take some time and we would have to have some consultation with other countries in this hemisphere before we could give all assurances against invasion that Soviet Union was seeking. McCloy again referred to need for clearing up this matter before President's Tuesday press conference. Though it was clear that Kuznetsov had no authority to accept proposal in regard to IL-28's which had been offered, he did ask McCloy to repeat just what offer consisted of, which was done.

Kuznetsov came back to U Thant's proposal for reciprocal UN observation and each time he did McCloy said he found great difficulties with it and stressed necessity if there was to be UN observation in US there had also to be reciprocity UN observation in Soviet Union.

Kuznetsov said in regard to assurance against reintroduction he did not know what Soviet Union could do except to solemnly declare it was not going to reintroduce weapons and asked what other guarantees we had in mind.

Kuznetsov also said he wanted to repeat at this time that he was now authorized to say that no nuclear weapons whatsoever were any longer on territory of Cuba. Please, he said, do not complicate situation by insisting upon interminable inspection on ground. It would be impossible to go all over Cuba turning over every stone, looking into every cave and into every bathroom to determine whether nuclear weapons still existed there. They were going to reaffirm that all nuclear weapons had been removed and that they were not going to reintroduce them.

McCloy said he wanted to have it clear that we were not in any way contemplating stopping of overflights in Cuba unless and until we were sure that there was not going to be any reintroduction of these weapons. We are doing utmost to keep overflights to minimum but in absence of any adequate verification this was only thing we could do and he repeated that overflights had probably saved us from war and they might do so again. McCloy made it clear that we would return fire if our planes were shot at; that we were going to do as we had been doing in past, i.e., keep overflights to minimum necessary to protect ourselves and hemisphere.

Kuznetsov was cordial throughout. Zorin was as difficult as ever. At end Kuznetsov said that he was glad to have had this frank discussion of our position; that he was troubled about our position in regard to verification and assurances against reintroduction as he could see how discussions in regard to these might go on interminably with our putting up obstacles to giving our assurance against invasion.

We left with no understanding in regard to future meeting and with no indication from Kuznetsov that they would give way in regard to IL-28's other than to say that they would consider removal of IL-28's in connection with solution of verification and reintroduction problems.

McCloy asked Kuznetsov if he had any word about Mikoyan. Kuznetsov said he still had no definite word as to when he was coming back.

Stevenson

192. Summary Record of the 27th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 19, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32A. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 10:55 a.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is *ibid.*, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 25-32A.

Director McCone summarized the week-end intelligence/^{1/} and commented on orders issued to Cuban anti-aircraft units to fire on reconnaissance planes.

^{1/}Based in part on CIA Memorandum [*document number not declassified*], November 19; "The Crisis, USSR/Cuba: Information as of 0600 19 November 1962." (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA-Cuba) See the Supplement.

Secretary Rusk reported on yesterday's McCloy/Kuznetsov talk (attached is copy of USUN message 1856).^{2/} He said the Russians in New York consider the IL-28's to be part of the deal, but we have received no word yet from Khrushchev.

^{2/}Document 191.

Secretary Rusk initiated a general discussion of the need for overflights and the effect of such flights on the Cubans and the Russians. Secretary McNamara commented that the overflight problem is primarily a political one. General Taylor recommended that there be six low-level sorties, some over the harbor of Mantanzas in order to watch incoming Soviet ships. The planes would be over Cuba less than eight minutes and would fly at tree-top level.

The President said the decision on flying low-level today is political. Our intelligence on the orders to the Cubans to fire on U.S. reconnaissance planes is hard. By not going today do we increase the chance of a settlement or if one of our planes is fired on, and we retaliate, would that increase our chances of settlement?

Mr. McCloy recommended against low-level flights today. Secretary Rusk, however, was concerned by the effect on the OAS and on NATO if it becomes public knowledge that the U.S. has flown no low-level mission since Castro threatened to shoot down our reconnaissance planes.

The President decided that no low-level flights would be flown today. High-level missions were authorized. On Wednesday/^{3/} we should plan to fly low-level. He asked that we examine, possibly next week, those military actions to be taken in retaliation for a shootdown.

^{3/}November 21.

General Taylor said existing plans call for an armed air reconnaissance and then an attack on the offending anti-aircraft site. Secretary McNamara noted that our plans call for two hours' advance notice before we attack Cuban territory.

The President made a comment, which was not clear, about photographs taken of our airfields by U.S. reconnaissance planes.

The President asked what was the impact on Khrushchev of the Indo-Chinese fighting.

Ambassador Thompson, reverting to an earlier question, said we should keep the way open to a coexistence line. The imposition of the quarantine would be very hard for the Russians to take. Therefore, we should act against the Cubans in Cuba. Mr. Bundy noted that we have given Khrushchev every escape hatch for the IL-28 bombers. If he does not now give in and remove them, there will be another serious Soviet miscalculation.

Mr. Nitze commented that the Russians wanted us to attack the Cuban anti-aircraft sites.

The President commented that we are heading down the road to a choice. Either the IL-28s will come out and we will continue to fly high-level missions, or if the Russians refuse to withdraw the bombers, we are heading for a new showdown on Thursday or Friday.^{/4/} We will wait today on the low-level flights and we will fly only when we believe it necessary for intelligence reasons, not as harassment.

^{/4/}November 22 and 23.

Mr. Bundy said the scenario called for no action until tomorrow when, if we received no answer, we would seek to obtain OAS support for our demand that the IL-28 bombers be withdrawn. The next move would involve military pressure.

Under Secretary Ball commented on his recent briefing of the NATO Council in Paris.^{/5/} He said he was surprised at the unanimous reaction that we had let the Russians off too easily and had not demanded the elimination of the Soviet base in Cuba. He said our European allies would support us in finishing the job and that there would be no objection to putting pressure on the Russians again via a blockade.

^{/5/}A report of Ball's briefing is in Polto 577 from Paris, November 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-2062) See the Supplement.

The President said he was not sure that a quarantine is the right response to the shooting down of a plane or the refusal to pull out the IL-28 bombers. How can Khrushchev submit a second time? Secretary Dillon responded that Khrushchev could take the quarantine more easily than a U.S. attack on Cuba. Mr. Nitze said that under Communist doctrine a Communist state can back down in the face of the superior position of an enemy. Mr. Bundy pointed out that we would be acting not against the Soviets by hitting Cuba.

The President was given a paper on proposed actions in the OAS involving conversations in advance with OAS powers with respect to our air surveillance.^{/6/} Secretary Rusk said primarily we would be reporting our actions to the OAS. Secretary Dillon felt that inspection covering the IL-28 bombers should be an arrangement with the OAS rather than the UN.

^{/6/}Not found.

The President said in the UN we could stress verification and in the OAS we could concentrate on the demand that the Russians withdraw the IL-28 bombers which are dangerous to other Latin American states.

In summarizing the present situation, the President said we now have no inspection and no safeguards on the

reintroduction of offensive weapons. Castro has rejected UN inspection and now he has concentrated his opposition on arrangements for national inspection. He asked that a statement be prepared for his use on the assumption that we have no Russian response to our IL-28 bomber withdrawal demand. We should emphasize Castro's rejection of ground inspection, thus requiring the continuance of air surveillance. We should seek to get the OAS to re-enforce our right to continue air surveillance.

Mr. Murrow commented that the Latin Americans are of the view that we are not doing enough against Castro.

The President requested that later in the day he be given a paper containing recommended courses of political and military actions which may have to be taken this week if we have no reply on the IL-28 bombers. This would include a recommendation as to what we would do if Khrushchev offers to take out the IL-28 bombers if our air surveillance ends./7/

/7/A draft contingency paper containing as Part IV, "Action in the Event Khrushchev Agrees to Withdraw IL-28's" was prepared on November 19. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62)

(At a meeting in the Cabinet Room at 6:00 PM on November 19 without the President or the Vice President,/8/ the group discussed a contingency plan which had been prepared by the State Department./9/)

/8/McCone prepared a record of the meeting held at 6 p.m. on November 19, in which the contingency plan cited in footnote 7 was revised, a message from Kennedy to Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Macmillan was revised and approved, and it was decided that the OAS meeting should be "informative" and that a resolution should not be submitted. (Memorandum by McCone, November 20; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B1285A, DCI Meetings with President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962) See the Supplement. The approved messages to Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Macmillan are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. See the Supplement.

/9/A revised contingency plan, November 20, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62. See the Supplement.

Bromley Smith/10/

/10/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

193. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy)

November 19, 1962, 2:45 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking. Ball was in Washington; McCloy in New York.

Ball told McCloy the general conclusion was that until tomorrow afternoon the President has to be in a position to say something in the way of a fairly full report to the American people. If he is not able to say the IL-28s have been promised by that time, that obviously this going to make the pressure increased for some kind of drastic action. Ball thought it just as well if the friends up there knew that. What we are doing, for McCloy's information--not to tell them--is we are going to get our telegrams this afternoon to bring both the NATO and OAS countries up to date on this situation and to tell them the thing may get considerably heated up to the point where there may be substantial action as a result of Cuban interference with our reconnaissance on the one hand or a continued refusal of the SU to come to grips with the IL-28 thing would be the reimposition of the quarantine perhaps on an extended basis. We are putting the governments on notice so that they can't say that

they are not consulted and also with the idea that if anything leaks out of the European capitals. We are not going to fly low level again before Wednesday.

Gilpatric said we were preparing for armed reconnaissance on Wednesday and following because we have now been clearly warned [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that we will draw some fire and we will be prepared in one way or another to return the fire. This will be at the low-level flights so that we won't counter any fire but go on tomorrow at high level. Our story is we are continuing reconnaissance, high and low level, as required. We would try, pending resumption of low level, not to be put in any public position of having stood down the low level in response to the threats from Castro, although in fact Bob feels strongly we ought to wait until after the President's statement tomorrow before we put ourselves in a position where we may have to return fire.

McCloy told Gilpatric that if he ran into these people he would indicate that we have to take more drastic action than we have taken in the past. Should he seek that out? Ball suggested that he simply say the President is going to have to make a statement to the American people. He hasn't made any kind of comprehensive statement for some time because he wanted to keep things as quiet as possible; but out of obligation to the public opinion, he has to say something. He has set a press conference tomorrow afternoon^{1/} where he will have to say there has been no indication of movement on the IL-28s, if there has been no progress on this. The result of this could very well be to increase American pressure for some kind of strong action.

^{1/}See footnote 7, Document 196.

McCloy said he had gone over that three or four times yesterday and he feels he has put them on enough notice in this regard. Unless he should bump into them he would be inclined to think it would be weakness to call them. If he should want another talk this afternoon McCloy will say that again. Ball and Gilpatric agreed.

McCloy said regarding the President's statement, this has to be worked on. Ball reported Sorensen and Johnson and Nitze were now working on that in another group. McCloy said they had been playing around on something up there. They may send their ideas down on this, to be put in the hopper.

194. Editorial Note

On the afternoon of November 19, 1962, Attorney General Robert Kennedy met with Georgi Bolshakov, ostensibly Press Attache of the Soviet Union but reputedly one of the leading KGB officials in Washington and a direct link to Chairman Khrushchev. The Attorney General warned Bolshakov that unless the Soviet Union withdrew its IL-28 bombers from Cuba, the United States was prepared to resume low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy insisted, required an answer before his press conference on November 20 at 6 p.m. (Memorandum by Robert Kennedy, November 30; Kennedy Library, Robert Kennedy Papers as cited in Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, page 550)

With the exception of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who had access for his biography, the Robert Kennedy Papers are not open to Department of State historians or any other researchers.

195. Memorandum of Conversation Between Alexander Fomin of the Soviet Embassy and John Scali of the American Broadcasting Corporation

Washington, November 20, 1962, 1:15-2:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62. Confidential. Drafted and typed by Scali at 3:40 p.m., November 20. According to a typed note on this memorandum, Fomin requested this meeting on November 16. The two men met at Aldo's Restaurant in Washington.

In long give and take, mainly on Cuba, Fomin made these main points:

1. Soviets are willing to allow the same kind of verification for exit of bombers as they allow for home shipment of missiles./1/

/1/The following handwritten sentence appears in parentheses at this point. "Check by US planes of Soviet ships taking bombers home."

2. Further on-the-spot inspection depends on U.S. negotiations with Cubans, not with negotiations with Soviets, because Cuban "sovereignty" is involved now.

3. Soviets are willing to send technicians connected with IL-28s home. He claimed all technicians connected with missiles already have gone home. He professed to be ignorant of continuing stay of any missile technicians, particularly those whose past role has been to guard missile installations.

4. Kennedy, he said, will lift the blockade today (Tuesday) and is now drafting text of non-aggression pledge he promised to make. "This will solve the Cuban problem."

5. Khrushchev has carried out all his undertakings with the President and is anxious for further progress in detente. He repeatedly asked what was next in President's priority, specifically returning to nuclear test agreement and non-aggression pact between Warsaw and Atlantic pact powers.

6. He implied repeatedly "progress could be made" in nuclear test agreement with compromise between number of on-site inspections suggested by West, which he put at 12, and number proposed by Soviets which he said was 3.

7. Nothing now seems to stand in way, he said, of Warsaw pact-Atlantic pact non-aggression treaty. Russia's ready, if only Kennedy is.

9. [sic] He brought up what he said was Russia's 1956 proposal for creating 800 mile aerial surveillance zone on both sides as step toward disarmament. Would U.S. be interested in this now, he asked, even though idea was rejected by "Dulles administration." I replied that if I remembered correctly zone proposed at that time was pretty lopsided in favor of Soviet Union. He replied this whole area could be discussed again, perhaps with better results.

10. Russia wants to concentrate on building up its economy and thus is in great need for prolonged period of peace. But there must be reasonable concessions on both sides, not on just Soviet side.

11. Soviets are being "neutral" in Chinese-Indian war. Russia is unhappy about this but at the present time can't do anything to stop it because the Chinese are being difficult. They don't approve of Soviet agreement with Kennedy because Chinese have been observers at all Soviet nuclear tests and they know power Soviets have. Therefore Chinese are asking, "why do you give in?"

12. Soviets realize Kennedy administration is much more reasonable, flexible and imaginative than Eisenhower administration was. Thus, Soviets realize there is now opportunity for reasonable agreements. But President mustn't push what he believes to be his present advantage too far, lest it encourage "hard-line" group in Moscow.

(I made points: Russia has to agree to effective on site inspection in Cuba; must also agree to pull all technicians out connected with missiles and bombers, and give satisfactory pledge not to reintroduce weapons or technicians. Kennedy considered follow-through on Cuba matter of first priority. Only after this settled would there be any reasonable prospects for successful negotiations on testing, disarmament, and Warsaw-Atlantic pact agreements.

I also said it wasn't true that Kennedy had agreed to Adenauer's alleged suggestion that all negotiations with Soviets over Berlin be broken off. On contrary, I said, President believed close brush with war over Cuba made it incumbent on both Soviets and Americans to seize opportunity for at least limited start toward responsible east-west agreements.

196. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, November 20, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. II, 11/20/62-12/14/62. No classification marking. For Robert Kennedy's account of how this message was delivered by Dobrynin, see Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy and His Times*, p. 550.

I have studied attentively your considerations which were forwarded through our Ambassador in Washington in the evening of November 15./1/ I wish first of all to express satisfaction with regard to your statement that the United States is also interested in the achievement of a rapid progress in untying the Cuban knot. This is our great desire too. It is good that you have confirmed once again that the U.S. commitment to give assurance of non-invasion of Cuba, which was agreed upon in the exchange of messages on October 27 and 28 remains firm and clear. I fully share also the thought expressed by you about the necessity to act with caution, to take into consideration the position of others. Now when we speak of eliminating the remnants of the crisis this is as important as at any of its past stages.

/1/Document 181.

I always believed and believe now that both of us are guided by the realization of the immense responsibility for the peaceful settlement of the crisis over Cuba being completed. The basis for such settlement already exists: the sides have achieved an agreement and have taken upon themselves certain obligations. It is precisely where we proceed from.

What have we agreed upon? In brief our agreement has come to the following.

The Soviet Union removes from Cuba rocket weapons which you called offensive and gives a possibility to ascertain this. The United States of America promptly removes the quarantine and gives assurances that there will be no invasion of Cuba, not only by the US but also by other countries of the Western Hemisphere. This is the essence of our agreement.

Later on you raised the question of removal of IL-28 planes from Cuba. I think you could not feel the precariousness of that request. Now, of course, there may appear those who would wish to rummage in the wordings and to interpret them in different ways. But you and we do know well what kind of weapons they were that set the forest on fire, they were missiles. It was not accidental, indeed, that in our and your message of October 27 and 28 there was not a single mention of bomber planes and specifically of IL-28's. At the same time those messages have direct reference to rocket weapons.

By the way, you yourself refer not to direct obligations of the sides but to the understanding implied by the American side in the expression "offensive weapons" mentioned in the messages and in this connection you recall your TV address of October 22 and your proclamation of October 23./2/ But you will agree, Mr. President, that messages that fix the subject of agreement and unilateral statements of the US Government are two different things indeed.

/2/For texts, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 806-811.

I informed you that the IL-28 planes are twelve years old and by their combat characteristics they at present

cannot be classified as offensive types of weapons. In spite of all this, we regarded our request with understanding. We took into consideration that you made certain statements and therefore the question of removal of IL-28 planes assumed for you as President a certain significance and probably created certain difficulties. We grant it. Since you might really have your difficulties in this question we moved in your direction having informed you of our consent to remove these planes from Cuba. What is the situation now if to summarize it in short and to speak of the main?

We have dismantled and removed from Cuba all the medium range ballistic missiles to the last with nuclear warheads for them. All the nuclear weapons have been taken away from Cuba. The Soviet personnel who were servicing the rocket installations have also been withdrawn. We have stated it to your representatives at the negotiations in New York too.

The US Government was afforded the possibility to ascertain the fact that all 42 missiles that were in Cuba have really been removed.

Moreover, we expressed our readiness to remove also the IL-28 planes from Cuba. I inform you that we intend to remove them within a month term and may be even sooner since the term for the removal of these planes is not a matter of principle for us. We are prepared to remove simultaneously with the IL-28 planes all the Soviet personnel connected with the servicing of these planes.

What can be said in connection with the commitments of the American side? Proper consideration through the UN of the commitment not to invade Cuba--and it is the main commitment of your side--so far is being delayed. The quarantine has not been lifted as yet. Permit me to express the hope that with receipt of this communication of mine you will issue instructions to the effect that the quarantine be lifted immediately with the withdrawal of your naval and other military units from the Caribbean area.

Furthermore, your planes still continue to fly over the Cuban territory. It does not normalize the situation but aggravates it. And all this is taking place at the time when we have removed the missiles from Cuba, have given you the possibility to ascertain it through appropriate observation and when we declare our intention to remove the IL-28 planes from Cuba.

I will not conceal that lately I have to hear more and more often that we are too trustful with regard to the statements of the US readiness to carry out its part of the agreement on Cuba and that the American side will under various pretexts evade the fulfillment of the obligations which it assumed. I do not want to believe this and I proceed from something different: the President has given his word and he will keep it as well as keep our word. But in such an acute and delicate question which we face there cannot but exist the limits beyond which the trust begins losing its value if it is not being strengthened with practical steps towards each other. All this should be mutually taken into consideration to sooner crown with success our efforts in settling the conflict.

I understand, of course, that some time is needed to formalize through the U.N. the agreement on the settlement of the conflict in the Caribbean area, including commitments of non-invasion of Cuba. But this time should be measured by days, not by weeks and, of course, not by months.

Of all the commitments based on the agreement achieved between us in the course of the exchange of messages you declare of your readiness to remove the quarantine immediately as soon as we agree on the term for the removal of IL-28's, without waiting for their removal.

Moving in your direction and taking the decision on the removal of IL-28 planes from Cuba we presume that we have grounds to count on similar understanding on your part also in the questions of the flights of American planes over Cuba and in promptest formalizing through the UN of the US commitments.

As for the discontinuance of flights of American planes over Cuba you yourself can see better how this should be

done. In my opinion, actual discontinuance of such flights over Cuba would already be a major step forward and would bring about a great easing in the situation, the more so that our missiles have been removed and your side has ascertained this.

They say that so far as it is a matter of formalizing the commitments through the UN it is difficult for the American side to accept the form of a protocol we are suggesting in which the commitments of the sides are to be fixed. We do not attach decisive significance to a form. Other forms are not excluded either. For instance, a declaration (or declarations) which would be confirmed by the UN. It is the content of the document which is important and also that the commitments of the sides be formalize through the UN without delay.

I heard that Americans have a rule: in any business each side should approach with the same standard the fulfillment of both its own obligations and the obligations of its counterpart and not use "double standard"--one for itself and another for the others. This is a good rule and if it is observed this promises a prompt settlement of the Cuban conflict. Let us follow this good American rule.

Now about the conditions which you set forth with regard to carrying out the verification and measures of further observation.

Yes, we really agreed to the effect that UN representatives could ascertain the removal from Cuba of rocket weapons which you called offensive. But we stipulated however that this question can be solved only with the consent of the Government of Cuba. We could not take an obligation for the Government of Cuba and your reference, Mr. President, that we allegedly took such an obligation, of course, does not reflect the real situation. I believe that you see for yourself the weakness of such a reference.

But what is the main thing in connection with the question of verification with regard to the missiles removed by us that is evaded in your communication? The main thing is that under agreement with you we gave you the possibility to carry out verification of the removal of our rockets in the open sea. We did that and that was an act of goodwill on our part. You will agree that we took this step in the circumstances when no promise had been made by us with regard to this matter in our messages. We did something more in comparison with what had been said by us in the message with regard to verification.

It is clear that the said verification of the removal of the missiles conducted in accordance with the arrangement between us substitutes the verification of which you spoke in your message and I would say, in a more effective form at that, because the American side was observing the missiles we were shipping out, so to say, at the final stage of their removal. While even verification of the dismantling would mean observing only the first stage of their removal from Cuba.

As a result the American side, as it itself so declared, had every opportunity to count the missiles put on our ships, to photograph them and to ascertain their removal.

Thus a way out was found and not a bad one, and the question of the verification must, of course, belong to the past. Now no one can doubt that we have carried out our commitment with regard to the dismantling and shipping of the missiles from Cuba which were a subject in our correspondence. The fact of the removal of those missiles has been officially confirmed also by the US Department of Defense.^{/3/}

^{/3/}For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, p. 458.

As for the rumors alleging that the missiles may have been left in Cuba somewhere in the caves, one can say that we do not live in the cave-man age to attach great significance to the rumors of this sort. If someone is spreading rumors of this kind he is doing that deliberately to create difficulties in the negotiations.

As far as the question of the American side ascertaining our removing the IL-28 planes from Cuba is concerned,

we do not see any problem here. In this respect you and we have the paved way and let us take that way. We have no objections against applying also to this case the procedure agreed upon between us for observation of the removal of the missiles though, speaking frankly, one could do without it. But if you want your naval vessels and helicopters to spend several hundred tons of fuel sailing and somersaulting around our ships carrying the IL-28 planes, let us then consider that such possibility exists.

I will tell you frankly that it was part of our plans, and we believe that we will do it at a proper time, to ship out of Cuba those groups of our military personnel which although were not directly involved in servicing the rocket weapons now removed, still had something to do with guarding those installations. We will do this upon the arrival of our ships. But I must say that the strength of those groups in Cuba is not significant.

You raise the question as to what to do next, how to ensure that those types of weapons on the removal of which we have agreed are not brought back to Cuba. I believe that with respect to non-introduction of such weapons in the future you and I do not have any differences. We are prepared to give firm assurances with regard to this matter.

However, you speak not only about this. You now want some permanent supervision to be established, in Cuba or over Cuba. But where was it taken from that we gave our consent to permanent supervision? The question has never been put that way in the exchange of messages. And generally, how one can take as a normal thing an establishment, and without any reciprocity at that, of some permanent supervision over a sovereign state?

If we are to show serious concern that no unexpected steps are taken on either side to the detriment of each other, then as I already said, the proposal of the U.N. Acting Secretary General U Thant on the so-called "presence of the U.N.", i.e. on establishing U.N. posts in the countries of the Caribbean area would meet this task. This proposal of U Thant was also supported as is known by the Government of the Republic of Cuba. We believe it to be a reasonable basis on which it is possible to come to an agreement. And it would be good if that idea was accepted by you and put into life.

To tell the truth, I am somewhat surprised that in connection with the idea of "presence of the U.N." in the Caribbean area you are talking for some reason about setting up observation posts at the ports of the Soviet Union. May be you have in mind the proposals which we submitted during the negotiations on the problem of disarmament and on the problem of prevention of surprise attack in 1955 and 1958. But those proposals had nothing to do and cannot have anything to do with the question of Cuba since that question simply did not exist at that time. Incidentally, I have already told you that in our opinion it would be useful to get back to considering the proposals to set up on a mutual basis the observation posts at airfields, major sea-ports, railway junctions and auto routes. We have given our representatives at the negotiation on disarmament in Geneva the necessary instructions. I repeat--we would like to come to an agreement on this question and if you give such instructions to your representatives at the negotiations on disarmament we will only greet that.

Such is our viewpoint on the three questions raised by you: on the removal of the IL-28 planes, on organizing the verification and on non-introduction to Cuba of such weapons which in accordance with the agreement are removed from Cuba.

How should we deal with the matter now so that we and you could soon bring joy to humanity with the news that the crisis over Cuba is completely liquidated?

The Government of the USA in view of the agreement reached on the IL-28 planes should immediately remove the quarantine which corresponds to your own statement as well.

It is necessary to stick to generally recognized international norms and rules fixed in the UN Charter--not to violate the territorial waters and air space of sovereign states and stop the flights of American aircraft over Cuba. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, that I met with some relief the report that during the last one-two days the

flights of American planes over Cuba did not take place. It is good if it promises maintaining of such wise decision in the future as well.

Let both of us agree, Mr. President, also that our representatives in New York be given at once the instructions to immediately proceed with working out an agreed document (or documents) that would formalize through the UN the commitments of the sides.

As we see the matter this will require only a few days if, of course, all the sides want to have speediest liquidation of the aftermath of a tense and dangerous situation evolved in the Caribbean area, the situation that really brought humanity to the brink of thermonuclear war.

One more point. I have read V. Kuznetsov's report on his talk with A. Stevenson from which I learned that the American side is going to give us a draft of its document stating the US commitments of non-invasion of Cuba.^{/4/} Our draft of the document on settling the conflict has been already forwarded to your representatives.^{/5/} Naturally, we will study your document with utmost attention. Let us hope that as a result of the negotiations we will manage to formalize the achieved agreement so that it satisfies all the sides.

^{/4/}For Stevenson's account of the meeting, see Document 183.

^{/5/}Transmitted in telegram 1798 from USUN, November 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1562) See the Supplement.

Your brother Robert Kennedy through our Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington and Mr. McCloy through our representative in New York expressed a desire to get promptly our answer to the considerations expressed by you on the question of the removal of IL-28 planes from Cuba.^{/6/} Well, I think, this answer of mine gives you not a bad material for your statement at your press-conference.^{/7/} However, I hope, Mr. President, that your statement will not be one-sided but will respond to mutual understanding of the situation with regard to immediate steps to remove the quarantine and to discontinue the flights of American planes over Cuba as well as with regard to the immediate formalizing through the UN of the commitments of the sides on the final liquidation of the crisis evolved in the Caribbean area.

^{/6/}See Documents 173 and 191.

^{/7/}For Kennedy's press statement, November 20, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962*, pp. 830-838.

In conclusion I wish to stress that much time has already passed since an agreement was reached between us and it is not in the interests of our countries, not in the interests of peace to delay the fulfillment of the agreement that has been reached and the final settlement of the Cuban crisis. Such is our conviction.

As far as we know F. Castro wants also to make a statement today concerning the settlement of the Cuban question. N.S. Khrushchev believes that it would be good if the President in his statements at the news conference did not introduce elements of aggravation and did not make any statements hurting the national feelings of the Cubans. Now it is especially important that the positive which has begun to show in the settling of the conflict be by all means supported and encouraged. It seems to us that the present state of affairs demands that each side display caution and restraint to avoid creating needless obstacles to the final elimination of the crisis which developed around Cuba.

If Mr. President could take this into account while conducting his news conference it would have a positive significance and would correspond to our mutual efforts to come more promptly to a solution acceptable to all sides.^{/8/}

/8/Apparently the last two paragraphs are an addendum by Dobrynin.

197. Summary Record of the 28th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 20, 1962, 3:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32a. Top Secret; Sensitive. The President arrived at 4 p.m. and the meeting lasted until 4:55 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32a.

Khrushchev's reply/1/ was read to the group, the President not having yet arrived.

/1/Document 196.

A statement to be made by the President at his 6:00 PM press conference was discussed and approved./2/ The following decisions were reached:

/2/See footnote 7, Document 196.

a. The quarantine is to be lifted immediately and a proclamation revoking it is to be prepared./3/

/3/For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, p. 463.

b. U.S. naval forces in the Caribbean will remain there for the time being and carry out normal exercises. Ships in the area will not be removed because it is normal for some to be always on station in the Caribbean. Latin American ships which are in the quarantine force will be asked to stay and participate in exercises.

c. Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President agreed, that there would be no low-level reconnaissance missions flown tomorrow.

d. High-level flights averaging not more than one a day will continue intermittently because of the importance of knowing that the IL-28 bombers are actually being removed.

Two other actions are to be taken without public notice:

a. The SAC air alert will be terminated and all other military forces will be put on a reduced alert basis.

b. TAC planes concentrated along the coast will be deployed inland.

Secretary McNamara recommended that within forty-eight hours we announce that the air reserves called up for the Cuban crisis would be released before Christmas.

The OAS Organ of Consultation meeting will be called off. The State Department will call in the Latin American Ambassadors before the President's press conference to brief them on the Russian reply.

Attention was called to the reference in the reply to Soviet ground forces. The assumption was that these forces would be removed.

The President asked where the question of our no-invasion assurance stands. In the light of what Khrushchev has agreed to do, if he does not get our assurances he will have very little. We should keep the assurances informal and not follow up with a formal document in the UN.

Alexis Johnson returned to the meeting to report that ABC reporter John Scali had been given the substance of Khrushchev's reply by a Russian source.^{/4/} There followed a discussion of whether we should insist on shipside inspection of the IL-28 bomber removal. No clear decision was reached, some of the group believing we should insist on the shipside inspection and others saying this was not necessary.

^{/4/}See Document 195.

There was further discussion of the no-invasion assurances. The Attorney General expressed his opposition to giving the assurance informally. We would be giving away a bargaining counter because Khrushchev is not insisting on having formal assurances. The President restated his view that Khrushchev would be in a difficult position if he gave us something and got nothing in return. We do not want to convey to him that we are going back on what he considers our bargain.

An instruction to McCloy and Stevenson^{/5/} is to be drafted which says that we will make no formal no-invasion assurance and explained why we declined to do so.

^{/5/}See Document 204.

McGeorge Bundy^{/6/}

^{/6/}Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

198. Editorial Note

At 5 p.m., November 20, 1962, 1 hour before President Kennedy's press conference, Ambassador at Large Thompson transmitted the following message through Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin:

"In addition to what he intends to announce at the press conference, he has also ordered a lower state of alert for the US armed forces that had been introduced in the beginning of the Cuban events. Simultaneously, those air squadrons that had been called to active duty during the Cuban crisis have been ordered back into reserve".

The text was provided by the Russian Foreign Ministry and is an unofficial translation.

199. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)

November 21, 1962, 9:45 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272. Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking. McCloy was in New York; Ball was in Washington.

McC: I have a feeling we have to do something now on our own and we can't stall much longer. I think they^{/1/} came forward pretty well yesterday.

^{/1/}The Soviet Union.

Ball: Yes, I think they did.

McC: Kuznetsov was on the phone a minute ago with me.

Ball: What's his reaction to the President's press conference?

McC: Well, I think he was all right on that, but he was angry over the passage of words between him and Adlai yesterday. Adlai was a little too blunt. He said "You ought to take those SAM-sites out". We weren't talking SAM-sites, we were talking about getting all the troops out. Then he blew his top and said "We are digging up something new all the time". They were wrangling down at the end of the table; I was at the other end of the table and couldn't intervene. But he came out of there boiling. He said "Gee whiz, after all we've done", etc "to get that sort of reaction just convinces me you are stalling, and I'm going to pack up and go home and tell the Chairman that I have been misleading him about the good-will of the Americans in regard to settlement". I think he was quite sincere. He was angry; there is no doubt about that. Now he called me up this morning and said "I'm going to call for a meeting right away", and I said "Don't do that. I can't tell you this minute what we are going to do. I believe that the time has come to expedite the conclusion of this thing and we ought to pretty quickly have a SC meeting. Let me get in touch with Washington and let me get a little more bearing because I think their mood down there is that the Premier has made some very definite steps and it is our move--at least to sit down and give you some stuff and tell you this is the way it is going to go." Then he said: "That's okay with me. You know, the only progress we've made has been the result of our I would hope we could have another similar meeting to that which we had at Stamford and Glen Cove."/2/ Well, this is delicate. It is going to be all right if we are definite. If we know what our position is, then we can do it. If there is any further exploratory business, I'm inclined to think that it isn't wise to have one of those formal meetings. He said that he had made a complete report of the Sunday meeting/3/ to the Premier and he said he hoped that we saw in the Premier's reply/4/ the results of that meeting. And I think you do. I haven't seen that thing, by the way.

/2/Kuznetsov and McCloy met at McCloy's house in Stamford, Connecticut, on November 4 and at the Soviet compound in the city of Glen Cove (sometimes described as being located in the village of Locust Valley), on Long Island, on November 18; see Documents 142 and 191.

/3/Sunday, November 18, see footnote 2 above.

/4/Document 196.

Ball: It's on its way up by messenger right now.

McC: Okay. I think we ought to get a look at it and see the tone of it. My feeling is if you can only get off this on-site inspection you are better off than if you keep talking about verification instead. A memorandum that is coming down to you, the first one, was dictated by Stevenson and company, and the second one is the one that I did that I showed Rusk last night./5/ I think that that is a deal we can make, and that is the business of getting their troops out and the best safeguard of their reintroduction, leaving off in the vague future the UN presence. I think you ought to sit down at this stage and draft the thing that we can say in the declaration and don't pussy foot on that any longer. Rusk said yesterday that we were deliberately holding it back from us. Let's see what it looks like and send it up here so that we can get to work on it.

/5/McCloy is referring to drafts of U.S. guarantees against invasion of Cuba. A memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk, November 22, contains three drafts including the McCloy version as revised by Rusk. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/21/62-11/30/62) See the Supplement.

Ball: We've got a meeting at 4 p.m./6/ scheduled to go over some instructions and we might have some conversations on the phone in the meantime about what those instructions should be.

/6/See Document 201.

McC: I think that would be good. Mind you, if the President goes off for the weekend it is going to be hard to hold Kuznetsov, and I think we should tell him something today. I think the Pentagon agrees with me on the general best safeguard business--removal of those troops, and I would push that ahead as something we ought to

do and then draft the statement and get it up quickly as you can.

Ball: All right. I'll get hold of Dean and see if we can get something so that we can at least work something out with you on the phone to get approved at 4 p.m.

McC: All right. And call me back this afternoon./7/

/7/No memorandum of the afternoon conversation has been found, but Ball summarized for the President an hour-long afternoon conversation with McCloy and Stevenson, see Document 203.

200. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, November 21, 1962, noon.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 72 D 272. Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.

Ball: I had a talk with Jack McCloy this morning./1/

/1/See Document 199.

Bundy: So did I./2/

/2/No record of Bundy's conversation has been found.

Ball: I have a feeling that we may be running down two somewhat divergent tracks here.

Bundy: I have exactly the same worry and was about to call you about it.

Ball: I wonder if we shouldn't get Jack down here for 4 p.m. and try to resolve this before we head into a long week where there can be no resolution.

Bundy: Let's talk about your track.

Ball: There are two schools of thought over here. One of them would be to try to bring this to some kind of a conclusion, even though the formulation would differ from the formulation of yesterday along this line: that if we can be assured either through appropriate UN verification arrangements or through our own means that all offensive weapons are removed and not reinstated, then Cuba has no fear of an invasion. That suggests that we are not going to invade as long as we keep ourselves

Bundy: Not going to invade on this ground. We are always going to have to reserve on other grounds. To form language for that is not too tough.

Ball: Yes. Something along this line "As a party to solemn treaty commitments." (Ball reads draft of this morning.)

Bundy: Yes. This is my track, to be honest with you. That is what I would like to do. Does anyone think that we are really going to get much more than that?

Ball: I have Martin here at the moment, for example. He says the Latins will die; they will come to a very bad conclusion--that we shouldn't give any kind of pledge except on a condition of adequate verification and

safeguards which of course we are never going to get.

Bundy: That isn't much of a pledge. It seems to me [what] I would say to Martin, and he would say to his Ambassadors, would be "We have said what we always have said." What we did was to reiterate our existing policy in return for which we got 30 bombers and 40 missiles out of there, etc. Those who aren't going to be satisfied with anything short of an invasion of Cuba aren't going to have their views changed by the character of the noises we make while we're not invading Cuba, either.

Ball: I think that may be. We ought to settle pretty solidly on it, however.

Bundy: I agree to that. I don't think there is any doubt what the USUN thinks; if we ask them without Stevenson, we create trouble. If we ask Stevenson, we get filibuster.

Ball: What we can do is try to get it on

Bundy: Where is the Secretary on this?

Ball: I talked to him earlier. I haven't had time. I don't think we would have difficulty with him on this, but I am not sure. I'd hate to speak for him on this.

Bundy: I'm pretty clear this is the line the President will want to go on. He wants to get a reasonable sort of "well this is all we can give you, because this is all you can give us with the Russians", and then go on with them to wider topics and let Fidel simmer while over the next six weeks . . . I think the President would like to or be prepared to trade a certain thickening of our assurance against a certain thickening of their affirmation that they are leaving.

Ball: Then the language I suggest "so long as we can be assured either . . ." you don't think that would be too bad?

Bundy: No. That is the sort of thing we could give to Kuznetsov to chew on at the end of the day today. Then there would be a hassle in which it is clear that we say to him "Look, we can do this better if your people would do what you haven't been able to get them to do. The best we can do in the light of what we initially said is to say that as long as we're satisfied, we'll be satisfied." Which isn't bad at all.

Ball: All right. I think we ought to be prepared.

Bundy: Why don't you prepare a paper on that framework, and if anyone in the Department wants to argue the case for a more rigorous assertion of interlocking declarations, it is even possible that we could present them both to Kuznetsov and say "Look if you can get this . . ."

Ball: I am sure he would want the alternative because I think they have really given up on the first one.

Bundy: That's right and it seems to me a question of if you spend a day on that or not. I don't frankly see the point in it.

Ball: Let me get it up both ways.

Bundy: You had better have it out with your Secretary.

Ball: Of course, I will.

Bundy: I know McNamara if, in fact, the trend line of Soviet presence in Cuba is downward, he doesn't see much

point in trying to bargain for something we are never going to get and would be perfectly willing to give something that perhaps went a shade beyond what the President actually gave yesterday. One way to go at this would be for McCloy to begin with Kuznetsov "Didn't you read the President's press conference?"

Ball: I think that's right. Of course Khrushchev may want something in the SC. I think McCloy has probably indicated

Bundy: That doesn't break my heart. (He mentioned Stevenson's "rough time" with Kuznetsov yesterday.)/3/ We perhaps ought to meet a few minutes before 4 over here to see what we've got. You might send over what you've got in advance.

/3/As described in Document 199.

[end of document]



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume XI
Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

201. Summary Record of the 29th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 21, 1962, 4 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32a. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 4:35 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is *ibid.*, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32a. See the Supplement.

Under Secretary Ball reported that Russian representative Kuznetsov had told McCloy in New York that we were upping the ante by asking for assurances with respect to the SAM sites. Kuznetsov threatened to go back to Russia. McCloy wants to give the Russians something tonight. Three draft instructions, one written by McCloy, another by Stevenson, and a third by the State Department, were discussed./1/ The State draft was largely a restatement of the President's press conference statement. It made the point that we cannot ignore the necessity of ensuring the peace and security of the hemisphere. We must satisfy ourselves that no offensive weapons remain in Cuba. The burden is on Cuba, not the USSR, to ensure that we can do this. The State draft was described as an offering document.

/1/See footnote 5, Document 199.

Mr. Ball said that McCloy's view is that we got from the Russians more than we expected. Therefore, we should not put so much stress on ground inspection now that if we don't get it it is a defeat for us.

The President agreed that we could abandon insistence on ground inspection, but he felt that the proposed no-invasion assurances were too hard. He said our objective is to preserve our right to invade Cuba in the event of civil war, if there were guerrilla activities in other Latin American countries or if offensive weapons were reintroduced into Cuba. We do not want to build up Castro by means of a no-invasion guarantee. The pertinent sentence in the declaration which we would make to the UN Security Council was revised./2/

/2/For the draft declaration as sent to USUN, see Document 205.

The President left the meeting after approving an interim reply/3/ to the most recent message from Khrushchev./4/

/3/Document 202.

/4/Document 196.

Secretary McNamara said he would be recommending to the President an aerial reconnaissance plan for the next few weeks. Low-level flights would be authorized only with Presidential approval, but he doubted that many such flights would be necessary. High-level flights, two per day accumulatively but not more than five in any one day, would be recommended. Secretary McNamara said that in the coming days we are going to have insufficient information out of Cuba but we can live with this rather than risk having one of our planes shot down and then having to retaliate.

Bromley Smith/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

202. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, November 21, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR File, 1962. Confidential. A draft with Bundy's handwritten revisions, also dated November 21, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. II, 11/20/62-12/14/62.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I have been glad to get your letter of November 20,/1/ which arrived in good time yesterday. As you will have seen, I was able to announce the lifting of our quarantine promptly at my press conference, on the basis of your welcome assurance that the IL-28 bombers will be removed within a month.

/1/Document 196.

I am now instructing our negotiators in New York to move ahead promptly with proposals for a solution of the remaining elements in the Cuban problem. I do not wish to confuse the discussion by trying to state our present position in detail in this message, but I do want you to know that I continue to believe that it is important to settle this matter promptly and on reasonable terms, so that we may move on to other issues. I regret that you have been unable to persuade Mr. Castro to accept a suitable form of inspection or verification in Cuba, and that in consequence we must continue to rely upon our own means of information. But, as I said yesterday,/2/ there need be no fear of any invasion of Cuba while matters take their present favorable course./3/

/2/In a statement at his press conference on November 20; see footnote 7, Document 196.

/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.

203. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)

Washington, November 21, 1962, 8 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.

Ball: I had about an hour's talk with Jack McCloy and Adlai Stevenson in New York, and then Mac has also had a talk with McCloy. Stevenson is prepared to go along on a draft that we worked out over the phone./1/ Jack has still got some reservations, and he wants to think it over overnight and then talk again in the morning. He wants to get out of it any reservation with regard to our right to overfly or protect ourselves, and I think that we really can't do it.

/1/See the attachment which was then sent to USUN in Document 205.

President: What does he feel about the overflights?

Ball: He has a feeling that actually we shouldn't insist on any kind of reservation of that kind; that we tell them orally we are going to have to do it, but that we don't put anything in any document because he thinks this doesn't give them enough, and that if we want to close this thing up we have to give them something.

President: He doesn't think we can rest on what I said yesterday?

Ball: No, he doesn't. He thinks we've got to go substantially beyond that. It is really a question of where we start in this thing and where we come out. My own feeling is that we probably ought to start with something not much different from what we arrived at tonight, and Stevenson himself agreed to that. I think Jack will in the morning, but he wanted to think it over a little further. Now I have some language which I worked out with Stevenson and which McCloy, although he doesn't buy it completely, just to give you the trend of it (they were both on the telephone), it would run like this: (attached) The main crux of the argument is this business whether to include some such phrase as "and the US is in position to be satisfied on these points" which is really a reservation of our right to overfly which it seems to me is essential if we are not going to get ourselves in a position where we may lose a U-2 and not be still feeling committed in the eyes of the world to a non-invasion guaranty, which I don't think we can be.

President: Well, could you put "if the US" part at the beginning?

Ball: As it was worked out with them it would be "Provided no nuclear weapons or other weapon systems capable of offensive use".

President: Well, could you you say "Provided the US is assured that".

Ball: You see, if you say "is assured" then the interpretation is that this means that the Russians have given them this assurance. What I propose to say was "Provided no nuclear weapons".

President: Yes, the only question in my mind is whether your statement really is too limiting to us. What about now if there is a simple war in Cuba?

Ball: Well, we take that out by saying "this does not alter any of the rights or obligations of the US set forth in the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty." The Rio Pact would give us the right to move in.

President: Would it?

Ball: I think by interpretation that we would be justified in doing it.

President: Well, we would [do] it any way if we have to.

Ball: Yes. That's the position I think we would have to take.

President: And we would probably get two-thirds of the OAS anyway.

Ball: Oh, I think so, yes. So that that is our real protection on that. But the problem with McCloy is that he just doesn't want any reference to the fact that we're protecting the right to overfly as a condition to the non-invasion assurance, and I really think we have to have it. So that he is going to think it over overnight and the idea is that we talk the first thing in the morning. If it is necessary I will then go up. Stevenson is rather opposed to my coming up. He thinks there are too many people in NY anyway. But we would like to get something in the

Russian hands say toward noon tomorrow.

President: What do they say is the hurry up there?

Ball: It's just that I think the Russians want to clean this thing up. It is a nagging business as far as Khrushchev is concerned in that he would like to get it behind him. I do think there is some value in not letting it drag out too long because I think the American people are never happy with a long, drawn-out negotiation, and that gives the newspapers a chance to build up all the suspicions and doubts, etc.

President: Yes. The only thing is, I say, we don't want to get . . . the wording of that is going to be important to us in the next two years. McCloy, you know, doesn't quite have that problem, which we have.

Ball: No, this wording is about what we came out with. It is only altered slightly from what we came out with this afternoon.

President: There's nothing . . . you seemed to have more "whereases" in the meeting this afternoon.

Ball: No, I tell you, the only difference is that instead of saying "if and so long as" we say "provided"--that's not really anything. And when we say "and the US is in position to be satisfied" what we have said before was "and the US and the other states of the hemisphere are in position to be fully satisfied"--but that's not a significant change.

President: Let me ask you this, George. Is there any way we can make this appear to be more routine than it is?

Ball: Well, the reason we have written it this way, of course, is to bury it and to make it appear as subsidiary as possible.

President: Yes. What about putting some "of courses" in there some place?

Ball: Well, we can do that.

President: Read the whole thing again.

Ball: (Reads)

President: I think that is all right.

Ball: I think it protects us adequately, and I think this is certainly where we ought to put it up to them and simply say to the Russians "Now, look, if have another way of giving this assurance through some kind of UN presence it is up to you to come forward with it."

President: Let's take two or three hypothetical cases. Suppose they pour a lot of conventional stuff in there. I suppose we can always blockade though, can't we.

Ball: Sure.

President: Suppose they shoot down some of our planes and use the SAM-sites

Ball: Well, if they shoot down our planes, then you see under the language we have here, then we would say the whole deal is off, because they have frustrated us from being in position to be satisfied.

President: Right. OK. Now if they reserve the right that they could in Guatemala?

Ball: Then we would go into the OAS under the Rio Pact.

President: I see--and what does that say?

Ball: It gives freedom of action because it is based on the assumption that a presence outside the western hemisphere is incompatible with the American system, you see. By reserving our rights under the Rio Pact, it really permits us to do pretty much what we please.

President: All we would really need is two-thirds.

Ball: That is right.

President: Well, anyway, if we caught them red-handed, we could do it anyway.

Ball: I would think so.

President: Now, when is McCloy going to see Kuznetsov?

Ball: The idea was that he and I would talk first thing in the morning. Then I would check back with Mac. If he will go along with this draft, then he will deliver this draft to the Russians by noon.

President: I think we can't go much further than this.

Ball: Well, I think what we can say is that this is the best we can possibly do for you. Now, the fact is that there is a reservation of our right to be satisfied. If you can produce it in any other way, we will be glad to look at it. If it is a UN presence or something, well let's discuss it. But we've got to have this.

President: I think you ought to say that constitutionally the President cannot make a comment that cuts across the Rio Pact.

Ball: That's right. I agree. I'll tell them that.

President: I think you can use that if they try to throw that at him. I think you might get up a background sheet some time so that if we get assaulted we can show all the examples of where we can move.

Ball: All right, we'll do that in the morning.

President: Let me know if they finally buy it. No, if they change it let me know; if not, that's all right.

Ball: If I can get McCloy and Stevenson to agree with this in the morning I won't bother you.

President: Fine. That's all right.

Attachment/2/

DRAFT ASSURANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION

Provided no nuclear weapons or/3/ weapon systems capable of offensive use are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and the United States is in position to be satisfied on these points; and provided Cuba does not invade or support an invasion of any other country, the United States declares that it will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba. This declaration/4/ does not alter any of the rights or obligations/5/ set forth in the UN Charter

and the Rio Pact.

/2/No classification marking. A note in Ball's handwriting indicated that this was agreed to by Stevenson, read to the President at 8 p.m., and McCloy would provide an answer on the morning of November 22.

/3/Ball wrote and added the word "other" at this point.

/4/Ball added the following phrase at this point: "is made on the representation of the Soviet Union here in the Security Council and".

/5/Ball added at this point, "of the United States."

204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, November 21, 1962, 9:49 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56261/11-2162. Top Secret; Sensitive; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Sisco and Cleveland; cleared with the Executive Committee and Ball, and approved by Cleveland.

1338. For Stevenson and McCloy. Subject: Next Steps in New York Negotiations.

I. Basic Assumptions

1. The loose ends still remaining unfulfilled in original understanding between President and Khrushchev are these: On Soviet side, on-site UN-supervised verification of removal of offensive weapons, and longer-term safeguards against their reintroduction. On our side, formal assurances against invasion of Cuba.

2. Recent indications from Soviets make clear their intention: to disengage militarily from Cuba, but to stick to their story that they have saved the Castro regime from US invasion. Our interest lies in speeding the disengagement process, while avoiding the kind of commitment that unduly ties our hands in dealing with the Castro regime while it lasts.

3. On verification and safeguards,

(a) The Soviets have given no indication that they are prepared to press Castro regime as hard as would be necessary to get Cubans to agree to any acceptable inspection system;

(b) Cubans have consistently been adamant in objecting to ground inspection of any kind, and have rejected several progressively softer proposals by SYG on verification;

(c) Both Soviets and Cubans have stressed need for reciprocal arrangements involving inspection of other Caribbean areas, probably including US, as price for inspection of Cuba.

4. Therefore it is not going to be possible in the short run to get a UN system of short-term verification or long-term safeguards on offensive weapons in the Caribbean.

5. Assuming (which is not wholly clear) that it would be possible to develop a satisfactory arrangement for adequate long-term safeguards on basis of mutuality in the Caribbean area, it is not to our interest to have the Soviets involved in creating, sponsoring, or administering such safeguards.

6. Absence of inspection arrangements, while leaving part of original deal unfulfilled, does provide rationale for (a) continued US photographic reconnaissance over Cuba, operating under existing OAS resolution, and (b) the

tough conditions on our non-invasion assurances.

II. Long Stall vs Rapid Wrap-up

1. On this analysis, that we will not be able to get satisfactory arrangements on verification and safeguards, we face two alternatives:

(a) to continue negotiations for an indefinite period, insisting on Soviet compliance with our full position that there should be UN verification of their withdrawal of offensive weapons as well as "suitable safeguards" against their reintroduction into Cuba;

(b) to close out this phase of the negotiations immediately on the basis of the steps the Soviet Union has taken and will promise to take, adapting our undertakings to reflect the absence so far of meaningful UN inspection arrangements.

2. There are distinct advantages to closing out this phase of the negotiations with the Soviets without delay. The Soviets would have the opportunity to disengage themselves from major military involvement in Cuba. We would be enabled to deal with Cuba largely as a Hemispheric problem and to consider next steps on long-range safeguards in a Caribbean Latin American context, without the intrusion of the Soviet Union. This would permit us to seek progress with the Soviet Union on wider subjects, such as nuclear testing, Berlin, disarmament and the election of the Secretary General.

III. Toward a Security Council Meeting

1. To accomplish a speedy wrap-up of current phase of negotiations, Soviets evidently have in mind a Security Council meeting at which agreed declarations would be made by the US and the USSR, a report would be made by SYG, and an agreed summation would be made by Chairman or in simple procedural resolution adopted by the Council. Soviets are not insisting on a formal protocol, nor do they seem to be insisting that Cubans be parties to this accord at this stage.

2. The United States is quite prepared to work toward such a wrap-up meeting of Security Council. In view of the non-fulfillment of important aspects of the original understanding, we cannot and should not declare the understanding fulfilled. However, we can adopt a procedure which enables a "line to be drawn under" the US-Soviet crisis over Cuba, while leaving open questions that must be sorted out with Cuba in hemispheric context over longer span of time.

3. In the course of negotiations during this next phase, we would have to make clear, both to Soviets and to general public, that Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding was never properly fulfilled, and the absence of on-site verification and of longer-term safeguards against reintroduction makes it necessary for OAS to retain full freedom of action as regards aerial surveillance and other means of keeping a close eye on Cuban behavior and any evidence of renewed Soviet intrusion into Hemisphere. We would continue to remind world that declaration of intention must be independently checked in a world still so full of international mistrust, which has just been treated to a classic example of large-scale duplicity. However, until after SC meeting we would avoid making our intentions on continued air surveillance manifest in a form or forum that would require Soviets to raise the issue of violation of Cuban air space.

4. In the circumstances we will have to place conditions on our non-invasion assurance which are justified by absence of Cuban cooperation with the United Nations and the inability (or unwillingness) of the Soviets to induce the Cubans to cooperate. This will leave the door open for regional arrangements for longer-term safeguards if Cubans cooperate, and for continued OAS air surveillance of Cuba, and military response to any Cuban aggression, if they do not.

IV. Scenario in the Security Council

Within this framework we would favor a Security Council meeting during next week at which the following steps would be taken:

1. The Secretary-General would report on the steps he has taken, and in particular his series of unsuccessful efforts to secure Cuban agreement to UN on-site inspection to verify withdrawal and dismantling of offensive weapons and to safeguard against future reintroduction.
2. The Soviet Union would make a declaration indicating steps it has taken pursuant to the US-USSR understanding and containing assurances that all missiles and nuclear components have been removed, that the IL-28's would come out within four weeks, that military units and personnel intended for the protection of these weapons systems will be removed in time, and that no offensive weapons would be reintroduced in Cuba in the future.
3. The United States would make a parallel declaration: (Being sent USUN in septel)/1/
/1/Document 205.
 - (a) taking note of the Soviet assurances cited above;
 - (b) indicating that we have lifted the quarantine;
 - (c) stating our non-invasion assurances, contingent on Cuban behavior.
4. These declarations would be noted by the Security Council President in a "summation" which would have to be agreed ahead of time. Alternatively a brief procedural resolution noting the declaration might be less difficult to achieve than getting UAR to agree to an acceptable summation. If a resolution is used, it should contain no substantive elements and should establish no continuing machinery.

Rusk

205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, November 21, 1962, 9:50 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2162. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted by Cleveland, Sisco, and Ball; cleared by Ball; and approved by Cleveland.

1339. For Stevenson and McCloy. Subject: Next Steps in New York Negotiations. Following is draft U.S. declaration in Security Council referred to in previous telegram:/1/

/1/Document 204.

In letters of President Kennedy on October 27 and of Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy on October 28, 1962,/2/ firm undertakings were made regarding the settlement of the Cuban crisis.

/2/See Documents 95, 102, and 104.

These undertakings were stated in President Kennedy's letter of October 27, and quoted in the Acting Secretary General's letter of October 28, along the following lines:

(1) The USSR would agree to remove from Cuba, under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision, all weapons systems capable of offensive use and would undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

(2) The United States would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. The President also expressed his confidence that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

The United States notes the statement made by the Soviet Union that all medium and intermediate range missiles, all nuclear weapons and components have been removed from Cuba, that all IL-28 bomber aircraft will be removed by December 20th, and that all sites for medium range and intermediate range missiles have been dismantled. It notes also that the USSR has stated its intention to withdraw all military units and personnel placed there for the servicing or guarding of these weapons systems. The United States notes further the statements of the USSR that no weapons capable of offensive use will be introduced into Cuba in the future. We welcome these statements and assurances.

The undertakings in the President's letter of October 27, that the United Nations would be enabled to verify the removal of missiles and bombers and the destruction of sites, and that United Nations safeguards would be agreed upon to ensure against further introduction into Cuba of weapons systems capable of offensive use, have not been fulfilled. A minimum inspection procedure was, however, arranged in cooperation with the USSR, under which United States naval vessels have verified that Soviet vessels leaving Cuba have carried out a number of missiles which the USSR had certified to the United States as having been in Cuba. The Soviet Union has also agreed to similar verification of the imminent withdrawal of all IL-28 bomber aircraft.

In the absence of Cuban agreement to United Nations verification and safeguards, the nations of the Organization of American States have no choice but to continue to be alert through their own resources to any possibility that offensive weapons systems remain or are reintroduced into Cuba.

In consideration of the steps that have been taken by the Soviet Union to date, the quarantine instituted on October 23, 1962, has been lifted on November 20, 1962.

Provided no nuclear weapons or weapons systems capable of offensive use are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and the United States is in position to be satisfied on these points, and provided Cuba does not invade or support an invasion of any other country, the United States declares that it will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba. This declaration is made on the representation of the Soviet Union here in the Security Council and does not alter any of the rights or obligations set forth in the UN Charter and the Rio Pact.

Rusk

206. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, November 22, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. II, 11/20/62-12/14/62. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The source text is an unofficial translation. The Russian text is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163.

Dear Mr. President, I have received your message./1/ I express great satisfaction. I fully trust the statement made in that message too that the United States confirms its commitment not to invade Cuba which you also confirmed in your statement at the news conference.

/1/Document 202.

In my confidential messages to you I have already laid down our understanding of the questions and of those steps which are needed to normalize the situation in the Caribbean area after the great and dangerous tension we and you have lived through.

No less important questions are facing us now, that must be solved to avoid recurrence of the situation which has just been eliminated through our mutual efforts.

You say that I was not able to convince Prime-Minister Fidel Castro about something. In general you are partly right. But it should be taken into consideration that Cuba is a young republic the Cuban leaders being very able and devoted to their people are however young, expansive people--Spaniards in a word, to use it far from pejorative sense. But one should understand the position they are in as the leaders of Cuba. The Republic of Cuba is a small country having for its neighbor a big and powerful state--the United States of America, a state which has been unfriendly to her since the first day the Cuban revolution was born. Moreover, one should not forget either that there was an invasion of Cuba.

That is what has to be taken into consideration in order to correctly assess and understand the situation and, if you wish, the state of mind of the leaders of Cuba. I even think that Prime-Minister Fidel Castro may have looked upon some questions with a great sense of understanding but he probably also correlated his steps with the feelings of the Cuban people who are taken by a great patriotic upsurge and desire to defend their independence. The Cuban people and their desire are worthy of respect.

Of course, you and we have a different appraisal of the Cuban revolution and of the events which developed around Cuba and of the position of the Cuban leaders. But this is another matter. The different appraisal must not after all prevent us from finding agreed solutions in the interests of peace. That is what the peaceful coexistence is. One should treat both sides with understanding and take into account the actual state of things--in this case the situation in Cuba which has chosen the way for its development in accordance with the will of its people.

We have been doing with understanding and patience everything that was needed and that was within our power to ensure the achievement of agreement on the elimination of the remnants of the crisis. A great work has been done in Cuba on our instructions by our representative, my first deputy A.I. Mikoyan. Incidentally, he will come back soon because we have given him appropriate instructions to this effect.

I understood your message in a sense that you yourself regard with understanding the difficulties that still remain. I would wish that we having accomplished the main thing, having given relief to the world public and having given orders to the armed forces contributing to the normalization of the situation--and we gave such order at once as soon as we learned that analogous steps were taken on your side--that we would take speedy measures to complete the settlement of the questions that would crown all our efforts.

It would be necessary that appropriate instructions be also given to your representative, Mr. McCloy for whom we and I personally, after my meeting with him in Pitsunde last year have respect, despite the fact that he, as I told him half seriously and half-jokingly, is a representative of Wall Street. True, he tried to convince me that Wall Street was not so terrible a thing as I imagined. He even promised when I happen to be in New York to take me to Wall Street to try to convince me that this is so. I do not lose hope that one fine day Mr. McCloy will fulfil his promise, that is, will take me to Wall Street. But this generally, as you understand, is just a digression.

As for us, in connection with the completion of the questions which have not been completed yet, we on our part have already given instructions to Kuznetsov regarding proposals to that effect which, as far as I know, have already been forwarded to the attention of your representatives in New York. We consider these proposals to be constructive, and we were guided by a desire to facilitate the completion of our agreement.

Now I would like to express the following wish: it would be extremely useful if while working on the proposals no steps are made on your part that would be pin-pricks for the other participants in the negotiations and that would create hooks capable of causing scratches to national pride and prestige of these other participants. The main thing has been achieved indeed and at the final stage it would be necessary to create good, reliable relations so that, relying on common sense, on reason and on the understanding of all the responsibility that lies upon you and us, to reach a final solution on a firm reasonable basis and thus to create conditions for a good, stable situation in the Caribbean area.

In this message of mine I do not raise any questions of substance since the questions that must be completed are known to you. Let us then make a joint effort to complete the remaining questions as well. This may serve as a good omen for both our sides in working out an approach for the solution of other not less important questions that we face. After all the question that you and we are struggling with is, though important, but a particular one. Meanwhile there are questions the solution of which is extremely important for destinies of peace and they must be solved in order to really stabilize the situation and secure lasting peace on earth.

Sincerely yours,

N. Khrushchev/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, November 23, 1962, 9:43 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2362. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted by Ball, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Ball.

1359. For Stevenson and McCloy. Subject: Next Steps in New York Negotiations./1/

/1/Ball and Bundy discussed these instructions on November 11 at 3:30 p.m. Bundy told Ball that "the President is prepared to fall back from this but he does not see any reason not to try it out. The President asked Bundy, and Bundy gave him assurances, on the point whether we thought McCloy had it clear in his mind that we don't want to haggle it to a dead end up there [United Nations]; that we would do anything [something?] else. He [the President] even suggested an exchange of private messages with the Chairman. Bundy told him he did not think the Secretary [Rusk] was ready to recommend this. Ball said he would be against anything that can't be published. Bundy agreed this was something to be careful of." (Memorandum of telephone conversation, November 23; *ibid.*, Ball Files; Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba)

You should see Kuznetsov promptly to discuss next steps in effecting understanding of October 27 and 28. You should begin by emphasizing our desire that this be wound up very promptly, a desire Chairman Khrushchev evidently shares. Ways and means of ending matter should be governed by this requirement.

You should present SC scenario contained Deptel 1338,/2/ give Kuznetsov our draft declaration (revised text of final paragraphs in next message),/3/ and explain it to him as the most we can do--and more than was originally promised--in the light of Cuban refusal to permit UN verification or safeguards. You should request prompt study and response. At the same time you should indicate that we do not want a long and fruitless haggle in the UN over differences which undoubtedly exist between what they would like and what we would like, particularly since some of these differences may wither away over time if things go well. Such a haggle is not in their interest either. If our statement is one which they could not live with in UN, we believe a satisfactory wind-up can be obtained by use of a Presidential statement, as in last press conference, which Soviets can readily interpret as promised assurance against invasion. We note with interest Chairman's last message/4/ which does indeed

interpret President's last press conference in this way.

/2/Document 204.

/3/Document 208.

/4/Document 206.

You should emphasize that there is in fact no present danger of invasion of Cuba, but that we cannot be put in position of giving a blanket guarantee to a man who has refused to cooperate with UN to fulfill understanding of October 27 and 28.

If Kuznetsov's initial response is cool, you may wish to press the point that exchanges between President and Chairman show no such Soviet position and that it may be helpful for Kuznetsov and perhaps Mikoyan to see President in Washington early next week so that negotiations in New York will not get out of phase with promising exchanges between Washington and Moscow.

If Kuznetsov presses Caribbean inspection scheme you should express readiness to discuss this point and point out again that any inspection of US would require inspection of USSR. We anticipate that these matters can well be discussed at Geneva in connection with negotiation on surprise attack. This is obviously a complex problem going well beyond initial understanding and requiring long discussion. Therefore we should not hold up all exchanges of assurances pending such an agreement but should promptly do the best we can in the light of Castro's position and move on to other issues. We of course have confidence in your ability to persuade Kuznetsov that our draft declaration is an ideal solution.

Rusk

208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, November 23, 1962, 9:40 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2362. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by U. Alexis Johnson.

1360. For Stevenson and McCloy. Subject: Next Steps in New York Negotiations. Revise last two sentences of seventh paragraph of US Declaration (Deptel 1339)/1/ to read:

/1/Document 205.

"A minimum inspection procedure was, however, arranged in cooperation with the USSR, under which United States naval vessels have received substantial verification that Soviet vessels leaving Cuba have carried away the number of missiles which the USSR had certified to the United States as having been in Cuba. The Soviet Union has also agreed to similar form of verification of the impending withdrawal of all IL-28 bomber aircraft introduced into Cuba."

In place of last three paragraphs, substitute following:

"In view of the steps that have been taken by the Soviet Union to date:

the United States on its part, as of November 20, 1962, lifted the quarantine instituted on October 23, 1962; and the United States further gives assurance that,

provided no nuclear weapons or other weapons capable of offensive use are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, it does not intend, as the President made clear at his press conference on November 20, to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

This statement is made on the understanding that by reason of the refusal of Cuba to permit arrangements contemplated to assure the carrying out and continuation of the commitments in regard to the maintenance and introduction of such weapon systems in Cuba, the United States will, until such time as such arrangements can be effected, continue to employ such other means of observation and verification as may be necessary.

The undertakings started herein do not alter or impair the rights and obligations contained in the United Nations Charter or the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, to both of which the United States is a party."

Rusk

209. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, November 24, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/21/62-11/30/62. No classification marking. A note on the memorandum indicates that this was part of the President's weekend reading, November 25.

I talked to Jack McCloy about his conversation with General Eisenhower and have done the attached memorandum as a result. He was in the country without a stenographer, so I said I would do it. I have sent him a copy and have asked him to make any amendment or correction so that the record will be accurate.

I have also taken the precaution of sending a copy of the draft declaration to John McCone over CIA wires to his retreat in the Caribbean./1/ I do not think he will raise objections, but I do think it is as well to have him signed on. The overtones of McCloy's report suggest that McCone may be in even closer touch with General Eisenhower than I, at least, have supposed.

/1/In this message, November 24, Bundy told McCone, who was on vacation in the Caribbean, that "we believe it [the U.S. draft declaration] fully safeguards U.S. position especially by its incorporation of Rio Treaty, but in light of your personal note to me, I would like you to have it in time to comment if you wish." Bundy also told McCone that McCloy had talked to Eisenhower "who fully supports plan to wind up negotiations in a way which fully protects overflights and intelligence resources, since he shares McCloy's view that UN inspection is both impractical and undesirable." (Ibid.)/1/

McG. B.

Attachment/2/

Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, November 24, 1962.

/2/Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Proposed Declaration on Cuba

I talked to Mr. McCloy about the language of the proposed declaration on Cuba and he agrees to stick with the wording which you approved yesterday on the first round.^{3/} When we have the first Soviet reaction we can see whether any alteration is desirable.

^{3/}See Documents 207 and 208.

Mr. McCloy also told me that he had had an entirely satisfactory conversation with General Eisenhower and that General Eisenhower seemed to share McCloy's view that we have a victory in hand and should now wind the matter up promptly. General Eisenhower also agreed that U.S. overflights and intelligence collection were a much better means of reassurance than some undefined UN inspection, and he expressed the view that he had been worried that we might get tied on too hard to this kind of thing. He said that the declaration McCloy was planning to negotiate might meet with some criticism in the country but that he, General Eisenhower, would not only not criticize it, but would support it. He suggested that Mr. McCloy might want to check the proposed language with John McCone, and Mr. McCloy later tried to do so but found that McCone was not available. Mr. McCloy told General Eisenhower that he had the feeling that McCone would not really be satisfied with anything short of an invasion of Cuba. General Eisenhower said that he himself had no such view, but thought McCone might have useful comments.

General Eisenhower did remark that a solution of this kind would still leave us with the Castro problem, but Mr. McCloy and he agreed that nonetheless this seemed the best course available right now. Mr. McCloy reported that General Eisenhower plainly shared his view that a quick wind-up of the immediate negotiations was highly desirable.

McG. B.

210. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, November 25, 1962, 11 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2562. Top Secret; Priority.

1941. Dept pass White House. Eyes only for the Secretary. Cuba--Meeting McCloy/Kuznetsov, Sat 24 Nov 62. Long session with Kuznetsov and Mendelevich this evening. No one else present. Dinner at McCloy's New York apartment.

First McCloy paraphrased instructions, emphasizing desire for prompt windup and real efforts which had been made to present Kuznetsov with draft declaration carrying out spirit of October 27/28 letters, despite fact full compliance not possible due largely Cuban recalcitrance. Also suggested possibility avoiding long wrangle at UN by Presidential declaration if this seemed more compatible with their interests. First read and then delivered him our draft.

Kuznetsov immediately replied he was disappointed in it as it did not contain any suggestion of thinking which he felt we should have been prompted to include as result of great Soviet concessions, etc.^{1/} Nothing in document embodied matters that Chairman had brought up in correspondence with President such as stabilization and normalization of conditions in Caribbean. Then went through the paragraphs of the protocol for our reaction.

^{1/}According to telegram 1942 from USUN, November 25, Yost reported that on the morning of November 25 Kuznetsov telephoned McCloy and stated "that he had slept badly last night and liked U.S. draft even less this morning than he had last evening." (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

When McCloy asked Kuznetsov specifically what he had in mind, Kuznetsov then referred to paragraphs in his protocol which are mainly rehash of Castro conditions. McCloy simply said they were out. Kuznetsov argued at some length but McCloy thought rather perfunctorily on this point. Kuznetsov seemed seek some comments from us on willingness discuss outstanding issues with Cubans. McCloy replied that we always prepared discuss things with Cuba if they wanted but no such conditions could be part of this transaction. Believe may hear again on this after Mikoyan arrives but believe it only matter of record.

Next Kuznetsov objected to long statement of Soviet concessions sounding as if Soviets compelled to treat for ignoble peace. McCloy replied simply evidenced clear effort put things right with no inference of indignity involved. Moreover showed U.S. moved substantially from original position, particularly in abandoning quarantine before all conditions met. Really statesmanlike document.

These preliminaries. Kuznetsov's real objection was to overflight reservation, stating this simply put us back to where we had started from. Referred to our same old insistence on-site inspection, which should now be discarded in light of their display of good faith. They had felt that if they agreed to take out their military units all further need for overflight would have passed. This clause defeats Kuznetsov's hopes for rapid settlement and did not know how to put his failure on this to his government.

McCloy replied this was cardinal issue with us. Overflights our only reliable means checking compliance. Even they not complete. Overflights which pinpointed missile bases played large part in avoiding war. Inconceivable abandon them without thorough verification on ground though we prepared to seek more satisfactory method verification. We not asking him agree to overflights. Simply stating in all honesty we intended reserve this precaution and wanted world know our commitments made in light of this fact, etc.

Kuznetsov stated whole paper would have to be sent to his government. Was certain they probably have number comments but sure overflight paragraph considered unsatisfactory and objectionable. Complained about references to unfulfilled obligations of Soviet Union. McCloy agreed use phrase "had not been capable of fulfillment" in place of language of draft. Kuznetsov also stated withdrawal military units not part of original agreement.

McCloy admitted this arguable but at any rate was to their as well as our interest to have it stated. Indicated this might not be point of issue if we agreed on other things and so long as they got military units out soon as possible. Overflights however were essential and fundamental element of our position. Kuznetsov kept coming back to this clause, pointing out its difficulties for them. Suggested we accept what he called latest U Thant proposal which had some element reciprocity in it so Castro would have basis for giving us some on-site inspection.

McCloy said we had not agreed to U Thant proposals and no inspection U.S could be made without inspection USSR. Any proposal take time to work out even if acceptable. Thing was to get on with declaration and move on to other important matters.

Further talk by Kuznetsov about U.S. not doing its share to which McCloy made usual reactions. Declaration not easy for U.S. local and hemispheric objections to thought U.S. providing sanctuary for Castro subversion of continent. We had made deal and prepared to live up to it and adopt all reasonable compromises necessary. This declaration gave Khrushchev all and more than he had asked for. Conditions were clear and overflight paragraph though understandably difficult for them was necessary for us and essential for us to make it clear.

Finally Kuznetsov almost pleaded with McCloy to take out this overflight clause, stating that we could made some reservation outside UN./2/ McCloy told him he had no authority modify it and personally did not see how position adequately covered unless we did state understanding on this in UN, pointing out they did not have to agree to it. Kuznetsov strongly requested U.S. give some further thought to this clause. In essence he kept

asking us to find a way to maintain our position without rubbing their noses in it.

/2/In telegram 1992 from USUN, November 28, Stevenson corrected the following two sentences to read: "McCloy told Kuznetsov he had no authority modify it and personally did not see how we could fail to make this clear in any statement we made in UN or elsewhere regarding invasions, since we could not risk being charged with bad faith in regard to assurances against invasion if in fact we did employ these overflight facilities and had said nothing publicly about it. McCloy pointed out that the Soviets did not necessarily have to agree explicitly with our statement regarding overflights and could make such reservations with respect to this point as they might desire." (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2862)

Then talked of procedure. McCloy made clear U.S. not refusing go to UN, but were merely suggesting some alternative. In so doing insisted U.S. would not sign any protocol or agreement such as Sovs had in mind but would make declaration on basis of their declaration with thought SYG would note declaration had been made, perhaps congratulating leaders involved for statesmanship in avoiding disaster, and no more. Kuznetsov seemed feel no resolution of SC other than noting declarations necessary. McCloy repeated possible advantages declaration outside SC but gathered Kuznetsov inclined toward UN record and anxious confirm U.S. not refusing UN record./3/

/3/According to telegram 1953 from New York, November 26, McCloy, Stevenson, and Yost saw U.N. Secretary General U Thant and brought him up to date on the conversation with Kuznetsov. They also gave U Thant a copy of the U.S. draft declaration and reported that his reaction was "good." (Ibid., 737.56361/11-2662) See the Supplement.

Kuznetsov repeated would in due course give us their draft and their comments on our draft. Then we discuss both together, but Kuznetsov sure overflight clause unsatisfactory. Kuznetsov did not object specifically to use of word "intend" but Mendeleovich picked it up. McCloy argued that constitutionally this best way for us handle it and Kuznetsov did not carry argument further. McCloy believes it will come up again when we receive their full comments as will "threat to peace and security" phrase. McCloy senses Sovs want declaration badly but overflight clause is bone in throat.

McCloy suggested that at appropriate time it might be well for Kuznetsov see President, perhaps with Mikoyan. Left that Kuznetsov would not get in touch with McCloy at least until Monday, that Mikoyan due back on Monday but Kuznetsov did not know for how long a stay. Kuznetsov said he would very much appreciate opportunity of paying respects to President at appropriate time.

Yost

211. Message From the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, November 25, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/21/62-11/30/62. Top Secret. A covering note to Bundy indicates that this message was received from McCone, who was on vacation in the Caribbean, at 10:45 a.m., November 25.

Pass to Bundy immediate. Believe the proposed declaration/1/ satisfactorily meets condition for continuing surveillance of Cuba in the absence of latter's agreement for U.N. inspection. Therefore feel such a declaration should not disturb those who view the total Castro problem as most serious. If this declaration acceptable to USSR then door should be open to informal discussion with Kuznetsov as to future of SAM installations which we know are now under Soviet control. Same applies to large amounts sophisticated ground equipment and missile launching boats. Assume references to OAS Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance would give us necessary

latitude for action if Soviets replace Castro and his regime with their own people thus producing a true satellite from where the Soviets could effectively operate against established governments in Latin America.

/1/See Documents 205 and 208.

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, November 26, 1962, 9:28 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2662. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson and with Rusk in substance, and approved by Cleveland.

1379. For Stevenson and McCloy. Subject: New York Negotiations (urtels 1941, 1942, 1943)./1/ Following amplifies and supplements Secretary's conversation with McCloy today:

/1/Document 210 and footnote 1 thereto. Telegram 1943 from USUN, November 26, in which the Mission suggested it was important to review U Thant's report on Cuba before he submitted it to the Security Council, is in Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2662)

1. We understand from reftels and Stevenson telecon that Soviets have expressed reservations or queries on four points:

(a) they have asked reason for reference to Acting Secretary General's letter of October 28/2/ (purpose is to underscore international character of undertakings);

/2/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 446-447.

(b) reference to fact that Soviet undertakings unfulfilled;

(c) recapitulation of Soviet "concessions" taken pursuant to Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence; and

(d) inclusion of our overflight reservation. We understand further you preparing some textual changes for our consideration.

2. While concurring in your acceptance of phrase "had not been capable of fulfillment," we strongly believe that at your meeting with Mikoyan tonight you should continue to press Soviets on basis Deptel 1359/3/ and urtel 1941. Mikoyan has well deserved reputation of being hardest bargainer in Kremlin's stable of tough negotiators. We should not consider any textual changes at least until Soviets have received a considered reaction from Moscow to our declaration, and we have been presented with draft of Soviet declaration. We assume that for bargaining purposes at least Soviets will submit draft declaration which includes some or all of Castro's demands and other unacceptable elements drawn from their protocol.

/3/Document 207.

3. Suggest following points might be stressed with Mikoyan:

(a) We prepared for prompt wind-up in Security Council;

(b) Draft declaration is most we can do--and more than was originally promised--in light of Cuban refusal to permit UN verification or safeguards. Alternatively, we prepared to substitute Presidential press statement of November 20;/4/

/4/For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962*, pp. 830-838.

(c) Soviet protocol categorically unacceptable;

(d) Question of discussing outstanding issues with Cuba is outside framework US-USSR transaction pursuant to Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence;

(e) In absence of agreement on UN verification, reservation re use our own resources to check compliance absolutely essential. We not seeking to humiliate Soviets nor asking them to formally agree to our overflights; we are merely making a frank statement of our intentions lest some dangerous miscalculation should occur; and

(f) U Thant proposal unacceptable and no inspection of US could be made without inspection USSR.

4. Hope you can probe Mikoyan re his talks in Havana.

5. Re urtel 1943, we believe it important that US have opportunity to review SYG report before it submitted to SC. We are concerned, for example, that he might include proposal he made to us on Caribbean security zone which he gave to Soviets, although it was unacceptable to us. Believe Yost should discuss this with Narasimhan with view making appropriate arrangements./5/

/5/The Mission reported that U Thant told one of their members that he did not contemplate any report on Cuba to the Security Council at this time. (Telegram 1972 from USUN, November 27; Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2162)

Rusk

213. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, November 28, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/21/62-11/30/62. Top Secret. Drafted by Cleveland, copies sent to Thompson, Tyler, Martin, and McGeorge Bundy.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Mr. McCloy on Cuba

Mr. McCloy called in at 2:15 p.m. to summarize the results of the meeting which he and Ambassadors Stevenson and Yost had just completed with Mikoyan, Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelevich.

We will have a Niact cable here,/1/ probably before the end of the day, so I will summarize here only the highlights:

/1/Telegram 1991 from USUN, November 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2862) See the Supplement. There is also a 21-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting in USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, 1A October/November meetings.

1. Mikoyan did almost all of the talking. He was clearly influenced by commitments to Castro to make a strong case on Castro's behalf; he also seemed to be motivated by the burden Cuba represents to the USSR. These two motivations produced many references to the "normalization" of relations with Cuba.

2. Mikoyan said our declaration was unsatisfactory, and represented a retreat from correspondences between the President and Khrushchev. He particularly objected to making the non-invasion assurances an intention rather than an unequivocal commitment as it seemed to be in the President's letter of October 27th. Mikoyan also jumped on our overflights and objected to US subversive activities in Cuba.

3. Mikoyan went back to the idea of a protocol signed by all three countries, and seemed to attach a good deal of significance to Cuba being one of the signatories. He would like to have a resolution, not merely a collection of unilateral declarations, in the Security Council.

4. Mikoyan's plea for Castro's conditions seemed more determined and comprehensive than in any of the Kuznetsov-McCloy discussions. Mr. McCloy's guess is that this is still pro forma, but it was spelled out at great length and will undoubtedly be spelled out once again for the President. Mikoyan repeatedly came back to the difficulties in which Castro would find himself, if the situation in the Caribbean could not be "normalized". "Normalization" of the Caribbean was, Mikoyan said, implied in all of the exchanges between the President and Khrushchev.

5. On inspection, the emphasis was on reciprocity, and Mikoyan lectured the American group on the importance of not being obstinate on this point. "Some note of reciprocity should be in the picture, and then we would not have any trouble with Castro on getting international inspection in Cuba". Mikoyan did not address himself to the US gambit that inspection in the United States would require inspection in the Soviet Union, even though this gambit was used again on this occasion. The Soviets mentioned Puerto Rico specifically, but the American negotiators said flatly that the inspection of any part of the United States was not in the cards, as a matter of reciprocity with Cuba alone. On reciprocity inspection, they referred to the "U Thant" proposal. Cuba, Mikoyan said, could not possibly accept a "one-sided inspection"; he said he had told Castro that his (Castro's) position was right on this point.

6. Mikoyan mentioned Guantanamo, indicating he did not expect us to withdraw right away but thought it would be reasonable for us to set a time at which we would begin to negotiate about withdrawal.

7. Mikoyan pressed hard on the U.S. commitment to bring the other members of the Western Hemisphere into line. The U.S. representative emphasized that it came with bad grace from the Soviets to put any emphasis on this point, since they hadn't even been able to bring into line the one Western Hemisphere country with whom they presumably had especially friendly relations.

8. Mikoyan objected to the reference in our declaration to the Rio Pact. He said he had read the Rio Pact (Mr. McCloy got the impression that perhaps he had read it for the first time) and did not like it. The Americans said that it was absolutely necessary to refer to the Rio Pact, since it was the basic document of Western Hemisphere security and we owed it to our co-signers to make clear that we were not, in our arrangements with the Soviets, watering down our commitments under the Rio Pact.

9. There was no detailed discussion of our draft declaration as such; Mikoyan said he would leave that to the negotiators. The Americans did indicate that we were not wedded to the reference in the declaration to U Thant; but no other concessions were made.

10. A tentative date was made for Friday to continue the discussion.

Mr. McCloy's prediction is that Mikoyan will rehearse for the President the Soviet position on the non-invasion pledge, on overflights, and on the need for a reciprocal form of inspection, and that it will not be possible to make any final arrangements with the Soviets in the course of Mikoyan's short visit to Washington. It is, indeed, not clear that Mikoyan expects to wrap this up personally, in which case they might look forward to a somewhat longer negotiation than we had previously assumed they wanted.

Mr. McCloy's suggestion is that the President make clear to Mikoyan:

- a. That there is a considerable record of conciliation and performance on both sides, and that the Soviets should not take this moment to turn unreasonable just because they are having difficulty with the unreasonable Mr. Castro.
- b. We can't think of giving up overflights, which everybody in the Hemisphere now knows have played such an important role in maintaining the security of the Hemisphere.
- c. That the kind of non-invasion statement that is contained in our draft declaration is really the most that the President can constitutionally do, especially in the absence of the arrangements for verification and safeguards that were agreed to in the correspondence between the President and Khrushchev.
- d. That it would be useful on both sides to wind the matter up quickly and with maximum good will, without trying to make a bargain out of every word. The Cuban problem will remain; if the Cubans want to normalize relations we are ready and willing to talk with them about it.

On the basis of today's conversation, it does not appear that there will be a quick wrap-up of the matter in the present negotiating framework. We will want to consider the possible alternative of sawing off the negotiations unilaterally if the Soviets stick to their intention to draw the Cubans into the windup arrangements.

214. Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency

[document number not declassified]

Washington, November 28, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA-Cuba. Top Secret; *[distribution indicator not declassified]*.

SUBJECT

Phasing of the Soviet Military Deployment to Cuba

1. With benefit of hindsight, we have examined the timing of movements of various types of Soviet units to Cuba. We now believe that the primary purpose of the deployment of ground and surface-to-air units was to defend Cuba as a whole as a strategic base. From our preliminary analysis, we also conclude that there was some apparent relationship in time between the deployment of these units and the MRBM and IRBM units. In other words, the MRBM and IRBM units at least had priority for protection. It should be noted that our dates are approximate and the time-span overall is quite short.
2. The Cuban operation began with the movement of SAM regiments and armored groups. Altogether, 24 SAM battalions and four armored groups were involved. The deployment of the SAM battalions began with their departure from the USSR in mid-July and continued through August. The deployment of the armored groups began in late July and continued through the first weeks of September.
3. The timing of arrival and the subsequent positioning of these units appear to have been phased with the closely following deployment of MRBM and IRBM units. (See table and map/1/) SAM units and armored groups were first deployed to western Cuba, including the ports of Havana and Matanzas; construction of SAM sites began in early August, while the armor arrived at its site about the middle of the month. The initial deployment of MRBM and IRBM units was also to western Cuba (San Cristobal and Guanajay), with construction equipment arrivals beginning in mid-August for the IRBM sites, and in mid-September for the missile equipment associated with the

MRBM units. Construction at those sites began about two weeks later.

/1/The map is not printed.

4. The second section of the SAM and armored group deployment was to central Cuba, where the units were in place during the first week in September. The second group of MRBM and IRBM units also went to central Cuba (Sagua La Grande and Remedios), with equipment arriving at the sites in the last two weeks of September.

5. A third group of SAM sites and an armored unit were established in eastern Cuba toward the end of September. Finally, a fourth increment of SAM units was deployed two to three weeks later to fill in gaps, thereby providing full coverage of the island.

6. Three of the four Soviet armored groups known to be in Cuba were positioned where they could give rapid ground protection to IRBM and MRBM sites. The fourth was located at Holguin, an IL-28 base within the third group of SAM sites.

7. It should be noted that the deliberately phased west-to-east sequence is consistent with the orderly military development of a base in the presence of the enemy. The detected deployment of strategic missile units, however, was asymmetric. We have found no evidence to suggest that additional units were programmed, except for the missing IRBM site at Remedios, but we are reexamining available evidence to see if any indications can be found of preliminary work for such installations.

8. We are not able to determine whether the USSR intended to establish a submarine base. We do know that four Soviet "F" class long range conventional submarines, which left Northern Fleet bases about 1 October, were in waters south of Bermuda by about 22 October. (They remained outside the quarantine line and finally returned to base in November.) [7 lines of source text not declassified]

TIMETABLE OF SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

(July-October 1962)

(All dates approximate)

Date: 25-31 July

Western Cuba: Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in western Cuban ports.

Central Cuba:

Eastern Cuba:

Date: 1-5 August

Western Cuba: Construction begins on SAM sites at Matanzas, Havana, Mariel, Bahia Honda, Santa Lucia, San Julian, & La Coloma.

Central Cuba:

Eastern Cuba:

Date: 5-10 August

Western Cuba:

Central Cuba:

Eastern Cuba:

Date: 10-15 August

Western Cuba:

Central Cuba:

Eastern Cuba:

Date: 15-20 August

Western Cuba: Soviet armored groups arrive at Santiago de las Vegas and Artemisa.

Central Cuba: Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in central Cuban ports.

Eastern Cuba:

Date: 20-25 August

Western Cuba:

Central Cuba: Construction begins on SAM site at Cienfuegos.

Eastern Cuba:

Date: 25-31 August

Western Cuba:

Central Cuba:

Eastern Cuba:

Date: 1-5 September

Western Cuba: Construction begins on Guanajay IRBM sites.

Central Cuba: Construction begins on SAM sites at Sagua la Grande, Caibarien, & Sancti Spiritus.

Eastern Cuba:

Date: 5-10 September

Western Cuba:

Central Cuba: Soviet armored group arrives at Remedios.

Eastern Cuba:

Date: 10-15 September

Western Cuba:

Central Cuba:

Eastern Cuba:

Date: 15-20 September

Western Cuba: Construction begins at San Cristobal MRBM sites.

Central Cuba: Construction begins at Remedios IRBM site.

Eastern Cuba: Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in eastern Cuban ports. Soviet armored group arrives at Holguin.

Date: 20-25 September

Western Cuba:

Central Cuba:

Eastern Cuba: Construction begins on SAM sites at Los Angeles; Chaparra and Jiguani.

Date: 25-30 September

Western Cuba:

Central Cuba: Construction begins at Sagua la Grande MRBM sites.

Eastern Cuba: Construction begins on SAM sites at Manati, Senado, and Manzanillo.

Note: Construction of the remaining SAM sites, which apparently were considered less vital than those listed above to the protection of offensive missile bases in Cuba, began in late September or early October. Work probably began on the SAM site at Siguaneya on the Isle of Pines in the last week of September and on the sites at Esmeralda, Chambas, Maldonado, Santiago de Cuba, Ciego de Avila, and Deleite during the first half of October.

215. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCSM-955-62

Washington, November 28, 1962.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba (Sensitive) 1962.
Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Readiness Posture Requirements (U)

1. Following the announcement made by the President on 20 November 1962 with regard to the lifting of the maritime quarantine of Cuba in response to the Soviet agreement to remove the IL-28s from Cuba within a period of about 30 days, we are entering a new phase of the Cuban situation.

2. The new phase has been highlighted by the termination of the 1/8 airborne alert; the return of B-47 aircraft to home bases, except for those in Florida; authorization for the commands to return to DEFCON 5 status except where specific situations dictate otherwise; the release of the Air Force Reserve Troop Carrier units; and the authority for the return to normal operations of US naval ships and air squadrons associated with the maritime quarantine. All other forces, however, are being maintained at high readiness, and military forces are capable of reacting on a 12-hour basis for CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62 and a 7-day basis for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62, except that necessary shipping has not been accumulated.

3. In this new situation, we must recognize the need for high- and low-level aerial reconnaissance over Cuba and over Soviet shipping in order to ascertain whether the Soviet commitments are in fact fulfilled. At the same time, we must recognize the maintenance needs of our forces and the personnel hardships which high alert levels have imposed.

4. In recognition of these facts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the following alert posture criteria to be appropriate at this time, with further reduction to normal pre-Cuba posture prior to Christmas contingent on actual Soviet withdrawal of IL-28 aircraft from Cuba:

a. Overflight reconnaissance:

(1) High-Level: Alert posture which will permit an average of two U-2 flights per day in any 10-day period and not more than a maximum of five U-2 flights on any one day.

(2) Low-Level: Four aircraft on 12-hour alert and eight aircraft on 24-hour alert, and similar readiness for all aircraft which support the foregoing reconnaissance missions (i.e., Fighter escort, CAP, SAR, ELINT, etc.).

[5 paragraphs (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

g. Air Defense: Resume normal posture except for those units which may be needed to increase the air defense of the Southeastern United States on a permanent basis. Long-term air defense needs for this region are under study.

h. Strategic Forces: Maintenance of normal alert levels.

5. Relaxation of readiness posture to the foregoing levels will permit the following actions to be taken at this time:

a. CINCLANT and component headquarters: CINCLANT and the component commanders will maintain the presently activated communications net. CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT headquarters elements can be returned to home stations except for reduced staffs maintained at Homestead.

b. Air forces: The reaction times provided permit the return of all units, less those required for conduct of and combat support to reconnaissance missions, to home bases and resumption of normal training. War reserve materiel and selected support and control personnel will remain at Florida bases.

c. Marine forces: All West Coast units less 3d LAAM Battalion will be returned to home stations at once. The FMF Atlantic units which are presently part of the recent Guantanamo defense augmentation will remain as presently deployed with a goal of returning these units to home stations by 20 December 1962. 5th MEB

shipping should be utilized insofar as practicable in returning the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, to the West Coast.

d. Army forces: All Army units can be returned to home stations except those required to meet the provisions of subparagraph 5a above, and the 159th Boat Battalion, which will remain temporarily at Fort Lauderdale pending completion of studies to determine a suitable location that will enable it to meet the required reaction time.

e. Navy forces: One CVA Group will be retained temporarily in the Guantanamo sea area to support the defense of Guantanamo until 20 December 1962. A Carrier Task Group will be retained in the Norfolk-Mayport area against the possible requirement for sighting Soviet ships departing Cuba ports with IL-28 aircraft and to support possible airstrikes under CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

(1) COMSTS should be given authority to recall transports without completion of voyages in process when the decision is made to prepare for execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62.

(2) COMSTS should be given authority to requisition ships when the decision is made to prepare for execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62.

(3) The recommissioning of the 11 LSTs should be continued. However, they need not be fully manned.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff propose to review the situation on a continuing basis in order to determine whether the criteria of paragraph 4, above, should be relaxed to permit a continuing phase-down to an approximately normal posture by about 20 December 1962. Should continued phase-down be warranted, the remaining units can be returned to home stations, and dependents can begin to be returned to Guantanamo prior to Christmas.

7. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following program of action:

a. An immediate reduction should be effected to the readiness levels reflected in paragraph 4, above, proceeding at a rate commensurate with optimum administrative efficiency.

b. A reassessment of the situation should be conducted on a continuing basis in order to ascertain whether IL-28 withdrawal warrants continued relaxation to approximately normal readiness levels prior to Christmas.

8. Your approval of the foregoing program is requested as a basis for further action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff./1/

/1/In a memorandum to Taylor, November 28, McNamara concurred with the recommendations in this memorandum, but suggested that "the limitation on U-2 flights over Cuba be 'an average of two per day, cumulative from November 21, with the understanding that no more than five U-2 flights would be scheduled for any single day.'" (Ibid.)

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

216. Summary Record of the 31st Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 29, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Meetings, Vol. III, Meetings 25-32A. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The meeting lasted until 10:52 a.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32A. See the Supplement.

The attached tentative agenda/1/ was followed.

/1/Not attached. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Series, Vol. III, Meetings 25-32A)

Director McCone reviewed the remaining Soviet military presence in Cuba, including MIGs, SAM sites, Komar ships, Frogs and coastal defense missiles.

There followed a discussion of reports appearing in the press quoting Cuban refugees on the existence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. The President asked again how we can control such reports and how we can deal with them publicly. He asked that further efforts be made with news media to relate the refugee reports to the hard evidence available to us. Mr. Helms and Mr. Salinger were to be asked to see if some system could be worked out to deal with this problem.

Secretary Rusk summarized the Mikoyan/McCloy talks in New York./2/ He recommended that in his talk with Mikoyan/3/ the President reaffirm our current position on Cuba, that he not raise the subject of Berlin, that he call attention to the situation in Laos, and stress the importance of reaching agreement on the nuclear test ban.

/2/See Document 213.

/3/See Document 218.

The President commented that the Russians won't take out their ground forces until we give a no-invasion assurance. It is better for us to have the Soviet units in Cuba than to give a formal no-invasion assurance.

Secretary Rusk said that the Soviet troops were there not to defend Cuba but to guard the Soviet strategic missiles. The Russians may decide to keep their troops there to control Castro. So long as the Soviet forces are there, we must be suspicious about what weapons are on the island and what weapons might be introduced.

Secretary McNamara raised the question of overflights and recommended that in general low-level flights should only be flown when necessary to clarify high-level pictures revealing suspicious activity. He said that high-level photography was very good and there was no need at present to fly low for several days. We should avoid escalation until the IL-28s are out and until Mikoyan has left New York. There are five types of wicked looking Soviet defensive missiles and the presence in Cuba of probably one thousand of such missiles undoubtedly gave rise to some of the refugee reports. These missiles are certainly being stored in warehouses and caves.

General Taylor and Secretary Rusk agreed that no low-level flights were necessary for a few days, but thereafter suspicious sites should be photographed at low level. The longer we wait to fly low level the harder it will be to do so.

The Attorney General called attention to the reference in the Khrushchev letter to the cave rumors./4/ He thought this point should be raised with Mikoyan in connection with verification problems.

/4/Document 196.

The President asked the State Department to prepare a plan which would keep the heat on Castro and bolster

other regimes in the Caribbean. A recommendation should also be made as to when the plan should be implemented. Assistant Secretary Martin replied that the State Department had a plan but was holding off implementing it until Mikoyan leaves New York. He recommended implementation of the plan be delayed as long as Soviet bombers and Soviet personnel are moving out of Cuba.

The President called attention to the Knabel post mortem of the Cuban crisis and another by Daniels of Reader's Digest. He mentioned Senator Keating's line, i.e., he has details of Soviet offensive missiles being hidden in Cuba which the Government does not have.

The importance of limiting discussion of the Cuban crisis was reemphasized by the President who reminded the group that press contacts should be strictly restricted to authorized White House sources.

Bromley Smith/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

217. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 29, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1962-31 December 1963. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone.

SUBJECT

Executive Committee of NSC Meeting--10:00 a.m.--29 November

All Present

McCone reported on the Cuban Memorandum of November 29, reading from the attached summary;/1/ on the memorandum "Phasing of the Soviet Military Deployment to Cuba"/2/ reading from the attached pages 2 and 2a; and the report "Deployment and Withdrawal of Soviet Missiles and Other Significant Weapons in Cuba",/3/ reading from memos [paragraphs] 3a, 3b and 3c; and made reference to the memorandum on "Soviet Policy in the Aftermath of the Cuban Crisis"; and the memorandum covering the background and character of Mikoyan./4/

/1/Reference is to SC No. 11211/63, "The Crisis: USSR/Cuba, Information as of 060029 November 1962," November 29. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA-Cuba) No summary was found attached. See the Supplement.

/2/Document 214.

/3/Not found.

/4/Neither document has been found.

The President questioned DCI at length concerning the publicity, particularly the article in the New York Mirror and the CBS broadcast by Oxley, both of which indicated that offensive missiles were known to be stored in Cuba. DCI emphasized in discussion that it was quite impossible to prove that offensive missiles had not been in caves, however all intelligence of every kind--photographic, agent reports, refugee reports, etc.--convinced DCI that this was most improbable. DCI and McNamara both commented on the various types of missiles remaining in Cuba and stated that without doubt some of them are in caves.

Rusk reported on the Mikoyan attitude as covered by the attached memo addressed to the Secretary of State/5/ and indicated that State felt that Mikoyan would take about the same position with the President in the afternoon. McNamara requested Committee authorization of two high-level flights per day. He requested no low-level flights. Taylor agreed. Rusk argued for low-level, principally for political reasons and fear that failure to fly would give Castro an opportunity for propaganda. McNamara indicated that the COMOR paper passed by USIB on November 21st/6/ demanded excessive coverage in the light of conditions which have developed in the last week or ten days. Bundy proposed to write a memorandum expressing the Committee's requirements for reconnaissance and then the DCI would use this as a directive to the COMOR Committee and USIB for guidance in developing a new reconnaissance program designed to meet Executive Committee needs.

/5/Apparent reference to the last document cited in the first paragraph.

/6/Not found.

Action: DCI suggested to General Carter that CIA study this problem and develop a draft of an Executive Committee Directive and a reconnaissance program which would meet the directive and submit both to me for discussion by Bundy and others.

The President requested a development of a long range plan for Cuba. He spoke in terms of 6 months or a year. State indicated that such papers had been prepared and would be put in form for submission to the Executive Committee.

The President then brought up the question of publicity and various articles which are being written on the Cuban episode, referring particularly to an article in Reader's Digest by Mr. Daniels and in Look Magazine by Mr. Knebel. Apparently both of these writers, particularly Daniels, is following the Keating line that considerable volume of information was in the hands of the Administration prior to October 22nd and that the Administration refused to accept positive information on offensive missiles. There followed a discussion of the over-flight policies in Cuba and an emphatic denial was expressed by various members of the Executive Committee that any flight requested by CIA or NRO during September had been denied. DCI took issue with these statements, stating that it was his understanding that the Administration wished Cuban over-flights program to avoid the possibility of a "U-2 incident". This caused CIA and COMOR Committee to program September flights so that planes would not be engaged by operational SAM sites. McCone stated that this was, in his opinion, an error as those responsible for planning reconnaissance should have insisted upon over-flying areas protected by SAMs in order to determine what was going on. He stated this was not done during September and, indeed, was not finally agreed upon until after a rather heated discussion at Special Group meeting on October 4th which was followed by a further meeting on October 9th, at which time the October 14th flight was authorized. DCI stated that he had had some trouble defending our September program before the Killian Board and sharp questioning by Mr. Clark Clifford had brought out the difficulty of explaining the lapse of 40 days in programming an aerial photography which would produce a complete mosaic of Cuba.

It was decided that all press contact with feature writers should be confined to Mr. Bundy and the Attorney General and that our respective organizations should be advised not to discuss any details of Administration activity in August, September and October with such feature writers. A memorandum is being circulated in CIA to this effect.

The President left the meeting.

There followed a brief discussion of the Mongoose program. DCI stated he felt future activity should be restricted to intelligence gathering but this should be carried on in a most intense manner and that CIA was prepared to present an operational plan which would involve refugee interrogation at Opa Laka, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and elsewhere, and an intense program with infiltrated agents, the use of Cuban in-place defectors and very active operation with third country liaison. It was decided that Mr. Helms should

present this program at the earliest moment and DCI was asked to call the meeting.

DCI also stated that the form of Mongoose organization should be modified and this was agreed, but no new organization form was discussed.

John A. McCone/7/

Director

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

218. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 29, 1962, 4:40-7:55 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Presidential Memoranda of Conversations: Lot 66 D 149. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Edmund S. Glenn of Language Services and approved by the White House on December 13. The time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library) The Department of State prepared a briefing paper with seven attachments for the President in anticipation of this conversation. (Department of State, S/S Presidential Memoranda of Conversation Files: Lot 66 D 149)

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

The Secretary

Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson

Mr. E.S. Glenn, LS

Miss N. Kushnir, LS

U.S.S.R.

Anastas I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

Mr. Yuriy N. Vino-Gradov, Soviet Delegation to XVII General Assembly (Interpreter)

Mr. Igor D. Bubnov, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy

After a few brief remarks about lung cancer, the President asked Mr. Mikoyan how he had enjoyed his stay in Cuba.

Mr. Mikoyan said that he enjoyed his stay very much. The weather was ideal and nature beautiful. This was the second visit of Mr. Mikoyan to Cuba. He finds the Cubans a most interesting people. The brothers Castro, Fidel and Raoul, are also very interesting. There is also an older brother who was at one time against the Cuban revolution but who now approves of it. As a matter of fact, he told his brother Fidel that if he had known how history would develop he would have joined the revolutionary cause sooner. The Castro family were large land owners. Fidel and Raoul gave away their holdings a long time ago. The older brother gave up his holdings only recently. Their mother has retained one-half of her holdings to pursue the family tradition but has given up the other half. At the time of the first visit of Mr. Mikoyan, Fidel Castro was not yet a Marxist and the flag under which he waged his revolution was that of liberalism. He became a Marxist more recently under the influence of the wishes and thoughts of the Cuban people.

The President asked Mr. Mikoyan when Castro became a Marxist.

Mr. Mikoyan said that it was one or two years ago. Raoul Castro, Che Guevara, and the eldest Castro brother [?]/1/ were Marxists already before the revolution. Not so Fidel, who was moved towards Marxism by the play of the revolution itself. Mr. Mikoyan said that the same thing would happen in regard to "you also". Perhaps not the President personally but later on.

/1/All brackets are in the source text.

The President said that Mr. Mikoyan obviously believes that it will happen to the President's brothers.

Mr. Mikoyan said that he spent two days traveling through Cuba. He admires greatly the liveliness of the Cuban people and the progress accomplished in Cuban agriculture. He saw a ranch with many lakes, 120,000 ducks and much cattle. Castro is doing a lot personally to mechanize agriculture and he is personally known by most of the farmers. Mr. Mikoyan saw Canadian milking machinery. He also saw a national cattle breeding farm with 12,000 cattle and 65 pure-bred bulls. Within five years this farm expects to increase the cattle herd to 70,000. Mr. Mikoyan also saw rural schools; one of these has 1,000 students fully supported by the government and expects within three years to increase the number of students to 20,000. All told, more schools were built in three years in Cuba than had been built during the 50 year period before Castro. There are in Cuba 70,000 students fully supported by the government and the enthusiasm of Cuban youth is impressive. The mansions of capitalists who have left Cuba--which the Cuban Government permits them to do--have been made into youth hostels. During the recent events the militia has been mobilized though on an entirely voluntary basis. The places of the men on the jobs were taken by the women who managed to fulfill their work quotas in all cases. Mr. Mikoyan was most impressed by all those young women at work.

The President said that now he understood why Mr. Mikoyan had liked his travels in Cuba.

Mikoyan said that indeed his visit to Cuba reminded him of his youth when he also was working for the cause of the revolution. He also made speeches at several universities and felt that the students greatly distrusted the United States. He must admit that they have some reasons for such an attitude. Since, however, it is expected that the exchange of correspondence between Chairman Khrushchev and President is to be registered with the United Nations, it is possible that the fears of the young Cubans will be calmed by the very fact of such a recording of this memorable correspondence.

The President said that the relations between the United States and Cuba are bad. What Mr. Mikoyan said about Cuban internal developments may be quite interesting; however, this is not the part of Cuban events which is of primary concern to us. What we are concerned with is the use of Cuba as a springboard for subversion, meaning both Soviet subversion and Castro's own efforts in that direction. There is no reason why statements that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba should not go on record. Yet this is hardly necessary since it is obvious that the United States could have invaded Cuba any number of times beginning with April 1960 but did not do so. This should suffice to make United States intentions clear. As a matter of fact, only recently the

President was speaking against those Americans who suggested an invasion of Cuba. Thus, once again the attitude of the United States was clear. However, beginning in July the Soviets have sent over 100 ships loaded with arms and military materiel to Cuba. While this was going on the President, trusting official statements by the Soviet Union, continued to affirm that there was no danger to the United States from an arms build-up in Cuba. This had led to very serious political difficulties on all levels. It is difficult for the President to say at the present moment that the situation with Cuba is in any way satisfactory, since it is not known what will happen next month or what the Chinese will do. Maybe the Chinese Communists will start an arms build-up in Cuba in January, or maybe the Soviet Union itself will start again such a build-up. After all, what the Soviets did once they could do again and no one could blame a certain feeling of mistrust on the part of the United States after what had happened.

Mr. Mikoyan stated that what the President had said presents an extremely serious matter. Yet the Soviet Union does not deserve any reproach. No one can believe that the arms build-up in Cuba was offensive and intended against the United States. It had, in fact, been decided as early as June, by Chairman Khrushchev and his colleagues, of whom Mr. Mikoyan was one, that the United States would be told about the arms build-up, in every detail, by the Soviet Union at an appropriate moment. First it was intended to communicate with the United States Government on a confidential basis and then to make an announcement to the press. Of course, this was something which the Soviet Union was not obligated to do since after all, the United States does not inform the Soviet Union of its military moves. As for the purpose of the military build-up, it was obviously not offensive; no military man and not even a civilian could ever believe that rockets in Cuba could be necessary or even useful for an attack against the United States. The decision had been made to inform the United States after the elections so as to avoid influencing in any way the political campaign in the United States. The President himself certainly would not want to have the elections influenced by Soviet moves. Of course on the 22nd of October no intimation of the build-up was made by the Soviet Union but even if a disclosure had not taken place the Soviet Union would have brought the entire build-up to the attention of the United States on November 8th or 10th, immediately after the elections.

The President said that the problem was not due to the fact that the Soviet Union did not make a statement to the United States about the arms build-up--as it obviously has the right to proceed with any such measures without announcing them to the United States--but on the contrary that the Soviet Union had made a statement according to which no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba or were going to be sent there.

Mr. Mikoyan said that obviously the two speakers had a different interpretation of the recent events. The fact remains that the purpose of the arms build-up in Cuba was defensive and not offensive. They were sent there to defend the island against invasion and for no other purpose. There were some 40 medium and intermediate-range missiles. It is silly to believe that those missiles emplaced in Cuba could be needed for an attack against the United States. After all, there exist other missiles with a much longer range--so long a range in fact that they cannot be tested within the territory of the Soviet Union and must be shot into the sea. The United States Government knows very well how far into the sea they are falling.

On the other hand, the President had spoken in his exchange with Chairman Khrushchev of a United States pledge of non-invasion. Nothing more need to be said. Now, when the United States is making this pledge conditional on the conduct of Cuba it is departing from its previous position.

Mr. Mikoyan said he was reminded of conversations he had with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. He had asked Secretary Dulles whether the latter thought the Soviet Union wished to attack the United States. Secretary Dulles had replied that he did not think that the Government of the Soviet Union in power at that time wanted to attack. Secretary Dulles then asked Mr. Mikoyan whether the latter thought that the United States wanted to attack the Soviet Union. Mr. Mikoyan replied that he did not think so but that he had some doubts in the matter. If the United States did not want to attack the Soviet Union why did it ring the Soviet territory with bases and continue a cold-war policy? Now the United States says that the Soviet tried to establish an offensive base in Cuba. Mr. Mikoyan would like to ask once more whether the President thinks that the Soviet Union

wishes to attack the United States.

The President said that he did not know what may have been the reasons of the Soviet Government to establish the base. The fact is that it was established.

Cuba was not threatened by the United States. At the end of September and throughout October the President attacked those people in the United States who spoke in favor of an aggressive policy towards Cuba. There were no indications whatsoever at the time when, in June, Mr. Mikoyan said a decision had been taken by the Soviet Union, that any aggressive moves by the United States were contemplated. Had the question been addressed to the President by Chairman Khrushchev at that time, the President would have been glad to say then as he says now that no invasion of Cuba is intended.

An invasion of Cuba is not a solution to the Cuban problem. We do not live now in the early days of the Twentieth Century. The United States has obligations extending throughout the world. It is true that there are refugees from Cuba who annoy Mr. Castro but there is no policy on the part of the United States Government to invade Cuba. Unquestionably, as able a man as the Soviet Ambassador in the United States must have been aware of that.

As for Soviet intentions, maybe war was not an aim of the Soviet Union but it seems that a policy of threat may well have been the objective. Mr. Mikoyan said that a statement about the build-up would have been made in November. At that time the missiles would have already been fully emplaced. What would have been the posture of the United States Government which had publicly affirmed its trust in the statements of Soviet leaders?

The entire episode cannot be interpreted in any other way than as a major attack against the present Administration and the Government of the United States.

The question is now how the lack of understanding between the two governments can be transformed into mutual understanding. Already in the recent past in the question of Laos and then again in that of Cuba, the two countries have come very close to the edge of the abyss. The question is now what about the future? How many more such near escapes or such situations of dire danger will happen during the next decade because the two governments do not understand one another?

Mr. Mikoyan said that he would first speak about the President's concluding remarks. After that he would reply to the President's earlier statements. In regard to the President's concluding remarks he wished to say that he fully agrees that agreement is necessary for peace and that lack of agreement between the two great Powers may well lead to disaster. As to the President's first remarks, he must emphasize that the Soviet move into Cuba had for a purpose only defense and deterrence. The Soviet Union acted in order to facilitate an agreement leading to peace. After all, it is well known that counter-revolutionary gangs were being trained in camps in the United States and on the territories of other countries of the Western Hemisphere allied with the United States. There was much war-like talk in the United States. Mr. Nixon spoke in favor of an invasion of Cuba, so did Pentagon generals. Under such circumstances, there was good reason to prepare deterrents and defense. It is quite clear that such was the purpose of the Soviet Union, which was going to inform the United States that what it intended through the build-up in Cuba was the defense of that island and not an aggression against the United States. After all, the Soviet Union has more than enough long-range missiles emplaced on its own territory to need anything else. Forty-two missiles are something insignificant for offense and therefore it is clear that they were meant for defense. Moreover, these missiles remained in the hands of the Soviet military and could not have been used without signal authorization from Moscow. Mr. Mikoyan would like to mention to the President in confidence that there exists Soviet legislation which makes it illegal to place nuclear or thermonuclear weapons under non-Soviet control. Mr. Mikoyan also feels that the threat of war is not Cuba but the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and therefore misunderstandings and threats must be eliminated from those relations. Mr. Mikoyan remembers a conversation with that very wise man, Secretary Cordell Hull, back in 1936. At that time, Secretary Hull had said that German fascism and Japanese militarism were preparing for war. Only

the United States and the Soviet Union were in a position to defend peace. The situation at that time was already what it is at the present. Both countries have terrible weapons and therefore both have an overwhelming responsibility before the entire world. An understanding and agreement between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy must be obtained in order to prevent war. This means, first of all, that the Cuban affair must be brought to a final conclusion and then that the other "knots" of the international situation must be "untied".

The President said that he did not know what exactly Mr. Nixon had said. In fact, Mr. Nixon had said many things throughout his career. What is clear is that during the period to which Mr. Mikoyan alluded Mr. Nixon was not in a policy making position. As for Pentagon generals, they are under the control of the Administration and there certainly had been no statements on their part calling for aggression. Once again, if the United States had wanted to invade Cuba it could have done so much earlier. There were no United States forces at the time of the hopeless attempt at landing made by Cuban patriots. There were no statements by any people in positions of responsibility in the United States which might have led to the belief that an invasion was being contemplated. The problem in fact is not Cuba, the problem is the attitude of the Soviet Government. Of course, it is clear that the United States Government has very little liking for the present Government of Cuba. This, however, does not mean an intent to invade them. After all, the Soviet Government does not like the present Government of Albania. This does not mean that the Soviet Union will invade Albania, as in such a case as well as in that of a hypothetical invasion of Cuba, international consequences could be very grave. The President stated that he is not, however, so terribly interested in Mr. Castro. What he is interested in, once again, is the attitude of the Soviet Government. How is it possible to go through the coming decade if we are, as in the past, to move from crisis to crisis. The President hopes that some day the Soviet Government will understand that its main duty should be the defense of the interests of the Soviet Union and not pushing the world from one small crisis to another one at the risk of catastrophe which would engulf everything.

Mr. Mikoyan said that Chairman Khrushchev shared the President's opinion that an understanding between the two governments is necessary for peace. Therefore, all the points of disagreement have to be taken one by one and resolved. Both countries must work for peace. The first step should be a final resolution of the Cuban affair--as the President himself said. Much was done in that direction, but unfortunately, no final situation has been yet achieved. This is because the US Government's attitude is not as helpful as it should be.

Once the Cuban crisis is resolved, the next steps might well be a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Pact organization and NATO, the cessation of nuclear tests, disarmament, and Berlin.

As the President himself has noted, the fact that the Cuban crisis has been largely resolved proves the necessity of talks and negotiations between the two governments. As the President has communicated it to Chairman Khrushchev, negotiations should not stop short of a final solution.

The exchange of correspondence between the two heads of state provides a basis for such a solution. A good way to carry it out would be to place this exchange of correspondence within an agreed protocol. Such a draft protocol, which would also include the position of the Cuban Government, was drafted by the Soviets. Unfortunately, the American representatives refused to accept it.

Another procedure might consist in drafting three declarations, by the United States, Soviet and Cuban Governments, to be agreed upon in New York and then, as a second step, placed before the Security Council for its approval.

The President asked whether Mr. Mikoyan meant an approval by the Security Council or a recording of the declarations with the Secretary General. One of these procedures would require a vote by the Security Council. This, as well as the inclusion of a Cuban declaration, would make the entire procedure impossible to accept. After all, the United States representative in the Security Council cannot be expected to vote in favor of Mr. Castro's declaration. What is important may be achieved simply by declarations agreed upon by the Soviet and United States Governments, which would then be registered with the Secretary General. As for the Cubans, let

them do or not do whatever they wish.

Mr. Mikoyan said that after all, the Cuban question is on the agenda of the United Nations and, therefore, must be discussed there. What would be important is that an agreement be obtained between the two Governments before a discussion in the Security Council. The latter, however, cannot be avoided, and the lack of an agreement would amount to keeping alive an international dispute. The two countries, therefore, should come forward with an agreed position. As for such points which are not agreed, they might be the object of separate statements.

The President said that the Cuban Government must be left out of the negotiations. The problem now may be whether there would be agreement on one or two separate declarations.

Mr. Mikoyan said that there should be two declarations, one by each Government, however, that the texts should be agreed upon by the two Governments. The Security Council could then approve those two declarations and could call on the two Governments to resolve the remaining points of difference. What is necessary is a preliminary agreement by the two Governments on the texts of two declarations.

The President said that he understood that Soviet representatives did not like the American draft.

Mr. Mikoyan said that the President guessed correctly the opinion of the Soviet Government.

The President said that Soviet missiles have been removed from Cuba and that he expects that the Soviet bombers will likewise be taken out. He also hopes that the same thing will apply to the other military units and weapons covered by his correspondence with Chairman Khrushchev.

Mr. Mikoyan said that what Mr. Khrushchev has promised to do has either been done or is being done. No other weapons, however, beyond those covered by the correspondence, will be removed.

[An unclarity in translation seems to have led to a temporary misunderstanding. The President was apparently referring to "units servicing or guarding the missile force". Mr. Mikoyan seems to have believed that the President's remarks applied also to military materiel beyond those specifically "service or guard" units.]

The President said that the Agreement covered missiles, bombers, and in due course, other units destined to service or guard the strategic offensive weapons. There is, of course, in Cuba, other military materiel about which, however, the President was not speaking.

Mr. Mikoyan said that the correspondence between the two heads of State is clear on that point. Unfortunately the United States draft declaration also contains a condition which applies to its non-invasion pledge. The condition in question is that the pledge applies only if Cuba abstains from any action which may be considered subversive or of a nature to undermine the governments of others of the Western Hemisphere. Otherwise the non-invasion guarantee is withdrawn. This conditional clause gives to the United States the right to judge the actions of another government and in fact to invade Cuba as it pleases. Mr. Castro has rightly asked "Who has given to the United States the right to invade or not invade Cuba, depending on its own wishes and furthermore to demand guarantees from the Cuban Government?"

The President said that it is Mr. Castro who is asking for guarantees and not the United States.

Mr. Mikoyan said that Mr. Castro was right in saying that no one gave the United States the right to invade or abstain from invasion according to its own interpretation of Cuban actions. Mr. Castro's declaration of the 28th is quite reasonable./2/ What he wants is a bilateral guarantee. According to the United States, Cuba must not undertake subversive action, but the United States and its Allies are free to undertake such actions. Castro's demand that the agreement cut both ways is reasonable and in agreement with international law. Likewise, his demands for the liquidation of an economic blockade, the abstention from piratical acts, especially by ships

belonging to Cuban counter-revolutionaries but based in United States ports and in particular Miami, are reasonable. So is his wish for a normalization of relations between the two countries. The only controversial point is that of the Guantanamo Base. Even there, however, Mr. Castro does not ask for the immediate elimination of the Base but only for the opening of negotiations to determine the time when it would be surrendered.

/2/Reference is to the September 27 message from Castro to U Thant; for an extract of the text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 439-440.

The President agreed that the actions of Cuban students shooting at Cuba from small boats are against United States legislation. Such actions are unimportant and only the sporadic exploits of publicity seekers. The United States Government is against such actions. The United States Government is not training any Cuban forces for action against Cuba and neither are such forces trained on the territories of the other nations of the Western Hemisphere. The important point is that of a non-invasion policy by the United States. The President said that he is repeating here and now that it is not the intention of the United States Government to invade Cuba.

It is, however, much more difficult to put such a statement in an official document without surrounding it with the necessary guarantees. After all, Mr. Mikoyan himself had stated to the press that the actions of the Soviet Government had "tied the hands of the Imperialists". Regardless of how the word "imperialists" might apply, the President cannot expect to tie the hands of the United States regardless of any situation which might arise. The declaration does not apply only to the present. It applies also to the future, at least to the next two or six years depending on the wishes of the American electorate. In the meantime, many things may happen. What will the Chinese Communists do? What if three years from now the Soviet Union decided to reintroduce offensive weapons into Cuba?

The President is stating once again that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba. Any official written document, however, must be so drafted as to recognize the international responsibilities of the United States.

After all, we can neither forget or disregard the fact that Castro is not a friend of this country.

Yet the most important thing has been achieved: the Soviet Union knows that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba and the United States knows that the Soviets have removed missiles from Cuba. This is the gist of the agreement between the two Heads of State.

The problem now is that of formal statements. Here difficulties arise. After all, no control has been allowed, as requested by the United States and agreed upon in the exchange of correspondence. In consequence the United States is forced to carry on the overflights against which the Soviet Union and Castro are protesting.

Another solution might perhaps be suggested to these two points: if no international control is possible, the United States must, as it said, find out about the situation through its own facilities. The only thing that can be done is to make United States surveillance as unobtrusive as possible. After all, the lack of international control places the United States Government in an exceedingly difficult position, as it makes it almost impossible for it to reply to charges which are being made that there are still Soviet missiles in Cuba.

The President showed Mr. Mikoyan a press clipping containing a statement that there are Soviet missiles hidden in Cuban caves.

Mr. Mikoyan reiterated that the agreement between the two Chiefs of State in regard to weapons has been reached and is being carried out accordingly. However, articles in the United States press and the attitude of United States military constitute an obstacle to the final resolution of the crisis. Now the United States is stating that it intends to continue its overflights of Cuban territory. This is a source of a legitimate irritation on the part of the Cubans. After all, the United States has aerial cameras which make it possible to photograph Cuba from

outside Cuban airspace. In spite of that the United States insists on violating Cuban airspace. This is not acceptable.

The President said that there are no such cameras; the angle at which photographs can be taken from outside the three-mile limit makes the photographs untrustworthy. The United States, however, endeavors to keep its overflights inconspicuous by carrying them out at high altitude and avoiding low altitude flights.

Mr. Mikoyan said that low altitude overflights are blatant hooliganism. High altitude overflights are also hooliganism but less blatant. Castro is right when he says that he will have to deal with such overflights by his own means.

The President said that this is not a question of great concern to the United States.

Mr. Mikoyan stated that such overflights violate the principles of the United Nations and Cuban sovereignty. Any country would protest against a state of affairs which hurts the legitimate pride and self-esteem of the Cubans. Castro has agreed to control. He only insists that such a control apply to all the parties concerned and not be strictly onesided. What makes the situation more difficult is the insistence of the United States to place a statement on this matter in the declaration. Trying to find out about facts by using one's own facilities is against international law but might be ignored; however, statement to that effect in a declaration does violate international law and cannot be accepted. Furthermore, the statement in the declaration that a non-invasion pledge is conditional on Cuba's abstention from subversive activities cannot be reconciled with international law as it in fact gives to the United States the right to determine by itself whether an invasion should take place. If there are any measures to be taken for the control of the subversion, they should apply equally to Cuba, to the other Caribbean nations and to the United States.

The President quoted the text of the proposed draft stating that "provided no nuclear weapons or weapons systems capable of offensive use are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and the United States is in position to be satisfied on these points, and provided Cuba does not involve or support an invasion of any other country, the United States declares that it will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba."/3/

/3/The quote is from Document 208.

Mr. Mikoyan said that it might not be impossible to express the fact that no nuclear weapons should be emplaced in Cuba, though not in the language of the present United States draft. In this draft it is said that Cuba might "support" the invasion of other countries. What is the precise meaning of the word "to support"?

The President said that he understands Mr. Mikoyan's concern on the latter point. His own concern should also be understood: the guarantee in question ties the hands of the United States for a period of years. If nothing were said beyond the point of the exclusion of offensive missiles and nuclear weapons from Cuba, that would mean that Castro would be free to do anything else he chose to do, and that the United States would be prevented from reacting against it. The President does not intend to give such a license to Castro. He is ready to state that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba; the problem is, however, that of avoiding giving Castro a blank check for a number of actions against which retaliation would be prevented by the declaration. This is why the clause in question was included. It is not because we want to invade Cuba. If Castro wants peace, that is fine, because that is what the United States wants and what the United States is saying. If he keeps peace we shall not invade Cuba, regardless of what Mr. Castro does within the borders of his country. This is their business.

Mr. Mikoyan said that the United States declaration means that the United States intends to control the actions of the Government of Cuba. What Castro wants is simply that if there is to be control it should be multilateral. His position is fully in agreement with the spirit of the exchange of letters between the two Chiefs of State. On the contrary the President said that Castro is an enemy of the United States and that the United States is going to terminate its blockade only under certain conditions. This means that the United States is moving back from the

position agreed upon in the exchange of correspondence. It means that the United States is to be free to continue its anti-Cuban policies but that Castro would be prevented from doing anything without the permission of the United States.

Multilateral control can be accepted, but a situation according to which one government would be in a position to judge the actions of another government is not acceptable.

Furthermore, the fact that the United States has responsibilities under the Rio Treaty does not need to be included, as this is of no concern to the Soviet Union and, furthermore, as the United States and its Allies have pushed Cuba out of the Rio Treaty organization.

The President said that Mr. Mikoyan had accused the United States of retreating from the position expressed in the exchange of correspondence. This is not so. It is on the contrary, the Soviet Union which is moving back from its position, as the correspondence specified inspection by the United Nations and that no such inspection was allowed. Mr. Mikoyan had said that the declaration should not contain any suggestion that one government might judge the actions of another. However, some safeguards are necessary since otherwise the hands of the United States would be tied even while the policy of the Soviet Union would be free to change.

Nothing was said in the exchange of correspondence about any control of American territory. Now, however, Mr. Mikoyan suggests that the United States as well as Cuba submit to control, while no control would be exercised over the territory of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union proposes that the declaration be placed before the Security Council by a simple expression of Soviet will, and describes a state of affairs depending entirely on Soviet intentions. This cannot be accepted by the United States. The United States Government was misled once and it intends to make certain that it will not be misled again.

The United States does not intend to invade Cuba and is ready to make that known. It must, however, insist on (1) a minimum of control, and (2) the expression of its obligations under the Rio Treaty. The Rio Treaty has been ratified by the United States Senate and is a part of United States legislation to which the President himself is subject. It cannot be ignored in a binding document.

If the Soviet Union prefers it, however, it may be possible to make the United States intent known in a way which would be quite clear though not imply the same legal complications, for example, through a statement by the President, let us say, a press conference. In fact, the President has already made a statement of this kind at his last press conference. If, however, an official declaration is called for it must include references to all the aspects of the problem.

Thus there is a choice between either an official declaration, the precise language of which could be worked out between Messrs. McCloy, Stevenson and Kuznetsov, or a simply verbal statement by the President at a press conference.

If the first alternate is chosen it would have to contain references to the Rio Treaty, of which the United States continues to be a member, and a clause referring to the possibility of the United States satisfying itself that Cuba and the Soviet Union are respecting their side of the bargain; a lack of such a clause would cause an uncontrollable uproar in the United States and throughout the Western Hemisphere.

The other solution might be a simple statement by the President that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba, with the hope that Castro will not undertake any provocative action and that the Soviet Union does not reintroduce a military threat into the Western Hemisphere. If Mr. Castro wishes to carry on the activities described by Mr. Mikoyan such as the education of Cuban children and the mechanization of Cuban agriculture, well and fine. All we ask is that he does not cause any trouble outside of his own borders.

If there is to be an official declaration its language can be worked out in New York by the representatives of the two countries but it will have to contain clear references to the absence of offensive weapons from Cuba, to the control of such absence, and to some guarantees to the defense. The only other possibility is an informal statement.

Mr. Mikoyan asked if the President's statement at a press conference would be instead of or in addition to the formal declarations.

The President said that if no agreement can be reached on formal declarations, then it might be possible for him to clarify the position of the United States by means of a statement at a press conference expressing the spirit of the exchange of correspondence between the two Heads of State. As a matter of fact, already at his last press conference the President had said that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba and that the same applied to the other nations of the Western Hemisphere. The President also expressed part of what he thinks about Mr. Castro, but this is not the same thing as an invasion. Thus a lot of progress was accomplished on the most difficult and important elements of the crisis. Let us hope that progress will be possible also on its remaining formal aspect through agreed declarations registered with the United Nations. If not, the President is ready to make an adequate statement at a press conference. Thus again there are two possibilities. Either agreed statements registered with the United Nations or a unilateral statement by the President at his press conference. Mr. Khrushchev, of course, can also wish to make a statement in either case. A statement by the United States or a statement agreeing with the United States will have to contain references to control and to the Rio Treaty.

There are, in fact, three possibilities: either agreement within the United Nations or disagreement and debate within the United Nations, if the Soviet Government so wishes; or again something which may or may not be satisfactory, that is to say a simple statement at a press conference. At that the two Governments could perhaps pass on to the other problems such as that of disarmament. In the meantime, the Cuban affair might be permitted to cool off and the President hopes that it will remain cool for a long time.

Mr. Mikoyan said that, in fact, what the President wants is merely to cool off a burning situation, while keeping the fire alive, whereas the Soviet Government wants to put the fire out for good before passing on to other questions.

The President said that the interpretations of the two participants in the conversation obviously differ.

Mr. Mikoyan suggested that if agreement could be obtained on a part of the items to be included in the declarations, such declarations could be registered officially with the United Nations. Any points on which there would be no agreement would then be the object of the statements outside of the United Nations. What should be included in the declarations is what was included in the exchange of correspondence. Other items, such as the Rio Treaty, could be left outside.

The President said that he wished to make it quite clear for the record that the United States is not moving back from any position agreed to in the correspondence.

The President quoted from the exchange of correspondence to the effect that the removal of missiles and other strategic weapons and military units would proceed under the control of the United Nations. This was not done. If the Soviet Union can manage to abide by the exchange of correspondence to the letter, then the United States will abide by that exchange to the letter. If not, the President can only act in the best way the situation permits.

Mr. Mikoyan stated that the Soviet Union fully abides by the exchange of correspondence. It had allowed inspection as the owner of the missiles and other weapons. The permission of the government on the soil of which the missiles were placed still remained necessary, and this is something over which the Soviet Union has no control. This is what was said in Chairman Khrushchev's letters of October 27 and 28. The only differences

between the two letters being that all mention of Turkey was deleted from the October 28 letter. Thus the Soviets did everything which was incumbent upon them. Secretary General U Thant was kept informed of what the Soviets were doing. On the other hand the Soviet Government appreciates that the United States Government has agreed to verify the removal of missiles by means other than those specified in the exchange of letters. These means are, however, fully satisfactory, since American newspapers published photographs of missiles being removed and American officers made sure that the removal of missiles was taking place.

At the point where the entire deal is about to be finalized, the United States refuses to move forward but takes a step backwards. The aim of the United States Government is obviously to avoid guaranteeing the non-invasion of Cuba and this aim is being pursued through the imposition of a new condition. Perhaps the Soviet Union would also like to bring in some new conditions; but it realizes that it cannot be done without agreement on both sides, and thus it feels that it must, and the United States Government must likewise, simply abide by the exchange of correspondence. As for the obligations arising from the Rio Treaty, the United States may take care of them as it wishes, either through a statement at a press conference or by some other means. This is not a matter of concern for the Soviet Union.

The President said that nothing was said in the correspondence about any formal declarations. The only thing mentioned was an affirmation of United States intent in regard to the question of a hypothetical invasion of Cuba. This is something which the United States continues to be ready to do, and as a matter of fact, which it has done and is doing again. As for the draft declaration, it seems that the United States draft is not to the liking of the Soviet Government. So far, however, we have not seen any Soviet draft proposal.

The point of fact remains that it is not the intention of the United States Government to invade Cuba.

Mr. Mikoyan said that Castro has stated that his intentions are peaceful.

The President said that in such a case he does not have anything that should worry him.

Mr. Mikoyan said that the United States draft is insulting to Castro.

The President asked in what way could it be so interpreted.

Mr. Mikoyan said that the United States draft proposes that the actions of one sovereign government be subject to the control of another government. This is unusual in international relations.

The President said that the United States affirms its intent not to invade Cuba, such affirmations are not usual either.

Mr. Mikoyan said that this pledge of non-invasion is made subject to a condition placed unilaterally on Cuba and to be enforced unilaterally by the United States.

The President said that we cannot be expected to let this assurance stand if someday missiles or other similar weapons are introduced by Communist China, or once more by the Soviet Union or by somebody else, or if other similarly aggressive steps are taken by Castro. Can the United States be expected to extend a guarantee without any limitations?

Mr. Mikoyan said that the pledge of non-invasion should be stated in the terms in which it appears in the correspondence.

The President said that he is ready to make a simple statement. If, however, the Soviet Union insists on binding declarations, it must accept the complexities which unavoidably accompany the drafting of legal documents. The President would like to suggest to leave questions of precise drafting to Messrs. McCloy, Stevenson and

Kuznetsov, with the repeated understanding that the declaration must include references to the obligations of the United States under the Rio Treaty and, in the absence of United Nations inspection, to some alternate system of guarantee and control. Thirdly, it must be specified that United States guarantees apply only as long as Castro abides by his peaceful statements. The United States is preparing to consider any draft which the Soviet Union might submit and which would satisfy those points.

Mr. Mikoyan said that the Soviet draft protocol contained all the necessary points but was not accepted by the United States.

The President suggested that matters of drafting be left to the delegations meeting in New York. The United States does not intend to invade Cuba and never intended to invade Cuba. The only threatening situation was the one created through the introduction of Soviet missiles into Cuba. If the Soviet Union does not repeat such an action, there may be no problem to worry about in the future. In any case it is clear that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba. That is the most important, and suitable language may be found by the New York delegations. In fact, the most difficult problem has been resolved, and what remains is only a secondary one.

Mr. Mikoyan said that it is true that much progress has been made and that is why he is so surprised at the President's position in regard to the final step of the declaration.

The President said that the difficulty is due to the failure of carrying out control. The Soviet Union objects to United States overflights of Cuba. The United States must insist on some means of control. It is possible that negotiations will lead to common ground. If so, fine. If not, a statement on the part of the President may be a step along the way.

Mr. Mikoyan said that he fully agreed with the spirit of the President's statement. He realizes that it will be impossible to discuss the declaration paragraph for paragraph in the present conversation. He is concerned, however, with the proposal to replace action within the United Nations by a simple statement at a press conference. The Cuba affair is on the agenda of the United Nations and failure to agree in that forum would keep the question alive. In fact, there is no reason to keep it alive as the carrying out of its obligations by the Soviet Union has been verified. Agreement has been obtained on the difficult question, the points of disagreement deal with something which should be easier to resolve. Mr. Mikoyan understands the President's concern, but he does not see why this concern should justify the inclusion of new conditions to the fulfillment of pledges. It is not possible to accept overflights. As for the Rio Treaty considerations, they belong in another forum. As for the question of preventing subversion, it should apply to all parties alike and not on a unilateral basis.

These are questions, however, which the delegations in New York might be able to resolve, if they are given correct instructions. Let them continue working at it. Nevertheless, Mr. Mikoyan has not fully understood what he must report to Chairman Khrushchev. Is it still the intention of the United States not to invade Cuba or is the United States backing away from that position?

The President said that he already has answered that question and said that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba. If the Soviet Union abides by the exchange of correspondence so will the United States.

Mr. Mikoyan said that he was happy to hear that.

The President said that he had made a statement to that effect already at the preceding week's press conference. At the present moment the only question that remains is that of formal documents. The Soviet Government has now come up with a proposal of a formal protocol to be signed with Cuba.

The President does not intend to sign any documents with Castro. A statement at a press conference would be a simple manner of resolving the question. An official document signed by all the parties induces legal complexities. This is, however, what the Soviet Union insists upon.

Mr. Mikoyan said that he liked what the President said at his last press conference and so did Chairman Khrushchev.

The President said that much progress has been accomplished, perhaps more will be accomplished in the next few weeks. In any case when Mr. Mikoyan returns to Moscow he will be able to report to Chairman Khrushchev the precise understanding that the United States has of this matter.

Mr. Mikoyan said that he would be able to remain longer if this could help to discuss these questions more fully and obtain a greater degree of agreement on them.

219. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 29, 1962, 4:40-7:55 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Glenn and approved by the White House on December 13. The time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library) This memorandum continues the conversation recorded in Document 218.

SUBJECT

Laos--Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

The Secretary

Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson

Mr. E.S. Glenn, LS

Miss N. Kushnir, LS

U.S.S.R.

Anastas I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

Mr. Yuriy N. Vino-Gradov, Soviet Delegation to XVII General Assembly (Interpreter)

Mr. Igor D. Bubnov, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy

[Here follows discussion of Laos, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, volume XXIV, pages 923-924.]

To return to the question of Cuba, it is possible that a solution as to form may be found provided there is no difference as to substance. It is necessary to decide to help the Delegations meeting in New York in order to

make it possible for the latter to succeed in their task.

The President said that there is a U.S. draft. Does the Soviet Union wish to submit a draft of its own? Does it insist on the idea of a protocol? Or does it desire to work on the basis of the U.S. draft?

Mr. Mikoyan said that the Soviet Delegation would submit a draft.

The President said that there is time to work out this question in New York. What concerns him is that every six months another crisis seems to arise. How can the world go through the next decade under such circumstances?

Mr. Mikoyan said that step by step negotiations will be necessary. The next question to be taken up may be in regard to a non-aggression treaty between the Warsaw Organization and NATO.

The President said that it is strange that there are two countries such as the Soviet Union and the United States which are powerful and wealthy, and which have no direct conflicts of interest to separate them. In spite of that, they find themselves perpetually in a state bordering on conflict. At the same time many other parts of the world are facing problems of hunger and underdevelopment. It would be good if the Soviet Union were to devote its effort to the pursuit of its own interests, in the same way in which the United States devotes its efforts to the pursuit of its own interests, and abandon the belief that it is its job to kindle revolutionary fires all over the world. This would be worth more than 40 non-aggression treaties.

Mr. Mikoyan said that revolutions are not caused by the Soviet Union. It is not the Soviet Union which was the cause of the Cuban revolution; as a matter of fact it knew much less about this revolution than did the United States. He already had said the same thing in January.

The President said that he did not accuse the Soviet Union of having fomented the Cuban revolution.

Mr. Mikoyan said that there will be revolutions regardless of what either the Soviet Union or the United States do.

The President said that this may be true, but that it was still important for the two countries to understand each other better. How could the Soviet Government believe that the United States would not react on finding that there were 40 missiles emplaced in Cuba? How would the Soviets have reacted if the United States had emplaced 40 missiles in Finland, especially if the government of that country had been as inimical to the Soviet Union as Castro is towards the United States?

Mr. Mikoyan said that there are United States missiles in Turkey very close to the Soviet Union. In spite of that he feels that Soviet citizens may sleep with tranquility, as long as the missiles in question are in American hands. This is because he trusts President Kennedy.

The President said that he has always been of the opinion that American missile bases such as those in Turkey do not make sense. Several have been deactivated and for the last twenty months the United States Government has worked at deactivating more. This is why the emplacing of Soviet missiles in Cuba has come as such a shock.

It is quite clear that the two governments have misjudged one another. This is a type of misjudgment which neither they nor the world can afford.

Mr. Mikoyan said that he liked the spirit of what the President just said. That is why it is necessary to talk problems over and to agree.

The President said that it was not enough to obtain verbal agreements. They also must be implemented. It would be better perhaps if--as in the case of Laos--the Soviet Union would not always insist that it is fulfilling its

obligations. It would be better if it were ready to admit its shortcomings as the United States is ready to admit its own shortcomings, and work harder to correct them.

Mr. Mikoyan said that problems had to be taken up one by one.

The President said that in doing so it must be remembered that the two countries have very few genuinely divergent interests, and yet there are many conflicts between them. There is something very wrong with such a situation.

220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, November 30, 1962, 6 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Top Secret. The source text is a copy from Moscow and contains no drafting information.

1180. Eyes only for Ambassador. Following is summary of meeting yesterday Stevenson, McCloy and Yost with Mikoyan, Zorin, Kuznetsov and Mendelevich:

Mikoyan said Soviet government, anxious terminate Cuban matter, believes Soviet draft protocol best form for termination, but since US doesn't like it, is prepared accept declarations which will be presented to SC for approval. Raised several objections to US draft declaration. Argued that according US draft, if Cuba takes any act which US considers jeopardizes security of Caribbean, US obligation against invasion would lapse; that this is direct retreat from statement in President's letter. Complained that there is no word in declaration about subversive activity against Cuba whereas Castro supported by USSR proposes that subversive activity be stopped by all countries. Contended that while US has right to ask for inspection in relation to non-introduction of weapons, Cubans also have right of inspection against invasion preparations. Supported multilateral inspection by UN observed. Said whole of US would not be inspected but only certain parts, including Puerto Rico, where camps of invasion bands are located; whole territory of Cuba would be subject to inspection as well as certain neighboring countries; one-sided inspection is impossible. Supporting Castro proposals, argued US need not at once abandon Guantanamo but should enter into negotiations with Cubans about its disposition. Also argued that if US not prepared normalize relations with Cuba at present, at least should say we are prepared negotiate later. Referred to statement President's letter October 27/1/ not only US would not invade but was confident other states would give similar assurances. Complained this point does not appear in US declaration.

/1/See Document 95.

Stevenson replied US eager have Cuban affair settled and he hoped receive Soviet draft declaration soonest. Said it appears principal points outstanding between us are Castro's five points; we cannot discuss them and it is better adhere to US-Soviet terms of agreement. If new matters introduced into negotiations, doubted they could ever be concluded said we understand Soviets feel obligated to support Cuba's demands but we also have numerous demands from other American republics which we are not introducing into negotiations. Regarding safeguards against introduction offensive weapons in Cuba, noted that according President's letter October 27 this was to be delegated to UN observers; since such observation in Cuba has not been possible, we have said frankly in our draft declaration that until such safeguards are provided, we must use our own means; we do not ask Soviets to agree to our unilateral means and inspection but simply point out to them we have no other choice. Pointed out US has gone further than exchange of correspondence by saying not only that we would not invade Cuba ourselves but that we would not support such invasion. As to assurances other American republics against invasion of Cuba, said President merely expressed opinion they would be willing give such assurances. As to procedures, believe best course is to proceed by agreed declarations in SC. If declarations cannot be fully agreed, they could at least be presented separately to Secretary General to be submitted to SC and have Cuban affair concluded in this manner.

McCloy urged should try to finish this crisis promptly and proceed to other problems to avoid other crisis. Pointed out US had gone beyond letters of agreement in raising quarantine before safeguards worked out and in demobilizing and sending back to their bases US forces in Florida. Emphasized US-Soviet agreement would not involve settlement with Castro. As to subversion, pointed out other American republics are threatened by Castro's activity in this field, and there are camps in Cuba training men for subversion in Latin America. Said when Castro eventually ceases to be a threat to the western hemisphere, we are willing to normalize relations with him and help Cuba economically. Added cannot waste time talking about Castro's conditions when US and USSR have much important matters of common concern to settle between themselves. Noted that inspection of US and Puerto Rico would be comparable to inspection of Soviet ports to detect offensive weapons being dispatched to Cuba.

Meeting concluded with repeated mutual assurances of desire to finish matter quickly and to study points made on both sides. Agreed meet again Friday.

Rusk

221. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, December 3, 1962, 9:35 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.

Ball--I just had a call from McCloy and he is seeing Kuznetsov at 11:00 am. He says Adlai is down here.

Bundy--I didn't know that. Over this Alsop-Bartlett thing,^{/1/} I guess.

^{/1/}Reference is to a story written by Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett for the forthcoming edition of the Saturday Evening Post claiming that Stevenson dissented from the Executive Committee consensus. The article claimed that Stevenson wanted to trade Turkish, Italian, and British bases for Cuban bases and that Stevenson advocated a new "Munich" appeasement settlement. A December 2 memorandum from Schlesinger to President Kennedy refutes the assertions of Alsop and Bartlett. (Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, 1961-1963) See the Supplement. See also Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, pp. 835-838.

Ball--He has a great anxiety to settle this thing and I am not at all clear

Bundy--That is not our view at all.

Ball--Jack is against trying to do business on the other fellow's drafting. He wanted to see what kind of instructions he could get that would enable him to make some progress this morning.

Bundy--Have we seen the other fellow's draft?

Ball--No.

Bundy--Well how can we say that?

Ball--He wanted some instructions

Bundy--He should do business on his draft but not theirs. He shouldn't do much business. We can't give him a

free hand when we don't know what their answer is. He should stonewall until we get back to him.

Ball--He says there are only three problems and he thinks if we want to settle we can get a quick deal and on probably plenty good terms.

Bundy--He has to do us the favor of letting us know the score. He should just go and listen. He should stand on the reasons of the President and Secretary of State and listen hard and we can't give him a mandate.

Ball--I was only reporting. He was wailing on

Bundy--He has nothing to wail on.

Ball--I got the impression that he had a kind of telephone conversation on the areas of where the differences lay. One is on the overflights and there is a question of how we can state it as not to tie Kuznetsov to it. The second was Kuznetsov's thinking this threat on security language is too rough. The third was this intention business. He said they are the only three elements that are interfering.

Bundy--Tell him to press them again; his client is not in any hurry.

Ball--All right.

222. Summary Record of the 32d Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, December 3, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 25-32A, 11/12/62-12/4/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith.

[Here follows 2 pages of discussion of India and Pakistan.]

Ambassador Stevenson and Under Secretary Ball reported on the current status of the Cuban negotiations in New York. Kuznetsov and McCloy are to meet again at 11:00 AM/1/ when it is expected that a Soviet paper will be presented to us. Involved in the negotiations are the way we express our intention to continue overflights, our insistence on the preservation of peace in the Caribbean and the no-invasion undertaking or "intention." The anxiety to conclude the negotiations is Russian rather than ours. We can go slow now because the pressure is on them.

/1/See Document 223.

The President agreed. He noted that Khrushchev had taken a very belligerent position with Canadian [British] Ambassador Roberts on Berlin. The statement on overflights can either be in or out. The reference to the Rio Pact can be in or out because the keys to the present negotiation are the no-invasion assurance and the peace and security of the Caribbean reference.

Ambassador Stevenson said present thinking was that there would now be no U.S. statement made before a Security Council meeting. The Secretary General could circulate a Russian statement and a U.S. statement to the UN members. We could thus reduce the elements of disagreement because two papers would be filed.

The President said we were not going to rat on an agreement with the Russians, but we were not going to tie on to a no-invasion pledge in a way which allowed Castro to operate from an invulnerable base.

Ambassador Stevenson said that as soon as the Cuban problem was settled, the Russians could heat up the Berlin

situation. We would keep the Cuban problem in the UN as long as we possibly could./2/

[Here follows 1 paragraph of discussion on India.]

Bromley Smith/3/

/2/In the record of action of this meeting, December 4, McGeorge Bundy noted that Stevenson and Ball reported on the current status of Cuban negotiations in New York. Bundy continued, "the President accepted in general recommendations covering the future of these negotiations with the Russians." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 25-32A, 11/12/62-12/4/62)

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

223. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

Washington, December 3, 1962, 8 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-362. Top Secret; Priority.

2086. Department pass White House. Eyes only Secretary. Re: Cuba. Fol is summary five and one half hour meeting between McCloy and Yost, Kuznetsov, Zorin and Mendelovich./1/

/1/A 23-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, lasting from 11 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., is in USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, 1-B December/January meetings. In addition, McCloy and Ball discussed the conversation over a secure telephone, December 3, 4:45 p.m. (Ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba) The memorandum of the Ball-McCloy telephone conversation is in the Supplement.

High points were fol: Sovs took even stronger position than formerly against 3 points in U.S. declaration: (1) ref to Rio Pact,/2/ (2) ref to overflights, and (3) condition that Cuba does not take action to "threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere" attached to our non-invasion assurances. Kuznetsov concluded session by saying that, if these 3 points included in U.S. declaration, it would be very difficult to foresee how long it would be before U.S. and Sovs could reach agreement on presentation to SC. On other hand he at same time emphasized great importance Sovs attach to presentation to SC of documents agreed on main points, if not in all details, which would lead to action by SC expressing satisfaction with work of parties and asking them continue negots to resolve problems still outstanding. Kuznetsov favored working rapidly toward conclusion of this kind which he said repeatedly would create more favorable prospects for solution of other international problems.

/2/For text of the Rio Pact, more formally known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, September 2, 1947, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949, pp. 226-229.

Kuznetsov said he "hoped" to have Sov draft declaration in couple of days and it was left that, unless some new ideas occurred to either delegation, we would await completion that draft before holding another mtg.

On points listed above to which Sovs strongly objected, they claimed ref to Rio Pact is part of U.S. attempt to give U.S. commitment conditional character and hence is unacceptable. It was part of effort to give U.S. free hand so it will not have to keep its obligations. It would authorize U.S. to take action against Cuba under Arts 6 and 8, including use of armed force, by alleging Cuba had undertaken aggression not involving the use of armed force including subversion. Kuznetsov also claimed Rio Pact violates UN Charter/3/ in that (1) it authorizes armed response against non-armed attack which is not in accord with Art 51, and (2) it authorizes use of armed force without approval of SC as provided in Art 53. Therefore reference to Rio Pact in U.S. declaration would be illegal since pact in conflict with UN Charter. Ref to UN Charter itself in U.S. declaration should be sufficient

for our purposes.

/3/For the U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, see *ibid.*, pp. 95-110.

As to overflights Kuznetsov said this ref unacceptable and reiterated usual arguments about unilateral actions violating sovereignty of Cuba, norms of international law and UN Charter. He claimed U.S. desires overthrow whole set of legal norms covering relations between states. Question withdrawal missiles and IL-28's settled and no more inspection needed except as agreed between U.S. and USSR. Only Sov obligations concerning non-reintroduction defensive weapons and U.S. obligations concerning non-invasion are outstanding and these both can be met by U Thant plan of observation in Caribbean. Sovs not opposed this kind of observation but must be in accordance with Charter and on basis of equality applied not only to Cuba but to all parties.

Kuznetsov objected to phrase in U.S. draft declaration reading "provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere" on grounds this is new subject not covered in exchange of letters. President's letter of Oct 27 offered invasion assurance in return solely for actions by Sov Union. No mention was made of action on part of Cuba. Furthermore this condition would render valueless U.S. commitment not to invade Cuba since U.S. or other Western Hemisphere country could easily undertake provocation against Cuba and then claim Cuba had threatened their security.

Kuznetsov reiterated earlier claim that Khrushchev had not agreed to on-site inspection except with consent of Cuba and that moreover dismantling and withdrawal had been fully inspected by agreed shipside procedure.

He also spoke again of guarantees against invasions by other states of Western Hemisphere and quoted Pres' letter on this point. He claimed U.S. draft contains no provision for U.S. implementing this obligation.

He also objected to phrase "weapons capable of offensive use". He claimed only weapons envisaged in correspondence were those present in Cuba at time of crisis which had been referred to in Khrushchev's letters as weapons you consider offensive. There were only medium range missiles with nuclear warheads and IL-28's. These had also been only weapons referred to in Pres' press conference of Nov 20. Phrase used in U.S. draft would give grounds for arbitrary and expanding definition in future which could be applied to all sorts of other weapons.

As to withdrawal of Sov military personnel, Kuznetsov asserted this need not be referred to in U.S. declaration since it had not been covered in original exchange of correspondence. Sov Govt had mentioned this subsequently as gesture of good will and not part of agreement. U.S. side had made clear in negots that it did not consider this to be "condition" of final settlement.

Kuznetsov repeated very briefly Sov support of Castro points included in protocol, mentioning specifically only economic blockade and Guantanamo.

He mentioned new point, asserting that, even if agreed declaration made by 2 parties in SC, much would remain outstanding, including reestablishment diplomatic relations and economic relations among countries in Caribbean. He hoped draft declarations would refer to continuing negot to clear up these matters.

He mentioned U.S. ref to medium and intermediate range missiles and suggested omission of latter since only former were in Cuba. He also objected to use of word "minimum" applied to shipside inspection procedure since he claimed there had been agreement that this procedure was satisfactory.

Summing up his remarks he said U.S. had made substantial step backward from exchange of letters and had introduced many new requirements which made it appear U.S. wishes delay concluding negots. If one side wished to introduce new questions other side will of course do likewise. Sovs wish to confine questions to those covered in exchange of letters and hopes U.S. declaration will be redrafted in this sense.

McCloy replied that there seemed to be very little left in U.S. draft that was acceptable to Sovs. He pointed out U.S. draft designed to move forward and bring about rapid settlement. He listed numerous steps U.S. had taken, including limitation of our quarantine, its lifting before all Sov obligations had been met and on basis of mere Sov assurances about removal IL-28's, our acceptance limited method of verification of withdrawal missiles and bombers, and finally and most significant introduction of words "supporting invasion" in non-invasion assurance which was substantial and positive change in wording Pres' letter Oct 27. If we have inserted additional points in declaration it is only in order to clarify matters not foreseen when letters were exchanged.

McCloy said he did not understand distinction between medium and intermediate missiles since we had identified both types on sites but supposed satisfactory nomenclature could be worked out. More fundamental problem was Sov objection to wording "other weapons capable of offensive use." He was alarmed by thought Sovs considered as offensive only particular weapons which had been removed from Cuba in this instance. Obviously other types of missiles such as ICBM's or other types of bombers were equally offensive. However this might also be matter of language which could be cleared up.

McCloy reiterated that, while we do not suppose either Sov Union or Castro is going to abandon the conditions he has put forward, we repeat once again that we do not accept these conditions and cannot deal with them in any way in our declaration. As to military personnel, McCloy agreed their withdrawal was not considered condition of settlement and emphasized U.S. nevertheless very much relieved when Khrushchev indicated they might be considered almost as component of missile complex and hence would be withdrawn.

McCloy also repeated again that in referring to non-invasion assurances which might be given by other Western Hemisphere nations that Pres was merely expressing an opinion, that while we do not believe other LA countries have any intention of attacking Cuba we are not in position to restrain them. However he emphasized again ref to non-support of invasion in our draft declaration.

McCloy expressed usual objections to so-called U Thant proposal for reciprocal inspection. He then repeated at length reasons why we must have right to use our own means of inspection in absence of acceptable international arrangements. This does not amount to any change in international law or norms of relations between nations but is merely statement that we are going to take this precaution until satisfactory international inspection system is set up. He does not expect Sov Union to agree with what we are doing but we cannot omit mention in our declaration. Possibly language can be improved but subject must be covered. This part of price that has to be paid for false assurances which had previously been given to U.S. Presumably overflights would not continue for all time but would have to continue until certain composure had been restored to area.

As to Rio Pact McCloy recognized there is fundamental difference between us. If Kuznetsov is correct that proposed U.S. declaration is incompatible with Rio Pact Pres would have to go to Senate and seek amendment to that pact. We do not however believe there is any incompatibility. However Rio Pact is principal international instrument dealing with security of Western Hemisphere and it cannot be omitted from our declaration.

McCloy concluded by urging that we not haggle interminably over language but agree to close out this transaction as quickly as possible. If Sov Union maintains all points Kuznetsov has put forward, McCloy would almost despair of reaching agreement on 2 declarations. While promising to consider points Kuznetsov had raised he urged him to take less jaundiced look at U.S. draft. He also urged Sovs to submit their draft soonest.

Yost added that it hardly seemed possible for 2 sides to reach total agreement on 2 declarations. What was important was that they be compatible and as close together as possible.

In concluding rebuttal, which covered most of above points in same general terms, Kuznetsov said it would be impossible to understand if, after all we have done, it should be impossible to prepare agreed documents for SC. Let us stick to exchange of letters of Oct 27-28/4/ and cut out new and unacceptable provisions he urged. He

then ended with remarks reported at opening this message.

/4/See Documents 95, 102, and 104.

Yost

224. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President Kennedy

Washington, December 3, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone. A note on this memorandum indicates that McCone took this paper to the White House on December 3 and stopped by the President's office to drop it off after lunch.

This memorandum was attached to McCone's memorandum of the Executive Committee meeting at 10 a.m. on December 3. McCone noted in the memorandum on the meeting that "later in the day I met with the President privately and pointed out to him my concern over Soviet conduct in Cuba." (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

Three indicators from Cuba that worry me are:

1. Detection of the presence of new and more sophisticated Soviet communications equipment as part of the air defense system. This would suggest that we soon would face the prospect of operational SAM sites manned by Soviets.
2. Che Guevara's statement to the London Daily Worker that peace has been assured and that Cuba will pursue the arms struggle already taking place in a number of Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Guatemala, Paraguay and Colombia. This would indicate no intention to halt Castro subversion in Latin America.
3. Mikoyan's public statement in Moscow that he had achieved Soviet objective of maintaining a Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere.

These three statements would prompt extreme caution on the part of the United States in any agreement which might give Castro and the Communists a sanctuary.

John A. McCone/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

225. Memorandum From the Vice President's Military Aide (Burris) to Vice President Johnson

Washington, December 4, 1962.

//Source: Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, Memos to Vice President from Burris, July 62-April 1963. Top Secret.

RE

Low Level Reconnaissance Mission Over Cuba

The last low level reconnaissance mission was performed on November 15. Light, scattered ineffective anti-aircraft fire was received, but no damage was sustained by the planes.

Low level missions were also performed on November 11, 12 and 13, although no resistance was encountered. The record of action of the NSC Executive Committee reflects that the low level missions were authorized on a day-to-day basis by the President. At Meeting No. 23 on November 8,^{1/} the President authorized ten low level flights. At Meeting No. 24 on November 12,^{2/} no discussion of low level reconnaissance is reflected, although at Meeting No. 25 on the afternoon of the same day, November 12,^{3/} the President authorized low level flights for November 13. In other words, low level reconnaissance was performed on November 11 and November 12 without specific authorization by the President which normally took the form of an action of the NSC Executive Committee. It is possible and probable that the missions were authorized as a result of personal discussions between Secretary McNamara and Mr. Bundy with the President.

^{1/}See Document 162.

^{2/}See Document 170.

^{3/}See Document 172.

Subsequent records of actions of the NSC Executive Committee reflect discussion of high and low level reconnaissance with authorization being granted for high level flights only. On November 21, Mr. McNamara presented a plan for regular high level reconnaissance, but left low level flights to be authorized specifically by the President. At Meeting No. 31 on November 29,^{4/} Mr. McNamara recommended that low level flights be made only when necessary to confirm certain indications gained from high level reconnaissance. This general policy is the subject for discussion by the working group at 5:30 p.m., December 4.^{5/}

^{4/}See Document 217.

^{5/}See Document 226.

The above pattern of events suggests an evolution of low level reconnaissance in the Cuban operation. To suspend these flights is to eliminate one principal source of very precise intelligence. At the same time the provocative and psychological aspects against the Cubans of aircraft at near sonic speeds and tree top height are eliminated. The risk of loss to conventional anti-aircraft fire is eliminated, although the risk of loss to high flying aircraft from missiles remains. In this sense, an incident resulting from the loss of aircraft is perhaps proportionate to the number of flights being made. The basic issue remains the relationship between necessity for surveillance--and on the other hand--our willingness to accept losses in gaining this information. In this connection, having announced its intention to continue surveillance, the United States must be fully prepared and organized to invoke predetermined countermeasures, and in the aftermath to justify its actions. Neither the action to be taken if another plane is shot down, nor policies relating to explanation of the action, has yet been clearly delineated.



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume XI
Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

226. Summary Record of the 32d-A Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, December 4, 1962, 5:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, 25-32-A, 11/12/62-12/4/62. Top Secret; Sensitive.

Mr. Bundy reported that Kuznetsov was telling Ambassador Stevenson the numbers and ports out of which the IL-28 bombers were leaving./1/

/1/Transmitted in telegram 2105 from USUN, December 4. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Telegrams, 1962 (TS, exdis, etc.))

A revised overflight guidelines paper was presented./2/ The general principle is that there will be regular high-level overflights and low-level missions will be done only on specific request, as authorized by the President.

/2/November 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-30/62) Printed as approved as an attachment to Document 232.

There was a discussion of a Miami news story reporting the presence in Cuba of an armed Soviet division. In fact, there is merely a mechanized regiment which is part of four Soviet task forces in Cuba. It was decided that the Defense Department would release to the press factual information about the Soviet troops in Cuba.

The group agreed that a standstill posture should be maintained in New York until the Russians give us their latest draft declaration.

Mr. McCone reported that the CIA would engage in intense intelligence gathering in Cuba in the next four months, while avoiding provocation until we know whether the Russians are withdrawing their military forces or building them up.

Bromley Smith/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

227. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 5, 1962, 8 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-562. Top Secret. Sent with instructions to pass to the White House.

2140. Department pass White House. Eyes only for Secretary. Cuba. McCloy and Stevenson believe it is very much in US interest, if possible, to bring US-Sov negot on Cuba to rapid and mutually acceptable conclusion./1/ They have growing impression that effects of victory in public mind are being gradually effaced by prolonged and inconclusive negotiation which gives impression we are still seeking vital objective we have not achieved. If public presumes this objective is on-site inspection, more and more importance will be attached to such inspection as negotiation continues. If and when we emerge from negotiation without achieving that objective, even though it may have been otherwise successful, we will risk seeming to have failed rather than to have succeeded.

/1/In a telephone conversation between Ball and Stevenson at 6:40 p.m., December 5, Stevenson informed Ball that after a long discussion with McCloy, "there is obviously a feeling in the White House, which is shared by the Secretary, which is quite adverse to Jack's [McCloy] views. (Ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba)

Second consideration which we have in mind is that there may be some substance in Kuznetsov's frequent reiteration of assertion that whether or not we agree on Cuban settlement will have most important effect on possibility of agreement in other fields. This may be bluff but there also may be element of sincerity in it and, if so, real effort on our part to reach prompt and agreed settlement could have substantial effect on Berlin, nuclear testing, etc.

We realize proposed Cuban SC declaration/2/ creates new, though not unforeseen complication and that either some way must be found to handle SC mtg harmoniously or alternative of separate declarations outside SC must be pursued.

/2/The text is in telegram 2104 from USUN, December 4. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963) See the Supplement.

In any case we think prompt determination should be reached as to what changes could be made in our draft declaration for use as soon as seems appropriate. We believe fol suggested changes largely verbal rather than substantive, would not in any sense jeopardize or weaken essential US positions. They might on other hand provide sufficient accommodation on some of points to which Sovs have most seriously objected so that latter could take amended declaration as basis for agreed settlement. If we put forward these amendments before receiving Sov draft declaration we would of course have to make clear that unacceptable Sov draft would necessitate withdrawal of our proposed declaration. However we are inclined to feel that more acceptable proposal on our part might produce less objectionable Sov draft and hence substantially reduce period of negotiation. In putting forward our amended draft we would certainly state unequivocally that it was as far as we could go and there was no use wasting time in attempting to negotiate our declaration further.

Our proposed amendments follow:

- (1) Omit word "minimum" in second sentence para 6;
- (2) In ninth para substitute for "other weapons capable of offensive use" more exact and less sweeping language which could not, as is case with present language, be applied to rifles and pistols. One possibility would be "other weapons of major offensive capability";
- (3) In same para, for words "provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the hemisphere" substitute "provided Cuba does not attack (or commit aggression against) any nation of the Western Hemisphere";

(4) For penultimate para present draft substitute fol: "Pending such time as arrangements can be effected to provide the safeguards necessary to ensure that no such weapons systems are maintained or reintroduced into Cuba, the US will employ such other means of observation and verification as may be necessary." We have several other drafts for this para if the Dept finds above unsatisfactory.

(5) Since there can be no question that the Rio Pact remains in full effect and that our declaration in SC on this occasion does not and cannot impair it, there is some question whether it need be mentioned in declaration. Alternatively President in subsequent press conference might make statement along lines final para present draft declaration.

Stevenson

228. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)

Washington, December 5, 1962, 5:30 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.

McC: I feel very strongly we are losing ground by this delay, and I feel that what we ought to do . . . I think there is misconception as to what our position is, and it is very serious. People are getting crystallized on this on-site inspection business, and I just think we are not wise in telling Kuznetsov that "Look, there are certain things that we can agree to, and there are certain things we can't agree to". What I would do is tell him, in the first place he didn't like that word "minimum" inspection. Of course it doesn't mean anything; we can strike that out. Secondly, I would tell him that the words we used there in regard to "nuclear or other weapons capable of offensive use." He brought up the point of the pistol. If we can find something else to cover him on that. We aren't talking about every kind of weapon that is capable of offensive use. So that I would say we were ready to change. Furthermore, I am ready to strike out "the Rio Pact" in this thing, because the Rio Pact exists anyway, and the President could say it on the side. And of course, nothing he says in connection with this in any way irrigates from the obligations and rights of our existing treaties. I would say we do have to reserve our intent to use such methods as we feel are necessary by way of observation and verification pending the adoption of other means that are satisfactory to us, and that we can't give way on that, because if we say that we have no intent to invade and the next day we sent a U-2 over there, in some interpretations it is an invasion, an invasion of their aerial territory. So we just have to reserve the fact that our intent is to continue the ordinary precautions. Then on the word "threat" that Thompson introduced, I would go back to "attack" or "commit aggression" or something like that, because I do think that with "threat" security is rather illusory. You know, Castro could make a speech and could say we're off the hook then. I believe it is good tactics to tell him irrespective of his declaration. His declaration is going to be . . . if we don't get something in to indicate that we're compromising, there is still going to be the reputation of Cuba, and then there will be a wrangle. But if he thinks that we are really trying to meet him, I believe he will come part way. And we may very well wind this thing up with a something less than transient wrangle on both our parts, which may very well prejudice Berlin, or something else.

(Ball left to meet with the Secretary and on return called McCloy back.)

GB: I undertook to talk with the Secretary briefly about this. His feeling, and this is I am sure the President's feeling, is that if we were really anxious on our part to close this thing up, what you are suggesting would be the thing to do it. But quite frankly the President doesn't want to close it up right now, unless it were closed completely on our own terms. What he would propose (and this has been cleared with the White House) to do would be send it up tonight.

McC: Don't tie our hands--don't tie our hands. Well maybe . . . I don't agree . . . what I'm telling you is that I think we can close it out, but we have a chance of closing it out on our terms if we do this. I think this dragging our feet is absolutely wrong. Now I can't say anything since this is the President's decision. I think we are petering away the victory, and I believe we have a reasonable chance by giving away nothing in this thing in consolidating the victory, and I'm not in doubt when I am saying that. I just think that you are getting them hardened up unnecessarily--at Geneva, on Berlin--and I don't think that's wise and I don't think that anything that I am suggesting that we give way . . . we're not giving away anything when I strike out the word "minimum," or don't use the word "threat" . . .

GB: That's right.

McC: I do think we have to hold onto the word "intend" and would intend to hold onto those words, but I would also hope that we could put into the operating clauses that there is nothing here in any way interrogates our intention to use all the observation and clarification facilities we have.

I just don't believe we are giving away anything. But I do believe we are losing. And I am convinced we are losing. We are losing every day that goes by. I was at the Board meeting at Chase today. Everybody wanted to know what was going on here. Are we in another snarl? There is so much emphasis on the on-site inspection. If we don't get the on-site inspection, which we don't want, it's going to be thought around the country we're losing. Yet if we say that pending getting such an inspection as satisfies us we intend to use the facilities we already have. Everybody will applaud that. The world will applaud that.

GB: How would you envisage this thing. Let's suppose that you were to make those amendments. How would it work out with Kuznetsov. What could he do then?

McC: I would say to Kuznetsov, "Now, look, if you . . . we've come a long way here toward meeting you on this business. You've talked all these things. We've met you on two out of four of them. We can't give way on the intent business. But now if you say that you could acquiesce in this statement and give us a statement that doesn't cause a wrangle in the UN, if it represents a real consensus, then, I would say let's go to the UN together, file that thing," and then let the SC head--he has seen these documents and congratulates the heads of state which worked out a situation in averting the crisis, and go on our way rejoicing. We have some language up here--it doesn't amount to anything but that, and I think he would take it as being an indication that we were not trying to welch or to introduce new conditions and that we were holding out on one thing that Khrushchev is anxious to get. At the same time we don't give up a thing that is of any value to us.

GB: I am going to have to . . . Let me see what kind of an advocate I can be here. I've got to get this back up to the President; because right now the posture of this thing that has come back from the White House cleared out, and I am going to have to let it go tonight with the idea that before you act on them we can have another look at this. I will see if we can get the Committee together in the morning if we can.

McC: Now, I have spelled this all out to Ros./1/ He tells me he agrees with it. There is one thing I have asked him to do and that is to give me the right definition of the "introduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons capable of offensive use". We can change that language. But naturally we're not going to limit it to merely these weapons that he took out, but we can use some such word as "major offensive weapons" or something like. I do this purely on the conviction that I have that we are not gaining ground now--that I think if we do close it up on that basis the President has nothing to fear. And I think we may have a better atmosphere for stuff that may be coming up in the future.

/1/Roswell Gilpatric.

GB: I'll get this thing cranked up here. I'll let it go tonight because I have no way of stopping it. Let's talk first

thing in the morning. In the meantime, I'll get hold of the WH and see if we can set something up.

McC: I've got an [un]fortunate situation coming up Friday and Saturday. I've been postponing meetings with clients of mine for 60 days, so I just have to do that then. And I have to testify in North Carolina on Monday. But you can reach me tonight or tomorrow.

GB: I'll get back to you one way or another.

McC: You talk to Gilpatric about it.

GB: You bet.

229. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, December 5, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret.

At the close of the Executive Committee Meeting last night,^{/1/} I raised the question of courses of action we should follow if the Cuban SAM sites are made operational and a U-2 is shot down. This question has been considered and the consensus seems to be that in such an eventuality, we will be obliged to take out the SAM site or perhaps several SAM sites. There appeared no difference of opinion among those in attendance at the meeting last night or previous meetings when I raised this question concerning the policy.

^{/1/}See Document 226.

However, as you said, the implementation of the "policy" was another matter and perhaps it would be more difficult to "seize the nettle" in such assumed circumstances than it is to agree among ourselves as to what should be done.

I continue to be disturbed over this situation as I feel that there is a strong possibility of such a confrontation as soon as the IL-28's are all removed. In this connection, I find it significant that Mr. Kuznetsov advised Governor Stevenson with regard to the number of IL-28's to be shipped on each of several ships, the ports and the dates of departure.^{/2/} This seems to indicate to me that the Soviets are about to "drop the curtain" on one phase of the Cuban problem.

^{/2/}See footnote 1, Document 226.

Other indications of their intentions have appeared recently. On Monday I gave you a note reporting (by Stevenson) Mikoyan's statements that "he had succeeded in maintaining a Socialist 'communist-controlled' state in Cuba." I also reported that we had detected a continual improvement in Soviet-controlled communications systems throughout the Island.^{/3/}

^{/3/}See Document 224.

Today the Watch Committee reports more extensively on the communications developments and their report, which appears as an Annex to this week's Watch Committee statement, is attached.^{/4/}

^{/4/}Not attached and not found.

I feel there is a very strong possibility that we will soon face a situation where the Soviets will first warn us against further overflights, indicate that their SAM sites are in operation, and if we persist will destroy one or more U-2's. Action by us of a type planned and mentioned last night could, therefore, involve a military operation against Soviet soldiers.

This therefore is quite possibly the situation that we will face. It will not be action against "Cuban forces" in disguise; it will be action against Soviet forces and this may possibly be announced to us in advance. I bring this up because I think the possibility must be given serious thought at this time and we might devise diplomatic moves which would either forestall such a confrontation or, alternatively, a pronouncement made now might so indicate our intentions that the confrontation will not occur.

John A. McCone/5/

Director

/5/Printed from a copy that indicates McCone signed the original.

230. Summary Record of the 33d Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, December 6, 1962, 11 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 33-37, 12/5/62-12/17/62. Top Secret; Sensitive.

Director McCone reported that all IL-28 bombers had been located at Cuban ports or on ships leaving Cuba. He called attention to a buildup of the Soviet communications system in Cuba and referred to the existing SAM sites and to the Soviet air defense capability.

The President read extracts from an FBI report on Mikoyan's briefing of the Soviet delegation in New York/1/ and asked that it be circulated to all Executive Committee members./2/

/1/In McCone's account of this meeting, December 6, Rusk briefed the committee on Mikoyan's visit to Cuba. According to that account "Secretary Rusk reported that Mikoyan had stated he had extreme difficulty in Cuba, that Castro refused to see him for nine days, and when he threatened to leave, Castro immediately stated he was prepared to make an arrangement with the Chinese Communists. Rusk therefore felt the Soviets may be inclined to leave substantial forces in Cuba to forestall a ChiCom takeover." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A)

/2/The Federal Bureau of Investigation report, December 4, is attached to a December 6 memorandum from Smith to the members of the Executive Committee. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, NSC Executive Committee) See the Supplement.

Ambassador Stevenson reported on the most recent New York meeting with the Russians. He read the proposed changes in a draft declaration on the Cuban problem which we would make and recommended that we give to the Russians a draft, as revised in his telegram,/3/ before the Soviet delegation received its draft from Moscow. The purpose would be to end the discussion. If our draft was not accepted by the Russians, then we should return to our position of circulating our own original draft declaration to the Security Council. He urged that we focus on our paper rather than theirs. We cannot haggle too long lest the Russians get tougher on Cuba and insist on discussion of other issues. The U.S. has achieved a victory, i.e., the strategic weapons have been removed. The longer we prolong the negotiation over minor issues, the closer we come to appearing to have failed. Mr. McCloy said that we may be dissipating our victory. In addition, the Russians may accept a one-shot inspection scheme which we don't want but which would be difficult for us to oppose.

/3/Document 227.

The President said he agreed that we could vitiate our success by prolonging the New York negotiations, but as long as Castro is in power, many will think that our victory will be pale. Senator Russell had already said that we had made a mistake by not invading Cuba. We are committed to make some kind of an invasion pledge. Do we want an agreement in New York or do we not? If we do not, we should stick on our present position. We do not know whether such a negotiating position in New York would affect negotiations on other issues.

Mr. McCloy said we should stick on our statement about aerial reconnaissance, but he opposed on constitutional grounds any statement of a declaration of our intentions on invasion.

Secretary Rusk said we do not want an agreement for agreement's sake. We want only a good agreement. We should not chip away at our statement but wait until the Soviets produce theirs. We should stay with our present position. Prolonged negotiations in New York may appear as a failure, but if we give away our position in a declaration, we are failing.

The President commented that the hardening of the Soviet posture is not due to our action in Cuba.

Secretary Dillon said he thought disagreement in New York was certain, but Mr. McCloy said we might get an acceptable Soviet declaration, accompanied by a statement that our overflights were not acceptable.

The President asked what we would do if there was a civil war in Cuba. Would we go in only if invited? Secretary Rusk said we could not allow a Soviet takeover of Cuba similar to that which occurred in Hungary.

The President asked whether an agreement reached in New York would prevent us from taking action against Cuba if the Soviets moved in Berlin. He asked whether the Chinese Communists would come into Cuba if the Soviets phased out. Would we consider a Soviet submarine base as an offensive weapon? If many additional MIGs were sent to Cuba, would we consider these to be offensive weapons? He concluded by saying we should put in a revised draft declaration and tell the Russians they could take it or leave it. If they decide to leave it, we will rewrite our declaration entirely, taking a tough view.

Secretary McNamara said if we rewrite the declaration we should take a firmer stand on the no-invasion course so that we would not guarantee Castro sanctuary.

Mr. Bundy favored rewriting the declaration so that we could back away from a no-invasion guarantee. We could tell the Russians this was the last chance.

Ambassador Stevenson said we should be ready with a revised draft in the event the Russians rejected a new proposal.

There followed a discussion of whether we should tell the Latin American Ambassadors where the negotiations now stand. Ambassador Stevenson said all of them will leak to the press but even so we should brief them in New York. Secretary Rusk preferred to inform the OAS representatives here first, but preferred to hold off for a day or two. If the briefing is not given before Monday,^{4/} it would be possible to do it with the OAS representatives here and the Latin American Ambassadors at the UN in New York.

/4/December 10.

The President suggested that we wait until tomorrow to see if we get an agreement from the Russians before we put out our statement. Mr. McCloy pointed out that there would be no time to get an agreement tomorrow. Secretary Rusk recommended that we do not put out our statement before we get the Russian draft because our

statement would cause anxiety.

Mr. Murrow stated that if we are going to give up our demand for on-site inspection, then we should make a louder noise about aerial surveillance.

Ambassador Stevenson reported that the status of the proposal to create the nuclear-free zone in Latin America was in doubt because if we could not get the concurrence of all Latin American States we would have difficulty putting the proposal forward.

The President approved revised instructions to the New York team to cover the negotiation during the next few days./5/ (Copy of instructions attached.)/6/

/5/McGeorge Bundy prepared a brief 3-point record of action of this meeting on December 6. It noted McCone's intelligence briefing, the recommended revisions to the U.S. draft declaration, and the President's approval of those revisions. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62)

/6/Sent as telegram 1511 to USUN, December 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662) See the Supplement.

Bromley Smith/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

231. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)

Washington, December 6, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, ExCom Meetings, December 4, 1962. Top Secret; Sensitive.

We agreed that I would send you a summary of the informal comments made on the draft memorandum on "Future Policy toward Cuba"/1/ which was discussed in the Executive Committee on Tuesday, December 4th./2/

/1/The draft memorandum printed as an attachment was attached to a copy of this memorandum in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. III, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62.

/2/Discussion of the draft memorandum was not included in the summary record, see Document 226.

First, it was generally agreed that there should be a reorganization of our machinery for Cuban action. In particular, there seemed to be general support for the idea of an Office of Cuban Affairs which could be public and above board, and which might do a more effective job with free Cubans and others concerned with the hopes for post-Castro Cuba. You and I agreed after the meeting that you would explore the availability of a particularly well-qualified individual to head this office.

With respect to the draft memorandum itself, the following general comments were made:

1. The memorandum is correct in recommending that no general policy be approved or set in motion until the current discussions with the Soviets on Cuba have developed somewhat further.

2. The proposed action in the OAS should not be framed sharply until we know more clearly what kind of resolution is likely to obtain unanimous or nearly unanimous support. Our current posture in the OAS is so strong that we should not weaken it for marginal advantages.

3. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the draft statement seemed approximately correct; paragraph 7 needed further development in order to distinguish desirable from undesirable travel to Cuba; paragraph 8 should make it clearer that it is Cuban funds whose transfer needs to be surveyed and controlled if possible; paragraphs 9 and 10 need to be spelled out carefully in cooperation with the other agencies primarily concerned.

The covert annex was considered only very briefly, but the preliminary sense of the meeting was that covert activities should be concentrated upon improvement in the collection of intelligence for the immediate future, and that we should not plan early sabotage activities.

Other items in the covert annex were not properly considered.

McG. Bundy

Attachment/3/

Draft Memorandum for President Kennedy

/3/See footnote 1. Top Secret. Drafted on December 3, although no drafter is indicated.

SUBJECT

Future Policy toward Cuba

Policy

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro regime and its replacement by one sharing the aims of the Free World. Our immediate objectives are to weaken the regime; frustrate its subversive intentions; further reduce its influence in the Hemisphere; and increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime (or split the regime off from the Bloc).

A policy of containing, undermining, discrediting and isolating the Castro regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic economic, psychological and other pressures will achieve these immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

Courses of Action

The following overt/4/ courses of action should be undertaken:

/4/For the program of covert actions please see Annex A. [Footnote in the source text. A typed note in the margin of the source text reads: "This annex will be circulated to ExCom members at a meeting called to discuss the memo."]

1. OAS action: condemning the Castro regime for its duplicity; extending the trade embargo to all items except foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies; further limiting air and sea communications between the Hemisphere and Cuba; authorizing air and other surveillance; and warning Cuba against continued promotion of subversive and sabotage activities.

2. Establishment of Caribbean security arrangements through ministerial level meetings of the Caribbean

countries for the purposes of reaching agreement on increasing the intensity of surveillance of coastal and international waters; increased surveillance and control of land boundaries; increased control over subversive activities within national boundaries; systematic exchange of intelligence information; and, development of procedures for coordination of military contingency planning for emergencies.

3. Application of the four-point shipping restrictions re Cuba.

4. Inclusion by NATO of Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

5. Discussion of Free World industrial nations from shipping crucial spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

6. Persuasion of non-Bloc nations to limit their airlines service to Cuba and to withhold transit rights to Soviet aircraft serving Cuba.

7. Persuasion of Latin American nations to limit the travel of their nationals to Cuba and to intensify measures to prevent agents and groups of international communism from carrying on their subversive activities.

8. Persuasion of appropriate OAS organs to study urgently the transfer of funds to the other American Republics for subversive purposes, the plan of subversive propaganda and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive techniques; and to make recommendations to the member states regarding counter-measures.

9. Maintenance of currently enhanced VOA medium wave facilities beamed to Cuba and adoption by VOA of a more aggressive line toward Cuba.

10. Facilitation of Cuban exiles' entry into the United States Armed Forces for training, and formation of reserve units thereafter.

Timing

We should surface our program of isolating and weakening Cuba when it becomes clear that our discussions on Cuba with the Soviets are unlikely to be fruitful. Actions with respect to Cuba which may contribute substantially to creating a situation calling for United States military action should be withheld until the Soviet combat units have been removed from Cuba or efforts to persuade the USSR to remove them have failed.

Annex A/5/

Covert Courses of Action

/5/Top Secret. Drafted on December 1 although no drafter is indicated.

1. Support fully the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within, in order that they may: a) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, b) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime.

2. Continue to support the Cuban Revolutionary Council in its efforts to maintain a degree of order and unity in the Cuban exile community.

3. Assist selected Cuban exile groups to encourage the Cuban people to engage in minor acts of sabotage.

4. Utilize selected Cuban exiles to sabotage key Cuban installations in such a manner that the action can plausibly be attributed to Cubans in Cuba.
5. Sabotage Cuban cargo and shipping, and Bloc cargo and shipping to Cuba.
6. Encourage the defection of Cuban diplomats, officials and delegates abroad.
7. Continue to assist and guide Cuban exiles in their radio broadcasts to Cuba.
8. Encourage and assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters to Cuba.
9. Develop more fully a clandestine "Voice of Free Cuba" radio capability either in Cuba or from a submarine in international waters.
10. Develop more fully a capability for covertly intruding upon Cuban television broadcasts.
11. Unless future developments warrant change, emphasize the following themes in covert propaganda output: a) the need to return to the original aims of the Cuban revolution; b) the Castro regime's betrayal of these aims; and, c) Castro, as a pawn in the Soviet expansionist game, having subordinated Cuba's national interests to those of the USSR.
12. Assist, through subsidy if necessary, non-Bloc importers of Cuban sugar to find alternative sources of supply.

232. National Security Action Memorandum No. 208

Washington, December 6, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 208. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Information copies were sent to the other members of the Executive Committee.

TO

The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Cuban Overflights

The President has approved the attached Guidelines for the Planning of the Cuban Overflights and would like to have an estimate of the adequacy of such a system of intelligence collection to meet the criteria set forth, on the assumption that it is supplemented by energetic collection of information by all other available means.

McG. B.

Attachment

Washington, December 4, 1962.

GUIDELINES FOR THE PLANNING OF CUBAN OVERFLIGHTS

This memorandum indicates the kinds of information the United States Government now needs to obtain with

respect to the situation in Cuba, from the point of view of overall policy.

1. The United States Government has a high priority need for evidence of the deployment of offensive weapons systems in Cuba.
2. The United States has a priority need for continuing and reliable information with respect to the general order of magnitude, deployment and state of readiness of Soviet military units and installations in Cuba.
3. The United States Government has a need for continued information on the general situation in Cuba--political, military, and economic--but it is assumed that overflight contributions to this end will be by-products of missions undertaken in fulfillment of the needs in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.
4. The United States Government is prepared to use both low-level and high-level reconnaissance, but it is desired that where practicable, necessary intelligence be obtained by a regular schedule of high-level flights, with low-level missions called for on the basis of specific indications of a target of special interest.

233. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 6, 1962, 9 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662. Top Secret; Priority. A note on the source text indicates it was passed to the White House at 10:15 p.m. December 6.

2178. Department pass White House. Eyes only Secretary. Re: Cuba. Reference: Deptel 1511./1/ In mtg with McCloy and Yost this evening Kuznetsov and Mendeleovich, after commenting on preferred changes in US draft declaration, put forward new suggestion as follows: That two sides agree on very brief declarations which would be presented in SC, that SC adopt res concerning these declarations and that points which are not agreed between parties be made in separate statements either in SC or outside. Sovs presented drafts their short declaration and SC res, text of which being transmitted immediately fol tel./2/

/1/Telegram 1511 to USUN, December 6, 2:46 p.m., contained modifications to the draft U.S. statement on Cuba as approved at the NSC's Executive Committee on December 6, (see Document 230). (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662) See the Supplement.

/2/Document 234.

At outset of mtg McCloy referred briefly to complications caused by Cuban declaration/3/ and probability acrimonious squabble in SC resulting therefrom. He then said in attempting to meet points in US draft declaration that Sovs had raised and to reach more or less agreed position we had some new language to propose. He emphasized however that, if Sov declaration which we had not received proves unacceptable, we would have to withdraw our new proposals and simply content ourselves with two separate statements drafted as we thought fit.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 227.

He then went over changes authorized first five numbered paras Deptel 1511. He also suggested that words "have not been fulfilled" at end first sentence para 6 might be changed to "have not been capable of fulfillment."

Sovs continued to object strongly to phrase "offensive weapons systems", claiming that it was as loose and as subject to expansion and misinterpretation as original phrase had been. Kuznetsov said it was definitely unacceptable. He insisted that weapons concerned were only those about which agreement had been reached in exchange of letters between Pres and Khrushchev.

McCloy replied that this was impossible since there are four types of missiles and of bombers as well as submarines, for example, which are clearly offensive weapons systems the introduction of which into Cuba would cause us gravest concern. It finally appeared Sovs might accept some language referring to other weapons "similar" or "comparable" to weapons agreed upon between Pres and Khrushchev, but they continued to maintain new US language was unacceptable.

As to overflights, while recognizing McCloy's statement that new text removed any implication Sovs are approving overflights, Kuznetsov nevertheless declared it maintains same idea and is not acceptable. US wants to get official justification to overfly. Moreover in connection with clause commencing "pending such time", he claimed US does not want any arrangements for international safeguards since it has turned down U Thant plan. He objected strongly to any reference to overflights in declaration and declared it was also unacceptable. McCloy countered with clear exposition why it was essential in US point of view that this reference be maintained.

As to proviso that "Cuba does not commit aggressive acts against any nation in the Western Hemisphere" Kuznetsov said this proviso is not in exchange of letters. McCloy replied Pres could not possibly say he would stand by if Cuba attacked another country with which we have a treaty obligating us to come to its defense. Kuznetsov replied Cuba has offered in protocol not to attack anyone else and that moreover threat is not from but against Cuba, citing Dec 4 attack on Cuban soil by boat containing exiles.

After inquiring whether we really had to put it in, Kuznetsov did not object seriously to new language in regard to US treaty rights.

Concluding discussion on changes in US draft Kuznetsov said that they had not removed main obstacles. McCloy thought we had sincerely tried to meet Sovs half way but that this is best we can do and if we cannot agree on this we must agree to disagree.

Kuznetsov thereupon put forward new suggestion reported in opening para this message. He proposed we make our declarations very brief and limit them to agreed points. All other points which either side feels it necessary to make could then be covered in separate statements either inside or outside UN.

He then went over US draft suggesting what might be omitted to make it acceptable to Sovs if we adopted suggestion of shorter form. These omissions were as fol: Two numbered paras quoted from Pres' letter of Oct 27; in next para reference only to medium and not intermediate-range missiles (it appears same Russian word applies to both these two); omit sentence concerning Sov military units and personnel; in next para omit whole of first sentence commencing "The undertakings in the President's letter"; in next sentence omit word "substantial"; in fol para omit words "to date"; in fol para omit two provisos so that pertinent portion would read "the US further gives assurances that it does not intend, as the President made clear" etc; omit whole of next para. He concluded he would consult about new language our final para.

Kuznetsov reiterated argument that new procedure he proposed would raise both sides of difficulties in reaching agreement which had emerged from discussion US draft. The points not agreed could be sure they were not "too odious". This procedure would also take care of Cuban declaration which he understood would not be agreed.

McCloy concluded by saying he was disappointed in response to our new proposals. He emphasized again that they were in any case dependent on our reaching agreement and would have to be withdrawn if there is no agreement. He pointed out we were going far in giving our assurance against invasion without any arrangements for on-site inspection. This of course further underlined necessity for overflights.

Also in conclusion Kuznetsov indicated that new Sov suggestion had been put forward by Khrushchev with view to making settlement easier for both sides. He thought however SC should adopt res and that mere consensus statement by Chairman would not be enough. It was important for peace of world that we go as far as possible in

settlement of Cuban question and that parties therefore continue negotiations normalize situation. McCloy remarked again that we do not intend to negotiate with Castro in framework this transaction though of course would negotiate willingly with him if he showed signs of wishing to live in peace in this hemisphere. He noted however US and Sovs had achieved good momentum in these negotiations and urged it be maintained and carried forward to other problems. Kuznetsov agreed.

Yost

234. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 6, 1962, 9 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662. Top Secret; Priority. A note on the source text indicates it was passed to the White House at 10:29 p.m. December 6.

2179. Dept pass White House. Eyes only Secretary. Re: Cuba. Fol is text of draft declaration and draft res referred to in ourtel 2178:/1/

/1/Document 233.

Draft declaration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Security Council

Being guided by the interests of strengthening peace throughout the world and seeking to conclude peaceful settlement of the dangerous crisis in the Caribbean according to an agreement achieved;

Taking into consideration that on November 20, 1962 the Government of the United States terminated all measures it introduced on October 23, 1962 regarding the ships bound for the Republic of Cuba;

Taking further into consideration the statement of the United States Government contained in its declaration of . . . 1962 to the effect that the United States will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba and that it is convinced that other countries of the Western Hemisphere will act likewise;

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics states the following:

1. All weapons, regarding the dismantling and withdrawal of which from the Cuban territory an agreement was reached between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the United States with the consent of the Government of the Republic of Cuba, have by this time been removed from the territory of Cuba and returned to the Soviet Union.
2. Such weapons shall not be introduced by the USSR in the territory of the Republic of Cuba.
3. The USSR Government proceeds from the premise that negotiations will continue between parties concerned on the questions connected with further normalization of the situation in the Caribbean with the purpose of working out mutually acceptable solutions.

The Security Council,

Expressing its approval of the understanding reached on the measures for peaceful settlement of the crisis in the Caribbean in the negotiations between the parties concerned with the active participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations;

Takes note of the declarations of the sides dated . . . 1962;

Expresses its firm belief that the Governments of the USSR, of the United States and of the Republic of Cuba will strictly fulfill the assumed obligations;

Calls upon the parties concerned to continue negotiations with the purpose of working out mutually acceptable solutions to the questions related to further normalization of the situation in the Caribbean area.

Yost

235. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 7, 1962, 1 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-162. Top Secret; Priority. A note on the source text indicates it was passed to the White House.

2183. Dept pass White House. Eyes only for Secretary. Re: Cuba. While new Soviet texts need important revisions, we believe basic idea of short agreed declarations by US and USSR in SC plus fuller unagreed statements, either in SC or outside, has much to commend it. We do not believe, however, we should agree to Cuba making an agreed declaration (as Soviet position implies) since this would complicate negotiations greatly and provide status as third party which we have refused for good reasons so far. Cuba would of course make unagreed statement on same basis as US and USSR. We should ask USSR to provide US copy in advance to assure it will not be too obnoxious.

This procedure would meet objective of closing up transaction on relatively harmonious note, and thus maintaining momentum for possible subsequent agreements on other subjects, while at same time giving us freedom of action to say what needs be said on matters which are not agreed. Since Cubans, and, we suspect, Soviets, will be making their unagreed statements in SC rather than outside, US should be prepared to do likewise.

What would seem to us at first reading to be most important to correct in Soviet draft declaration would be (1) too narrow definition of weapons which will not be reintroduced, and (2) indications that "parties concerned", including both Soviets and Cuba, will continue negots for "normalizing" situation in Caribbean and (3) lack ref to Khrushchev-Kennedy letters. Second observation applies a fortiori to last para Soviet draft res.

We would much prefer end SC exercise with consensus statement by SC Pres, though Soviets have so far insisted this is not enough. Believe we should argue this point, possibly being willing concede to res in last analysis, trading this for satisfactory substance.

If we accept short declaration idea, we could presumably relegate to our separate unagreed statement in SC some of points to which Sovs object, such as references to overflights and Sov military personnel. However others, such as provisos attached to non-invasion assurance, as well as ref to treaty obligations, would have to be retained in our agreed declaration.

We are preparing redrafts of US and USSR agreed declarations, US unilateral statement, and consensus statement and will forward them later today./1/

/1/Document 237.

Stevenson

236. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

Washington, December 7, 1962, 1:54 p.m.

//Source: Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office Files, Secretary of Defense's Cable Files, Cuba, December 1962. Top Secret. Repeated to the Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Commander of the Air Forces, Atlantic, and Commander of Army, Atlantic.

7742. Ref: CINCLANT message DTG 021702Z Nov 62./1/

/1/This telegram, not found, was apparently a request for planning for the use of nuclear weapons.

1. The JCS concur that planning should proceed for employment of nuclear weapons for limited war operations in the Cuban area.
2. In developing these plans the application of force must be selective and discriminating in relation to the objective to be achieved. Collateral damage to nonmilitary facilities and population casualties will be held to a minimum consistent with military necessity.
3. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
4. In view of the above, the recommendations contained in paragraph 3 of reference message are approved for planning purposes. Request the JCS be advised promptly of any case where these limitations with respect to weapon yield or height of burst prevent the accomplishment of the military objectives.

237. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 7, 1962, 8 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-762. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates it was passed to the White House at 8:35 p.m. December 7 and to principal officers of the Executive Committee.

2189. Dept pass White House. Eyes only for Secretary. Cuba.

1. Following are preliminary (A) US draft declaration, (B) revised Sov declaration, (C) elements of supplementary US statement including essentially sections taken out of present text US declaration, and (D) draft consensus statement by SC Pres in accordance mytel 2183./1/

/1/Document 235.

2. In its proposal of last night USSR is in effect asking us to agree that they have now fulfilled all of their undertakings therefore that US assurance should be categorical, and to maximize future obligation of US through SC res that would transform our assurance into decision of SC.
3. To achieve these purposes they suppress references to exchange of letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev in preference for references to subsequent agreements worked out in negotiations, thus eliminating all reference in their statement to verification; they also seek to revise our declaration to imply that verification has been complied with. They also are seeking to write Cuba into picture as much as possible, including support for future negotiations on "normalization" of Caribbean. Sov draft res, by approving declarations, but with no notice taken of supplemental statements would leave us in difficult future situation on overflights, Sov military personnel in Cuba and other problems.
4. It seems to us our objective should continue to be to draw line under current crisis but only on contingent

basis, and retain statement in our declaration that USSR has not fulfilled all undertakings which is justification for our continued overflights and for qualifications we place on no invasion assurance. For same reason we should keep SC action to minimum possible. Draft consensus statement we have prepared therefore is only expression of attitude of SC and not of approval or decision.

5. We have also deleted references in Sov declaration and in res to continued negotiations to normalize situation in Caribbean. We have done this on assumption USSR means Castro's five points and that negotiations on political settlement in Caribbean is unacceptable either with Russians or with Cubans. In light size and sophistication Sov military presence, which apparently will continue in Cuba even after present crisis is settled, however, we may want to consider whether further negotiations of some sort around this issue might be foreshadowed. If so some appropriate wording might go into our "statement".

(A) US draft declaration

In letters of President Kennedy on October 27 and of Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy on October 28, 1962,^{/2/} firm undertakings were made regarding the settlement of the Cuban crisis.

^{/2/}See Documents 95, 102, and 104.

In connection therewith the United States notes the declaration of the Soviet Union today that all weapons, on which agreement was reached in accordance with the undertaking, have been removed from Cuba and returned to the Soviet Union and that the sites have been dismantled. The United States notes further the declaration of the USSR that no weapons of this nature, that is, offensive weapons systems, will be introduced by the USSR in the territory of the Republic of Cuba. We welcome these assurances.

While the undertakings that the United Nations would be enabled to verify the removal of missiles and bombers and the destruction of sites and that suitable United Nations safeguards would be agreed upon to ensure against further introduction into Cuba of weapons systems capable of offensive use have not been capable of being fulfilled, a procedure was arranged in cooperation with the USSR, under which the United States has verified that Soviet vessels leaving Cuba have carried away the number of missiles and IL-28 bombers which the USSR certified as having been in Cuba.

In view of the substantial steps that have been taken by the Soviet Union in implementation of the undertakings and in the hope that a termination of the present crisis will lead toward progress on other issues:

The United States on its part, as of November 20, 1962, lifted the quarantine instituted on October 23, 1962, and the United States further gives assurance that, provided no nuclear weapons and no offensive weapons systems are present in or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not commit aggressive acts against any nation of the Western Hemisphere, it does not intend, as the President made clear at this press conference on November 20, to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

The undertakings stated herein do not alter or impair the rights and obligations under all existing treaties to which the United States is a party.

(B) Revised Soviet declaration

Being guided by the interests of strengthening peace throughout the world and seeking to conclude peaceful settlement of the dangerous crisis in the Caribbean according to undertakings reached in letters of President Kennedy on October 27 and of President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev on October 28, 1962;

Taking into consideration that on November 20, 1962 the Government of the United States suspended the quarantine it introduced on October 23, 1962 regarding the ships bound for the Republic of Cuba;

Taking further into consideration the statement of the United States Government as contained in its declaration of (blank) 1962 to the effect that the United States will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba;

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics states the following:

1. All weapons regarding the dismantling and withdrawal of which from Cuba agreement was reached in accordance with the undertakings between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, have, with the consent of the Government of the Republic of Cuba, by this time been removed from Cuba and returned to the Soviet Union, and all the sites dismantled.
2. Weapons of this nature shall not in the future be introduced by the USSR into Cuba.

(C) Elements of supplementary US statement

The undertakings to which this declaration refers were stated in President Kennedy's letter of October 27 along the following lines:

1. The USSR would agree to remove from Cuba, under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision, all weapons systems capable of offensive use and would undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.
2. The United States would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--(A) to remove promptly the quarantine measure now in effect, and (B) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. The President also expressed his confidence that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

In addition to the removal of those weapons systems capable of offensive use to which I have already referred, the US takes note of the stated intention of the USSR to withdraw all military units and personnel placed in Cuba for the servicing or guarding of these weapons systems.

The United States regrets that the undertakings for United Nations verification of the removal of missiles and bombers and destruction of sites, and for suitable United Nations safeguards against further introduction into Cuba of weapons systems capable of offensive use have not been capable of being fulfilled. In the absence of such fulfillment the United States will employ such other means of observation and verification as may be necessary to ensure that no such weapons are present or introduced into Cuba.

We earnestly trust that this session of the Security Council marks the achievement of a peaceful solution of the crisis caused by the introduction of offensive weapons systems into Cuba, and that the door to a solution of other outstanding problems might now be opened.

[The United States will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall one day be truly free.]/3/

/3/Brackets in the source text.

(Other elements might have to be added after we see Soviet and Cuban statements. Last para suggested on assumption their statements would necessitate it.)

(D) Draft consensus statement

The President and the Security Council:

Members will have taken note of the declaration and statements made by the representatives of the United States of America, and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with respect to the Cuban crisis which gave rise to the Security Council meeting of October 23, 1962, as well as the statements of the Secretary General, and by members of the Council and Cuba.

I am confident that all members of the Council will join me in an expression of satisfaction that the crisis the world has recently faced in the Caribbean has been terminated through direct negotiations with the active participation of the Secretary General, and of earnest hope that the door is now open to the solution of other outstanding problems.

Stevenson

238. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)

Washington, December 8, 1962, 11 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 72 D 242, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.

G: My reaction to this latest set of messages from New York/1/ has not been one of immediately going along with it.

/1/Apparent reference to Documents 235 and 237.

GB: No, I think it is terrible. It seems to me they have gone directly contrary to what we agreed at the Ex Com meeting also. As a matter of fact, there is a message in from the President to that effect--which Brom Smith was going to pass on to you./2/

/2/No written record of this message has been found.

G: He called me.

GB: He had already drawn up over here, even before we got these messages down, some instructions/3/ which attempted, based on our conversation with McCloy, that said in effect since the Soviet Union is taking this line which means watering down what we feel are essential reservations and trying to get them out in a way where they wouldn't be nearly effective that we just can't buy this and that a move ought to be made now to fold this up as quickly as possible on a basis of unagreed statements, preferably filed with the Security Council. There are really three possibilities: (1) is unagreed statements filed with the Security Council; (2) a meeting of the SC in which these statements would be made orally; and (3) nothing done in the SC but simply to go back to a press statement and reaffirmation. Of those three the first is the one we would strongly support.

/3/Apparent reference to a draft telegram to USUN, December 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662) See the Supplement.

G: I would also choose in that order.

GB: What we think is the meeting of the SC is not a good idea. I would take one and three against two, because the meeting of the SC would almost certainly mean the Cubans would come in and it would be out of control. I would propose to try to get out this afternoon to the Ex-Com some suggested draft instructions in the hope that those could be the subject for the discussion at the meeting Monday afternoon./4/ Stevenson is coming down for

the meeting because he is going to a concert in Washington that night. I don't think McCloy will be here; but I think we just have to go ahead.

/4/See Document 241.

G: There is no doubt about it all. I was rather surprised, because I thought Jack was so clear that no matter what happened to put in the proviso about overflights and that if we couldn't make any progress with the Soviets on restatement with the changes he had in mind, we would go on other basis. I know he is getting impatient and wants to get back into law practice.

GB: I can well understand his feeling, and I think he would like to feel he had folded the thing up now. Any normal good workman would in a situation like this.

G: Sure. We all like to draw lines under things, but this is one where I don't think we're doing any good for ourselves.

GB: I agree. And this is the line which Dean [Rusk] and I are prepared to take, and if it meets with your and Bob's [McNamara] approval, then we will try to circulate something so that you will get it Monday morning./5/

/5/See Document 239.

G: I am sure from a conversation with Bob that he agrees with me. Bob is leaving Monday night and will be there Monday afternoon.

239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, December 8, 1962, 7:23 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/12-862. Top Secret. Drafted and approved by Cleveland.

MISUN 22. Eyes only Stevenson, McCloy and Yost from Cleveland. Following is draft instruction, approved by George Ball, which is being circulated this weekend for consideration by NSC Executive Committee Monday afternoon:

"For Stevenson and McCloy.

1. We have carefully studied report of your meeting with Kuznetsov Dec 6 (urtel 2178),/1/ text suggested Soviet draft declaration and resolution (urtel 2179),/2/ and your suggestions in urtel 2189./3/

/1/Document 233.

/2/Document 234.

/3/Document 237.

2. It emerges clearly that Soviets will not agree to procedure in Security Council which would associate them in any way with our determination continue overflights in absence acceptable international verification arrangements to assure against reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. Numerous Soviet objections to our declaration, unacceptable Cuban declaration, and Soviet rejection our final position on US declaration all attest to this.

3. We believe there is no further advantage to us in attempting reach for 'agreed' statements by further modification of our position, or by prolonging further an essentially sterile negotiating process. Soviet tactics

seem clearly designed to obtain formal US and Security Council acceptance of concept that Khrushchev has fully discharged his obligations under agreement reached in exchange of letters with President October 27, which of course he has not. In addition Soviets obviously hope to squeeze out one more drop of blood from us in form of elaboration of non-invasion guarantee.

4. As far as we are concerned, the bargain on Cuba has already been struck on the basis defined in the President's November 20 press conference statement. In return for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles and IL-28's, we have lifted the quarantine. We have also made the declaration of non-invasion in President's press conference of November 20. We do not intend to go any further on substance without acceptable safeguards arrangements assuring compliance with Soviet promise not to reintroduce offensive weapons systems into Cuba, which have not been obtained and may be unobtainable.

5. Proposal (urtel 2189) to have Security Council meeting at which agreed material would be expressed in agreed statements, and disagreed material would be expressed separately in disagreed statements, does not appear to be an exit from this box. If differentiation between two kinds of declarations, agreed and disagreed, is designed to be a matter of substance--that is, if agreed declarations thereby acquire more standing than the disagreed declarations--then it would obviously be very bad from US standpoint to declare our intention to continue air surveillance in a manner which accords it only second-class dignity. If, on other hand, the split into two different kinds of declarations is intended to be merely matter of form, then there is no point in having two different kinds of declarations.

6. Accordingly, you should seek meeting with Kuznetsov with a view to settling on one of the following procedures for wrap-up. Procedures are listed in order of strong preference:

(a) Unagreed statements are filed by US and USSR with SYG, who will distribute them to members of SC for information.

(b) Unagreed statements are made by US and USSR separately in whatever public manner they choose. (Ours would be at a Presidential press conference or in statement issued by White House.)

(c) Meeting of SC at which unagreed statements are made by US and USSR.

7. In none of these cases should a Cuban declaration be a part of the scenario. Disadvantage of SC meeting is that it would be impossible not to seat Cuba or to permit Cuban Representative to be heard, presumably at length, on all sorts of matters that are not germane to understanding between the President and Khrushchev. If SC route were taken, Soviets would have to agree at minimum not to take up cudgels on behalf Cuba. This would enable Cuban speech to be made, but not other member of SC would comment on it and it would not be regarded as part of IR-USSR discussion.

8. One tactical question remains: If we are sufficiently sure Soviets would turn down proposal in urtel 2189, it has been suggested that it be given to Soviets on take-it-or-leave-it basis, in order to demonstrate that reasonable terms for agreed declarations are not obtainable. But since we would not ourselves want to get into the double-declaration procedure for reasons outlined above, we do not believe it is desirable to make the offer."

Rusk

240. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, December 10, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. III.

Secret.

We should soon reach a decision regarding the use of Cuban exiles in broadcasts beamed to Cuba. The following is suggested for your consideration.

On the assumption that United States policy toward Cuba will continue to be one of exerting economic pressures and making Soviet support as expensive as possible, it is recommended that Cuban exile broadcasts urging economic sabotage and passive resistance could play a valuable role. This recommendation also assumes that CIA can exercise a certain guidance and control over these broadcasts.

The following considerations would be involved in such a program:

1. The Cuban individuals and groups doing the speaking should be carefully selected for their reputation and credibility with the people in Cuba. Students should do the speaking to students; labor leaders to labor, teachers to teachers, etc.
2. The Cuban audience should be urged to act with care and cautioned against open rebellion. The program would be based upon work slowdowns, purposeful inefficiency, purposeful waste, and relatively safe forms of sabotage. Specific examples of the activities urged would be putting glass and nails on the highways, leaving water running in public buildings, putting sand in machinery, wasting electricity, taking sick leave from work, damaging sugar stalks during the harvest, etc.
3. The program would be strictly attributable to the Cuban exiles with no open participation by USIA or other government agencies. If real results were achieved, the Voice of America could report these as evidence of opposition to the Castro regime through interviews with refugees and extracts from letters.

The advantages of such a program would be: 1) it would lend direct support to the U.S. economic pressures; 2) provide the Cuban exile community, now straining at the bit in inactivity, an outlet for their energies with a potential for real accomplishment; and 3) give the opposition inside Cuba a purposeful line of action not tied to open revolt./1/

/1/In a December 11 memorandum to Murrow, McCone replied that in light of the discussion at the Executive Committee meeting (see Documents 241 and 242) the CIA would resume non-attributable Cuban exile radio broadcasts on or about December 14. (Kennedy Library National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. III)

Edward R. Murrow

241. Summary Record of the 34th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, December 10, 1962, 5:40 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 33-37, 12/4/62-12/17/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 7:12 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

There was a general discussion on how to bring the New York negotiations on Cuba to an acceptable conclusion. Two papers were circulated--a UN plan and a Washington plan./1/

/1/Apparently a reference to Documents 234 and 239.

Ambassador Stevenson reported that the Soviet proposals had been put in at the same time as ours. He handed

to the President a paper listing the advantages and disadvantages of several courses of action.^{/2/} He urged that a Security Council session be called so that the Security Council could be put on notice by means of an unagreed U.S. statement of our intention to overfly Cuba.

^{/2/}Not found.

Mr. McCloy said that there was not much difference in the procedural recommendations but he preferred we try to get one statement agreed with the Russians and disagreed statements from both the U.S. and the USSR. He felt it was better to give one agreed statement and then file our own views in a separate document.

The President said the key part of any statement is the no-invasion assurance. If we could put in no more than a reference to the November 20th press conference statement, this would be acceptable.

Secretary Rusk suggested that both sides make a full statement in the Security Council, revealing their differences, and then introduce a separate paper containing agreed sentences.

Under Secretary Ball argued that we were not anxious to end the Cuban affair because the Cuban problem will continue to be with us. The Soviet military presence remains in Cuba.

Ambassador Thompson argued for a prompt agreement in New York. He thought an agreement would make it easier for Khrushchev to remove the remaining Soviet troops.

Secretary Rusk noted that all we were doing was ending the offensive weapons phase of the problem. The Cuban problem is still with us.

The President asked why we had to take the overflights problem into the Security Council. Mr. McCloy replied that we must cover our no-invasion pledge by stating the exception, i.e., our continuance of overflights. Secretary Rusk noted that the Rio Treaty makes our overflights legal, as spelled out in the OAS Resolution.

Ambassador Stevenson predicted that the Russians would reject our statement, but we should go back to them again and discuss it. Mr. McCloy agreed. If the Russians again rejected our position, then we could go the route of filing separate statements.

Secretary Rusk said it was important to us in Latin America and for our domestic public to get out our full statement. Once we have done this the Soviets could point out what they disagree with.

Ambassador Stevenson read the statement which the Security Council President hoped we and the Russians could accept.^{/3/} The President called attention to the implication that the Cuban crisis was over. He preferred more general language. Mr. Bundy said that if the Soviet presence in Cuba was important to us, we do not want to draw a line under the crisis. How can we give no-invasion assurances if the Soviet military presence remains in Cuba? The President said we do not want to have the Soviets restating our no-invasion statement. Ambassador Stevenson reviewed his position again, calling attention to his telegram and noting that the Soviets expect to conclude the Cuban negotiations in the UN.

^{/3/}U Thant's statement has not been found.

Secretary Rusk said we should be careful not to paper over our disagreement. Our agreement with the Russians is not real. Mr. Ball noted that if a Security Council meeting were held, the Cubans would be given a chance to voice their complaints.

The President favored Secretary Rusk's plan. We should try to get our statement out. We and the Russians could file disagreed statements. We should avoid a Security Council meeting and we should abandon any attempt to get

a consensus in the Security Council because this would be misleading.

Secretary Rusk said that others might try to force us into the Security Council, but they might not if they know we will be unable to agree with the Russians. We might tell Kuznetsov that no agreed statement was possible.

Mr. McCloy said that we cannot throw out entirely Kuznetsov's plan. He urged that we try again to get an agreement with the Russians.

The President said our best position is to go for separate statements filing it with the UN, but without a Security Council meeting. The least desirable position is a Security Council meeting. We could live with agreed/disagreed statements without a Council meeting.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we do not break up the negotiations this week during the plenary session of the Communist Presidium in Moscow. Mr. McCloy hoped that we could record an agreement and Ambassador Stevenson said that if we told the Russians we could not agree on a statement with them, the Russians would not want a Security Council meeting. He said we could create a mood of trying to reach an agreement.

The President expressed his concern that the OAS States and the domestic public opinion, including Congressional opinion, will exert great pressure on the Government in the next few months. We must not go too far down the line of no-invasion assurances. We may have a showdown with the Russians later. We will be going no place on Berlin. Thus, there may be a difference of view among those in New York thinking of the UN climate and those in Washington who are looking at our overall relations with the Russians.

Mr. McCloy said the negotiations in New York would have an effect on worldwide problems.

There followed further discussion of what our position should be in New York. Ambassador Stevenson summarized his view again and Secretary Rusk made clear that our position was to discuss our proposal as well as theirs. The President concluded the discussion by saying we could discuss the Russian plan but we should keep the negotiations out of the Security Council.

In response to a request by Mr. Murrow, the President authorized CIA, in coordination with USIA on policy matters, to resume broadcasts by Cuban refugees on transmitters under Agency contract. Such broadcasts had been forbidden during the earlier phase of the missile crisis./4/

/4/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting stating that there was discussion on how to bring the negotiations in New York to an acceptable conclusion and a decision by the President to resume broadcasts by Cuban refugees to Cuba. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62) See the Supplement.

Bromley Smith/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

242. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, December 10, 1962, 5:30 p.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Executive Committee Meeting--10 Dec 1962--5:30 p.m.

All Present plus Stevenson and McCloy

McCone covered most recent intelligence, indicating no developments, intense study of photography was continuing and then reported on the telegram covering the interview with Ricardo Nunez (IN 32394),/1/ reading and emphasizing the underlined portions. McCone then pointed out to the Committee that Guantanamo involved 7,000 officers and enlisted men, replacement value of \$400 million whereas in current estimates the Soviets had 12,000 officers, enlisted men and technicians and equipment valued in excess of a billion and it appeared very logical to answer the arguments about Guantanamo by emphasizing that the real occupier and the real military threat to Cuba is the Soviets, not the U.S. Note: We should consider ways and means of playing this up on radio and further news media.

/1/Not further identified.

There followed a long discussion which involved a sharp difference between Rusk, Ball, Johnson and Martin on one hand and Stevenson and McCloy on the other as to negotiating procedures to be followed in attempting to reach a sign-off arrangement with Kuznetsov. Stevenson and McCloy wished to take our statement and the Soviets' and attempt to draft a statement in which the areas of agreement were pointed out, and in a second chapter, the areas of disagreement would be set forth. The consensus was that this would be a wrong procedure; that it would down-grade the importance of on-site inspection and continued aerial inspection and it would be misunderstood by the public and Latin American states and therefore was undesirable. The President expressed himself as favoring a presentation of our position with a unilateral presentation by the Soviets with their position (there was some indication that an attempt would be made to reach agreement on these two statements in advance of their publication), and let the Secretary General or the public reach their own conclusions as to where the areas of agreement and disagreement lie. At the end of almost two hours of discussion the disagreement seemed to prevail and, although attempts were made to reconcile the differing opinion, it was my conclusion that in the actual execution of the agreement or the talks with Kuznetsov in the next couple of days there will evolve a procedure favored by Stevenson and McCloy and opposed by the Secretary of State.

Mr. Murrow brought up the question of resuming the clandestine radio broadcasts which had been sponsored by CIA and carried on by the Cuban refugee community. He pointed out to the President that these efforts had been "stood down" following the October 22nd speech and during the complicated negotiations. He strongly recommended that they be reinstated. The President and the Executive Committee approved and instructed CIA to reinstate the broadcasts or to permit the Cuban refugee groups to go right ahead. Action: CIA should act upon this question at once and should report to me as to the actions taken so that I in turn can report to the President.

Note: In the evening at the White House I discussed the meeting with the President and the Attorney General. Both were amused by the argument but obviously somewhat disturbed that such a difference should be brought before the Executive Committee. Undoubtedly the President "heard" Stevenson because of recent publicity. I continue to be concerned over the danger of placing undue reliance on photography. We seem to be drifting into a frame of mind that high-level photography is all we need, that it will show everything that must be seen, that it is preferable to on-site inspection, that really on-site inspection is undesirable because it would be impartially conducted and the institution of it would automatically end over-flights and that there is little to be gained from low over-flights.

I wish General Carter and appropriate members of the staff to consider this very seriously and to discuss it at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NRO to be sure that we are not becoming overly dependent upon aerial photography and so run the risk of making a serious error. I would like this taken up at once and reported back not later than Monday, December 17th. Also I would like to personally discuss this with the Joint Chiefs and the President prior to leaving for the West Coast on December 21st.

John A. McCone/2/

Director

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, December 11, 1962, 7:59 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared by McGeorge Bundy.

1593. Eyes Only Stevenson and McCloy.

1. We have carefully studied report of your meeting with Kuznetsov Dec. 6 (urtel 2178),/1/ text suggested Soviet draft declaration and resolution (urtel 2179),/2/ and your suggestions in urtel 2189./3/

/1/Document 233.

/2/Document 234.

/3/Document 237.

2. You are authorized to seek the agreement of Kuznetsov to the following text of a joint report to be made to the SYG:

"As a result of the exchange of communications between the President of the United States and the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers on October 27-28 arising out of the recent Cuban crisis, the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union wish to make the following report to the Secretary General of the United Nations:

The Soviet Union has stated that it has dismantled all missiles in Cuba which it caused to be erected or was in the course of erecting for the purpose of launching nuclear missiles from Cuba and has removed from Cuba all such missiles which it introduced into Cuba, as well as all the components of such missiles and their launching apparatus. The Soviet Union, in cooperation with the United States, arranged a procedure whereby substantial verification was afforded the United States of the fact that 42 missiles, which the Soviet Union declared was the total number of such missiles introduced into Cuba, have in fact been removed from that island.

The Soviet Union likewise has stated that it has removed 42 IL-28 bombers from Cuba, that being the total of such bombers which the Soviet Union states it introduced into Cuba, and the Soviet Union has made possible a similar means of identification by the United States of the fact that 42 such bombers were in fact removed.

The Soviet Union has also stated that it has removed all nuclear weapons which it previously introduced into Cuba, as well as the components of such weapons.

In connection with the removal of the above-mentioned missiles, bombers, and nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has stated that it will not reintroduce into Cuba those or other weapons systems of a similar or comparable offensive character. The United States has, as of November 20, 1962, lifted the quarantine which it imposed around the island of Cuba on October 24, 1962. This has been done upon the basis of the statements and acts of the Soviet Union above referred to./4/

/4/In telegram 2291 from USUN, December 12, the Mission reported it made several drafting changes in the preceding paragraphs in the interests of shortening the text before submitting it to Kuznetsov. The changes did not affect the substance. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-1262) See the Supplement.

It was contemplated by the above mentioned exchange of letters between the President and the Chairman that there would be created an effective system of international inspection on the island of Cuba so as to verify the dismantling of the sites and the removal of the above-mentioned weapons, as well as to provide safeguards against the further maintenance and introduction of such weapons in Cuba. Apart from the verification procedures above mentioned, it has not been possible thus far to effect an international verification system on the ground, particularly one such as would provide the safeguards against the future maintenance and introduction of such weapons in the island of Cuba.

The President of the United States has stated in his press conference of November 20 that it was not the intention of the United States to invade Cuba provided all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in future, and provided Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

The President of the United States reaffirms his previous statement in this regard and repeats his assurances that the United States has no intention either to invade or support an invasion of Cuba on the above conditions. In reaffirming the President's statement and the assurances referred to above, the United States wishes to make it clear, however, that, pending the installation of an adequate system of international or other effective verification on the island of Cuba to insure against the maintenance and reintroduction of such weapons and weapons systems into Cuba, it intends to employ all necessary means of observation and verification of its own in order to insure against this eventuality.

The Soviet Union, believing that it has substantially complied with the spirit of the exchange of communications between the President and the Chairman above referred to, believes that any further inspection, observation or verification is unnecessary and unjustified, but with this position the United States cannot agree.

Nothing herein contained in any way affects the rights and obligations of any treaty or existing agreements to which either the United States of America or the Soviet Union is a party.

The President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union express the hope that the action taken by the United States and the Soviet Union following the above mentioned exchange of communications to avert the threat of war arising from the Cuban situation will lead to further constructive negotiations between the two countries to adjust the differences existing between them and generally to lessen the tensions which might induce further danger of war."

3. It is hoped that, in negotiating this, it would be possible for you to obtain affirmation, even though not expressed in the above text, of the Soviet intention to remove all Soviet military units from Cuba.

4. This supersedes draft instructions contained Deptel 1580./5/

/5/Telegram 1580 to USUN not seen by the President, authorized Stevenson and McCloy, as a negotiating tactic, to discuss the Soviet proposal for unagreed statements incorporated into a single document with equal status. It informed the mission the United States could not agree to a Security Council resolution and would prefer to avoid a consensus statement, and that Stevenson and McCloy should not agree to a consensus statement without further instructions. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662)

Ball

244. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, December 11, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. III-C, 11/28/62-12/30/62. No classification marking, but the Department of State classified the message Top Secret and Eyes Only. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163) A note on the source text indicated that copies were sent to Ball, Thompson, Robert Kennedy, and U Alexis Johnson. This document was sent to the Soviet Embassy at 2:15 Moscow time, December 10. (*Problems of Communism*, Special Edition, Spring 1992, p. 60)

Dear Mr. President, It would seem that you and we have come now to a final stage in the elimination of tension around Cuba. Our relations are already entering now their formal course since all those means placed by us on the Cuban territory which you considered offensive are withdrawn and you ascertained that to which effect a statement was already made by your side.

That is good. We appreciate that you just as we approached not dogmatically the solution of the question of eliminating the tension which evolved and this enabled us under existing conditions to find also a more flexible form of verification of the withdrawal of the above mentioned means. Understanding and flexibility displayed by you in this matter are highly appreciated by us though our criticism of American imperialism remains in force because that conflict was indeed created by the policy of the United States with regard to Cuba.

More resolute steps should be taken now to move towards finalizing the elimination of this tension, i.e. you on your part should clearly confirm at the U.N. as you did at your press conference and in your messages to me the pledge of non-invasion of Cuba by the United States and your allies having removed reservations which are being introduced now into the U.S. draft declaration in the Security Council and our representatives in New York should come to terms with regard to an agreed wording in the declarations of both powers of the commitments undertaken by them.

I believe that you already had an opportunity to familiarize yourself with the text proposed by us/1/ of a brief declaration of the Soviet Government in which the Soviet Union's main commitments resulting from the exchange of messages between us are formulated. We proceed from the assumption that an analogous brief declaration should be made by the U.S. Government and that the main U.S. commitments resulting from the exchange of messages will also be fixed in it. Have a look, Mr. President, at this proposal submitted by us through your representatives in New York.

/1/See Document 234.

But notwithstanding what the agreement on the concrete texts of our declarations at this concluding stage will be, anyway the basic goal has been achieved and tension removed. I will tell you frankly that we have removed our means from Cuba relying on your assurance that the United States and its allies will not invade Cuba. Those means really had the purpose of defending the sovereignty of Cuba and therefore after your assurance they lost their purpose. We hope and we would like to believe--I spoke of that publicly too, as you know--that you will adhere to the commitments which you have taken, as strictly as we do with regard to our commitments. We, Mr. President, have already fulfilled our commitments concerning the removal of our missiles and IL-28 planes from Cuba and we did it even ahead of time. It is obvious that fulfillment by you of your commitments cannot be as clearly demonstrated as it was done by us since your commitments are of a long-term nature. But it is important to fulfill them and to do everything so that no doubts are sown from the very start that they will not be fulfilled. I already told you at one time that our friends especially those of them who regard us with certain lack of understanding are trying to convince us that imperialism cannot be trusted, that is that you cannot be trusted, as a representative of such capitalist state as the United States of America.

It goes without saying that you and I have different understanding of these questions. I shall not go into details as to what my understanding is because in this regard you and I cannot have common opinion since we are people representing different political poles. But there are things that require common understanding on both sides and such common understanding is possible and even necessary. This is what I would like to tell you about.

Within a short period of time we and you have lived through a rather acute crisis. The acuteness of it was that we and you were already prepared to fight and this would lead to a thermonuclear war. Yes, to a thermonuclear world war with all its dreadful consequences. We took it into account and, being convinced that mankind would never forgive the statesmen who would not exhaust all possibilities to prevent catastrophe, agreed to a compromise although we understood--and we state it now--that your claims had no grounds whatsoever, had no legal basis and represented a manifestation of sheer arbitrariness in international affairs. We agreed to a compromise because our main purpose was to extend a helping hand to the Cuban people in order to exclude the possibility of invasion of Cuba so that Cuba could exist and develop as a free sovereign state. This is our main purpose today, it remains to be our main purpose for tomorrow and we did not and do not pursue any other purposes.

Therefore, Mr. President, everything--the stability in this area and not only in this area but in the entire world--depends on how you will now fulfill the commitments taken by you. Furthermore, it will be now a sort of litmus paper, an indicator whether it is possible to trust if similar difficulties arise in other geographical areas. I think you will agree that if our arrangement for settling the Cuban crisis fails it will undermine a possibility for manoeuvre which you and we would resort to for elimination of danger, a possibility for compromise in the future if similar difficulties arise in other areas of the world, and they really can arise. We attach great significance to all this, and subsequent development will depend on you as President and on the U.S. Government.

We believe that the guarantees for non-invasion of Cuba given by you will be maintained and not only in the period of your stay in the White House, that, to use an expression, goes without saying. We believe that you will be able to receive a mandate at the next election too, that is that you will be the U.S. President for six years, which would appeal to us. At our times, six years in world politics is a long period of time and during that period we could create good conditions for peaceful coexistence on earth and this would be highly appreciated by the peoples of our countries as well as by all other peoples.

Therefore, Mr. President, I would like to express a wish that you follow the right way, as we do, in appraising the situation. Now it is of special importance to provide for the possibility of an exchange of opinion through confidential channels which you and I have set up and which we use. But the confidential nature of our personal relations will depend on whether you fulfill--as we did--the commitments taken by you and give instructions to your representatives in New York to formalize these commitments in appropriate documents. This is needed in order that all the peoples be sure that tension in the Caribbean is a matter of yesterday and that now normal conditions have been really created in the world. And for this it is necessary to fix the assumed commitments in the documents of both sides and register them with the United Nations.

You, Mr. President, do not want to agree with the five conditions put forward by Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba Fidel Castro.² But, indeed, these five principles correspond fully to the provisions of the United Nations Charter which is a legal basis for the relations among states, a sort of foundation for securing peace and peaceful coexistence. I will tell you frankly that such position of yours is surprising. Maybe you have some difficulties. But, Mr. President, we who occupy such responsible position in the world and who are endowed with high trust, have to overcome those difficulties. The peoples will appreciate that because for them it means insuring lasting peace on earth.

In Prime Minister Castro's letter to U Thant, October 28; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Document, 1962, pp. 447-448. 2

I would like to express to you my disapproval of certain things. We read now various articles by your columnists and correspondents and we are concerned that in those articles they are widely commenting on the confidential exchange of opinion and it is being done by the people who as it would seem have no relation to confidential channels set up between us. Judging by the contents of these articles it is clear that their authors are well informed and we get an impression that this is not a result of an accidental leak of the confidential information but a result of benevolence for those people into whose hands gets the information they make public. This evidently is done for the purpose of informing the public in a one-sided way.

Frankly speaking, if we use the confidential communications this way, it will be far from facilitating confidence in those channels. You yourself realize that if your side begins to act in the way that our exchange of opinion by way of confidential channels will leak through fingers these channels will cease to be of use and may even cause harm. But this is up to you. If you consider that those channels have outlived themselves and are of no use any longer, then we also will draw appropriate conclusions in this respect. I tell you this straightforwardly and I would like to know your opinion on this matter. I have been denouncing American imperialism. But on the other hand I consider it useful for us to continue to maintain the possibility of confidential exchange of opinion because a minimum of personal trust is necessary for leading statesmen of both countries and this corresponds to the interests of our countries and peoples, to the interests of peace all over the world.

Let us, Mr. President, eliminate promptly the consequences of the Cuban crisis and get down to solving other questions, and we have them in number. [Here follows portions of the letter dealing with the test ban and the German question; for text, see volume VI, Document 83.]

Please, excuse me for my straightforwardness and frankness but I believe as before that a frank and straightforward exchange of opinion is needed to avoid the worst.

Please, convey to your wife and your whole family wishes of good health from myself, my wife and my entire family./3/

/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.

245. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 12, 1962, 8 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-1262. Top Secret. Priority.

2292. Dept pass White House. Eyes only Secretary. Cuba. Fol is report of three-hour mtg this afternoon Stevenson, McCloy and Yost with Kuznetsov, Mendelevich and Counselor of Sov Emb in Washington./1/

/1/According to a 16-page memorandum of conversation, the meeting took place at the Soviet delegation headquarters and lasted from 2:30 to 5:45 p.m. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, 1B December/January Meetings) Passed to the White House at 9:30 p.m. December 12.

Our impression was that Sovs firmly rejected single joint document on grounds (1) that it contains certain elements, particularly provisos on our no-invasion assurance and reference to overflights, to which they cannot in any form lend their name, and (2) that Cubans would not be participants in this declaration. Sovs continued to express strong preference for SC mtg to terminate affair but we had feeling that this position not unshakable and that they might ultimately agree to filing separate declarations with SYG.

Stevenson opened meeting by saying that he thought it was in interest of both sides to reach maximum possible agreement and to demonstrate to public that we are doing so. To this end it seemed preferable to us, after further consideration, to present single agreed declaration signed by both parties than separate declarations. It also

seemed decidedly preferable to us to submit such declaration to SYG for transmittal to SC Pres rather than to present declarations at SC mtg. It seemed to us inevitable that latter would result in controversy and recriminations and would tend to destroy the effects of partial agreements which we had reached.

McCloy continued by saying that he had just discussed problem thoroughly with President and Secretary and that it is President's desire to end this affair by stressing note of agreement rather than of disagreement. Therefore we have drawn up single document in which agreements and disagreements are equally frankly stated though fact that there is but one document strengthens impression of overall agreement. If there were too many documents, one or two Sov, one or two US and a Cuban, chance of misinterpretation and confusion in public mind would be great. He too stressed dangers involved in SC meeting which we might not be able to control and in which Cubans as well as some SC members would become involved in acrimonious controversy.

McCloy pointed out following major points omitted from Sov draft declaration which we felt must be included: (1) Indication agreement between President and Khrushchev on verification and future safeguards have not been fulfilled, (2) provisos attached to our non-invasion assurance, and (3) our determination to apply own means of verification pending agreement on international arrangements. He also rejected implication in Sov drafts that we are entering into an agreement with Cubans to normalize our relations with them. He then went over draft joint declaration transmitted Deptel 1593 modified as indicated ourtel 2291,^{/2/} emphasizing that, while this draft based on instructions from Washington, it is informal document prepared here and was passed to Sovs at this time as illustrative rather than final text.

^{/2/}See Document 243 and footnote 4 thereto.

McCloy emphasized President's strong feeling that agreed and disagreed elements of our position must have same status and adduced this as further reason for single, joint document or at least single document on each side. He said Cubans could of course file separate declaration if they wished and, if it were not too provocative, we might not have to reply. If there should however be SC meeting in which Cubans spoke there would almost certainly be LA and probably US replies, Sovs would support Cuba, whole history of Cuban crisis would be rehashed and atmosphere of agreement would be destroyed.

In conclusion McCloy made two points (1) that we would wish to include in joint declaration before it was finally approved paragraph in regard to withdrawal Sov military units, and (2) that if we cannot agree on joint declaration and have to file separate declarations we would probably wish to go back in some cases to language used in our earlier drafts.

Kuznetsov replied that he would of course report our new proposal to his govt but that he was convinced idea of single document would not be acceptable. You have your problems, he said, but you should also take ours into account. If there is joint declaration without Cuba, this will not be understood. If there is to be joint declaration it must be on behalf of all three govts. Stevenson and McCloy interjected that this would be entirely unacceptable to US.

Kuznetsov continued by stating that, though our joint draft contained some changes in wording and some new paragraphs, it still contains many points with which Soviet Union does not agree. It would be impossible for Sovs to put their signature on this document since our viewpoints on certain elements differ radically. He claimed sentence commending "it was contemplated by the above-mentioned exchange of letters" was inaccurate insofar as Sovs concerned since Khrushchev in his letter of Oct 27 had made on-site inspection dependent on Cuban agreement. This point had been made many times, Kuznetsov said, issue is closed and he hopes we will not have to come back to it. As to verification for future, Soviet Union is not opposed provided obligations are reciprocal and has therefore supported U Thant plan for inspection throughout Caribbean. Kuznetsov also repeated at length his objections to provisos attached to non-invasion assurance, claiming that they would give us excuse for violating this assurance whenever we desired. As to overflights, he said Sov Union cannot agree to statement of this kind being presented to SC for approval in Soviet Union's name. He claimed paragraph in which it is stated

that Sov Union believes any further inspection, observation or verification unnecessary and unjustified does not represent Sov position.

Kuznetsov then returned to Sov draft declaration and resolution submitted to us Dec 6/3/ and asked why these were not acceptable. There would be agreement, he said, on short drafts and supplementary disagreed statements could be shown by each side to other in order to minimize SC debate. His govt feels it more expedient that declarations be presented to SC rather than to SYG since subject was raised with SC at beginning of crisis. He was disturbed at McCloy's statement that, if we cannot agree on joint declaration, US will go back to earlier and worse wording in separate declarations. He urged negotiations be carried on sincerely and on the basis of the greatest possible degree of mutual agreement. Our two countries face many important international problems on solution of which destiny of peace depends and manner in which we deal with Cuban problem will affect solution of all others. President and Khrushchev have shown wisdom and patience in solution of this dangerous crisis and it is most important it be wound up in same spirit.

/3/See Document 234.

Stevenson went over again advantages of joint declaration over single declaration and of filing with SYG rather than of presenting to SC. If we should go to SC he foresaw great difficulty of working out res acceptable to both sides and suggested consensus statement would be decidedly preferable.

Kuznetsov reiterated his objection to joint declaration and argued in favor of two separate declarations as closely agreed as possible. He agreed to consider again whether SC meeting or more filing of declarations with SYG would be preferable.

McCloy emphasized Sovs had no need to worry about US not fulfilling its obligations. It would certainly do so and that was why it was insisting on citing them fully and clearly. It was impossible for US to give assurance against invasion without provisos which we had included. As to going back to earlier language in case there is no agreement on this document he pointed out he had been authorized to modify our language in some cases in order to obtain agreement, but that if no agreement were reached and separate disagreed declarations were filed, he had previously made it clear we would feel free to revert to some of our earlier language.

There was some discussion of the phrase "those or other weapons systems of a similar or comparable and offensive character". Kuznetsov wished to substitute "those or similar weapons". He objected particularly to the word "offensive". McCloy said he would consider whether the word "offensive" could be dropped leaving the words "similar or comparable" but said he could make no commitment on this score. McCloy also referred at some length to dangers of aggressive acts by Castro, recent Che Guevara interview in London Daily Worker/4/ which underlined necessity for second of our provisos on non-invasion assurances.

/4/In this interview on December 4 Che Guevara promised subversion in the rest of Latin America based on and inspired by the Cuban model. (Telegram 1531 from London, December 7; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-762)

Meeting concluded with further expanded discussion of procedures in which it once more appeared clear Sovs would not accept single declaration but would press at least for two declarations as closely agreed as possible.

Sovs continued to express preference for SC meeting but were less strong on this point. US side made it clear that if there were SC mtg it could only end in consensus statement more or less along lines of that proposal shown to them. Kuznetsov quoted Khrushchev's statement at today's Supreme Soviet mtg in favor of rapid conclusion of negotiations and sealing the agreement under authority of UN.

Meeting concluded with understanding that Soviets would get in touch with us when they had obtained Moscow reaction to our latest proposals.

Stevenson

246. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central Intelligence McCone and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)

Washington, December 14, 1962, 12:30 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.

McCone said that the negotiation of Donovan seems to be coming to a head. The President wants the Attorney General to go down because he now has commitments to cover the Castro list. McCone further said that this raises a problem of how to get down there because there is no transportation. McCone suggested, last night, that his Sanchez, head of the Family Committee, call Beratta, a close adviser of Castro's--that woman who has been described in various reports as being his advisor, his secretary or his mistress--can arrange for him to come down. McCone said that if he comes down, they would allow him in and then we would have him charter a Pan American plane and fly down there. McCone doesn't know how this will work out, but it is about the only way to do it. Ball agreed.

McCone said that he thinks this should be done rather overtly; last time it was done very secretly, and Ball had no objection to it being done overtly. McCone said the reason he thinks it ought to be done overtly is because there is no government involvement here. The second thing is that we have been freezing the three Cuban defectors, and there have been some very significant reports. He said that Hilsman has them.

McCone said that an appraisal of Soviet intentions had been made which he would like Ball to take a look at. McCone thinks that some place along the line, they are either going to take a shot at one of our birds or threaten to do so. It might be that we might be able to prevent it by some kind of a leak or statement at Ball's level or at the President's level that we have to carry this on and if they take a shot at one of those birds, we are going to have to take such action as is appropriate. Ball said that that is not a bad idea. McCone asked if Ball would give a little thought to it.

247. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, December 14, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. II, 11/20/62-12/14/62. No classification marking.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I was glad to have your message of December 11/1/ and to know that you believe, as we do, that we have come to the final stage of the Cuban affair between us, the settlement of which will have significance for our future relations and for our ability to overcome other difficulties. I wish to thank you for your expression of appreciation of the understanding and flexibility we have tried to display.

/1/Document 244.

I have followed with close attention the negotiations on the final settlement of the Cuban question between your representative, Mr. Kuznetsov, and our representatives, Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy, in New York. In these negotiations we have tried to understand your position and I am glad to note that Mr. Kuznetsov has also shown effort to understand our problems. It is clearly in the interest of both sides that we reach agreement on how finally to dispose of the Cuban crisis. To this end, Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy presented on Wednesday a new draft of a joint statement which by now has certainly reached you./2/ I wish to assure you that

it is our purpose to end this affair as simply and clearly as possible.

/2/See Document 243.

You refer to the importance of my statements on an invasion of Cuba and of our intention to fulfill them, so that no doubts are sown from the very start. I have already stated my position publicly in my press conference on November 20th, and I am glad that this statement appears to have your understanding; we have never wanted to be driven by the acts of others into war in Cuba. The other side of the coin, however, is that we do need to have adequate assurances that all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and are not reintroduced, and that Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. As I understand you, you feel confident that Cuba will not in fact engage in such aggressive acts, and of course I already have your own assurance about the offensive weapons. So I myself should suppose that you could accept our position--but it is probably better to leave final discussion of these matters to our representatives in New York. I quite agree with you that the larger part of the crisis has now been ended and we should not permit others to stand in the way of promptly settling the rest without further acrimony.

With regard to your reference to the confidential channels set up between us, I can assure you that I value them. I have not concealed from you that it was a serious disappointment to me that dangerously misleading information should have come through these channels before the recent crisis. You may also wish to know that by an accident or misunderstanding one of your diplomats appears to have used a representative of a private television network as a channel to us. This is always unwise in our country, where the members of the press often insist on printing at some later time what they may learn privately.

Because our systems are so different, you may not be fully familiar with the practices of the American press. The competition for news in this country is fierce. A number of the competitors are not great admirers of my Administration, and perhaps an even larger number are not wholly friendly to yours. Here in Washington we have 1200 reporters accredited to the White House alone, and thousands more in other assignments. Not one of them is accountable to this government for what he reports. It would be a great mistake to think that what appears in newspapers and magazines necessarily has anything to do with the policy and purpose of this government. I am glad to say that I have some friends among newspapermen, but no spokesmen.

But let me emphasize again that we do indeed value these confidential channels. I entirely share your view that some trust is necessary for leading statesmen of our two countries; I believe that it is important to build the area of trust wherever possible. I shall of course continue to hold and to express my convictions about the relative merits of our systems of government, and I will not be surprised if you do the same.

In particular, we have been very glad to have opportunities for private exchanges with and through Mr. Bolshakov, and I am sorry to learn that he is returning to Moscow. It is our impression that he has made a real effort to improve communications and understanding between our two governments, and we shall miss him very much.

I appreciate your writing me so frankly, and in return I have tried to be as straightforward, for I agree with you that only through such frank exchanges can we better understand our respective points of view. Partly for this reason I refrained in my last press conference from commenting on certain aspects of your speech before the Supreme Soviet with which you realize, of course, we could not agree.

We also are hopeful that once the Cuban crisis is behind us, we shall be able to tackle the other problems confronting us and to find the path to their solution.

[Here follow 2 paragraphs on the test ban and the German question; for text, see volume VI, pages 231-233.]

Thank you for your expressions of good wishes to me and my family, and let me in turn send you and your wife

and family our personal good wishes for the coming year./3/

/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.

248. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, December 15, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 208. Top Secret.

This memorandum is in reference to NSAM #208 dated December 6 transmitting a memorandum entitled "Guidelines for the planning of Cuban overflights",/1/ and requesting "An estimate of the adequacy of such a system of intelligence collection to meet the criteria set forth . . ."

/1/Document 232.

On December 6, I wrote to you/2/ stating that I was of the opinion that two regularly scheduled U-2 missions per day would reasonably satisfy the requirements, with the understanding that postponed flights, because of weather, would be flown when weather permitted, and with the further understanding that low-level flights would be requested if considered necessary because of a special interest in targets or protracted postponement of the high level missions.

/2/Not found.

With reference to the assumption expressed in NSAM #208 that an energetic program for the collection of information by all other available means would be used to supplement photography, the United States Intelligence Board has considered these carefully.

I can report to you that:

- (a) CIA is increasing its effort in a variety of ways, including an expanded use of agents, legal travellers, refugee interrogations both in this country and in other countries, and through liaison arrangements with third countries. In addition, CIA is prepared to endeavor to insert additional intelligence collecting teams as soon as policy decisions are reached in this respect.
- (b) NSA will continue an intensive program in the SIGINT field which has during recent weeks added materially to all other intelligence.
- (c) The United States Intelligence Board has also considered ways for more energetic utilization of resources available in the military services, most particularly the Army and the Navy, and will take such actions as might be appropriate to increase their unilateral activities without duplicating the activities of CIA.

I think the combination of the photography and other measures can give us a reasonably satisfactory body of intelligence. However, it will not, in my opinion, be totally satisfactory nor as dependable as an arrangement for well organized on-site inspection, which is politically not attainable at the present time.

John A. McCone

249. Summary Record of the 36th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, December 17, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62. Top Secret. The meeting lasted until 12:28 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

Director McCone presented intelligence summaries on Cuba and on the Congo.

The President sent instructions to Mr. McCloy in New York to remind the Russians of our often repeated statement that if any U.S. planes are attacked over Cuba we will retaliate./1/ The instructions grew out of a discussion of whether the President, at his next press conference, should make public our position to retaliate if our reconnaissance planes were attacked. The repeated warning is to be done as a reminder of our position, not as if we were making a new point.

/1/See Document 252. McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting. The actions relating to the discussion of Cuba indicated that McCone presented a current intelligence summary and the President asked Rusk to instruct McCloy to remind the representatives of the Soviet Union in New York that if U.S. planes were attacked over Cuba, the United States would retaliate. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62)

The President commented on the rise in the price of sugar which is benefiting Cuba. He asked whether there was anything that could be done about this but was told that the price was set by the world market and was not easily affected./2/

/2/The CIA sent OCI No. 3622/62, December 16, "Rising World Sugar Prices and the Effect on Cuba," to the White House on December 20. The conclusions of the memorandum were that sugar market was tight and Cuba would benefit economically. (Ibid., Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. III) See the Supplement.

Secretary Rusk summarized his recent meeting with the NATO Council in Paris. He said the NATO powers expressed great satisfaction with the way the Cuban missile crisis had been handled. De Gaulle had the same view.

With respect to NATO problems, Secretary Rusk said he had stressed the need for increased European continental forces. NATO is marking time on organization problems and on nuclear questions pending the completion of the Common Market negotiations. The NATO meeting was so placid that reporters had to resort to sensationalized stories.

Returning to Cuba, Secretary Rusk said there was no sense of urgency. The Russians apparently want more time prior to deciding what to do in New York. We appeared to be heading toward separate statements on the Cuban crisis.

The remainder of the meeting was taken up with the discussion of a Congo plan and policy recommendations of the Subcommittee on South Asia.

Bromley Smith/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

250. Editorial Note

The 37th meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council was held at 3:45 p.m., December 17, 1962. According to Bromley Smith's summary record:

"At the conclusion of the meeting there was a discussion of the U.S. statement which was to be released if it is decided to make separate and disagreed U.S./USSR statement on Cuba to the UN."

"Ambassador Stevenson handed to the President a draft of the proposed statement. The President received it, saying that he would make a decision later in that day."

McGeorge Bundy's record of action of the meeting states:

"A U.S. statement for use in the event it is decided to make separate and disagreed U.S. and USSR statements on Cuba to the UN Secretary General was revised and agreed upon." (Both December 17; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62)

The draft statement discussed and approved at the Executive Committee was sent to the Mission at the United Nations; see Document 251.

[end of document]



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume XI
Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, December 17, 1962, 9 p.m.

//Source: USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002, Incoming Telegram (TS, exdis, etc.) 1962. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

1677. Following is approved text of statement US would make in event Soviets prefer two separate statements rather than one joint statement that includes both agreed and disagreed points. This text reflects changes suggested by McCloy to Cleveland December 16/1/ and changes agreed with Stevenson in Washington December 17./2/ While this text can be used with Soviets at your discretion, we assume next move is still up to Kuznetsov, whose reaction to December 12 draft of joint statement/3/ we still await.

/1/No record of those suggestions were found.

/2/See Document 249.

/3/See Document 243.

Begin text

As a result of the exchange of communications between the President of the United States and the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers on October 27-28, 1962, arising out of the recent Cuban crisis, the Representative of the United States wishes to make the following report to the Secretary General of the United Nations:

The United States takes note of the statement of the USSR that it has dismantled all of the missile sites and that it has removed from Cuba all of the missiles, all of the IL-28 bombers, and all nuclear weapons, missile components, and launching apparatus. It also takes note of the statement of the USSR that it will not reintroduce into Cuba those or other weapons systems of similar or comparable character. The United States also notes that in connection with the removal of the above-mentioned weapons, the Soviet Union has stated its intention to withdraw all military units and personnel placed in Cuba for the servicing or guarding of these weapons systems.

The United States wishes to inform the Secretary General that on the basis of such statements and acts the United States on November 20, 1962 lifted the quarantine which it had imposed around the Island of Cuba on October 24, 1962.

It was contemplated by the above-mentioned exchange of letters between the President and the Chairman that

there would be created an effective system of international inspection in Cuba to verify the dismantling of the missile sites and the removal of the weapons, and to provide suitable safeguards against the further maintenance and introduction of such weapons in Cuba.

A procedure was arranged between the USSR and the United States for verification at sea of the removal of the missiles and bombers which the Soviet Union declared it had introduced into Cuba. However, it has not been possible thus far to effect on the ground the contemplated international system of verification and safeguards.

Pending the installation of such a system to insure against the maintenance and reintroduction of such weapons and weapons systems into Cuba, the United States is compelled to continue to employ the means of observation and verification it has found necessary.

The President of the United States stated at a press conference on November 20 that provided all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in future, and provided Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere, it was not the intention of the United States to invade Cuba.

The President of the United States reaffirms his previous statement and repeats his assurance that, subject to the above conditions, the United States has no intention either to invade or support an invasion of Cuba./4/

/4/Confirming a U. Alexis Johnson-McCloy telephone conversation of the morning of December 18, the Department sent a substitute paragraph for paragraphs 7 and 8 in this telegram. The new paragraph reads: "The United States further gives assurance that provided no nuclear weapons or other weapons capable of offensive use are present in or reinforced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, it does not intend, as the President made clear at his press conference on November 20, to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba." (Telegram 1685 to USUN, December 18, 12:27 p.m.; USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002, Incoming Telegram (TS, Exdis, etc.) 1962)

Nothing herein contained in any way affects the rights and obligations of any treaty or existing agreements to which the United States of America is a party.

The President of the United States expresses the hope that the action taken by the United States and the Soviet Union following the above-mentioned exchange of communications to avert the threat of war arising from the Cuban situation will lead to further constructive negotiations between the two countries to adjust the differences existing between them and generally lessen the tensions which might induce further danger of war. *End text.*

Rusk

252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, December 18, 1962, 2:09 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-1862. Top Secret. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared in substance with the President.

1687. Eyes only for Stevenson and McCloy. At a suitable occasion in our negotiations with Kuznetsov and in connection with any discussion with him on the question of our continued reconnaissance, you should express to Kuznetsov our growing concern over fact Soviets are continuing work at and improve anti-aircraft arsenal in Cuba. We are concerned that someone might have the motive of interfering with our reconnaissance. We have made it amply clear to the Soviets that, in the absence of other safeguards, we must and will continue that reconnaissance. We have no desire to return to the days of late October and assume this is also shared by the Soviets. The Soviets must recognize that destruction of American aircraft and loss of American life arising from

this deliberate activity of the Soviet Union could well have such consequences. We hope Kuznetsov will understand that our motive in bringing this to his attention is simply to make sure that there is no misunderstanding on this point. In short, we feel it would be unwise continue this buildup in view of the non-belligerent and non-provocative character and intent of our reconnaissance.

Rusk

253. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 18, 1962, 7:02 p.m.

//Source: USUN Files: FRC 84-84-001, 1-B December/January meetings. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Yost.

2401. Re: Cuba. At meeting this morning Stevenson, McCloy and Yost--Kuznetsov, Mendelevich and Counselor of Sov Emb in Wash, Kuznetsov presented new Sov proposal./1/ Gist of it was that four letters, two from President dated Oct 27 and 28 and two from Khrushchev dated Oct 27 and 28, be registered at UN and passed to SC Pres for distribution to SC members as official UN documents. Cuban Rep would follow same procedure and separately submit statement from his Govt. No SC meeting would be held and no further action would be required or taken.

/1/In a December 18 memorandum to Rusk, Cleveland informed the Secretary of this proposal. Cleveland stated that he talked to McCloy by phone and they agreed it would be appropriate to ask for clarification from Kuznetsov on two points: was it necessary for the Cubans to submit anything as part of the scenario and could the respective two letters be submitted separately by the two delegations? (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-1862) See the Supplement.

Kuznetsov opened meeting by recapitulating history of attempts to work out draft declarations, emphasizing that U.S. drafts of both separate and joint declarations had contained "completely unacceptable" condition to non-invasion assurance which were not contained in exchange of letters between Pres and Khrushchev and that Sovs could not approve in any form statement implying that U.S. has right to overfly Cuba.

Noting that U.S. does not favor SC mtg, Kuznetsov then put forward proposal summarized above.

Stevenson raised two questions. First, he pointed out it was Khrushchev's letter of Oct 26, not his letter of Oct 27, which was referred to in President's letter of Oct 27 and formed basis of agreement. Second, he asked whether Sovs had draft of joint letter to SYG or whether it was purely letter of transmittal.

McCloy noted that Sov proposal omitted any recitation of progress since exchange of letters, such as dismantling and removing of missiles and bombers, lifting of blockade and assurances in Pres's Nov 20 press conference, as well as omitting any reference to points on which agreement not achieved, such as UN verification system and need for U.S. to use own means of verification in absence of system.

Kuznetsov replied that President's Oct 27 letter does refer to Khrushchev's Oct 26 letter but also refers to its fifth para to Khrushchev's Oct 27 letter. Moreover he claimed President's letter of Oct 27 in its substance dealt with points made in Khrushchev's letter of Oct 27 rather than in his Oct 26 letter. He cited President's reference to Sov willingness to withdraw weapons systems and not to reintroduce them in future, which Kuznetsov claimed were specified in Khrushchev's Oct 27 letter.

As to joint letter of transmittal, he said it should be brief and formal and not set forth differences between us. It should be limited to following points:

1. Rep's report they are sending 4 letters;
2. They ask SYG to register letters in UN;
3. They ask SYG to send letters to SC Pres for distribution to SC members as UN documents.

If U.S. accepts proposal Sovs can then within one day prepare draft letter of transmittal for discussion.

As to McCloy's remarks, Kuznetsov said that if we attempt to include in letter of declarations points which have not been agreed, such as that U.S. will continue overflights, then we would be starting negotiations all over again. Sovs cannot be party to any document containing such provision or give impression they approve it. They cannot also agree in any way to making non-invasion assurance condition of Cuba's not threatening other states. New Sov proposal does not mean that all questions concerning Cuba will be settled. Some points we would like to include and some points they would like to include would be omitted.

Stevenson emphasized we had always understood agreement between us rested essentially on two letters, Khrushchev's of Oct 26 and President's of Oct 27 which says Khrushchev's Oct 26 letter provides basis of agreement. It would be inappropriate to include in group of letters constituting our agreement Oct 27 letter to which U.S. never adverted except in connection with future disarmament. Moreover Khrushchev's Oct 27 letter deals with proposal on concurrent action relating to Cuba and Turkey, which was never adopted and which was irrelevant. Moreover Sov proposal omits all account of what has transpired since exchange of letters. He suggested there might possibly be two letters of transmittal. He welcomed efforts to end negotiations quickly but said his first reaction was to be troubled by difficulties he had mentioned.

McCloy added that if only letters proposed were submitted there would be irresistible pressure to publish also Khrushchev Oct 26 letter which was referred to in President's Oct 27 letter. Moreover there is so much discussion in Khrushchev's Oct 27 letter of weapons in Turkey that inclusion of this letter would disturb rather than tranquilize atmosphere. He also repeated his difficulty with the omission of any statement of what has been accomplished on both sides. He pointed out that U.S. has in fact, taking into account President's Nov 20 press conference, carried out all its obligations even though we have not had benefit of on-site inspection. We must therefore continue overflights. Also if we register with UN our intent not to invade we must also register in document of equal dignity our intent continue observation by our own means until other means of verification can be established. He also pointed out that assurance we had offered in various drafts "not to support invasion" goes beyond what is set forth in exchange of letters and was offered in order to meet objections Sovs had raised.

Kuznetsov replied that he had listened attentively to objections but hopes U.N. will carefully study new proposal with view to reaching final solution. We have negotiated for weeks and if we seek to include in documents all points U.S. wants and all points Sovs want, it will be very difficult ever to conclude. Sov idea is not to raise in these documents points on which we cannot agree but to limit ourselves to letters which are already known to world as basis for settlement which has been achieved. They had selected only four letters which were concerned with settlement and which have been published. If U.S. thinks Khrushchev Oct 26 letter should also be published they would consult their govt whether do so. As to references to Turkey in Oct 27 letter, these are nothing new and Sov views in regard to foreign military bases around its borders are well known. Sovs, as concession to U.S. viewpoint, have given up idea of SC meeting and res. Essence of their proposal is to avoid stirring up all of the moot questions we have been discussing for a long time and on which no agreement has been reached. World is already aware of what has been done since letters were exchanged and is reasonably well satisfied. Sovs are still much interested in all of points covered in protocol, normalization of situation in Caribbean, but are not going to insist on inserting them in these documents. As to overflights, U.S. creates vicious circle by repeating it will continue them until international arrangements are established, while at same time it does not state what sort of international system it contemplates and rejects that which has been put forward by U Thant.

In conclusion he repeated his appeal that U.S. think seriously about latest proposal. There has been attempt on

each side to understand position of other side. However, if U.S. insists on putting in documents reference to overflights and conditions as to assurances, we will be once again at very beginning of our negotiations and solution will be far away.

McCloy concluded that we would of course study proposal. However he would not want to give impression through this procedure that we have reached full agreement when in fact we have not. If the documents prove to be inadequate we might find ourselves in position of seeking SC meeting to expound our point of view more fully there. He said he had been more optimistic before this meeting than he now is, as he had hoped we were moving toward separate documents to be submitted to SYG.

Stevenson

254. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, December 19, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-1962. Top Secret. Drafted by Cleveland. Also sent to U. Alexis Johnson.

SUBJECT

Cuba

Mr. McCloy called to report on his luncheon with Kuznetsov today. He will try to do a cable on it later on this evening./1/ Meanwhile, this is my understanding of what he was saying:

/1/Telegram 2416 from USUN, December 19, 5:30 p.m. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, 1-B December/January Meetings) See the Supplement. A 12-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting indicates that the discussion lasted from 11:15 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. and was held in Stevenson's office. (Ibid.)

1. Kuznetsov was "intrigued" with the general idea of separate submissions to the Secretary General of the documents in the public record on Cuba since the last Security Council meeting, which was October 25. Mr. McCloy got the impression that Kuznetsov would favorably recommend our proposal to Moscow.
2. The Soviets continue to be sticky about using the word "register". Assuming there are two separate submissions to the Secretary General, they would presumably use the word "register" in theirs, but we would be free to use any word we wanted to describe our submission. The problem is that the "Prime Minister" (Khrushchev) used the term "register" in "his" correspondence.
3. Kuznetsov "winced" at the idea of the President's November 20 Press Conference being included in our package of documents. He conceded that there was much in the Presidential statement that was good from the Soviet point of view but said that "25% of it is bad", notably the reference to overflights and the provisos on the President's non-invasion assurance.
4. Kuznetsov said that he didn't know whether the Soviet Government would want to publish the October 26 letter. He had reread it and saw nothing discreditable in it, but as we could probably tell, it had a rather special style and was in fact written by Khrushchev himself. Mr. McCloy explained we would have to show this letter to the Congressional leaders on request, since it is referred to in the President's letter of October 27. But, McCloy added, we would not ourselves publish it unless the Soviet Government wants it published.
5. During the discussion of overflights, Mr. McCloy threw in the warning that if any plane is shot down we will

be "right back in October".

6. Kuznetsov was unclear of what the Cuban submission would consist of. He referred vaguely to an early statement by Castro (which might be his long television speech answering the President's original October 22 address) and to a document dated November 13 which we are still trying to identify here./2/

/2/Possible reference to Castro's letter to U Thant, November 15; for text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 459-460.

7. Kuznetsov said he appreciated that we were trying to wind this negotiation up without delay, and that this was also the desire of the Soviets.

255. Circular Telegram to All Latin American Posts

Washington, December 22, 1962, 1:23 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-2262. Limited Official Use; Niact. Drafted by Hurwitch and approved by Martin.

1135. James B. Donovan, private US citizen and counsel for Cuban Families Committee, reported last night Castro signed agreement with him release 1113 Bay of Pigs prisoners on following conditions:

1. Assurances to deliver \$53,000,000 pharmaceuticals, medical supplies and foodstuffs and possibly some related products such as insecticides.
2. Delivery of goods in Habana amounting to 20% of above value before prisoners released.

American Red Cross acting in collaboration Cuban Families Committee has vessel now loading which together with air cargo now being prepared will deliver the 20% by December 23 in order begin airlift prisoners Miami area dawn December 23. Three Cuban Red Cross represent-atives arrived Miami last night to inspect cargo being loaded. Transaction is therefore on Red Cross to Red Cross basis.

Goods donated by US private companies to ARC now total about \$45,000,000; contributions continue to be made. (FYI. If necessary US prepared to make available upon ARC request powdered skim milk from surplus stocks in amount not to exceed about \$10,000,000 which represents less than 10% existing surplus this commodity. Such release can be made within existing statutory authority. End FYI.) These donations by private companies allowable under current tax legislation. Rulings rendered by Internal Revenue re these donations conform to existing regulations and precedent. Private companies have choice under the law between paying taxes on this amount or making charitable contributions (up to 5% of their profits) for tax deduction purposes. This choice entirely theirs.

Inland and overseas freight, insurance, handling costs and labor have been donated by railroads, airlines, steamship lines, trucking companies, insurance companies and labor unions. No USG funds involved. Government role has been essentially to cut red tape in order expedite transaction.

Prisoners fought bravely at Bay of Pigs before capitulating. Since capture none has defected or publicly condemned US despite offers to reward them for doing so. Prisoners suffering severe malnutrition and disease (some may be near death).

While difficult assess precisely, Department does not believe transaction will materially affect stability Castro regime. Reports indicate veteran Cuban communists opposed transaction while 26 July group favored. Cuban normal annual imports pharmaceuticals alone over \$60,000,000 hence transaction involves substantially less than

year's supply any commodity. Castro regime had budgeted approximately \$1,000,000 in foreign exchange for purchase pharmaceuticals; inclusion pharmaceuticals (which comprises over half of amount) therefore releases only that amount foreign exchange for other purposes.

FYI. Donovan reports Castro prepared review cases of twenty-four US citizens now imprisoned with view clemency or amnesty provided current transaction consummated good faith. End FYI.

Bearing in mind that last minute snags may upset transaction, you authorized draw on foregoing except FYI portions in reply inquiries. Cable press and official reaction transaction.

Rusk

256. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 23, 1962, 2 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-2362. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

2477. Cuba. McCloy and Yost met this morning two and half hours with Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelevich. Sovs stood adamantly on their last proposal that only four letters exchanged between President and Khrushchev October 27 and 28 without any other documents be transmitted to UN./1/ No progress whatsoever was made. McCloy had impression from earlier conversations that Kuznetsov personally might have favored accepting our proposal that two sets of documents chosen separately be submitted but that Moscow had overruled him.

/1/See Document 253.

Kuznetsov opened meeting with long statement commencing with assertion that US proposal to transmit along with President's letters of October 27 and 28 White House press statement of October 27 and President's press statement of November 20 was entirely unacceptable. After careful thought Sovs see no need for additional documents since basic agreement between US and USSR is embodied in four letters of October 27 and 28. Reservations which US put forward in unilateral fashion are after agreement between President and Khrushchev. White House statement October 27 and President's press statement November 20 contain same reservations as in various US draft declarations which Sovs had pronounced unacceptable. Particularly statement November 20 contains new reservations concerning export of communism, political and economic sanctions, ending of Cuban regime. US, Kuznetsov claimed, is trying to undermine value of non-invasion assurances given in President's letters October 27 and 28 by introducing new conditions. After Sovs have removed offensive weapons, given US chance to verify, and stated readiness to give assurances re reintroducing weapons, US changing its position in trying not to reaffirm its obligations. It would appear US wishes to get rid of these obligations and have its hands free not to observe non-invasion guarantee on pretext Cuba committing aggression against US or some other country. Furthermore, from sentence in November 20 statement commencing, "We will not, of course, abandon . . ." it is clear US seeking overthrow Cuban Govt and install old system. This is open attempt export counter-revolution to Cuba. This is dangerous policy and pursuing this course could bring heavy consequences. Sovs cannot appear to agree in any form, directly or indirectly, to US carrying on such policy.

Kuznetsov touched lightly on October 27 White House statement, merely saying it was never considered basic document on settlement Cuban crisis and need not be included. Returning to November 20 statement, he repeated usual arguments against overflights and added they contradict recent GA resolution on "friendly relations".

He asked why US so reluctant adopt UN system of inspection proposed by U Thant, either observation groups in Caribbean area or observation groups stationed in NY with authority visit Caribbean from time to time. US blandly rejects this proposal without even discussing it. Yet at same time US maintains that, since there is no

international system, it must continue observation by its own means.

US has said Soviet Union is not obliged to agree with what was said in October 27 and November 20 press statements. However, even if documents are transmitted to SYG separately by two sides, it might appear Soviet Union had no objection to US documents and had even agreed to them to certain extent.

As to "registration" Kuznetsov said Sovs astonished US objecting to common practice wherein thousands of documents registered or filed in UN. However, he would, as further concession, drop this word and he submitted new text for joint letter of transmittal in which word not employed (text this letter set forth at conclusion this telegram).

In summing up, Kuznetsov said position of US side in negotiations in no way strengthens confidence between our govts and is inconsistent with expressed desire of US Govt to strengthen confidence. He urged US reconsider its position and accept Soviet proposal to submit to SYG four letters exchanged between President and Khrushchev October 27 and 28 and indicated these could be transmitted to SYG in either joint or separate covering letters.

McCloy replied had hoped we were close to agreement today but it appears that we have gone backward. He had described previously how US had in fact already done or offered more than was required by exchange letters between President and Khrushchev and said he saw no use going over arguments once again. Sovs have turned down three US proposals as unacceptable. We find latest Sov proposal unacceptable. Perhaps best we can do is for each side transmit SYG whatever documents it wishes without disclosing in advance what it is submitting and thereby not implying there is any approval by other side. This would not be good solution but might be only one available.

As to inspection, there had in fact been no formal U Thant proposal. US would still like inspection on the spot. It is still getting numerous reports from exiles of heavy Cuban armament, of strong Soviet military presence, and camps for training guerrillas. Satisfactory inspection system would have to be elaborate and it would at best take months to work out.

November 20 statement expresses frankly our views concerning Castro. We do not think Cuban people are free and do not like Castro's social system but that does not mean we are going to invade Cuba. If Sovs include Turkey letter with all its emphasis on Turkish bases we would have to include October 27 press statement. US is sincerely desirous of carrying out its obligations and believes it in vital interest both parties terminate this affair. He described possible solutions as follows:

1. Joint declaration;
2. Separate declarations but ours would have to include what we are going to do in our own defense;
3. Separate transmittal of unagreed documents to UN;
4. Separate unagreed statement outside UN by chiefs of state, Foreign Ministers or UN Reps, simply summing up, stating it had not been possible to reach full agreement but that crisis is terminated, and both sides hope for progress in future.

McCloy concluded by expressing regret that situation cannot be terminated before reconvening of Congress when whole question likely subject of Congressional debate.

Kuznetsov expressed his gov't's sincere desire reach agreement and show two govts can do something together. Much has already been done to avert disaster and we should be able to agree on documents to be submitted to UN. He then however reiterated that only document Sovs believed it necessary submit are four letters October

27 and 28.

McCloy emphasized we are not asking Sovs to agree to documents we submit. Yost suggested that there might in separate letters transmittal be clear disclaimer by each party that it did not necessarily approve all documents submitted by other party. Possibility of this suggestion was explored but Kuznetsov concluded by repeating from his instructions that "reservations contained in President's statement of November 20 and White House statement October 27 contradict the understanding which had been reached and Soviet side cannot sanction them in any form whatsoever".

McCloy made it perfectly clear that, while he would of course report Soviet views to Washington, he was convinced US could not accept their proposal to submit four letters alone.

It was agreed that, while there appeared to be total impasse, both parties would reflect and communicate with each other later.

At conclusion of meeting Zorin announced that for reasons of health he is leaving his UN post and returning to Moscow to resume his duties as Deputy FonMin. He emphasized that his health has been poor for some time. Kuznetsov mentioned that Zorin's successor is present Soviet Amb to Japan, has spent more than ten years in China, and is outstanding expert on Chinese affairs.

Following is text of new joint draft letters of transmittal proposed by Sovs.

"Esteemed Mr. Secretary General,

Attached herewith are the letters of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev and the President of the United States of America John F. Kennedy of October 27 and 28, 1962 which contain the obligations assumed by the Govts of the USSR and the United States for the settlement of the crisis that arose in the Caribbean area.

It is requested to transmit them to the President of the Security Council for circulating these messages as documents of the Council.

Respectfully,

Representative of the USSR

Representative of the United States"

Stevenson

257. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, December 26, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 12/62. Confidential. Copies were sent to Cleveland, Martin, Thompson, and McGeorge Bundy.

SUBJECT

Cuba New York Negotiations

McCloy called me this morning to state that after dinner yesterday/1/ Kuznetsov took the initiative in raising the question of the negotiations for the report to the UN on the Cuban affair. McCloy said that during the course of the conversation Kuznetsov said that Khrushchev himself placed great emphasis on inclusion of his October 27 Turkish Jupiter letter, explaining that he needed this domestically as he had used his position on this in defense of his action in Cuba. Kuznetsov also reiterated their objections to the inclusion of the President's November 20 press conference. Kuznetsov urged McCloy to come up with some new formula.

/1/No other record of the dinner conversation has been found.

McCloy said he made it clear that he was at the "end of his string" and had no further suggestions to offer. He said he also made it clear that we could not agree to any of the proposed Soviet procedures. McCloy felt that Kuznetsov was "squirring".

McCloy said that he did not recommend or propose to take any new initiatives and would wait for Kuznetsov to get in touch with him. I said that we entirely agreed.

258. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, December 28, 1962, 1:53 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-2862. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson, cleared by Martin, Cleveland, Thompson, Rusk, and in substance with President Kennedy.

1761. Eyes only Stevenson and McCloy. Confirming McCloy-Johnson telcon,/1/ following is text of proposed US letter to SYG which you are authorized to discuss with Kuznetsov:

/1/No other record of this telephone conversation has been found.

"In the period since the last meeting of the Security Council on the Cuban crisis, I am pleased to report that considerable progress has been made in relieving the tension which arose between the Soviet Union and the United States in connection with the introduction of certain offensive weapons in the island of Cuba.

In this connection, for the Council's record, I am transmitting true copies of the President's letters of October 27 and October 28. Other statements relating to the United States position in this matter are contained in a White House press statement dated October 27, and in the President's opening remarks at his press conference on November 20, 1962.

The President of the United States has asked me to express to you his hope that the steps taken by the two governments in this matter may lead to further constructive efforts on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union to adjust the differences between them.

My Government is also grateful to you for your own part in assisting both parties to find the means to avert the serious threat to the peace which the Cuban situation then entailed.

In view of the present situation, my Government, which originally requested the Cuban item to be placed on the Security Council agenda, believes it need not further occupy the Council's attention at this time."

If Kuznetsov rejects foregoing formulation, you are authorized subsequently to propose to Kuznetsov the following text of a proposed joint letter to the SYG:

"On behalf of our respective Governments, we desire to express to you our appreciation for your efforts in assisting the Soviet and United States Governments to avert the serious threat to the peace which arose in

connection with the Cuban situation.

While our Governments regret that it has not been possible fully to resolve all of the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the considerable progress that has been made, it is no longer necessary for this item to be retained upon the agenda of the Security Council."

Alternatively, the substance of the foregoing joint letter could be incorporated into separate letters by US and Soviet representatives.

Rusk

259. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 28, 1962, 9 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-2862. Confidential; Limited Distribution.

2513. Dept pass White House. Cuba. McCloy, Plimpton and Yost met this afternoon with Kuznetsov and Mendelevich (USSR).

1. McCloy gave Soviets following draft of suggested separate letter to be given to SYG by US, on assumption Soviets would also give SYG a separate letter in form previously submitted to US, presumably accompanied by copies of Khrushchev's letters of Oct 27 and 28 and reference to any other documents Soviets want.

[Here follows the draft of the first letter in Document 258 with the exception of the last 2 paragraphs that were slightly revised and combined. The revised final paragraph of the letter as submitted to the Soviet delegates is printed below.]

2. McCloy pointed out US draft merely referred to White House press statement Oct 27 and Presidential news conference statement Nov 20, and did not submit them as UN docs, thus moving toward Soviet position.

3. Kuznetsov asked why the reference in the letter could not be limited only to the Presidential letters of Oct 27 and 28 since the White House press statement and news conference were matters of public record, and since the basic obligations of the two parties were contained in the four letters of Oct 27 and Oct 28.

4. McCloy said this was impossible and that he had gone as far as he possibly could in eliminating the submission to the UN of the press statement and news conference statement and merely referring to them.

5. Kuznetsov said the letter was not acceptable, and that the Soviets could not agree to or approve either openly or tacitly any reference to any qualifications or reservations to the US obligations under the October 27 and October 28 letters.

6. McCloy pointed out that Soviets were not being asked to approve or agree to anything, and that the Soviet separate letter would presumably not contain any such intimation.

7. Kuznetsov repeated that Soviets could not approve any reference to over-flights over Cuba or intrusion into Cuban territorial waters (which violation of Charter and international law) or to Cuban behavior. None of foregoing had been referred to in Oct 27 and 28 letters or negotiations incident thereto. Presidential news conference Nov 20 was first reference to Cuban behavior as a qualification of US obligation not to invade, and qualifying references to subversion, export of communism, Cuban aggression, etc., so vague as to weaken and vitiate US obligation.

8. McCloy said that these were familiar Soviet arguments, and that he would not repeat US counter-arguments, and that neither US nor any other country could unqualifiedly and unconditionally agree not to invade another country.

9. Kuznetsov also objected to word "offensive" as applied to weapons in US draft. McCloy said he would agree to taking out word.

10. Kuznetsov then submitted following new draft of joint letter to SYG by USSR and USUN Reps (accompanying Russian text being pouched Cleveland).

McCloy stated this not acceptable, since US must make reference to White House press statement Oct 27 and President's press conference Nov. 20.

Begin Verbatim text.

Esteemed Mr. Secretary General,

Attached herewith are the letters of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev and the President of the United States John F. Kennedy of October 27 and 28, 1962 which contain the obligations assumed by the Govts of the USSR and of the US on settling the recent crisis in the Caribbean area.

It is requested to transmit them to the President of the Security Council for circulation as documents of the Council.

The Government of the USSR and the Government of the United States express the hope that the action taken to avert war arising from the crisis in the Caribbean area will lead to further constructive efforts by the parties concerned to settle differences existing between them and generally to lessen the tensions which might induce further threat of war.

On the instructions of our respective governments we express gratitude to you, Mr. Secretary General, for your efforts in the cause of a peaceful settlement of the crisis in the Caribbean area.

Respectfully,

The Representative of the USSR

The Representative of the United States

End verbatim text.

11. McCloy said he had done his best to meet the Soviet position in that the last US draft merely referred to the White House press statement and Presidential news conference without submitting them, thus making them of less dignity than the Oct 27 and 28 letters, but that no country could give an absolute guarantee against invasion if it or its allies were attacked, and that the US did not intend to make Cuba a sanctuary for Castro. He also pointed out that the Nov 20 press conference statement contained many provisions favorable to the Soviets, going beyond the Oct 27 and 28 letters. He also pointed out that the Nov 20 statement was made before the weapons were all removed, and that Khrushchev had publicly thanked the President for that statement.

12. Kuznetsov said that Soviets had hoped that there could be an agreed text evidencing an agreement between the Soviets and the US which would have provided a favorable atmosphere for the future composition of differences, but that the raising by the US of new conditions, new points made the matter more complicated and gave the impression that the US did not want to finish the matter and that it would have been in the interest of

the whole world to have a full agreement reached. He further referred to the US responsibility for the Bay of Pigs affair and that recent statements by US officials gave the impression that the US was continuing to do its utmost to overthrow the Castro regime mentioning great TV emphasis on returned prisoners and their statements that they would go back. He also referred to supposed US support ever since World War II of reactionary groups such as Nationalist Chinese, South Koreans, etc., and to US unwillingness to consider U Thant's suggested reciprocal inspection plan.

13. McCloy, after appropriate rejoinder to Kuznetsov propaganda, said that perhaps new negotiations should be initiated for proper inspection of US, the Soviet Union and Cuba, but that time was limited and that perhaps the best thing for Soviets and US to do was to send joint letter to SYG to effect that they express their thanks to him for his efforts, that they had made progress but had not completely agreed as to the matter, and that they saw no need for further SC meeting. He then presented, as an uncleared draft of his own, the following proposed joint letter:

[Here follows the verbatim text of the second letter in Document 258.]

15. McCloy said it might be possible to incorporate in such joint draft letter some of the language contained in the Soviet draft joint letter just submitted by Kuznetsov, but that any joint letter must indicate that there had not been complete agreement between the parties.

16. Kuznetsov said he could not make a comment on the new draft, but would consider it and report it to his govt.

17. The meeting closed with Kuznetsov's admission that the ball was "in his net." We would like to think this meant we had scored a goal at basketball, but realize he thought the game was tennis.

18. *Comment:* Kuznetsov gave impression he had firm, explicit instructions not to agree to any reference to White House press statement of Oct 27 or Presidential press conference statement of Nov 20./1/

/1/Stevenson, McCloy, and Plimpton met Kuznetsov and Mendeleovich on the morning of December 31. Kuznetsov said that he gave "sincere examination" to the first U.S. draft letter submitted to him on December 28, but it was still unacceptable. The two sides discussed the second joint letter, Kuznetsov suggested some minor changes, but neither side came to any final decision. (Ibid., 737.56361/12-3162) See the Supplement.

Plimpton

260. Memorandum From the President's Military Aide (Clifton) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, December 29, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 213. Secret.

SUBJECT

Cuban Focal Point in the Miami Area

During the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting at Palm Beach,/1/ the question came up of the future use and employment of the Cuban brigade/2/ trainees.

/1/President Kennedy met the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 27, 10:15 to 10:40 a.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

/2/On December 29 President Kennedy addressed the members of the Cuban Brigade who had been released and returned to the United States on December 25. The text of the President's remarks are in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962*, pp. 911-913.

For the military, the question was how many of these brigade officers could be used at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, in helping to train the Cuban trainees, how many of the Cuban officers might need a special officers' course for updating and retraining as officers, and finally, how many of the Cuban refugee prisoners would actually go in for a 20-week retraining course.

There were no numbers involved, but it was agreed by all that certainly some of them would end up at Fort Jackson.

The next question raised was whether this Cuban brigade would be a focal point for a new political groupment. From all we could learn it looks like they might become such a party. The President pointed out that one of the tough problems in dealing with the 100,000 Cuban refugees in the Miami area is their lack of formalized party--he stated that there are four major parties and about one hundred splinter groups--and he thinks that the Cuban brigade might become a fifth rallying point, possibly a rather heavily emotionally charged one.

The Chiefs brought up the future political problems in connection with future military plans for Cuba, and it was stated that what we actually need is the establishment of a government-in-exile. This was in response to the President's directive that in their future planning the political preparations would have to be carefully organized. By this he meant the military, political preparations: the civil affairs, military government aspects, and the preparations to receive defectors en masse, if and when it occurred; but also to be prepared for their political organization at any time that we were back on Cuban soil.

With all this as background, the question came up about how our government is going to deal with this 100,000 nucleus in the future. It was suggested that whatever we do in Washington it was essential that we establish a "focal point" in the Miami area. Right now these various groups sit down there, stew in their own juice, elect committees, become emotionally upset, and then finally call upon somebody in Washington to let off their steam. If we are to get any benefit for future operations with this large group of people, it was suggested that we have a continuing office down in that area so that these committees could be guided and they would have a place to put in their requests and let off steam before they get to such an emotional pitch.

That evening after I got home the President called me and asked me to discuss this further with General Wheeler (because of the Army's future involvement both as a trainer of Cubans and as the executive agent for the Department of Defense in Cuban affairs), with Katzenbach of Justice, and with Director McCone (because of the Agency's interests). I have done all this.

General Wheeler and Secretary Vance both want to sit in on any meeting that you hold to formulate recommendations for the President on this matter; Mr. Katzenbach says that the Department of Justice's future interest is primarily one of the immigration authorities and he would very much like to have immigration represented, both in Washington and in Miami in anything that is established, including preliminary discussions. Mr. McCone has some deep feelings about the whole process, and especially his future relationships with the Cubans, and he would like to have General Carter sit in on any deliberations. He feels that if we establish a Miami "focal point," the Agency certainly would have to work in coordination with them.

The President then asked especially that I get the matter to your attention and he will await your early recommendations, including the advice of the Department of State. All concerned felt that the Department of State should be the chief agency for the focal point, if it were established.

Last footnote: HEW is the most involved at the moment. There are 100,000 Cuban refugees down there and

60,000 of them draw money from the Cuban refugee relief program. They obviously would be very important in the Miami area and are going to be continuously involved as long as they are paying money out to these refugees.

Mr. Katzenbach has a rather large immigration installation at the Miami National Airport--it can house as many as 600 people on a transient basis. It was his suggestion that any headquarters set up in the Miami area be set up at this location because the Cubans are already used to dealing with the government at that location. HEW concurs in this.

C.V. Clifton/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

261. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, January 4, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Cuba, Security, 1963. Secret.

SUBJECT

Further organization of the Government for dealing with Cuba

On your oral instructions conveyed by General Clifton, I have met with an interdepartmental group to try to work out an improved arrangement for our handling of Cuban policy and action in 1963. The time is ripe for such a reorganization, because we seem to be winding up the negotiations in New York, the prisoners are out, and there is well nigh universal agreement that Mongoose is at a dead end. The people with whom I have been working are: Vance, Yarmolinsky and General Wheeler as delegates for McNamara and Gilpatric; Nick Katzenbach as a delegate of Bobby; Pat Carter from CIA; and Alexis Johnson and Ed Martin from State Department.

The following paragraphs represent my personal sense of what we have worked out together, and while there may be some small differences of point of view or need for revision, I think they are ripe for your consideration.

1. The first guiding principle is that final policy responsibility should remain with you, working with the Executive Committee when necessary. There is no point pretending that major Cuban policy decisions can be made anywhere else than in the White House, and your own executive role, supplemented by the Executive Committee when there are major policy issues or interdepartmental difficulties, is indispensable.
2. The more complicated matter is where to put day-to-day coordinating responsibility. After considerable discussion, the unanimous consensus is that we should locate this responsibility in a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, working as a deputy to Ed Martin in the State Department and acting as chairman of an interdepartmental group on Cuba. The Coordinator would be responsible to Dean Rusk and Ed Martin for departmental business, and, under their guidance, to you and the Executive Committee for interdepartmental coordination. Nothing in his authority would supplant the responsibility of other operating departments for management of their own assigned tasks, or their right to be consulted before their resources are committed; but it would be clear that you and the Executive Committee were looking to the Coordinator and his interdepartmental committee for effective execution of your policy decisions. In ordinary circumstances, the necessary coordination will be carried out effectively by good will and good sense on all sides. When there is an honest difference that cannot be resolved it will, of course, have to come upstairs one way or another.

The key to this administrative organization is, of course, the individual appointed as coordinator. The

recommendation of the State Department is that Sterling Cottrell should be given this job. He has been doing a very solid and constructive job as head of the Vietnamese Task Force, and he is due for reassignment to Latin American Affairs, which turns out to be his preferred professional field, both by experience and by interest. He has the necessary professional seniority in the Department, and high interdepartmental acceptance. He has worked well with the White House staff.

If this arrangement should be approved, the Cuban desk of the Department would be absorbed in a new, higher level Office of Cuban Affairs under Cottrell, with Bob Hurwitch as his deputy. Hurwitch has done a very able job within the Department, but he is a little junior for a major job of interdepartmental coordination. At the same time, Cottrell would be expected to find and appoint a deputy coordinator, to be based in Miami, to handle day-to-day relations with Cuban refugees and with interested agencies of Government on the spot. Bob Orrick has been asked to expedite effective interdepartmental administrative support, as necessary, for both the Coordinator and the Miami office.

3. If a Coordinator for Cuban Affairs is established, then we think the Mongoose office should be disbanded and responsibility for covert operations should be a part of the work of the Coordinator and his associates from other departments, reporting on covert activities to the Special Group (5412) in the normal way. The Special Group would in turn be guided by broader policy as established by you through the Executive Committee. The covert aspects of our Cuban enterprise are not the most important ones, at present, and they need to be handled in the wider context of an open Cuban policy, centered in a visible office of Cuban Affairs. Such a change would liberate General Lansdale for many other tasks in which his services are uniquely valuable.

4. The problem of organization is of course less than half the battle: what we really need is to sort out our policies toward Cuba. There are a number of loose ends, large and small, of which the following are samples:

a. The shipping orders and the broader question of economic pressure on Cuba are still unsettled. Executive Orders have been prepared along the lines of your press conference statement, but they are being held up, as I think Dean Rusk has explained to you, pending discussion with OAS and other Allies. The State Department will take any public rap for this delay.

b. The organization and handling of refugees needs restudy. We need a much more open and continuous communication with refugee leaders, and we need clarification of the opportunities to be offered to Cuban volunteers, whether or not they are veterans of the brigade. If we can manage it, we need to get a stronger process of representation of free Cubans.

c. We should intensify our investigation of ways and means of communicating with possibly dissident members of the Castro regime, perhaps including even Fidel himself. Donovan, for example, has an invitation to be Castro's guest at the beach of Veradero, and there is work to be done also in our relations with men like Manolo Ray.

d. The role of intelligence officers needs to be redefined. The very large commitment of the CIA to Mongoose activities should be reexamined, and probably substantially reduced, and the role of CIA as an apparent spokesman and agent of the United States Government in Cuban affairs should probably be reduced still further--although this in no sense reflects on the Agency, which has been trying to do what it was told to do.

e. The political, psychological, and personal aspects of the effort to isolate Castro's Cuba should be pursued intensively in the OAS. We do not want Cuba to be a hemispheric training ground for Communists, and we have not exhausted our weapons here.

f. We need to keep up a continuous and high-level barrage of public statements explicitly defending our rights of surveillance. You said on television that the camera will be our best inspector and this position should be energetically sustained.

g. The question of Pan American flights should be reviewed. My own view, which Ed Martin shares, is that it is probably to our advantage to have such flights, and that Juan Trippe should not be allowed to get away with poor-mouthing on the cost to Pan American. Over the long run this franchise is of the highest importance to Pan American, and nothing I have heard about their marginal losses is very impressive.

5. It would help to have your general reaction to these matters by Monday./1/ If you approve, we could put the organization into effect at once and have a preliminary discussion of the substantive issues by Cottrell's people with the Executive Committee before the end of next week.

/1/January 7.

McG. B.

262. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, January 7, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President in Palm Beach, Florida--9:45 a.m.--Saturday--5 January 1963

The meeting was brief. General discussions consumed about an hour. Secretary Rusk was present during the latter half which involved Cuban program.

1. McCone generally reviewed the Killian report,/1/ stated it was a good report, indicating that it "called the glass of water half full, not half empty," the report was well received but only a part of the total review being made by the Killian Board and that the DCI could not forecast a final Killian Board position. McCone stated that he personally felt the Intelligence Community had done a good job but looking back in retrospect he felt that they could have done better. DCI expressed the feeling that principal errors or intelligence deficiencies were:

/1/The final Killian report, February 4, submitted to the President, is in *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, pp. 361-371.

a. Failure to press aggressively overflight program between August 29th and October 14th and this was due to timidity throughout the government, including the Intelligence Community for fear of a "U-2 incident" once SAM sites were detected in Cuba. This foreclosed earlier detection of the existence of offensive missiles.

b. A conviction on the part of government officials and intelligence estimators that the Soviets would not accept the responsibility of a confrontation which would result from placing of offensive missiles in Cuba and

c. Because of this conviction the estimators and others in Government failed to fully evaluate many indicators which, if carefully analyzed, would lead to the conclusion that something more than defensive armament was going into Cuba.

The President seemed inclined to believe estimators should not be criticized for their judgment as it was reasonable to assume the Soviets would not place themselves in an indefensible position militarily, they would assume we would find out and would respond and this would place them in a difficult position, which it did. Furthermore he felt the SAM sites placed the Soviets in an awkward position for if they used them against one of our airplanes we would be inclined to respond militarily and they could not defend the SAM sites. In general the

President agreed with Sherman Kent's position that the Soviets made a bad guess as to our response.

2. The President questioned me concerning refugee reports and I responded substantially as summarized in the Killian report, indicating the only refugee or agent reports dealing significantly with offensive missiles came in on or after September 20th and at most there were only 8 or 10 out of a total of some 1200 reports.

3. The President asked if the 5412 Committee reviewed raw intelligence of this type and I responded that their doing was not within their province, that raw intelligence was circulated to the Intelligence Community and that matters of significance should be brought to the members of the 5412 Committee through their respective intelligence officers and, if necessary, such matters should be considered by the United States Intelligence Board. I maintained that handling of raw intelligence was not a problem for 5412 Committee.

Action: In view of the importance placed on the 5412 Committee by the President, we should insist that the Committee meet regularly and for a sufficient time for review of their responsibilities (and not be crowded off the calendar by the Special Group CI) and furthermore that action papers be sent to the members of the 5412 Committee not later than Tuesday morning for consideration the following Thursday.

4. With respect to Cuban policy, the President expressed concern over the welfare of the prisoners, urged that arrangements be made to barracks them at Opa Locka or elsewhere in order to avoid growing distress and criticism. DCI agreed to go into this with proper authorities.

There followed an extended discussion of policy with respect to Pan American flights. The President wished them resumed but did not feel doing so should be in response to a demand by Castro. It was therefore agreed that DCI would meet with Donovan and arrange for him to go to Havana and work out suitable considerations for the resumption of flights which would specifically avoid the appearance of responding to a Castro demand.

5. The President spoke favorably of the Cuban Task Force outlined in the recent Bundy memorandum^{/2/} which would be chaired by State with departmental representation. The President also recognized the need for CIA to complete liaison arrangements with free countries, indicating that this should be pursued aggressively even if it required DCI to visit several countries personally to work out these arrangements.

^{/2/}Document 261.

6. DCI reported proposed meetings with the Chairmen of CIA Congressional Committees and later with the Committees themselves. The President agreed. Both McCone and the President felt that DCI line should not be defensive but rather should indicate that a substantial intelligence success occurred.

7. The President suggested that McCone prepare a briefing for the Leadership meeting on Tuesday afternoon.^{/3/} He questioned DCI concerning Keating issue,^{/4/} asked where Keating had gotten his information and why Keating had stated that 95% of it came from within the government. McCone answered that he had no verification of this and that he was convinced that Keating information had come from refugee sources. In answer to a question McCone stated that he had concluded that the first offensive missiles reached Cuba between the 2nd and 9th of September.

^{/3/}January 8; see Document 265. The material McCone used for the briefing of the Congressional leadership is in the Supplement.

^{/4/}Senator Kenneth B. Keating (R-N.Y.), one of the Kennedy administration's most persistent critics, charged that the administration was purposefully overestimating the extent of Soviet withdrawal from Cuba and downplaying the Soviet presence still in Cuba.

8. McCone advised the President that he expected an investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

which would probably be initiated by a demand from Senator Lausche.

John A. McCone/5/

Director

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

263. Editorial Note

On the morning of January 2, 1963, Vasiliy Vasilevich Kuznetsov met with John McCloy to inform him that the Soviet Union greatly preferred the short form of the draft letter as contained in Document 258. Kuznetsov handed McCloy a revised joint letter of which the second paragraph was substantially different from the U.S. draft. According to telegram 2558 from the Mission to the United Nations, January 2, the Soviet Union's draft second paragraph reads:

"The USSR and USA Govts believe that in view of the understanding reached between them and of the progress in the settlement of the crisis in the Caribbean area there is no further need for this item to occupy the Security Council attention at this time, though it has not been possible fully to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this crisis."

After consultation by telephone between Stevenson and Rusk, the United States Mission was authorized to transmit the following draft second paragraph to Kuznetsov:

"While it has not been possible for our Govts fully to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the considerable progress that has been made, it is no longer necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the SC at this time."

If the Soviets objected to this second paragraph, McCloy was prepared to agree to substitute the following:

"The Govts of the Soviet Union and the United States of America believe that, in view of the understanding reached between them and of the progress in the settlement of the crisis, there is no further need for this item to occupy the attention of the SC at this time, although it has not been possible fully to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with it. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, 1-B December/January Meetings)

McCloy and Francis T.P. Plimpton met with Kuznetsov and Mendelevich, Kuznetsov's assistant, at the Soviet Mission at 5 p.m. on January 3. Kuznetsov deplored the omission of the reference to "understanding" in the new U.S. draft's second paragraph. Kuznetsov maintained there was an understanding and it was in the interests of both sides to include the word.

Kuznetsov presented a new Soviet draft of the second paragraph which reads:

"While it has not been possible for our govts fully to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and of the progress in the implementation of this understanding, it is no longer necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the SC at this time."

Kuznetsov pointed out that the Soviet draft closely followed the United States draft. McCloy countered that he was disappointed that the Soviet Union did not accept the United States draft. Both men agreed to minor stylistic revisions in the third paragraph of the letter. McCloy told Kuznetsov that he would consider the Soviet draft and let Kuznetsov know his answer. (Telegram 2587 from USUN, January 4; *ibid.*)

After discussion with U. Alexis Johnson in Washington, McCloy telephoned Kuznetsov on January 4 and told him that the United States agreed to the insertion of the word "understanding," but within the context of the phrase "degree of understanding." McCloy also insisted on the phrase "extent of progress." Kuznetsov objected to these qualifiers, but McCloy commented that his opposition seemed weak by reason of the inclusion of "understanding." (Telegram 2600 from USUN, January 4; *ibid.*)

On the afternoon of January 5 the Soviets accepted the U.S. draft as conveyed to Kuznetsov by McCloy in the January 4 telephone call. The two sides agreed to sign and release the joint letter on January 7. (Telegram 2617 from USUN, January 5; *ibid.*) All the telegrams referred to above are in the Supplement.

The joint letter as submitted to the United Nations Secretary General, January 7, reads:

"On behalf of the Governments of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, we desire to express to you our appreciation for your efforts in assisting our Governments to avert the serious threat to the peace which recently arose in the Caribbean area.

"While it has not been possible for our Governments to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connexion with this affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and the extent of progress in the implementation of this understanding, it is not necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the Security Council at this time.

"The Governments of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union express the hope that the actions taken to avert the threat of war in connexion with this crisis will lead toward the adjustment of other differences between them and the general easing of tensions that could cause a further threat of war." (*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963*, page 243)

264. National Security Action Memorandum No. 213

Washington, January 8, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 213. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense; the Attorney General; the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; the Director of Central Intelligence; and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

TO

The Secretary of State

SUBJECT

Interdepartmental Organization for Cuban Affairs

The President has approved the following organizational arrangements to facilitate the coordinated management of all aspects of our current policy toward Cuba; final policy responsibility of course remains with the President, working with the Executive Committee of the National Security Council when necessary.

1. Day-to-day coordinating responsibility will be vested in a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the Department of State, acting as Chairman of an Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba. The Coordinator will be responsible to the Secretary of State for State Department business, and under his guidance to the President and the Executive Committee for interdepartmental coordination.

2. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee shall consist of the Coordinator and representatives of the

Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Representatives of other departments will be associated with the work of this committee as necessary in particular cases. Officers shall also be detailed to the Office of the Coordinator from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, HEW, CIA, and USIA. Other departments and agencies may be requested to participate in the work of the Interdepartmental Committee and in the work of the Coordinator's Office as appropriate. A White House officer will maintain liaison with the Coordinator and with his Interdepartmental Committee.

3. The President and the Executive Committee will look to the Coordinator for effective coordination of the execution of policy decisions, and for timely recommendations on new courses of action. The Coordinator will work through his assigned officers and with the Interdepartmental Committee in meeting these responsibilities.

4. The Coordinator's authority will not supplant the responsibility of other operating departments or agencies for the management of their assigned tasks or their right to be consulted before their resources are committed. Differences which arise will be promptly referred to higher levels of resolution.

5. The Coordinator will name a full-time representative who will open an office in Miami to represent the U.S. Government in relations with Cuban refugee organizations and coordinate the implementation of all Federal programs being carried on in the area, relating such programs to State, local and private programs.

6. The Coordinator will assume the same responsibility for covert operations as he does for overt actions. However, he will report on covert matters to the Special Group which will be guided by broader policy established by the President through the Executive Committee.

McGeorge Bundy

265. Editorial Note

On January 8, 1963, President Kennedy, Vice President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and Director of Central Intelligence McCone met with the bipartisan Congressional leadership from 5:30 to 6:35 p.m. Attending were Senators Mike Mansfield, Hubert H. Humphrey, George Smathers, Richard Russell, Everett Dirksen, Thomas Kuchel, Leverett Saltonstall and Bourke Hickenlooper and from the House of Representatives were Speaker John McCormack, Representatives Carl Albert, Hale Boggs, Carl Vinson, Thomas Morgan, Charles Halleck, Leslie Arends, and Frances Bolton. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

McCone drafted a brief memorandum for the record of the meeting, noting that McNamara gave a briefing on South Vietnam "expressing an optimistic point of view"; Rusk briefed the Congressional leaders on the Cuban negotiations at the United Nations and on the Congo; and McCone briefed them on Cuba. McCone noted that there were "no significant questions" from the Congressional leadership.

McCone's January 8 briefing statement was attached to his January 9 memorandum for the record. In it he stated that the Soviet Union had withdrawn 42 strategic missiles, 42 jet bombers and their related equipment and about four or five thousand military personnel associated with the maintenance and operation of this equipment--leaving approximately 17,000 Soviet troops still in Cuba. McCone noted that the Intelligence community believed, but could not prove by aerial recon- naissance, that these withdrawals represent all the strategic weapons placed in Cuba by the Soviet Union. Aerial reconnaissance would reveal if strategic missiles were reintroduced or reactivated. McCone stressed that there was still a substantial Soviet military presence in Cuba. McCone summarized the situation as follows: "Castro remains in control, his attitudes seem unchanged, but the Soviets have retained sufficient military capability in Cuba to give them powerful leverage on Castro should he oppose their policies too actively." McCone finished his briefing with an overview of the current areas in Latin America in danger of subversion directed by Moscow and Havana. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963) For McCone's briefing paper and memorandum for the record, see the Supplement.

266. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 9, 1963, 5 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Guthrie, cleared in draft by Thompson, and approved by the White House on January 14. The meeting was held at the White House and lasted until 6:02 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) The Department of State prepared a January 9 briefing memorandum for the President for this discussion. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1161/1-963) See the Supplement.

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador at Large

John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

USSR

Vasilij Vasilyevich Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador

Lev Isaakovich Mendelevich, Assistant to Kuznetsov

Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, First Secretary of Embassy (Interpreter)

Kuznetsov thanked the President for receiving him, saying that he considered this an honor, particularly in view of how busy the President is. He said that he had come to New York on Khrushchev's instructions to assist the UN Secretary General in the handling of the Cuban crisis. The Soviet Government considered that this part of the negotiation has been completed and that it would therefore be useful to meet the President and pay his respects. Everyone in the USSR understands that Khrushchev's instructions played a crucial role in the troubled days of crisis in the Caribbean and that as a result the danger of a thermonuclear war had been averted. The President had also displayed understanding. And so he had been instructed by his Government to make certain observations on the situation and related matters.

The President said that he appreciated Kuznetsov's coming to Washington and noted that Mr. McCloy had told him he had been very courteous throughout the New York negotiations and had made every effort to work out a satisfactory solution. He noted that Kuznetsov's stay in this country, while not as long as Mikoyan's in Cuba, had been lengthy and that he appreciated his efforts in New York.

Kuznetsov said that Messrs. McCloy and Stevenson and others had been very experienced. The atmosphere of the talks had been business-like and they had clearly expressed the United States viewpoint. He agreed with the President that the results had not been everything that had been hoped for. He said that under instructions he

wished to comment on the results of the situation in the Caribbean. The Soviet Government and people are constantly working to improve relations with the U.S. In Moscow great significance is attached to the fact that throughout the Caribbean crisis the United States and the U.S.S.R. acted on the basis of trust and mutual understanding. Whether this basis can be maintained, including that personally between the President and Chairman Khrushchev, and whether the clear and definite commitments made during the negotiations and exchange of letters can be maintained would determine whether other international problems could be settled in the future. The Soviet Government will firmly adhere to the commitments it undertook toward Cuba and proceeds on the assumption that the United States Government will do the same. The fulfillment by both sides of these agreements will be a touchstone of the ability of the two powers to trust each other's word and to avert a military conflict. Speaking frankly, he had to say that during the course of the talks in New York on the settlement of the Caribbean crisis, especially during the last stages, the U.S. side handled the matter not in a way it seems it should have if it were also seeking to create trust between the two states. The Soviet Government would like to believe that the United States Government will in the future act in a manner which would not bring the world to the abyss of a thermonuclear war. The crisis in the Caribbean demonstrated with great clarity that both countries should act in accordance with the United Nations Charter concerning relations between all nations, large and small. Without this, there could be no guarantee that the United States and the U.S.S.R., which possess powerful armaments, will not confront each other again. Furthermore, the demonstrative welcome by the President of the Cuban refugees could not but be noted in Moscow; demonstrations like this revive the shadows of the past and leave their mark on the present. The overcoming of the crisis on the basis reached, puts other problems in the forefront: Chairman Khrushchev spoke of this in messages to the President and in public speeches. Two main problems to be solved are the question of the German peace treaty and the question of general and complete disarmament. Without eliminating the remnants of World War II it will be impossible to achieve normal relations and without the trust such relations engender general and complete disarmament would be impossible. The Soviet Government will make every effort to move the 18 Nation Disarmament Committee ahead and is prepared to do everything that would contribute to the success of these negotiations.

The President said that he thought Kuznetsov knew from his talks with McCloy and Stevenson of the particular sensitivity in the United States to anything involving Cuba. This is a delicate nerve in the United States stretching back to the beginning of our country. On the other hand, the President said, he was anxious to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union. He had noted before that these two most powerful countries have no national interests which bring them into collision. The President had spent a good deal of time defending this viewpoint prior to the Cuban crisis. Now that the matter had quieted down he saw no reason why the United States and the U.S.S.R. should be involved again in the same way. He asked Kuznetsov to explain to his principals American sensitivity over Cuba. The fact that there are 15 to 17,000 Soviet troops still in Cuba causes difficulties for the United States Government and for those in the United States who seek to maintain good relations with the U.S.S.R. The President said the Soviet Government could understand how the United States felt about this if they could imagine a similar situation in Finland. He was hopeful that Soviet policies toward Cuba, including the personnel and armaments there, would lead to a further relaxation of the situation. As to the question of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, the President said he had put them on the beach and he felt responsible for them. He had not said in his address to them that the United States would invade Cuba, though he had expressed the hope for a change in the situation there. All the U.S. forces which had been mobilized during the crisis were back in their camps. If the Soviet Union can comprehend the sensitivity and difficult nature of the problems the United States faces in the Caribbean, this can lead to a solution of other problems.

In reply, Kuznetsov said that the Soviet Government will fulfill all of the obligations it undertook with the exchange of letters between Khrushchev and the President. As for the Soviet military personnel in Cuba, it seemed to him that all the agreements in the exchange of letters had been carried out. This problem had been dealt with in the course of the exchange and there was a clear understanding on both sides concerning this matter. The Soviet Government will abide by all its agreements so there is nothing new in this problem.

The President noted that Khrushchev had given a clear commitment to withdraw all military personnel connected with the missile sites in Cuba and all others "in time". He recognized that the latter was not the same kind of

commitment since no time was specified. Nevertheless, he wanted to mention this matter which occupied attention in the United States.

Kuznetsov reiterated that he thought that there was no misunderstanding on this point.

Referring to the President's comparison of the Cuban situation with Finland, Kuznetsov noted that there were many U.S. military bases, armed with deadly weapons and occupied by troops, around the U.S.S.R. However, he had no instructions on this point and said that the U.S.S.R. is not raising the question at this time.

The President replied that the U.S. had not introduced a new major base in any country such as Finland. A thermonuclear base there would have created a new situation. He repeated that Cuba was a matter of great sensitivity to the American people and again asked Kuznetsov to communicate this to his Government. Good relations between our two countries, the President said, will be made easier if the Soviet Government understands this.

Kuznetsov reverted to the question of the President's reception of the Cuban brigade in Florida.^{/1/} He said this had created the opinion in Moscow that this brigade will be maintained, that others will be created and that then there would be a fresh invasion of Cuba.

^{/1/}See footnote 2, Document 260.

The President replied that this was not going to happen. In a backgrounder which he had given in Florida he had said that the United States had no intention of invading Cuba and noted that our position remained that which he had set forth in his press conference of November 20. He said there would be no third hand invasion of Cuba. Nevertheless, it would be easier for the United States if there were a reduction of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. The President noted that Castro makes many more speeches than the President does and in them calls for revolution in Latin America. However, Castro was of no concern to the United States. The relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. are more important and the President was anxious to lessen areas of disagreement between the two countries.

Kuznetsov replied that while the results of the New York negotiations were not as great as they might have been, the situation was better now than it had been at the end of October. The immediate threat had been averted. However, normalization of relations required that something else should be done. No one can agree that a situation is normal when a great power threatens a small one, and officially expresses a desire to strangle and overthrow the government of the smaller one. Thus, some problems remain and further normalization of the situation depends on the United States Government. During the New York talks, the Soviet side had mentioned a tripartite protocol in which the head of the Cuban Government would have obliged himself to abide by the United Nations Charter and not to interfere with the internal affairs of other countries. If the United States Government fears Cuban actions, perhaps it should reexamine this protocol.

The President reiterated that the United States was not concerned with Cuba but with the Soviet military presence there. He noted a number of speeches which Castro and Che Guevara had made during the last two months calling for armed struggle in Latin America, saying that small bands of guerrillas would act as a catalyst in the process of taking power from the hands of the Yankee imperialists and insisting that this must be done in a large number of Latin American countries. He read a quotation from an interview by Che Guevara on November 23.

Kuznetsov replied that he was not at all sure the quotes which the President had made from the Cuban speeches were exact. It seemed to him that the Cubans had far more reasons to fear and worry than the United States. Ever since the beginning of the 1959 revolution, Cuba had been under various undermining pressures. The Cuban Government and Castro had made quite clear their willingness to negotiate with the United States concerning all points awaiting solution. The United States could respond to these Cuban proposals in order to normalize

relations. He noted that the New York talks had been between the United States and the U.S.S.R. but that the problem had been made more difficult by the fact that they had been talking about another country./2/

/2/Kuznetsov met earlier with Secretary Rusk at noon in Rusk's office. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 63 D 330) See the Supplement.

267. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, January 12, 1963, 10:30 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, 1/1/63-2/17/63. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith on January 15. The meeting took place in the President's office and lasted until 11 a.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President--Cuba Aerial Reconnaissance

OTHERS PRESENT

Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Director McCone, Assistant Secretary Nitze, Assistant Secretary Tyler, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Jeffrey Kitchen, Mr. John McNaughton

Mr. Bundy said that we had evidence of greater participation of Cuban nationals in the air defense system of Cuba which raised the possibility of an attack on one of our reconnaissance planes. Although the President was not being asked to reach a decision today, the group did wish to discuss two questions:

- a. In the event there is a radar lockon of one of our planes, does the plane complete its mission or abort?
- b. Is our need for information about the cargo of a Soviet ship approaching Cuban waters sufficient to fly low-level reconnaissance, both day and night, including flights during the time the ship is being unloaded in port?

The President asked why a plane should abort in the event of a radar lockon.

Mr. Bundy replied that if the plane continued on its flight, it is possible it would be shot down. Secretary McNamara said he did not think we should permit ourselves to get into a situation where we would have lost a plane and not yet have decided how we would respond to such hostile action. He suggested that there were three possible courses of action:

- a. We could fly a reconnaissance mission, have a plane shot down, and then decide how we would react.
- b. We could fly missions equipped with our most sophisticated electronic countermeasures equipment. The cost of using the ECM equipment would be the possibility of compromising highly advanced and highly classified instruments.
- c. We could use alternative equipment such as drones.

In response to the President's question, Secretary McNamara said we did not have yet positive proof of a radar lockon on any of our planes although we had evidence indicating radar tracking.

The President said that he thought the Defense Department should decide whether or not to use our sophisticated ECM equipment. He said he intended to believe that if it appeared that the Cubans were taking

actions with a view to shooting down one of our planes, the plane should abort the first time this happened and we could then prepare ourselves for prompt reprisals in the event the circumstances were repeated.

Mr. Bundy said that during this week there would be no change in the present rules regarding aborts by reconnaissance planes.

Director McCone said he favored using the U-2 in good weather, but if the weather were bad, he thought we should fly low-level missions.

Secretary McNamara said that he did not agree with low-level aerial reconnaissance in bad weather because the loss of a U.S. plane or the controversy arising out of low-level flights would be all out of proportion to the value of the information obtained from pictures taken at a low-level. He said that the cargo of the Soviet ship/1/ probably did not consist of missiles and that certain knowledge about it was not worth the complications arising out of low-level flights.

/1/McCone prepared his own memorandum of record of this meeting on January 12. In it he indicated that the ship being referred to was the Simferopol and that the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance had recommended it be subjected to round-the-clock photography at 4-hour intervals. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963) McCone also wrote a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, January 15, explaining his views on surveillance of the Simferopol. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. III) For both these memoranda, see the Supplement. According to a January 17 memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy on the advice of Rusk and McNamara, the President authorized only high-level surveillance of the Simferopol. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. III)

Director McCone said that CIA was trying to find out what was in the cargo and would continue to do so during the time the cargo was being unloaded, but he was not certain that they would be able to obtain the information we wanted. He expressed a view that the cargo might contain armaments dangerous to us.

Mr. Bundy said there were political problems immediately ahead of us, such as Donovan's proposed visit to Havana in connection with the remaining prisoners in Cuba and Kuznetsov's visit this week. He said the group would return to the President at a later time when more information was available.

Secretary McNamara said the Defense Department would be prepared to carry out low-level missions on very short notice if the President so decided.

Bromley Smith/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

268. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, January 18, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, 1/62-9/62. Secret.

The President has mentioned again his interest in maximizing the information we get from Cuba by other sources than air surveillance, and has asked me to report this interest to you. He would like to know what we are now doing to encourage visits to Cuba by knowledgeable and friendly observers of other nationalities, and also whether our arrangements with friendly countries having embassies in Havana are as effective in this respect as

they should be. He would like to know what additional measures are being taken in this respect. He believes that we should be able to arrange for regular visits to Cuba of visitors of a rank and sophistication which would give them access to high authorities of the Cuban government, and make their reports correspondingly valuable. He would like to know what plans are proposed for this purpose.

McGeorge Bundy/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

269. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

CIA/RR CB 63-10

Washington, January 19, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, White Label. Secret. Prepared by the Office of Research and Reports.

THE CUBAN ECONOMY IN 1961 AND 1962 AND PROSPECTS FOR 1963 THROUGH 1965

Summary and Conclusions/1/

/1/The 9-page discussion portion of the paper is in the Supplement.

The Cuban economy during 1963 probably will not decline further in total output and may show some improvement in comparison with 1962. Cuban GNP in 1962, measured in 1958 prices, is estimated to be 25 percent below the 1958 level. The total supply of available goods, however, was only about 20 percent lower than in 1958 because Cuba ran a trade deficit in 1962 that was substantially higher than the deficit in 1958.

Total agricultural output will not increase much during 1963, for the sugar harvest probably will decline slightly from last year, largely offsetting moderate gains in other crops. Industrial production will increase to some extent as Cuba's new managerial class gains experience and the economy begins to regain some of its lost efficiency. Investment also probably will expand as a number of new industrial projects are started during the year. The dynamic upward improvement of prices in the world sugar market probably will raise Cuba's export earnings in 1963 above the 1962 level. The increase will not be enough, however, to finance the required volume of imports, and Cuba will still require large balance-of-payments credits from the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

It appears probable that the Cuban economy will continue to improve during 1964 and 1965. The government is making vigorous efforts to expand agricultural production. The traditional failure of most Communist regimes to achieve satisfactory results in agriculture, however, precludes the prediction of any dramatic successes for Castro in this sphere during 1964-65. Continuing improvement at the managerial level may well yield further increases in industrial production. Investment activity also probably will continue to expand. Finally, the outlook for export earnings suggests that Cuba will remain dependent on the Bloc for large industrial and balance-of-payment credits.

270. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, January 19, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/63. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Cuban Coordinating Committee

The following are some further thoughts on the work of the Committee:

1. Future Policy Toward Cuba--As I mentioned to you in my memorandum of January 18,/1/ Secretary Vance submitted a paper to the Committee which identified two possible courses of action in trying to overthrow the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba: (1) a policy of applying increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, and (2) a policy of applying political, economic, psychological and military pressures as appropriate opportunities present themselves./2/ In presenting the paper to the Committee, Secretary Vance made it abundantly clear that while he had identified an alternate course of action, the identification did not include an endorsement--he had not yet reached a decision on that question.

/1/Not found.

/2/This paper, in what was apparently a final form, is Document 272.

While, on the surface, Bob Hurwitch seems to have accepted the consideration of an alternative course of action in the policy paper, he undoubtedly views it coldly. He believes strongly that such factors as (1) our hope to act with full OAS support, and (2) Presidential statements about our non-aggressive intentions, necessarily limit our policy to one of applying pressures as opportunities present themselves; this is neither a "hard" nor "soft" policy but the only politically realistic policy. Deep down, I think he regards the consideration of the so-called "active policy," at best, as a useless exercise and waste of time and, at worst, as an insidious attempt by DOD dreamers to bring to life a policy which will earn battlefield promotions at the expense of U.S. national interest. I can't say yet how far Mr. Cottrell goes along with this view.

On this one, I'm with Secretary Vance. The alternate course of action is substantively worth focusing on. Also, the educational aspect is important. Both Mr. Cottrell and Secretary Vance are new at the Cuban business. If they are to be really effective in their new roles, it seems worthwhile that they think through basic courses of action which may appear to others to be unattractive. The process need not turn out to be either very time-consuming or dangerous.

After you received the phone call from Secretary Vance,/3/ I passed your message to Mr. Cottrell. He and Mr. Vance planned to meet late Saturday/4/ afternoon to thrash out the policy paper.

/3/No record found.

/4/January 19.

2. CIA vis-a-vis the Miami Office (Mr. Crimmins)--I mentioned to you in a previous memorandum that at one meeting, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], the CIA representative, viewed the work of the Miami office in a narrow sense; he obviously was reluctant to see Mr. Crimmins getting involved in CIA business. Bob Hurwitch tells me that this problem is under control. He said (1) that [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] had simply not gotten the word, (2) that Mr. FitzGerald and others in CIA do have the word, and (3) that there is no need at present to make an issue of this point.

3. Timing of Meetings

The following meetings on Cuba are scheduled for this week:

Monday, 2:00 PM--Cuban Coordinating Committee at State

Wednesday, 10:30 AM--Mr. Cottrell, Secretary Vance, Mr. Helms, Mr. Dungan, with you in your office

Thursday, 10:00 AM--ExCom/5/

/5/January 21, January 23, and January 24. For the account of the Executive Committee meeting originally scheduled for January 24 at 10 a.m. but postponed until January 25 at 4 p.m., see Document 274. No records of the other meetings have been found.

4. Papers

Papers for the ExCom meeting/6/ will be distributed on Tuesday afternoon.

/6/See Documents 272 and 273.

Gordon Chase/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

271. Notes of President Kennedy's Remarks at the 508th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, January 22, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Meetings, 1963, No. 508, 1/22/63. No classification marking. A note at the top of the memorandum indicated it was drafted by a "CIA Reporter." McGeorge Bundy prepared a briefing memorandum, January 21, for the President for this meeting. (Ibid.) The portion of Bundy's memorandum on Cuba is in the Supplement.

Other memoranda of this meeting exist. One apparently by Bromley Smith, January 22, is *ibid*; another by Maxwell Taylor, January 22, is in National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Taylor's Memos for Record; a third, apparently by a Department of State official, is in Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/1-2263.

Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the National Security Council Tuesday, January 22, 1963

I will start by reviewing areas of policy which will be before us in the coming months and indicate the general attitude which I have toward them and to emphasize where we might put our emphasis in the next few months.

The responsibilities of the United States are worldwide and the U.S. is the only country which is recognizing its wide responsibilities. We are part of NATO, SEATO, etc. and support other pacts even though we are not a part of them. Other nations are not doing their share.

Would like to say a word first about Cuba.

The indications are that the importance of timing is of paramount importance in reaching judgments--both by the USSR and the US. Our big problem is to protect our interests and prevent a nuclear war. It was a very close thing whether we would engage in a quarantine or an air strike. In looking back, it was really that it presented us with an immediate crisis and the USSR had to make their judgment and come to a decision to act in twelve hours. In looking back over that four or five day period, we all changed our views somewhat, or at least appreciated the advantages and disadvantages of alternate courses of action. That is what we should do in any other struggle with the Soviet Union--and I believe we will be in one in the future. We should have sufficient time to consider the alternatives. You could see that the Russians had a good deal of debate in a 48 hour period. If they had only to act in an hour or two, their actions would have been spasmodic and might have resulted in

nuclear war. It is important that we have time to study their reaction. We should continue our policy even though we do not get Europe to go along with us.

The time will probably come when we will have to act again on Cuba. Cuba might be our response in some future situation--the same way the Russians have used Berlin. We may decide that Cuba might be a more satisfactory response than a nuclear response. We must be ready--although this might not come. We should be prepared to move on Cuba if it should be in our national interest. The planning by the US, by the Military, in the direction of our effort should be advanced always keeping Cuba in mind in the coming months and to be ready to move with all possible speed. We can use Cuba to limit their actions just as they have had Berlin to limit our actions.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

272. Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Cottrell) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, January 24, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.000/1-2463. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that this paper was prepared for the Executive Committee meeting of January 24, which was postponed to January 25, see Document 274.

SUBJECT

United States Policy Toward Cuba

There are submitted for your consideration two alternative statements of policy and related courses of action with respect to Cuba. Alternative I was prepared by the Department of State. Alternative II was prepared by the Department of Defense. The Coordinator's Recommendation that Alternative I be approved, and the Department of Defense non-concurrence, appear at the end of this paper.

Alternative I

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'.

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS)

by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose;

6. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS;

8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

9. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth below:

1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U.S. action could jeopardize their release.

2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days.) These orders:

a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

4. At the termination of the U.S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal

to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

6. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

7. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

8. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

9. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

a. Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba;

b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

Alternative II

United States Policy

1. Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba is the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

2. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension; erode its domestic political support; frustrate its subversive activities, negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

4. We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

5. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/Communist or Soviet forces.

6. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort.

8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of four point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of and participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U.S. will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the U.S. for "intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will depend how adroitly these actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and the courses of action under it may eventually become impossible to conceal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U.S. will not permit the maintenance of a Communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures of Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, U.S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be the loss of U.S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity.

Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

Coordinator's Recommendation

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

Statement of DOD Representative

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U.S. In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of that regime. The specific actions recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the policy recommended in Alternative II and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken in executing that policy. I recommend adoption of Alternative II.

273. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, January 24, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-2463. No classification marking.

SUBJECT

Papers for NSC Executive Committee Meeting, January 25 at 4:00 p.m.

Attached are two revised papers "Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations" and "United States Policy Toward Cuba" which are being transmitted to members of the NSC Executive Committee for consideration at the meeting of the Committee on Friday, January 25 at 4:00 p.m. Also attached is a new page 8 for the paper entitled "United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade."/1/ The other two papers transmitted on January 22 remain unchanged and will also be considered at the Friday meeting. They are: "United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States"/2/ and "Current Problems Concerning Cuba."/3/

/1/The memorandum on the Cuban Brigade is in the Supplement with the addition of the new page 8.

/2/Attached, but not printed.

/3/Not printed; see the Supplement.

CCW/4/

/4/These typed initials appear above Brubeck's typed signature.

Attachment 1

Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Cottrell) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

SUBJECT

Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations

1. U.S. Policy Objectives

The following should be the objectives of the U.S. with respect to Cuba:

- a. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
- b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
- c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
- d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;
- e. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
- f. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;
- g. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;
- h. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other Free World states, and especially from

states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;

i. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

j. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

2. Supporting Actions

Actions in support of these objectives and their time sequence are set forth in the attached paper entitled "U.S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade. Existing programs will be reviewed and further recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

a. intensified covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to return the 26 of July Movement to its original aims.

Note: It should be noted that approval of the foregoing actions may impair our ability to accomplish objective b. (removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because taking these actions could provide the U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3. Cuban Brigade

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members.

The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit and individual members urged to accept civilian training or to enlist in the existing U.S. military program for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter. Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided.

Attachment 2

Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Cottrell) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

SUBJECT

United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

[Here follows a list of objectives identical to that in Attachment 1.]

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:

a. Intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

2. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans.

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS 24 hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days.) These orders:

a. Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

c. Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

5. At the termination of the U.S. Chiefs of Mission Conference--January 28-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of ships of OAS member states from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings of internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economical measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations to Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military force. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

274. Summary Record of the 38th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. IV, 38-42. Top Secret; Sensitive. This record is part I; part II relates to European policy.

Prior to the arrival of the President, Secretary Rusk asked Ambassador Thompson to explain why he did not agree with the others on the Cuban paper under consideration./1/ Ambassador Thompson said the paper was aimed at Cuba and does not take into account some of our worldwide objectives. He thought we should act toward Cuba in such a way as not to provoke a reaction from the USSR, particularly during the current period when we are seeking to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty and when we do not yet know what will flow from the split between the Chinese Communists and the USSR. In addition, he said there still existed a possibility of a split between Castro and the Russians. He urged that we do nothing overtly which appeared to the Russians to be contrary to what we had agreed to do during the Cuba negotiations. The proposed shipping orders, he said, would cause the Russians more concern than any of the proposed courses of action listed in the paper. He feared that if we implemented the proposed shipping orders, we might delay the withdrawal of Soviet troops still in Cuba. He acknowledged that domestically the policy he was suggesting would be difficult but suggested that key Congressmen be told exactly what the situation is.

/1/Rusk is referring to the revised version of "U.S. Policy Towards Cuba," see attachment 2 to Document 273.

Director McCone doubted that the Soviets would remove their troops from Cuba and downgraded preliminary evidence, cited by Ambassador Thompson, which would indicate that the Russians might be planning to withdraw highly classified equipment from Cuba.

Ambassador Thompson acknowledged that the Cuban paper placed domestic considerations in opposition to foreign policy considerations and a policy aimed at Cuba against a policy toward the USSR.

Secretary Rusk doubted that the Russians would remove any more of their troops and said he believed we must assume that the forces there are going to stay. Therefore, he felt we should accept the actions listed in the Cuba paper because the risk of delaying Soviet troop withdrawal was not great. As to the shipping orders, he called attention to the fact that they would mean very little practically. Free World trade with Cuba has, in the period January 1 to January 19, practically ceased. He acknowledged that while many of our allies would take informal actions to block the use of their ships in the Cuba trade, these same allies would oppose us if we asked them to adopt a principle, i.e. an embargo, with which they disagreed. He said that in view of the President's press statement,² he felt we may have to issue the shipping orders to encounter serious domestic opposition.

Apparent reference to Kennedy's press conference of January 24, in which he admitted that "There are still approximately 16 or 17 thousand Russians there [Cuba], that the Soviets are continuing to operate the SAM sites and other technical pieces of equipment, and there are some organized units, the same organized units we've describe before, which are still on the territory of Cuba." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 93)²

The Secretary reported that even without the shipping orders, our economic pressures against Cuba are in fact tending to isolate Cuba economically. He preferred not to take on the task of persuading our allies to act formally to prevent Free World trade with Cuba when they appeared to be ready to block this trade by informal means. He felt that a decision had to be taken on whether the President's press conference statement required us to issue the orders even if they were not really necessary.

Secretary Ball said that serious problems would not arise until ships which had participated in the Cuba trade

came to U.S. ports and were refused admittance in compliance with the shipping orders.

The President joined the meeting.

Director McCone repeated his earlier view that there was little evidence to support a statement that the Russians were withdrawing their sophisticated equipment from Cuba. He cited numerous reports of internal disturbances in Cuba and added that Castro may be concerned by them. Referring to testimony he had given earlier in the day to a Senate Committee, Director McCone estimated that there is about twice as much Soviet equipment in Cuba as there had been prior to the Russian buildup. The largest increase in military equipment is in tanks.

The President said that Senator Keating was alleging that there is now in Cuba ten times as much equipment as there was. He asked how we made available to the press accurate statements of the Soviet increases in equipment.

Secretary Rusk praised the way in which Director McCone had handled the Senate Committee earlier in the day and then suggested that the State Department, the Defense Department, and the White House press heads reconstitute a group to be responsible for giving to the press current information on Soviet equipment in Cuba.

Mr. Bundy expressed his view that the Defense Department should be responsible for giving to the press information on the military situation in Cuba. He added that the Cuban Coordinator should know all the latest information in order to avoid giving to the press differing stories. (At the end of the meeting it was decided that Assistant Secretary of Defense Sylvester should have a man on his staff who would be the expert on the military situation in Cuba and constantly available to answer press queries. His work should be closely related to the Cuban Coordinator's work.)

Secretary Rusk reviewed for the President the earlier discussion on removal of Soviet troops.

The President asked whether Ambassador Thompson shouldn't raise with Dobrynin the question as to whether the Russians were going to remove additional troops from Cuba as had been suggested in one of the Khrushchev letters.

Secretary Rusk reviewed for the President the problem of the issuance of the shipping orders.

The President decided to postpone issuance of the orders. He did not think they should be issued while Donovan was negotiating with Castro on the release of the American prisoners in Cuba. He asked that we draw up a statement^{/3/} explaining why we were delaying the issuance of the orders, which would be released only if the press asked about the orders.

^{/3/}Not found.

Secretary Ball said that the only part of the shipping orders which were meaningful had to do with the shipment of U.S. property on vessels engaged in the Cuba trade. He said that no Executive Order was necessary to achieve this objective because the President could give guidance to the Department of Agriculture which would cover the largest amount involved, i.e. food shipments.

The President decided that there would be no public announcement but that the Department of Agriculture and other agencies should be directed to refrain from shipping U.S. products on ships engaged in the Cuba trade.^{/4/}

^{/4/}There were problems with this decision, see the January 30 memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 220) For the decision on shipping, see Document 277.

There followed a discussion of the dropping of propaganda leaflets from free traveling balloons. It appeared that no one was prepared to advocate the use of balloons. The President decided that balloons should not be used. In response to a question as to whether a balloon capability should be retained for use in an emergency, Acting Director Wilson stated that USIA would prefer to rely on airborne TV to meet an emergency.

Secretary Rusk explained the courses of action which he believed we should take in the OAS (see attached OAS paper).^{/5/} He acknowledged that the new actions proposed did risk a less than unanimous vote in the OAS.

^{/5/}See footnote 2, Document 273.

The President expressed his strong reservations to the course of action proposed. He did not see why we should change the existing OAS resolution. He did not wish to have Assistant Secretary Martin undertake a trip to Mexico, Chile and Brazil with his hat in his hand requesting support for an altered resolution.

Secretary Rusk said the practical effect of the recommended OAS resolution on trade would be very little because the Latin American states had very little trade with Cuba. However, OAS action would provide a basis upon which to ask NATO to place Cuba under COCOM rules.

Secretary Rusk said we were now seeing in Cuba the effect of our economic embargo. Director McCone agreed and said that the lack of spare parts for U.S. equipment in Cuba was seriously affecting the Cuban economy.

The President decided that Assistant Secretary Martin should go to Mexico on other business and incidentally find out the current Mexican position toward further OAS action against Cuba. Depending on the Mexican reaction, a decision could then be made as to whether he should proceed to Chile and Brazil. Only then should we decide whether further action in the OAS should be undertaken. The President did not wish us to undertake an effort which had little chance of succeeding. He asked for a statement as to what the effect would be if the OAS adopted the resolution we favored and if NATO agreed to place Cuba under COCOM rules.

Secretary Rusk concluded discussion of the OAS by calling attention to the fact that some OAS members felt that we should act more forcefully than we have so far done.

Mr. Cottrell summarized the recommendation covering our policy toward the Cuban brigade (see attached paper).^{/6/} He said no one favored continuing the brigade as a "hard core" and all favored a medium course of action.

^{/6/}See footnote 1, Document 273.

General Taylor expressed reservations about allowing members of the brigade, upon completion of their military training in the U.S. training camps, to become eligible for membership in a reserve unit. He was concerned that these reserve units would become political.

Mr. Bundy expressed his view that the proposed course of action would be difficult to sell to the brigade members.

The Attorney General explained his views in detail. He said some members should be sent to Latin America to lecture in Latin American universities or to engage in work with Latin American student groups; other members would choose to undergo military training while still others would want to return to civilian life, and, therefore, would be seeking jobs. He felt that some members could be usefully placed in special forces units assigned to Latin American countries. He felt that their firsthand experience with Communism could be used to great advantage in Latin American countries in explaining the threat of Communism.

The Attorney General said he had been told that most brigade members were opposed to Cardona, the present

head of the Cuban Revolutionary Committee. Many of them wanted to stay out of politics but wished to retain membership in a group which would be a symbol to those who would eventually rebuild Cuba. He said we should first talk to the brigade members and then draw up a program. He thought that the brigade members should be treated as equal partners, and that we should try to get their ideas rather than dictate to them. In order to avoid their turning hostile, he felt they must be treated properly and must have a sense of participation. We would get a great deal out of them if we handled them correctly. One way would be to tell them honestly that we cannot now invade Cuba and that they can fight Communism much more effectively in the present by undertaking tasks suggested to them in other Latin American countries, either as special forces members or as civilians in the academic field.

The Attorney General concluded by saying that the brigade members should participate in some way in planning our Cuban intelligence actions. He thought we would benefit by their ideas and suggestions. He urged that we not merely pick brigade members and use them as agents, instructed as what to do, but rather we should encourage them to take part in the selection of targets and methods of operation. He acknowledged that one reason why this had not so far been done was because of the reputation the Cubans had of being unable to keep a secret. He doubted that all Cubans could be accused of talking too much.

Mr. Cottrell expressed his doubt that the brigade members would be accepted by the 26 July group in Cuba which considered them to be mercenaries and untrustworthy.

Mr. McCone said he did not believe the brigade was discredited in Cuba. On the contrary, he said it was considered to be a brave group of Cuban patriots. He urged that we not destroy the value of the brigade but use it as an asset, preferably by working with individual brigade members.

Secretary McNamara, in response to a question, said there would be no difficulty in providing military training for those brigade members who wished to be trained. They would be trained with the 2200 Cubans now in camp.

The President decided that in the next two weeks we should find out from individual brigade members what each would prefer to do, i.e. take a civilian job, be given military training, go to Latin America in various capacities as scholars, lecturers, student leaders, etc., or become intelligence agents. The Army, CIA and Mr. Cottrell's office would work together, in consultation with the Attorney General. A decision as to whether there should be a brigade headquarters would be made later. The President expressed his hope that large numbers of the brigade members would choose to take military training.

Secretary Dillon referred to the basic objectives listed in the Cuban paper. He questioned objective number 5 which called for encouraging Castro to split with Moscow. He felt this objective was inconsistent with the objective of seeking the overthrow of Castro.

Mr. Bundy said this was a subordinate objective which should be kept in even though it was in some ways inconsistent with another objective.

The President said he did not think it was necessary to approve the general parts of the paper and summarized the specific actions which he had already approved.

There followed a discussion of the intelligence "objective" author-ized in paragraph 10 of the basic paper. The President expressed his strong view that we should not risk good men by sending them to Cuba to get information which was only of marginal use to us. He was reminded that the 5412 Special Group reviewed each plan to send intelligence teams into Cuba. The President said the Group should make a judgment in each case as to whether the danger of the loss of the team was worth the benefit to the U.S. derived from the information we would obtain. He said no intelligence officer should feel that he was required to send in the largest possible number of agents merely to satisfy an intelligence requirement.

Bromley Smith/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

275. Memorandum for the Files

Washington, January 26, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-2663. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. According to a covering memorandum from Cottrell to Rusk, January 28, Cottrell sent this memorandum to Rusk informing the Secretary that McCone had similar information. When shown that information, the President stated that it "looked interesting."

SUBJECT

Donovan's Meeting with Castro, January 25, 1963

The following are, according to Donovan, the significant results of subject meeting:

1. This was the most cordial and intimate meeting to date. Castro and Donovan with Cmte. Vallejo as interpreter spent most of the day together. (Vallejo is a physician who trained at Massachusetts General Hospital and was a Major in the U.S. Army. A 26th of July idealist, he has been very helpful to Donovan.) During an impromptu visit to a medical school, Castro led 300 medical students in chanting "Viva Donovan."
2. Castro agreed to release the imprisoned Americans, after a short "rehabilitation" period. He wanted to exchange Molina (imprisoned for accidental shooting of a Venezuelan child in a New York restaurant) and the three Cubans involved in the UN incident. Castro also indicated that a little more of the commodities due for the Brigade exchange should first be shipped. Castro said he would turn the Americans over to Donovan only, rather than to the Swiss, and would so inform the Swiss Ambassador that evening at a reception.
3. Castro agreed to reply within a short time to the PAA proposal (transmitted by Donovan) for ten flights a week on a payment basis of 50 percent in dollars and 50 percent in pesos.
4. Castro seemed receptive to the Donovan suggestion that in view of Cuban-Chinese friendship Castro might be helpful in obtaining the release of Americans imprisoned in China.
5. Donovan told Castro his difficulties lay in his dependence upon the Soviets. Castro only grunted in reply.
6. At Donovan's suggestion, Castro agreed to review the cases of some Cuban political prisoners, but pointed out in irritation that if they were released, they would only attempt to return and cause trouble as CIA agents. Castro also was irritated over the U.S. press story that crutches had been taken from an invalid girl as she boarded the Shirley Lykes. He called the story untrue.
7. Donovan and Vallejo agreed to communicate with one another by telephone regarding any matters of importance relating to their conversation.
8. At the airport just before Donovan's departure, Vallejo broached the subject of re-establishing diplomatic relations with the U.S.
9. Castro warmly re-issued the invitation that Donovan return to Cuba with his wife for a week or so (possibly the first week in March). Castro indicated he wished to talk at length with Donovan about the future of Cuba and international relations in general.

Note: The two high level Red Cross officials who spent two days last week in Havana with the Cuban Red Cross found the latter's cooperation and hospitality remarkably good. Upon their departure Cervantes, head of the Cuban Red Cross, expressed the hope that the cooperation between the two humanitarian organizations presaged improved relations between the governments.

Robert A. Hurwitch

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